Alicia McKenzie

Cyber warfare: Are you protected?

Beware of the war exclusions!

Following the Lloyds Performance Management Supplemental Requirements & Guidance, published July 2020, all insurance and reinsurance policies written at Lloyd’s must exclude all losses caused by war and nuclear, chemical, biological or radioactive risks (NCBR), except in limited circumstances.[1] This reinforces the exclusion of war and NCBR in hull and cargo and most cyber policies. Both cyber security data and privacy breach (CY) and cyber security property damage (CZ)[2] polices are among the exempted class of business which would be allowed to write war risks. However, when writing these cyber policies, the terms and scope of the cover must be unambiguously stated. If there is an extension of the policy to include war, that extension must not override any NCBR exclusions contained within the cyber policy. It is customary to follow local law or regulation on how coverage should be provided for in policy documentation and for the exempted classes of business, it is recommended to follow local market practice. In light of these guidelines several war exclusions in varying degree of liability were developed to be endorsed on or attached to commercial cyber policies. It is not yet clear if the same clauses are or will become applicable to non cyber policies but the discussion is relevant considering current geopolitical conflicts and imminent threats to businesses and states.

The exclusions (LMA5564, LMA5565, LMA5566, LMA5567)[3] are very similar in terms of the language used and excludes loss of any kind directly or indirectly occasioned by, happening through or in consequence of war or a cyber operation. The burden is on the insurer to prove that the exclusion applies. An obvious difference is the causal language used in each clause. ‘Happening through’ is not language commonly used in the marine sector, as such its meaning and what needs to be established to fulfil this causal effect requires clarification. Clauses 3-5 of each exclusion refer to the attribution of a cyber operation to a state and the definition of war and cyber operation are both related to the acts of a state against another state. War is defined as the ‘use of physical force by a state against another state’ thus excluding cyber incidents / attacks which may have the same effect but without physical use of force and not by a state against another state. Cyber operations means ‘the use of computer system by or on behalf of a state to disrupt, deny, degrade, manipulate or destroy information in a computer systems of another state’.[4] The emphasis on ‘states’ means that the exclusion would not be applicable to private acts of civilians who are not acting on behalf of their government or another state. Furthermore it is doubtful whether cyber operation would extend to the damage loss of cargo, vessel or financial losses since the subject of a cyber operation is the ‘information in a computer system’.

In attributing cyber operation to a state, the primary but not exclusive determinant is whether the government of the state in which the computer system affected is physically located has attributed the cyber operations to another state or those acting on its behalf. Pending a decision, the insurer may rely on an inference which is objectively reasonable as to attribution of the cyber operation but no loss shall be paid during this time. If the government of the state in which the affected computer system is located takes too long to decide, or is unable to declare or does not determine attribution, the responsibility shifts to the insurer to determine attribution by using other evidence available to it. There are several problems with the terms of LMA5564, there is no explanation of the type and source of information the insurers should rely on to develop an inference and what will qualify as objectively reasonable and importantly who will sit as ‘objective person’. Furthermore, the reference to the insurer using ‘such other evidence as is available’ suggest that the insurer is permitted to rely on any source, type / quality of evidence available that will support his position that the exclusion does apply. In other words, the acceptable standard of evidence to support the insurer’s ‘inference’ and to discharge his burden that the exclusion does apply is low and therefore prejudicial to the assured.

The second war, cyber war and cyber operation exclusion (LMA5565) differs from LMA5564 in that LMA5565 clause 1.1 to 1.3 list the conditions under which war and cyber operations are excluded. These are war or cyber operation carried out in the course of war and or retaliatory cyber operations between any specified state (China, France, Germany, Japan, UK or USA) and or a cyber operation that has a detrimental impact on the functioning of the state due to the direct or indirect effect of the cyber operation on the availability, integrity or delivery of an essential service in that state and or the security or defence of a state. Clause 3 introduces the agreed limits recoverable in relation to loss arising out of one cyber operation and a second limit for the aggregate for the period of insurance. If the limits are not specified, there will be no coverage for any loss arising from a cyber operation. Noteworthy is the fact that similar limits have not been introduced for loss arising from a war or cyber war, so the limit would be based on the insured value of the subject matter insured. The definition of essential service creates uncertainty because what is categorised as ‘essential for the maintenance of vital functions of a state’ may vary across states. While examples are provided which includes financial, health or utility services, unless the parties stipulate and restrict this category to only the services named in the policy, there is potential contention between the parties over what will qualify as an essential service and what is a vital function to a state. It is expected that the marine sector will be among the list of essential services, however it is unlikely that an attack on a commercial private vessel or onshore facilities would qualify as harm to an essential service, vital for function of the state.

A third form of the war, cyber war and cyber operations exclusion LMA5566 is identical to LMA5565 except that there is no equivalent to the clause on limits of liability for each cyber operation or aggregate loss in LMA5566. The fourth form of exclusion LMA5567 expounds on the conditions mentioned in LMA5565 and LMA55666, particularly the exclusion or loss from retaliatory cyber operations between any of the specified states leading to two or more of those states becoming impacted states. The exclusion of cyber operation that has a major impact an essential service or the security of defence of a state shall not apply to the direct or indirect effect of a cyber operation on a bystanding cyber asset. LMA5567 introduces the concepts of impacted states and bystanding asset, thus expanding the effect of the exclusion clause. Impacted states means any state where the cyber operation has had a detrimental impact on the functioning of that state due to its effect on essential services and or the security or defence of that state. The bystanding cyber assets are computer systems used by the insured or its third party provider that is not located in the impacted state but is affected by the cyber operation. As an exemption to the exclusion, the consequence is that the insurer will be exposed to liability for loss to assets that are not owned by the insured or its third party providers. The only requirement being that these bystanding cyber assets / computer systems are used by the insured or its third party providers which could be an extensive list of unidentified assets and liabilities. Another problem with the definition of bystanding cyber asset is it does not declare for what purpose the said asset should be used by the insured or by the third party provider. The presumption is the use should be related to the subject matter / business of the insured but without clarification, there are doubts about the scope and limits of the term. Interestingly and of concern is the use of the words ‘cyber war’ in the title of each exclusion but is not repeated in any of the four clauses nor is there a description of the meaning of a cyber war and how it differs from a cyber operation and war as defined in the clauses.

A guidance on the correct interpretation of the exclusion clauses was not published and given their deficiencies, the effectiveness of each exclusion clause is reduced. In terms of their application to marine activities, the insurer will find that he is liable to indemnify the assured for his loss from cyber-attack unless there is evidence to attribute the cyber act to a state. The exclusions will be more effective in scenarios where terrorist or political groups are involved. War is limited to acts between states and significant emphasis is placed on damage to essential services of a state. Despite the deficiencies discussed above, the importance and take up of any variation of the exclusion clause will increase as the political security of nation states and businesses continue to be of concern to insurers. The constant threats and warning in the news of cyber-attacks being used as weapons of war will affect market response and which will sometimes be reflected in strictness of language / variations of the war exclusions used in insurance policies. Other stakeholders must be proactive and ensure that they have adequate insurance protection against cyber war risks and war risks generally and mitigate their risks of loss by implementing and maintaining good cyber hygiene based on industry specific best practices.

[1] Lloyd’s, ‘Performance Management – Supplemental Requirements & Guidance’ (July 2020) 41 <https://assets.lloyds.com/assets/performance-management-supplemental-requirements-and-guidance-july-2020highlighted/1/Performance%20Management%20Supplemental%20Requirements%20and%20Guidance%20July%202020Highlighted.pdf> accessed 22 March 2022. War and NCBR policies can only be provided where: the exclusion of war is prohibited by local legal or regulatory requirements but this is not inclusive of the writing non-compulsory war risks; where the type of business is within the exempted class and where the syndicates have the express agreement from Lloyds through business planning process.

[2] Lloyd’s, ‘Cyber Risks & Exposures : Market Bulletin Ref : Y4842’ (25 November 2014)

<https://assets.lloyds.com/assets/y4842/1/Y4842.pdf > accessed 22 March 2022.

[3] LMA, ‘Cyber War and Cyber Operation Exclusion Clauses’ (LMA21-042-PD, 25 November 2021)

<https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/News/LMA_bulletins/LMA_Bulletins/LMA21-042-PD.aspx> accessed 22 March 2022.

[4] Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Use of Force’ in Tallin Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations ( 2^nd edition Cambridge University Press 2017)The Tallin Manual is nonbinding legal source which explains how international law applies to cyber operations. It is in the process of a five (5) year review for the launch of Tallinn Manual 3.0.

Cryptocurrencies and Ransomwares – Are they Recoverable?

Cyber criminals have been exploiting the ‘privacy’ features of crypto-assets to target businesses and individual accounts to steal and unlawfully demand the transfer of crypto-currencies through ransomware attacks. In addition to the distinctive features of cryptocurrencies which gives cyber criminals a false sense of anonymity, the rapid rise in cryptocurrency fraud and ransomwares are also the product of very lax or non-existent international regulation. In 2020, 57.9% of the organizations in the UK and 78.5% in the USA were affected by a ransomware.[1] The targets of major ransomware attacks in 2021 included Colonial Pipeline and JBS meat processing in the US, Health Services Executive in Ireland and Hackney Borough Council in England. The business types targeted is an indication of the threat to critical national infrastructure. Some ransom demands are made in fiat currency while others are in cryptocurrencies. The average ransom paid by medium sized organizations was US$170,404 and the average costs to rectify and respond to a ransomware was US$1.85 million.[2]

International and Government Response

Prior to the creation of the Ransomware Task Force in December 2020[3], there was no coordinated effort among states and the private and public sector to tackle the serious and growing threat from ransomware attacks.

Equally problematic is the lack of clarity on the legality of paying ransom / ransomware demands.

England and Wales

The payment of a ransom is not illegal in England and Wales provided they are not paid to or have any association with terrorist groups (s. 15 (3) Terrorism Act 2000), persons subject to economic sanctions or used to finance a criminal act[4] and there is nothing illegal about the contracts between the parties.[5] The National Cyber Security Centre in their guidance on mitigating malware and ransomware attacks emphasised that law enforcement does not encourage, endorse or condone the payment of ransom demands.[6]

United States of America

The US has not outlawed the payment of ransoms but have issued an advisory on potential sanctions risks for facilitating ransomware payments.[7] The advisory warned that companies including insurance firms, financial institutions and those specialising in digital forensics and incident response that facilitates the payment of ransom may risk breaching OFAC[8] Regulations. These companies are encouraged to contact the relevant government agencies if they reasonably believe that the person making the ransom demand may be sanctioned or in connection with sanctioned individual or entity.

France has unofficially declared their refusal to pay ransomware demands. Consequently, AXA insurers in France announced they would temporarily halt writing cyber insurance with a clause to indemnify customers for ransom paid.[9]

Efforts to recover cryptocurrency?

Seizure / Recovery of cryptocurrency

Bitfinex: The authorities in the US have been able to successfully trace and recover crypto-assets stolen or paid for ransom. The most recent is US$5bn worth of stolen bitcoin seized by the US Department of Justice reported on Tuesday (08/02/2022).[10] The bitcoin was stolen in 2016 after hackers breached the Bitfinex cryptocurrency exchange. The money was then transferred to digital wallets said to be operated by a couple in New York. At the time, the bitcoin valued about US$71 million but its current value is upwards US$5 billion. Various methods were employed by the couple to launder about US$25, 000 of the bitcoins. The couple will be charged for federal crimes of conspiracy to defraud the US and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

The length of the probe (5yrs) and the coordinated efforts of investigators from across the U.S and Germany highlights the resources governments and private investigators are willing to invest to ensure cyber criminals are not allowed to steal and launder cryptocurrencies gained unlawfully.

Colonial Pipeline: The authorities were also able to recover some of the cryptocurrencies paid as ransom by Colonial Pipeline Company following a ransomware attack in 2021. Colonial paid the cyber-criminals US$4.4 million in cryptocurrency to release the system, which they made a claim to recover from their cyber insurers. The U.S authorities recover US$2.3 million of the ransom.[11]

Injunctions

AA v Unknown and others[12] :The claimants were UK insurers whose customer, a Canadian insurance company computer system was hacked and encrypted. A ransom demands of US$950,000 in bitcoins to a specific address was made by the hackers. The Claimants agreed to pay the ransom. Some of the money was transferred into fiat currency while 96 bitcoin was sent to an address linked to an exchange operated by the 3^rd and 4^th defendants. The first Defendant was the persons unknown who made the demand. The second Defendant was the owner / controller of the 96 Bitcoins. The insurers retained the services of an incident response company that specialises in the negotiation of crypto currency ransom payments to negotiate with the hackers to regain access to the customer’s data and systems. The ransom was paid but further investigations were carried out by the insurers with the assistance of Chainalysis Inc, a blockchain investigations company who also provides software to track the payment of cryptocurrency.[13] The investigations successfully revealed the location of the Bitcoins, 96 of which was found at an address operated by the 3^rd and 4^th Defendants while some was transferred to a fiat currency account. The insurers successfully made an application to the High Court for a proprietary injunction over the cryptocurrency. It was held by the court that cryptocurrencies are ‘property’ and could be the subject of a proprietary injunction as they met the four criteria of property; ‘being definable, being identifiable by third parties, capable in their nature of assumption by third parties and having some degree of permanence’.[14] The decision was an adoption of points presented in the Legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts by the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce.[15]

ION Science Ltd v Persons Unknown and others[16]: The case concerned the fraudulent inducement of the claimants to make an investment equivalent to 64.35 bitcoin and pay for commission to receive profits from the said investment. The company referred by the Respondent was operating without Swiss authorisation. The bitcoins were transferred to two cryptocurrency exchanges each located in the US and Cayman Islands. The court granted orders against the first Respondent (Persons Unknown) in the form of a proprietary injunction, a worldwide freezing order and an ancillary disclosure against persons unknown. There was also a Bankers Trust order which could be served on two cryptocurrency exchanges outside of the Jurisdiction.

Remarks: These cases are examples of the instances where cyber-criminal are held responsible for the theft of or laundering of cryptocurrencies. Cyber criminals are subject to the application of money laundering and Terrorism. Crypto-assets illegally acquired can be the subject of an injunction, a worldwide freezing order and seized even if the investigation takes years to complete. Cyber insurance and incident response companies do have an obligation to ensure they are not facilitating the payment of ransoms to terrorists, sanctioned person or governments and their affiliates. The abovementioned orders are methods victims of a cryptocurrency fraud or ransomware attack can use in their effort to recover their crypto-assets. However while these methods have been successful for traceable currencies (Bitcoins and Ethereum), the same may not be very effective to recover non-traceable cryptocurrencies (Monero).

[1] CyberEdge, ‘2021 Cyberthreat Defense Report’ (2021), 23 < (1) New Messages! (imperva.com)> accessed 09 February 2022.

[2] SOPHOS, ‘ The State of Ransomware 2021’ (April 2021) < sophos-state-of-ransomware-2021-wp.pdf> accessed 09 February 2022.

[3] Institute for Security and Technology, ‘Combating Ransomware A comprehensive Framework for Action: Key Recommendations from the Ransomware Task Force’ (Ransomware Task Force, 2021) < Combating Ransomware – A Comprehensive Framework for Action: Key Recommendations from the Ransomware Task Force (securityandtechnology.org)> accessed 09 February 2022.

[4] Serious Crime Act 2007, ss 45- 46.

[5] Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 630 CA

[6] NCSC, ‘Guidance: Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks’ ( Version 3.0, 09 September 2021) < Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks – NCSC.GOV.UK> accessed 07 February 2022.

[7] The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office, ‘ Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments’ (OFAC, 01 October 2020) < *ofac_ransomware_advisory_10012020_1.pdf (treasury.gov)> accessed 09 February 2022.

[8] The U.S Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

[9] Frank Bajak, ‘ Insurer AXA halts ransomware crime reimbursement in France’ (AP News, 06 May 2021) < Insurer AXA halts ransomware crime reimbursement in France | AP News> accessed 07 February 2022.

[10] BBC News, ‘ Record-high seizure of $5bn in stolen Bitcoin’ (08 February 2022) < Record-high seizure of $5bn in stolen Bitcoin – BBC News> accessed 08 February 2022.

[11] Josephine Wolff, ‘ As Ransomware Demands Boom, Insurance Companies Keep Paying Out’ (Wired, 12 June 2021) < As Ransomware Demands Boom, Insurance Companies Keep Paying Out | WIRED> accessed 09 February 2021.

[12] [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm); [2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 704.

[13] [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm); [2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 704, paras [12-13] per Bryan J.

[14] [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm); [2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 704, paras [55-61] per Bryan J; National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] 2 All ER 472, 494 per Lord Wilberforce.

[15] UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, ‘ Legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts’ (November 2019) <The LawtechUK Panel (technation.io)> accessed 05 February 2022, paras 15 and 71- 85.

[16] (unreported, 21 December 2020).

Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK and other cases [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB)

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Issue: Whether tenants of commercial premises remain responsible to pay their rents despite the enforced closure or inability to trade from their premises because of COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations?

The Claimant (Landlord) requested a summary judgment (CPR 14.2) to be made against the Defendants (tenants) for the rent of three (3) commercial premises that became due during the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenants are Cine-UK Limited (Cine-UK), Mecca Bingo Ltd and Sports Direct.com Retail Ltd. The landlords are Bank of New York Mellon (BNY / Superior landlords) and AEW respectively. The annual rent to be paid in advance by quarterly instalments on the usual days. The tenants claimed that the COVID-19 Regulations meant that public access was restricted to their business premises which eventually led to their closure for substantial periods. As a result, the tenants claim that they did not have to pay all or parts of the rent. The tenants believe they have a real prospect of defending the Claims based on the following reasons: the rent cesser clauses should be construed or be implied so that at least whilst the businesses are closed because of COVID -19 and COVID-19 Regulations and on the assumption that the landlords have insurance, they do not need to pay rent. Alternatively, the landlord is to recover the rent by their insurance. Even if the rent cesser clause did not have such effect by construction or implication, a similar effect could be achieved from suspensory frustration or an application of principles of supervening event in terms of illegality and or the doctrine of temporary failure of consideration. Finally, such effect could be achieved by an application of Government guidance requiring negotiations and ameliorative measures between landlords and tenants as it relates to the payment of rent during the pandemic.

The landlords’ position is this is a matter of allocation of risk in relation to events that were foreseeable and for which the tenants should have negotiated a cesser clause. They argue that the insurance may cover some liabilities to the landlord but does not extend to covering loss or rent where there are no relevant rent cessation provisions in the leases and the relevant tenants can pay. Therefore, the rent including the value added tax (VAT) and interest continue to fall due despite the COVID-19 Regulations and its effects.

Mecca Bingo and Sports Direct had additional claims concerning mistaken payments and miscalculations which they are seeking to recover, however the details of such claims will not be addressed herein.

Lease Agreements

The leases are written in a standard commercial form, for a defined number of years and after 18 months of closure, the Cine -UK lease would have 12.5 years to run or 2.5 years if the break clause were to be exercised, The Mecca and Sports Direct leases would have another 11 years to run.[1] There were provisions made in each lease for the insurance of specific events including against property loss or damage by insured risks. Equally relevant is the presence of a rent cesser clause in each lease where the property has been destroyed or damaged or access to it denied or the property is unfit for occupation and provided the insurance is not vitiated or payment of insurance monies is not refused as a result of the act or default of the tenant.[2] There is also an extension of cover clause for ‘Murder Suicide or Disease’[3] where insurers agree to indemnify the insured for loss of rent resulting from interruption of the business during the indemnity period following any human infectious or contagious disease manifested by any person whilst in the premises or within a 25 mile radius of it.

Issues: Construction of Rent Cesser Clauses

The landlords submit that the rent cesser clause would operate to only suspend rent where the insured risks have caused physical damage or destruction which prevents the premises from being fit for occupation or use. Conversely, the tenants maintain that the word “physical” was not used, thus they propose that what has happened is damage or destruction even though not of a physical nature. Even if destruction must be physical, damage which is used as an alternative to destruction, need not be.

Master Dagnall held that the usual meaning of the word damage relates to a physical state. The tenants referred to Halbury’s Law[4] definition of “damage” which had a wider meaning representing ‘any disadvantage suffered by a person as a result of the act or default of another…’, however “damage” as used in that context was based on the law of “damages” and not the lease of a property. Additionally, ‘damage or damaged’ was used as an alternative to destruction thus there must be a link to a physical item. Whereas the words ‘damage or damaged’ could apply to nonphysical events, it is imperative that the context in which the words are used is analysed. Throughout the agreement, ‘damage or damaged’ is used with or surrounded by words which connote a physical state for example ‘reinstatement work or physical remediation.’[5]. In any event, ‘it will be a stretch of the definition of the words “damage or damaged” if it should include nonphysical disadvantage as suggested by the tenants.’[6] Master Dagnall reasoned this would ‘introduce a modern colloquial meaning into standard form documents’[7].

The rent cesser clause is subject to the requirement that the inability to use the premises must be caused by physical damage or destruction and not a mere inability to use the premises without more. The real subject of the insurance is the property of the landlord, that is the ‘brick and mortar’, in other words the physical property rather than the ‘effects on the trade’.[8] Accordingly, the rent cesser clause will operate where the closure to the insured property is due to physical damage or destruction, it is not sufficient for it to be in consequence of closure without physical damage or destruction.[9] In concluding on this issue, the court agreed with the landlords’ that the rent cesser clause is only triggered by physical damage or destruction to the insured premises. This is also the natural meaning of the words ‘damage or damaged’ used on their own or in the context of the agreement.[10] Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with a possible commercial purpose and in line with the ‘brick and mortar’ aspects of the provisions.

Implication of the Rent Cesser Clauses

Master Dagnall acknowledged that it would be fair and reasonable to imply the rent cesser clause as proposed by the tenants. Yet, it might be prejudicial to the insurers who may not have contemplated this liability when they agreed the premium even though it is their responsibility to consider both the expressed and implied terms of the relevant lease.[11]

There is no warranty in the leases that the premises can always be utilised for its permitted use but the obligation to pay the rent remains unless the parties agree otherwise. Moreover, if the parties intended for the rent cesser clause to operate where there is nonphysical damage, the parties should have expressly provided for this in the agreement. As such, the court agreed with the landlords’ that the lease sets out all the circumstances under which the rent cesser clause would apply including where an insured peril has occurred. Even though COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations may be unprecedented, in respect of SARS and the consequent fears, it is not convincing that COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations were unforeseeable.[12] The case is not fit for an ‘Aberdeeen implication’, because it is not clear what both parties would have intended if they were notified of the potential of and had considered COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations.[13] Based on the foregoing, Master Dagnell concluded that the tests for implication of the rent cesser clause proposed by the tenants was not met, therefore they do not have any real prospect of success for summary judgement on this issue.

Tenants’ reliance on the Insurance

Master Dagnall agreed with the landlords that the insurance policies do not compel the insurers to pay the landlords the outstanding rent where the rent cesser clause does not operate.[14] The court’s decision is influenced by the following points[15]:

Without the operation of the rent cesser clause (no physical damage), the landlords who are the insured have not suffered any loss of rent.
The landlords’ construction was in accordance with policy wording, particularly ‘the Murder, Suicide or Disease extension’. The policy provides that the insurer will indemnify for the loss of rent, which has not occurred. The loss to the landlords must have been due to the interruption of the landlords’ businesses which in the circumstances have also not occurred. If the premises were vacant and could not be leased due to COVID-19, that could have been reasoned differently but those were not the facts before the court.
Even if damage could be extended to nonphysical loss, the other requirement mentioned in i. and ii. above must be satisfied.
The commercial purpose of the insurance taken out by the landlords is to insure against the operation of the rent cesser clause which would have been a loss to them. If the tenants wanted to be protected in these circumstances, they would need to negotiate a wider rent cesser clause or alternatively purchase a separate business interruption insurance policy.
The Mark Rowlands v Bermi[16] and Frasca-Judd v Golovina[17]. line of authority[18] relied on by the tenants was not accepted as directly on point. They are not concerned about what is covered by the insurance but with whether the insurance as it exists can be extended to protect the interests and loss of the tenants. Rather than being concerned about the liability for rent, it is concerned about the liability for remediation costs.
Any suggestion that a clause be implied into the insurance policy that rent would be covered in the absence of a rent cesser clause cannot be accepted as either obvious or necessary for business efficacy. The insurance policy is well drafted and contains clauses specifically detailing the allocation of risks. Furthermore, the insurance is chiefly to protect the landlords against loss and to imply such a clause would be in contract with rules of implication.

Interpretation of the Insurance Provisions

Another point raised by the tenants is the breach of the insurance contract by the landlords who sought insurance coverage against COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations but not the sums equivalent to rent that would be loss from the closure or inability to use their premises. Additionally, the tenants insist that since they pay the premium for the insurance, they have the right to benefit from the insurance through cover for the rent.[19] The leases define COVID-19 and other diseases and Basic Rent as an ‘Insured Risk’ as such the tenants reasoned that since they pay for the insurance, it makes sense that when there are resultant closures, the insurer will pay for the rent or its equivalent. The landlords disagreed. They are of the view that this issue is governed by the rent cesser clause which describes when rent is payable following an insured risks which will eventually determine when the insurance covers the rent.[20]

Master Dagnall agreed with the Landlords ‘that the inclusion of something as an insured risk does not mean the landlord must include a clause in the insurance for the insurer to pay three (3) years of rent if the insured risk occurs and cause the closure of or prevented the permitted use of the premises.’[21] The fact that the tenants indirectly pay for the insurance does not mean the insurance must be tailored to benefit the tenants as suggested by implying such a term. The court also dismissed the notion that the implied term was required to give the lease business efficacy. The lease works well without the implied term. It provides for insurance against rent where a rent cesser clause applies in some instances and not in others. The tenants could have insured themselves against this risk by purchasing a separate and more appropriate insurance policy.

Frustration

Some of the tenants (Sports Direct, Mecca and Cine – UK) argued that there was a temporary frustration of their lease during the periods of lockdown hence rent not being payable during those periods. The landlords countered by stating there has been no frustration since ‘temporary frustration’ does not exist in law. Master Dagnall considered and applied National Carriers v Panalpina[22] and The Sea Angel[23]and held that the principle of frustration does apply to leases. Closure of the premises due to events outside the control of the parties is a supervening event, thus being capable of causing frustration of the lease but only on rare occasions. The relevant question is whether ‘the situation has become so radically different that the present situation is outside what was the reasonable contemplation of the parties so as it to render it unjust for the contract to continue?’[24]

COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations could qualify as a supervening event but in light of SARS, they were foreseeable but unprecedented.[25] While it was not reasonably expected by commercial people that the lockdowns would last for more than eighteen (18) months, there was significant amount of time remaining in each lease (Cine -UK another 12.5 years to run or 2.5 years if the break clause were to be exercised and Mecca Bingo and Sports Direct another 11 years each) in relation to the period of closure due to COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations. For this reason, there was no ‘radical difference’ nor was it unjust for the leases to continue bearing in mind their terms and the allocation of risks. There was no frustration of the leases. As for the tenant’s contention that the Sports Direct lease was temporarily frustrated, Master Dagnall rejected the tenant’s claims and agreed with the landlords that there is no such doctrine as temporary frustration in law. Frustration by definition and effect means the discharging and ending of the contract without the possibility to revive it hence it cannot be suspended.

Illegality

The tenants claim as well that they are relieved from their obligations to pay rent under the lease as its performance has become impossible based on its illegality. The landlords responded by agreeing that this is possible, however of no benefit to the tenants since it is not illegal for them to pay rent. It was held that the suspension of an obligation that is illegal does not excuse another obligation which is not interdependent or conditional upon the former. A suspension of the rent will only be allowed if a rent cesser clause can be invoked, however the tenants have failed to do so. Illegality of an obligation would not excuse the tenants from their obligation to pay rent.

Failure of Consideration

The final point raised by the tenants is that they are relieved from their obligation to pay rent due to partial failure of consideration arising from their inability to operate from and use the premises as permitted. Master Dagnall accepted that the tenants may successfully establish that they cannot trade from the premises as permitted by their lease however he refused to accept that would relieve the tenants of their obligation to pay rent. Moreover, ‘partial failure of consideration’ is not a separate principle; It is related to or dependent on a relevant principle of contract law, which the tenants have failed to establish.[26] The inability of the tenants to use the premises as permitted is not necessarily a ‘partial failure of consideration, instead it is an unexpected occurrence which means the leases are not as beneficial to the tenants as initially expected.[27] The landlords did not breach the contract and there was no provision for the rent to be suspended except for the limited circumstances provided for the application of the rent cesser clause. Based on the foregoing, the tenants were unable to rely on to COVID-19 or COVID-19 Regulations to counter claims against them for rent incurred during the period of interruption. The tenants must continue to pay the rent even for the period in which they could not use the premises as permitted because of COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations.

Comments

Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK and other cases is among the recently decided cases addressing business interruption claims arising from COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations. It reveals to contractual parties, businesses, and insurers that an interruption to businesses caused or arising from COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations on its own may not be sufficient to successfully claim for business interruption and to compel the insurers to indemnify an assured for their loss. As demonstrated in this case, the legal obligations between a tenant and landlord will not change because of interruption to the business caused by COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulations as this is not the fault of either party. It is important for tenants and landlords to recognise that the terms of the lease and insurance policies will determine the allocation of risks and that rent will only be suspended in accordance these terms and the scope of a rent cesser clause where expressly provided. The same is true for the interpretation of insurance clauses. Though an insurance policy may contain a business interruption clause or extension clause on ‘diseases’ that is wide enough to include COVID-19, the scope of its application will be limited based on the surrounding words of the clause. Therefore, if as in this case, the business interruption clause requires there to be ‘damage or destruction’ and there is no physical damage to property at the insured premises, the assured will not recover for loss merely because COVID-19 disrupted their business and caused financial or other nonphysical loss.

The context and surrounding words within which the clauses are written are very important to aid with their construction and it should not be assumed that ‘damage’ will take a wider meaning to cover nonphysical loss simply because COVID-19 is widespread and has affected many businesses. The identical concerns apply to the treatment of an extension clause on ‘diseases’ which for example covers COVID-19, its application to a scenario will depend on the other words or requirements of the clause and what makes commercial sense. COVID-19 Regulations have also not prohibited landlords from requesting the rents from tenants who can afford to pay, in fact the parties are encouraged to arrive at ameliorative settlements and where possible continue to meet their obligations under the lease. It will be difficult for a court to allow a rent cesser clause to implied into a lease written on a standard form if the test of obviousness and necessity are not satisfied. It is also difficult because standard clauses are usually well drafted, without errors, and deemed to have considered all possible circumstance.

A successful claim for frustration of a lease due to COVID-19 and COVID-19 Regulation is possible. However, what is of value is comparing the period of interruption with the outstanding period of the lease and then determine whether there has been such radical difference in the subject of the agreement that it would be unfair to continue the lease. Merely relying on the occurrence of COVID-19 and the length and extent of the lockdown are not adequate to satisfy this claim. Interestedly, Master Dagnall analysis throughout the judgment in relation to the issues raised were resolved by applying settled principles of law, thus we must be reminded that COVID-19 has not changed the fundamental principles of contractual interpretation, the law of frustration, law of implication and the obligations under a lease agreement. Nonetheless, the specific words of a clause, contract or insurance policy and their interpretation will be the key towards the success or failure of a claim involving COVID-19. More importantly, tenants and other business owners must ensure their business interruption policies and rent cesser clauses are drafted to make provision for loss due to nonphysical damage and loss of turnover.

[1] para 36.

[2] para 43.

[3] para 59.

[4] Volume 29 para 303.

[5] para 120.

[6] Ibid.

[7] para 120.

[8] [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB), para 126.

[9]ibid.

[10] para 127.

[11] para 140.

[12] para 148.

[13] Ibid.

[14] para 167.

[15] para 168.

[16] [1986] QB 211.

[17] [2016] 4 WLR 107.

[18] Essentially, the principle is that in a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant, where a landlord is indemnified by an insurer, the landlord cannot seek to also recover from the tenant in either contract or tort, otherwise that would effectively be double indemnity. The insurance taken out is to benefit both the tenant and the landlords.

[19] [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB), para 173.

[20] para 177.

[21] para 179.

[22] [1981] AC 675.

[23] [2007] EWCA Civ 547.

[24] [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB), para 209.

[25] ibid.

[26] [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB), para 221.

[27] Ibid.

Insurance Implications of “Phishing”!

Phishing Emails - How to Protect Your Customers When Using E-Signature | OneSpan

The 2Cs, COVID-19 and cyber risks, 2 plagues of our generation, both of which command global interest and competes in both print and online media for daily headlines. They also have one thing in common, they are highly misunderstood and mutates ever so often. For these and other reasons, governments and business stakeholders have invested heavily in developing safety guidelines to mitigate the loss and damages arising directly or indirectly from cyber risks and COVID19. While governments have made some progress in the fight against COVID-19 through the vaccine administration, cyber risks on the other hand is mutating at such a rate where it almost impossible to keep up and the shipping and insurance industries are just as vulnerable to cyber risks as any other industry. Here we will briefly discuss phishing, often described as the most widespread and pernicious cyber-attack technique, but the discussion will be centered around the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in RealPage v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh and Beazley Insurance Company[1].

BIMCO in its guidelines on cybersecurity risks onboard ships describes phishing as encompassing the sending of emails to many potential targets asking for pieces of sensitive or confidential information. The email may also contain a malicious attachment or request that a person visits a fake website using a hyperlink included in the mail. A distinguishing feature of phishing is that attackers pretend to be a real and trusted person or company that the victim usually or have had business relations. It is reported in the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2020, that phishing attacks are the most common attack vector used by cyber criminals and that between 2017 and 2020 there has been a rise in the number of businesses experiencing a phishing attacks from 72% to 86% whereas there has been a fall in viruses and other malware from 33% to 16%.[2] Since phishing is such a constant threat to businesses, it is understandable why insurers see the need to cater for this risk in their cyber insurance policies and or other commercial crime policies.

Facts of RealPage case:

RealPage provides several services for their clients who are property owners and managers of real estate. The clients entered contracts with RealPage authorizing it to act as agents on their behalf, and to manage and collect monies debited from their customers’ accounts, and to credit the client’s identified bank account. The tenants authorized the transactions processed by RealPage and this was communicated to RealPage by their clients. RealPage then contracted with Stripe to provide software services that enable payment processing and related functions.

The payment process involved the following:

A tenant would log in to an interface called “Resident Passport” to make a payment to one of RealPage’s clients.
Upon initiation of a payment by a tenant, RealPage would send application programming interface (API) calls[3] to Stripe’s server either through Stripe Dashboard or the On-Site application.
Upon receipt of an API call, for an automated clearing house (ACH) transaction, Stripe would send instructions to its bank, Wells Fargo to process the ACH transfer that would pull money from the tenant’s bank account and place these funds in Stripe’s Wells Fargo bank account.
Thereafter, Stripe would direct Wells Fargo to complete another ACH transfer to pay these funds to the clients in accordance with RealPage’s instructions.

The funds held in Stripe’s accounts were for the benefit of its users and merchants such as RealPage. If there was a balance owed to a client of RealPage, the funds for that client in Stripes account would be for the benefit of the said client. RealPage had no rights to the funds held in Stripes account. RealPage was not entitled to draw funds and did not receive interest from funds maintained in the account. RealPage contracts describes the relationship with Stripes as independent contractors. One exception where Stripe operates as an agent is holding funds that are owed to RealPage

The hackers used targeted phishing to obtain and alter the account credential of a RealPage employee. They then used those credentials to access the Stripe Dashboard and alter RealPage’s fund disbursement instructions to Stripe. The hackers diverted over $10 million that was not yet disbursed to clients. RealPage discovered the fraud, contacted Stripe and directed them to reverse the payments and freeze outgoing payments. RealPage was unable to recover over $6 million of the funds. RealPage refunded clients for lost funds.

Insurance Policies with National Union and Beazley

At the time of the attack, RealPage had a commercial crime policy with National Union and an Excess Fidelity and Crime Policy from Beazley. The Excess Policy provides a $5,000,000 limit of liability “for any loss which triggers coverage under the Commercial Crime Policy. Therefore, any recovery under the Excess policy was dependent on RealPage successfully making a claim under the Commercial Crime Policy. The following provisions of the Commercial Crime Policy are the most relevant

Ownership of Property; Interests Covered:

The property covered under this policy is limited to property:

(1) That you own or lease; or

(2) That you hold for others whether or not you are legally liable for the

loss of such property.

Computer Fraud:

We will pay for loss of or damage to “money”, “securities” and “other property” resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the “premises” or “banking premises”:

a. To a person (other than a “messenger”) outside those “premises”; or

b. To a place outside those “premises”.

Funds Transfer Fraud:

We will pay for loss of “funds” resulting directly from a “fraudulent instruction” directing a financial institution to transfer, pay or deliver “funds” from your “transfer account”.

Insurance Claims and Responses

RealPage claim for the funds lost under the policy but National Union was only willing to reimburse the transactional fees owed to Real Page. With respect to the diverted funds that were owed to RealPage clients, National Union concluded that based on their preliminary analysis, RealPage did not own or hold the funds and thus was not entitled to coverage. As a result of National Union’s denial of coverage, RealPage filed a claim seeking a declaration of judgment for the funds fraudulently diverted and lost as a result of the phishing attack.

Court Proceedings

The main issue for the court was ‘whether RealPage is entitled to coverage under commercial crime insurance policies for the loss of its clients’ funds which were diverted through a phishing scheme’? In answering this question, the central issue is whether RealPage held these funds despite its use of a third-party processor, Stripe Inc? After an extensive discussion of the meaning given to the word ‘hold’, it was accepted that there must be possession and not necessarily ownership of an item. Accordingly, the court held that RealPage did not suffer a direct loss as required under the policy as they did not hold the funds at the time of the phishing attack and in so doing the court decided in National Union and Beazley’s favour granting them summary judgment.

RealPage argued that the policy was expansive enough to cover property they held. They also reasoned that since they had the authority to direct Stripe as to where the funds should go, they ‘held’ the funds. The court rejected this line of reasoning by stating ‘hold’ cannot be reduced to simply the ability to direct but required some sort of possession of property. By applying the ordinary meaning of ‘hold’, Real page was not in possession of the funds. The funds were in Stripes account at Well Fargo and not RealPage up to the time it was diverted to the hackers account. RealPage ability to direct the transfer of the funds does not amount to holding the funds. Furthermore, RealPage had no rights to the funds in the account, could not withdraw the funds and held in the same account as those of other Stripe users.

RealPage had to also establish that they had suffered loss resulting directly from computer fraud or funds transfer fraud. Since RealPage did not hold the funds, its loss resulted from its decision to reimburse its clients. Accordingly, RealPage did not suffer a direct loss as required under the Policy.

Insurance implications

While we acknowledge that this decision is not binding on the courts in the UK, it cannot be denied that many of the practices within the UK cyber insurance market are influenced by what happens in the more mature US market. Furthermore, many of the insurance companies including Beazley who are leading the way in the UK as cyber insurance providers also have parent companies, branch offices or subsidiaries operating in the USA. So, while the decision is not binding, it will certainly be persuasive or at the very least leave an indelible lesson for both assureds and insurers to seek clarity and modify policy clauses relating to loss or damage from phishing or other social engineering attacks.

If a higher court was to approve this judgement and a similar practice is adopted in the UK by insurers, it will be very difficult for assureds who use third party providers to assist them with payment transfers and other transactions to successfully claim an indemnity from their insurers relying on similar policy wording. This would mean even though the assured’s system was breached when the employee inadvertently shared their confidential account details and though the phishing diverted funds belonging to clients of the assured, a policy bearing similar clauses as those provided above, would not respond since the outcome of the claim would be totally dependent on the definition of ‘hold’ and what was considered to be in the possession of the assured as per the requirement of the policy at the time the funds were fraudulently diverted.

To prevent such a harsh outcome for assureds, it is recommended that assures negotiate with their brokers for their cyber insurance policies or commercial crime policies to include words which would cover situations where funds are being held in the account of an agent or third-party contractor. In so doing, the policy wording could be modified to include not just funds the assured ‘hold or owns’ but to also cover ‘loss of funds for which they have authority to direct’.

Variations in policy wording – UK

Cyber Crime[4]
We will indemnify you in respect of the following for loss by theft committed on or after the Retroactive Date stated in the schedule which is first discovered during the period of insurance and notified to us in accordance with Claims conditions applicable to Section B:

i) assets due to any fraudulent or dishonest misuse or manipulation by a third party of the computer system operated by you

ii) your funds or those for which you are responsible at law from an account maintained by you at a financial institution following fraudulent electronic, telegraphic, cable, telephone or email instructions todebit such account and to transfer, pay or deliver funds from such account and which instructions purportto have come from you but which are fraudulently altered, transmitted or issued by a third party or are

a forgery.

In the event that any party other than an insured person enters into an agreement with a third party entity pretending to be you we will pay reasonable fees and costs to establish that such fraud has occurred should the third party seek to enforce such agreements against you provided that such loss is first discovered and is notified to us during the period of insurance.

The words provided in clause 1a (ii) will cause a different outcome when compared to how property was defined and what was decided by the court in RealPage. In RealPage the National Union insurance policy defined ‘property’ as that i) owned or leased by the assured or ii) that you hold for others whether or not you are legally liable for the loss of such property’. Whereas, under Section B- Crime, clause 1a (ii) of Zurich Cyber Policy, the assured will be indemnified for ‘your funds or those for which you are responsible at law from account maintained by you at a financial institution following fraudulent electronic … or email instructions to debit such account and to transfer…’. The difference with the Zurich policy is that unlike the National Union policy in RealPage, there is no requirement for the assured to ‘hold’ the funds in the literal sense of the word. Furthermore, under the Zurich policy the insurer will only indemnify the assured if funds are either his or those for which he is responsible at law. This is different in RealPage as the National Union policy will cover property that the assured hold for others whether or not he is legally liable for the loss. Another distinguishing feature between the two policies is that in the Zurich policy the insurer will cover funds from an account maintained by the assured at a financial institution.

This latter feature has similar meaning to ‘hold’ as interpreted by the court in RealPage. If we consider for example, maintenance of a bank account, this includes holding and transferring funds within the account and the execution of other control mechanisms to ensure that the account remains active and in good financial standing. However, others may argue that ‘an account maintained by the assured at a financial institution’ should be given a wider meaning in that even accounts owned or held by a third party at a financial institution may be maintained by the assured. In other words, maintenance of an account does not necessarily mean that the funds must be held or are being held by the assured as was decided in RealPage. If this interpretation should be applied to the facts in RealPage, it is reasonable to conclude that the insurers would have been held liable to indemnify the assured since the monies in the account held by Stripe Inc was the legal responsibility of RealPage. Moreover, if the account was used solely to hold funds related to RealPage business there should be no logical explanation as to why it cannot be accepted that RealPage is maintaining the account in accordance with Zurich policy wording. Either way, the ambiguity and possibility of a trial will be removed if the parties clearly defined and explained what it meant by ‘maintenance of account’.

For those businesses without a cyber insurance policy, coverage may be acquired under their commercial crime policy. Below is an example of a clause covering this type of loss that can be found in most crime policies:

Computer Fraud and Funds Transfer Fraud[5]

The Insurer shall indemnify the Insured for:

1. loss of or damage to Money, Securities or Property resulting directly from

Computer Fraud committed solely by a Third Party; or

2. loss of Money or Securities contained in a Transfer Account at a Financial Institution resulting directly from Funds Transfer Fraud committed solely by a

Third Party.

“Funds Transfer Fraud” means fraudulent written, electronic, telegraphic, cable, teletype

or telephone instructions by a Third Party issued to a Financial Institution directing such

institution to transfer, pay or deliver Money or Securities from any account maintained by

an Insured at such institution, without the Insured’s knowledge or consent.[6]

Some crime policies in their definition section provide that a “Transfer Account” means an account maintained by the Insured at a Financial Institution from which the Insured can initiate the transfer, payment or delivery of Money or Securities.”[7] Like the Zurich policy, the implications of the clause will turn on the meaning assigned to ‘maintenance of an account’ as discussed above.

Funds transfer fraud is also covered in Beazley Commercial Crime Insurance Module[8]:

Fund transfer fraud means the transfer of money, securities or other property due to electronic data, computer programs or electronic or telephonic transfer communications within a computer system operated by the insured having been dishonestly, fraudulently, maliciously or criminally modified, replicated, corrupted, altered, deleted, input, created, or prepared.

Fund transfer fraud does not include loss due to social engineering fraud.

Based on this definition and the exclusion of social engineering from Fund transfer fraud, an assured in RealPage’s position could not rely on the Funds transfer clause under their commercial crime policy. Instead, the assured would need to rely on the social engineering fraud clause (where not excluded), variations of which are found in most cyber insurance policies.

Social Engineering Fraud[9] means the insured having authorised, directed or acknowledged the transfer, payment, delivery or receipt of funds or property based on:

an electronic or telephonic transfer communication which dishonestly, fraudulently, maliciously or criminally purports to be, but is not, from a customer of the insured, another office or department of the insured, a financial organisation or vendor; or

a written or printed payment instruction obtained by fraudulent impersonation.

In some policies for example Zurich Cyber Policy, an obligation is placed on the assured to confirm the validity of the transfer instructions before actions are taken to send the funds to the account mentioned in the purported instructions. The confirmation must include ‘either verification of the authenticity or accuracy of the transfer instruction by means of a call back to a predetermined number or the use of some other verification procedure and the assured must keep a written record of the verifications along with all elements of the fraudulent transfer instruction’.[10] It is imperative for assureds to check their cyber insurance and or commercial crime policies to ensure they have adequate protection against phishing and other types of social engineering attacks as cyber criminals will continue to use these attack vectors to steal from companies.

[1] Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-1350-b (ND Tex Feb 24, 2021)

[2] Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Cybersecurity breaches survey 2020’ (March 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2020/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2020 > accessed 31 March 2021.

[3] The API calls sent from RealPage to Stripe provided information about the tenant’s account, the client’s destination account and the amount due to the client.

[4] Zurich Insurance plc, ‘Cyber Policy: Section B – Crime’ (2020) 29 < https://www.zurich.co.uk/business/business-insurance/specialty-lines/financial-lines/cyber > accessed 8 April 2021.

[5] Beazley Inc, ‘Crime Insurance Policy: Insuring Clause 1F’ (BICCR00020411)<https://www.beazley.com/documents/Management%20Liability/Crime/Crime%20Policy.pdf> accessed 9 April 2021.

[6] Beazley Inc, ‘Crime Insurance Policy: Clause II Definition EE’ (BICCR00020411)<https://www.beazley.com/documents/Management%20Liability/Crime/Crime%20Policy.pdf> accessed 9 April 2021.

[7] Beazley Inc, ‘Crime Insurance Policy: Clause II Definition P’ (BICCR00020411)<https://www.beazley.com/documents/Management%20Liability/Crime/Crime%20Policy.pdf> accessed 9 April 2021.

[8] Beazley Inc, ‘Commercial Crime Insurance Module (Lloyds Syndicate) Clause F: Definitions’

<https://www.beazley.com/documents/Wordings/Commercial%20Crime%20Module%20%28Lloyd%27s%20syndicate%29.pdf > accessed 9 April 2021.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Zurich Insurance plc, ‘Cyber Policy: Conditons application to Section B – 7 Social Engineering Cover’ (2020) 31

< https://www.zurich.co.uk/business/business-insurance/specialty-lines/financial-lines/cyber > accessed 8 April 2021.

Microsoft Exchange Email Hacks!

numbers projected on face — Photo by Mati Mango on Pexels.com

Another cyber-attack labelled ‘Microsoft Exchange Email hacks’ hits the news again! This attack has been concerningly described as ‘zero day’ attack. A zero-day attack means that the points of vulnerability were unknown before the attack therefore the cyber-attack occurs on the same day that the weakness is discovered in the software. Like so many things happening around the world at this point, the race is on to get on top of these attacks which are believed to be state sponsored and cultivated in China by the hacking group Hafnium. Chinese government denies any involvement. This method of attack has already been replicated and used to infiltrate companies and public bodies in more than 115 countries around the world. It is still early days, so many UK companies may still be unaware that their systems have been hacked. The European Banking Authority has reported that their system has been compromised and that there is a possibility that personal data has been exposed.

What happened?

Microsoft announced that the hacking group exploited four (4) zero-day vulnerabilities in the server’s system to enter the Microsoft Exchange Server which is used by large corporations and public bodies across the world. The calendar software of governments and data centres were also compromised. The hackers also sometimes used stolen passwords to gain unauthorized access to the system. The hackers would then take control of the server remotely and steal data from the network. The attack has affected thousands around the world.

Tom Burts, a VP at Microsoft described in a sequential order how the attack was carried out;

First, it would gain access to an Exchange Server either with stolen passwords or by using the previously undiscovered vulnerabilities to disguise itself as someone who should have access.

Second, it would create what’s called a web shell to control the compromised server remotely.

Third, it would use that remote access – run from the U.S. based private servers to steal data from an organization’s network.[1]

What is not affected?

The identified vulnerabilities do not affect Exchange Online, Microsoft’s cloud-based email and calendar services that’s included in commercial Office 365 and Microsoft 365 subscriptions.

International Response

In response Microsoft issued a software update for its 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019 versions of Exchange. The UK National Cybersecurity Centre, the US and the Norwegian governments are already issuing warnings and guidelines to businesses about the hacks.

But what does this mean for insurers?

This is an extra dent in the cyber security efforts of companies and public bodies yet another opportunity for a lesson to the insurance market of the potential global and high aggregate loss from just one attack. This incident is another illustration of how susceptible computer systems and servers are to cyber-attacks. Similarly, it is another indication to corporations and public bodies that foreign entities are working assiduously to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within their systems to achieve their motives, whatever they may be. So far, the impact is widespread, and victims include organisations such as infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defence contractors, NGOs. Cybersecurity group Huntress has reported many of their partners servers have been affected and they include small businesses for example small hotels, ice cream company, senior citizen communities, banks, local government and electricity companies[2].

In light of the recent business interruption decision from the Supreme Court, it will be interesting to see how many of these UK companies will present their claims to insurers and how insurers will respond to claims from assured whose businesses may have been interrupted by the Exchange Email hacks.

There will be gaps and exclusions in these Business Interruption policies which may not provide adequate protection against cyber risks so it is the assured with a cyber risk policy / insurance coverage who will be the most protected during and after these attacks.

Applicable cyber insurance clauses and possible response of insurers

Most cyber insurance policies cover data loss and business interruption as a result of a security breach so this will not be much of an issue for assureds with cyber insurance coverage. There are exclusions in most cyber insurance policies which may leave an assured vulnerable when hacking of this nature (Microsoft Exchange hack) occurs. Let us consider some of these exclusions and their potential impact further:

First Party Loss

costs or expenses incurred by the insured to identify or remediate software program errors or vulnerabilities or update, replace, restore, assemble, reproduce, recollect or enhance data or computer systems to a level beyond that which existed prior to a security breach, system failure, dependent security breach, dependent system failure or extortion threat;

Betterment

for repairing, replacing or restoring the Insured’s Computer System to a level beyond that which existed prior to any Claim or Loss;

The inclusion of this or any clause with similar wording means the assured may not be covered for the expenses and cost incurred to hire experts to identify or remediate vulnerabilities within their IT systems. Consequently, the assured will not be indemnified for the expenses or costs incurred to install the patches as recommended by Microsoft as these will be classified as updates or enhancement to the computer system beyond a level that which existed prior to the security breach.

Infrastructure failure

We will not make any payment for any claim, loss or any other liability under this section directly or indirectly due to:

Any failure or interruption of service provided by an internet service provider, telecommunications provider, utilities supplier or other infrastructure provider. However, this exclusion does not apply where you provide such services as part of your business.

ii. failure or malfunction of satellites or of power, utility, mechanical or telecommunications (including internet) infrastructure or services that are not under the insured organization’s direct operational control.

Third party providers

arising out of the failure of any third party provider including any utility, cloud, internet service provider or telecommunications provider, unless arising from a failure of the Insured to protect against unauthorised access to, unauthorised use of, or a denial of service attack or damage, destruction, alteration, corruption, copying, stealing or misuse by a Hacker of the Insured’s Computer system;

ii. The Insurer shall not be liable to indemnify the Insured against any Loss arising as a result of the failure of a third party service provider or cloud provider unless they are hosting hardware or software that is owned by the Insured.

Could the relationship between Microsoft and its clients fall into the category of ‘other infrastructure provider’ to relieve the insurer of any liability to the assured? As software service providers of Microsoft 365 and Azure it will be no surprise to see claims being denied based on clauses with the same or similar wording. However, the assured may object to the insurer’s denial of the claim by the applying ejusdem generis rule in stating that ‘or other infrastructure provider’ should be limited to companies such as Virgin Media, British Gas or Welsh Water and not extend to software providers. According to Cambridge dictionary, infrastructure as it relates to IT means the ‘equipment, software, etc. that a computer system needs in order to operate and communicate with other computers.’ If this definition is accepted by the parties, the challenge for the insurer will be to establish that the Microsoft Exchange Server qualifies as a software needed for a computer system to operate and communicate with other computers. Rather, the function of the Microsoft exchange server is to aid with email storage and calendaring and is unrelated to other operational functions necessary to communicate with other computers.

Certainly ‘infrastructure or services that are not under the insured organization’s direct operational control’ will create less problems for the insurer to establish that the exclusion applies as this broad construction will exclude losses and expenses from incidents such as Microsoft Email Exchange Hack.

Government intrusion

which results, directly or indirectly, from access to, confiscation or destruction of the Insured’s Computer system by any government, governmental agency or sub-agency, public authority or any agents thereof;

Since the Microsoft Exchange Email are believed to be carried out by Hafnium which is a government backed group, it is reasonable to identify them as agents of the government of China. Therefore, assureds whose policies include a government intrusion exclusion may be denied coverage for their loss or expenses arising directly or indirectly from access to or destruction of the assured’s computer system by groups such as Hafnium.

Conclusion and the way forward

As aforementioned, it is early days and the real financial impact if any from these attacks are not yet known. However, what is certain is that hackers, whether state sponsored are not are using very sophisticated techniques to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within computer servers and networks. Therefore, companies and public bodies must continue to invest in employee training and take reasonable steps to manage and mitigate their losses from potential cyber-attacks which unfortunately will happen at one point. Among those decisions should be the purchase of cyber insurance policies that addresses the needs of the business with particular attention being placed on the exclusions clauses and ensuring that as an assured you are adequately protected against the cybersecurity risks to which you are most directly and indirectly prone .

While large corporations and government entities may have the requisite IT expertise to support them, the real concern remains for those small and medium sized businesses that do not have the resources for a complete check and cleaning of their systems. Therefore, larger corporations within the supply chain must offer their expertise to the small and medium sized businesses with which they trade to respond to this and other cyber security threats. Since Microsoft Exchange Online servers have not been affected, many small and medium sized businesses may begin to switch to using cloud-based email storage. However, this does not mean they will be immune from cyber-attacks.

Tokio Marine in their Cybersecurity Insurance Policy wording 0417 went as far as to include a list of reasonable steps that an insured should take to avoid / mitigate their loss and these along with government and industry guidelines should be a good starting point in your fight against cyber attacks and their debilitating impacts.

Reasonable steps to avoid Loss

The Insured shall protect its Computer system by:

a. having Virus protection software operating, correctly configured and regularly or automatically updated;

b. updating Computer systems with new protection patches issued by the original system or software manufacturer of supplier;

c. having a fire wall or similar configured device to control access to its Computer system;

d. encrypting and controlling the access to its Computer system and external devices including plug-in devices networked to its Computer system;

e. controlling unauthorised access to its Computer system by correctly configuring its wireless network;

f. changing all passwords on information and communication assets at least every 60 days and cancel any username, password or other security protection once an Employee’s employment has been terminated or after it knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that it had become available to any unauthorised person;

g. taking regular back-up copies of any data, file or programme on its Computer system are taken and held in a secondary location;

h. having an operational system for logging and monitoring user activity on its Computer system;

i. remote wipe functionality is installed and enabled on all portable devices where such functionality is available

[1] Tom Burts, ‘New Nation – State Cyber attacks’ (02 March 2021) < https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/> accessed 14 March 2021.

[2] John Hammond, ‘Rapid Response: Mass Exploitation of On-Prem Exchange Servers’ (03 March 2021) < https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-mass-exploitation-of-on-prem-exchange-servers?__hstc=1139630.77196394391fe1afb6fc8e7d1d6a8bc9.1615725167878.1615725167878.1615725167878.1&__hssc=1139630.5.1615725167882&__hsfp=3684379411&hsutk=77196394391fe1afb6fc8e7d1d6a8bc9&contentType=listing-page> accessed 14 March 2021.