Financial Conduct Authority v. Arch Insurance (UK) and Others [2021] UKSC 1
This was a test case brought by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) on behalf of holders of business interruption policies. During the spring national lock-down (in 2020), businesses which held such policies made claims from their insurers but most of these claims were denied on the premise that the wording used in such policies was not broad enough to provide indemnity to the policy holders. In particular, the focus turned on business interruption policies that provided cover for infectious and notifiable diseases (disease clauses) and prevention of access and public authority clauses and restrictions (prevention of access clauses). The FCA selected a representative sample of 21 types of policies issued by eight insurers for the test case. It is believed that the outcome of the case could be relevant for 370,000 businesses holding similar policies issued by 60 different insurers. The High Court delivered its judgment on 15 September [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) mainly in favour of the assureds. Using leapfrog appeal procedure, the FCA and six insurers appealed to the Supreme Court composed of Lords Reed, Hodge, Briggs, Hamblen and Leggatt.
The judgment of the Supreme Court is very technical and lengthy (112 pages) but is no doubt a great victory for holders of such policies. The analysis below will focus on the key points made by the Supreme Court.
Disease Clauses
When a business interruption policy provides cover for losses emerging from “any occurrence of a Notifiable Disease within a radius of 25 miles of the premises” what does that exactly mean? Does it mean that cover is available for business interruption losses as long as it could be shown that they resulted from the occurrence of the disease within the radius? Or does the clause provide cover as long as there is one case of illness caused by the disease within that radius? Naturally, the former construction would restrict the limit of cover as in most cases it would be impossible to show that the losses resulted from the localised occurrence of the disease as opposed to the wider pandemic and government restrictions generally. The High Court went along with the latter construction which the Supreme Court was prepared to accept with a slightly different reasoning. The Supreme Court by making reference to the wording of the clause, especially the emphasis in the clause on “any occurrence of a Notifiable disease”, indicated that the wording of the clause is adequate to provide cover for the business interruption caused by any cases of illness resulting from Covid-19 that occur within 25 miles of the business premises.
Prevention of Access
It has been stressed that such clauses generally provide cover for business interruption losses resulting from public policy intervention preventing access to or use of the insured premises. A legal deliberation was necessary to determine the nature of public policy intervention required to trigger such clauses. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s analysis on this point to the effect that “restrictions imposed” by a public authority should be understood as ordinarily meaning mandatory measures “imposed” by the authority pursuant to its statutory or other legal powers and the word “imposed” connotes compulsion and a public authority generally exercises compulsion through the use of such powers. On that premise, Prime Minister’s instructions in a public statement of 20 March 2020 to named businesses to close was capable of being a “restriction imposed” regardless of whether it was legally capable of being enforced as it was a clear, mandatory instruction given on behalf of the UK government.
In some hybrid policies a different wording is used such as “inability to use” or “prevention of access” or “interruption”. The Supreme Court was inclined to construe such wordings broadly. For example, in policies where the insurance provides cover when there is “inability to use” the premises, the Supreme Court was adamant that the requirement is satisfied either if the policyholder is unable to use the premises for a discrete part of its business activities or it is unable to use a discrete part of its premises for its business activities as in both of these situations there is a complete inability to use. This construction opens the door for businesses in hospitality sector which can do only take-away meals for the loss of their in-person business. Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected insurers’ argument that the hybrid policy that refer to “interruption” implies a “stop” or “break” to the business as distinct from an interference, holding that the ordinary meaning of “interruption” is capable of encompassing interference or disruption which does not bring about a complete cessation of business activities, and which may even be slight.
Causation Issue
Insurers argued that traditional causation test applied in insurance law should not be adopted as the appropriate test in the context of construing relevant provisions of business interruption policies. Instead, it was argued, that is should be necessary to show, at a minimum, that the loss would not have been sustained “but for” the occurrence of the insured peril. In their view, it was necessary for the business to show that the insured peril had operated to cause the loss; otherwise due to the widespread nature of the pandemic it would be very easy for holders of such policies to show business interruption losses even if the insured risk had not occurred. The obvious objective for developing this contention was to limit the scope of cover provided by such policies as otherwise (if the traditional causation rules were to apply in this context) businesses operating in locations which have no or few cases of the illness could still recover under the policy even though the loss in those instances is caused by disruption occurring outside the radius (or nationally).
In developing their argument, insurers relied heavily on the decision in Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni General SpA [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm); [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 531. In that case, the claim was for business interruption losses caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The insured premises in question were a hotel in New Orleans. There was no dispute that the insured property suffered physical damage as a result of the hurricanes. When it came to the business interruption losses, however, insurers in Orient-Express case successfully argued that there was no cover because, even if the hotel had not been damaged, the devastation to the area around the hotel caused by the hurricanes was such that the business interruption losses would have been suffered in any event. Accordingly, the necessary causal test for the business interruption losses could not be met because the insured peril was the damage alone, and the event which caused the insured physical damage (the hurricanes) could be set up as a competing cause of the business interruption. The High Court chose to distinguish Orient Express from the current litigation on matters of construction. The Supreme Court went further and decided that Orient-Express was wrongly decided and should be overruled. Analysing the facts of Orient-Express case the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that business interruption loss arose there because both as a result of damage to the hotel and also damage to the surrounding area as a result of hurricanes. Therefore, there two concurrent causes were in operation, each of which was by itself sufficient to cause the relevant business interruption but neither of which satisfied the “but for” test because of the existence of the other. In such a case when both the insured peril and the uninsured peril which operates concurrently with it arise from the same underlying fortuity (i.e. the hurricanes), then provided that damage proximately caused by the uninsured peril (i.e. damage to the rest of the city) is not excluded, loss resulting from both causes operating concurrently is covered.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected insurers’ argument, holding that the “but for” test was not determinative in ascertaining whether the test for causation has been satisfied under the insuring clauses analysed as part of the test case. The traditional principles of causation should, therefore, be applied. The Supreme Court on this point concluded at [191]
“there is nothing in principle or in the concept of causation which precludes an insured peril that in combination with many other similar uninsured events brings about a loss with a sufficient degree of inevitability from being regarded as a cause – indeed as a proximate cause – of the loss, even if the occurrence of the insured peril is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about the loss by itself.”
Applying the traditional proximity test, essentially enables business to recover under such policies simply by proving a link between the local occurrences and the national reaction even if the “but for test” is not satisfied.
Some Further Remarks
The judgment is legally binding on the eight insurers that agree to be parties to the test case but it provides guidance for the interpretation of similar policy wordings and claims. However, it should not be ignored that there are still many policy wordings not tested or considered by this decision. There is no doubt that the decision is welcomed by businesses that have been adversely affected from the global pandemic and have failed to rely on their business interruption policies. Was this a case simply concerning construction of certain insurance contracts or other considerations (i.e. impact of the pandemic on social and economic life) played a significant role? The answer is probably the latter even though insurers throughout the litigation maintained that “one simply should not be allowed to rewrite an insurance contact to expand the scope of the indemnity”. But isn’t this the nature of test cases, i.e. judges are usually required to pass moral, ethical judgments on an issue that has significant implications on a part of the society? The global pandemic had significant implications on our lives and economy and at times like this it is inevitable that a judgment needs to be made as to where the economic loss resulting from the pandemic should fall. This is what the UK Supreme Court did here!
