Official blog of Swansea University's IISTL, where we keep you up to date with the latest maritime and commercial legal news.
Author: Professor Barış Soyer
Professor Soyer was appointed a lecturer at the School of Law, Swansea University in 2001 and was promoted to readership in 2006 and professorship in 2009. He was appointed Director of the Institute of Shipping and Trade Law at the School of Law, Swansea in October 2010. He was previously a lecturer at the University of Exeter. His postgraduate education was in the University of Southampton from where he obtained his Ph.D degree in 2000. Whilst at Southampton he was also a part-time lecturer and tutor. His principal research interest is in the field of insurance, particularly marine insurance, but his interests extend broadly throughout maritime law and contract law.
He is the author of Warranties in Marine Insurance published by Cavendish Publishing (2001), and an impressive list of articles published in elite Journals such as Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Berkley Journal of International Law, Journal of Contract Law and Journal of Business Law. His first book was the joint winner of the Cavendish Book Prize 2001 and was awarded the British Insurance Law Association Charitable Trust Book Prize in 2002, for the best contribution to insurance literature. A new edition of this book was published in 2006. In 2008, he edited a collection of essays published by Informa evaluating the Law Commissions' Reform Proposals in Insurance Law: Reforming Commercial and Marine Insurance Law. This book has been cited on numerous occasions in the Consultation Reports published by English and Scottish Law Commissions and also by the Irish Law Reform Commission and has been instrumental in shaping the nature of law reform. In recent years, he edited several books in partnership with Professor Tettenborn: Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, published by Informa in 2012; Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air, published by Informa in 2013 and Offshore Contracts and Liabilities, published by Informa Law from Routledge in 2014. His most recent monograph, Marine Insurance Fraud, was published in 2014 by Informa Law from Routledge.
His teaching experience extends to the under- and postgraduate levels, including postgraduate teaching of Carriage of Goods by Sea, Transnational Commercial Law, Marine Insurance, Admiralty Law and Oil and Gas Law. He is one of the editors of the Journal of International Maritime Law and is also on the editorial board of Shipping and Trade Law and Baltic Maritime Law Quarterly. He currently teaches Admiralty Law, Oil and Gas Law and Marine Insurance on the LLM programme and also is the Head of the Department of Postgraduate Legal Studies at Swansea.
The chartered vessel (a gearless Panamax bulk carrier) ran aground while entering the port of Chaozhou under pilotage. As a result, she suffered damage to hull structure. The owners claimed the cost of repairs and associated damages in the amount of US$ 1,158.559.59 plus interest and costs on the premise that charterer directed the vessel to an unsafe port in breach of a safe port warranty in the charterparty.
The charterers defended the claim arguing that the vessel was unseaworthy as she lacked the proper charts which prevented the master from preparing an effective berth-to-berth passage plan (The CMA CGM Libra [2021] UKSC 51). On that basis, the charterers argued that unseaworthiness was the effective cause of the loss and as the Hague-Visby Rules were incorporated into the charterparty by a Paramount Clause, they were able to rely on breach of Article III Rule (1) of the Rules as a defence of circuity of action to the owners’ claim for breach of the unsafe port warranty, according to the principle in Post Office v. Hampshire [1980] QB 124.
Was the port unsafe?
There is authority pointing to the fact that a systematic error in the infrastructure of a port could potentially make that port unsafe (The Ocean Victory [2017] UKSC 35)- the pilots employed by a port can certainly be considered part of that port’s infrastructure. It was in essence the submission of the owners that the pilot’s failure to deploy the stern tug in “indirect” mode to bring the stern of the Vessel around to port and her head around to starboard meant that he was incompetent. (according to the owners, this failure demonstrated a disabling lack of skill or knowledge amounting to incompetence in line with the test laid down in The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719). The tribunal disagreed. After a technical evaluation assisted by expert mariners, it was held that the main fault of the pilot in this case was failure to execute the manoeuvre required to enter into a port (that poses some navigational challenges) correctly. This was deemed to be an isolated error on his part. The pilot worked at Chaozhou for 5 years before this incident, continued working as a pilot there for some five years afterwards, and had not been involved in any other incidents. He had demonstrated the ability to control the Vessel and the tugs in other respects during this incident.
It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a pilot employed by a harbour authority could be regarded as incompetent but the burden that the owners need to discharge in such a case is a considerable one and unless it can be demonstrated that the pilot in question is recently appointed and no adequate training opportunities are offered to him/her by the harbour authority to familiarise himself/herself with particular navigational challenges the relevant port poses, it is likely that any navigational error of the pilot will be judged as one off as was the case here.
Was the vessel unseaworthy?
The finding on the safety of the port was adequate to dispose the owners’ claim but the tribunal also made the following observations regarding the vessel’s seaworthiness. It was found that the vessel did not have the up-to-date Chinese paper chart on board showing the limits of the dredged deepwater channel. On that basis it was held that the passage plan must have been defective as it could not have been based on appropriate channel data at the time the vessel departed the loading port. The tribunal also found that as a result the Master and deck team failed to alert the pilot to his errors and failed to attempt any action to avoid the grounding. Therefore, it was evident that the vessel was unseaworthy. However, it was held that the unseaworthiness was not an effective cause of the grounding. We can only assume that the tribunal after evaluating the expert evidence concluded that pilot’s negligence was the main effective cause of the grounding- put differently but for the pilot’s negligence the vessel could have still entered the port in a safe manner despite the fact that the passage plan, based on incomplete data, was defective. This is obviously a factual finding, and it is hard for us to comment on without having access to the expert evidence that the tribunal had the chance to see.
That said it would have been very interesting to see how the tribunal would have reacted to the point raised by the charterers: i.e. if the port had been deemed unsafe and unseaworthiness was found to be an effective cause of the loss. In that case, would the charterer be able to avoid liability without having the need to demonstrate that the Vessel’s unseaworthiness was a novus actus interveniens which severed the chain of causation between the unsafety of the port and the grounding? Possibly yes, but that is a moot point which needs to be decided on another day.
PT Adidaya Energy Mandiri v. MS First Capital Insurance Ltd [2022] SGHC(I) 14; [2022] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 381
Factual and Contractual Matrix
The assured operated an unmanned single point mooring buoy (SPM) at a gas field which was moored to seabed by nine set of chains at three locations on its skirt area. The insurance policy provided cover for physical damage to the SPM on total loss basis only with an insured value of US$ 4, 700,0000. The policy, inter alia, contained two warranties:
Clause 1- “The Insured Equipment is only to be operated by and under the supervision of suitably trained and authorised personnel…”
Clause 8- “Suitable precautions and preservation/maintenance measures to be adopted when storing, handling, transporting and operating Insured Equipment.”
The policy was subject to English law as amended by the Insurance Act (IA) 2015. It also contained a clause to the effect that the assured should notify the insurer within 30 days of becoming aware of any incident giving rise to a claim which may be covered under the policy.
Between 1 and 13 July 2018, several collisions between the SPM and a crude oil tanker (The Bratasena) occurred during loading operations leading to the flooding of the SPM’s compartments. Emergency repairs were carried out in August/September 2018 and further repairs were made in situ in December 2018. The SPM received further repairs in May/June and November 2019. The assured claimed that the SPM was a constructive total loss (CTL) by tendering a Notice of Abandonment (NoA) on 22 May 2019. The assured also claimed expenses incurred to prevent the SPM from becoming a total loss as sue and labouring expenses. The assured’s indemnity claim was rejected by the insurer on various grounds mainly due to breach of marine warranties and procedural issues. The assured’s claim for sue and labouring expenses was also rejected by the insurer. The assured brought the current proceedings against the insurer before the Singapore International Commercial Court as per jurisdiction agreement in the contract.
Breach of Warranty
Sir Jeremy Cooke IJ, was of the opinion that both of the warranties in the contract were breached. The assured was in breach of Clause 1 as no evidence was presented showing that the crew was adequately trained to operate the insured equipment. It was also held that there was a breach of cl. 8 as there was no static tow in place to ensure that The Bratasena did not surge into the SPM. Moreover, it was found that there was no 24/7 watchkeeping during loading operations which meant another failure in the provision of suitable precautions and preservation measures. It was also found that the crew’s failure to notify the assured of every contact with the SPM constituted a further breach as that prevented any corrective measure taken.
Having established that both cl 1 and 8 were breached, the trial judge held that the cover was suspended at the time of the loss by virtue of s. 10(2) of the IA 2015. It was also held that s. 11(3) of the IA 2015 could not assist the assured here as there was no prospect of the assured showing that non-compliance with the warranties did not increase the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances which it did occur.
Other Defences Raised by the Insurer
The clause requiring the assured to notify the insurer within 30 days of becoming aware of any incident giving rise to a claim which may be covered under the policy was held to be a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. It was held that this clause was breached (which barred recovery) as the assured even though by 17 July 2018 was aware that there had been several collisions between the SPM and The Bratasena, gave no notification to the insurer until 5 September 2018.
Agreeing with the contention of the insurer, the Court also found that the SPM was not a constructive total loss as the repair costs (estimated to be around US$ 2 million by the insurer’s expert and US$ 3.2 million by the assured’s expert) did not exceed the insured value under s. 60(2)(ii) of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906. It was also held that (even if the repair costs had exceeded the insured value of the SPM), the assured could not treat the loss as constructive total loss as it failed to tender NoA within a reasonable time (as required by s. 62(1)(3) of the MIA 1906). The trial judge stressed that NoA was not tendered until 22 May 2019 even though the temporary and permanent repairs required to preserve the vessel from being a total loss had been completed by mid-December 2018. Sir Jeremy Cooke IJ was convinced that the assured had waived its right to abandon the SPM to the insurers as it sold the equipment in June 2019 for US$ 400,000 at an undervalued price on the premise that it was a liability, but it kept operating it following the collision and kept earning a revenue. All these inconsistent actions pointed to the Court that the assured was dealing with SPM for its own account throughout so its offer to cede its interest in the SMP to the insurer was taken to have been withdrawn.
The assured’s claim for sue and labouring costs were mostly rejected. By virtue of s. 78(3) of the MIA 1906, to qualify as a sue and labour expense, it is necessary to show the assured that the expenses were incurred for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss to the insured property. This puts a serious limit on a policy like this one which provides cover on “total loss basis” only allowing the assured to claim costs that had been spent to prevent the insured property from an immediate risk of total loss as sue and labouring expenses. On that basis, the Court held that most of the expenses were not recoverable as sue and labouring expenses. More precisely:
Replacement of the mooring hawser was not incurred to preserve the property from total loss;
Inspection costs of the mooring chain, SPM riser and the pipeline end manifold, had no influence on the loss;
Effecting permanent repairs (especially in 2019) did not qualify as there was no longer a risk of sinking.
The only expense recoverable as sue and labouring expense was the inspection costs and repairs to prevent further flooding immediately after the collisions in July 2018 (US$ 20,875 on the estimate of the insurer’s expert).
Comment
The Court’s findings on the CTL issue and sue and labour clause do not break any new ground. What we see here is a very good application of established legal principles to the facts of the case with the assistance of insurance experts.
However, given that this is the first case (known to the author) that gives judicial airing to the changes introduced on the traditional warranty regime by the IA 2015 (in addition to academic scrutiny carried out- see, for example, observations of the author in 3rd edition of Warranties in Marine Insurance (2017, Routledge), his contribution to Cambridge Law Journal [2016] “Risk Control Clauses in Insurance Law” pp, 109- 127, Professor Clarke’s observations published in The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law, 2017), pp. 54-59 comments of R. Merkin and Ö. Gűrses, “The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of the Insurer and the Assured” (2015) 78 MLR 1004), it is worth commenting on that aspect of the case.
The case is a very good reminder that when dealing with a warranty that requires the assured to adopt safety standards and practices (such as cl 8 here), when such standards are not maintained by the assured, it will be very difficult (if not impossible) to convince the Court that non-compliance with such warranty could not have increased the risk of loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred (s. 11(3) of the IA 2015). From the way the arguments were presented to the judge, it is also evident that (as predicted by academics) the effect of s. 11(3) is to introduce a test of causation from the backdoor! Inevitably, the courts will be drawn into an enquiry as to whether the loss would have happened in the manner it did, had the safety standards been appropriately adopted.
One should also bear in mind that the effect of s. 11(3) could be negated altogether (i.e., the assured could be prevented from arguing that the breach of warranty did not contribute to the occurrence of the loss so that it should not have any detrimental impact on coverage) if it is drafted in a way that serves the purpose of describing the limits of the cover as a whole. A warranty of that nature is excluded from the application of s. 11(3) on the premise that such a term will have a general limiting effect not linked to a specific risk (s. 11(1) stipulates: “This section applies to a term (express or implied) other than a term defining the risk as a whole,…”). Unfortunately, this matter was not deliberated by the trial judge in depth, but it could be plausibly argued that cl. 1 is such a term as it requires the insured equipment to be operated only by and under the supervision of suitably trained and authorised personnel. On that basis, it can be viewed as going to the definition of the insured risk rather than simply being a term designed to reduce the risk of a particular type of loss. If so, regardless of whether breach of cl. 1 has contributed to the loss, the risk is suspended the moment the insured equipment is operated by personnel who are not adequately trained until that situation is rectified (as long as, of course, the breach does have a lasting impact on the risk (s. 10(2) of the IA 2015). Lack of discussion on the nature of cl. 1 did not here have any impact on the outcome as the judge was convinced that non-compliance with the warranty did, in fact, increase the risk of loss which actually occurred in the manner in which it occurred but such an analysis would have helped us to see how judges actually deal with the issue of identifying whether a warranty is one that “describes the risk” (which is excluded from the application of s. 11(3) of the IA 2015) or is one which is designed to reduce the risk of “loss of a particular kind” or “loss at a particular location” or “loss at a particular time”.
By 31 July 2023, all retailers in the UK must comply with a new “Consumer Duty” when selling new and existing products and services to their customers (the date of implementation is 31 July 2024 for firms offering closed products and services). This Duty has been introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) with an amendment to existing Principles for Business (PRIN) and intends to impose a higher standard of behaviour for firms interacting directly or indirectly with retail customers. The scope of the duty has been extended to the regulated activities and ancillary activities of all firms authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs) and E-money Regulations 2011 (EMRs), and on that basis applies not only to insurers but also to insurance intermediaries (e.g., insurance brokers).
What Does the New “Consumer Duty” Entail?
In a nutshell, the new “Consumer Duty” requires retailers to take a more proactive approach and put their customers’ needs first. It should, however, be noted that the duty is neither a “duty of care” nor a “fiduciary” one. It also does not require retailers to provide advice to customers. Although the Duty does not give customers a private right of action, it enables the FCA to investigate any allegation of breach and the FCA could accordingly issue fines against firms and secure redress for customers who have suffered harm through a firm’s breach of the Duty.
More specifically, the Duty introduces:
An overarching customer principle that firms must act to deliver good outcomes for retail customers.
This overarching principle requires firms: i) to act in good faith; ii) to avoid causing foreseeable harm; and iii) to enable and support customers to pursue their financial objectives. No firm definition of the term “good faith” in this context has been provided but the FCA put forward some examples where a firm would be judged not be acting in good faith. Accordingly, an insurance firm will not be acting in good faith if it sells insurance to a customer by taking advantage of his/her vulnerability. Similarly, an insurance company will not be acting in good faith if it exploits its customers’ behavioural bias- i.e. renewing a policy automatically without reviewing the details of any revised terms or endorsements as well as any changes to excess or premiums introduced by the policy.
The Duty focuses on four outcomes (products and services, price and value, consumer understanding and consumer support) and requires firms to ensure consumers receive communications so that they can understand products and services that meet their needs, offer fair value and the support needed to consumers.
The Duty, therefore, will require insurers to reflect on how they assemble, sell, market insurance products to their customers and what kind of support they provide to customers who make inquiries. The insurers are now under a statutory duty to act in good faith, avoid causing foreseeable harm and support their customers in the process of delivering these outcomes.
Specific Implications for Insurance Companies- Especially Those Using AI and Algorithms
The insurers are already reflecting on how they present their policies and various terms in their policies. They will be expected to inform customers fully of the limits of cover (especially policy excesses). Similarly, any proposed changes to cover at renewal stage should be made clear to customers so that they are aware of the changes to their policy and scope of cover. Many insurers would tell you that these are the good practices that they have been implementing for some time anyway.
One area that insurers need to pay careful attention is the standard questions they expect potential customers to answer in cases where they utilise automated computer underwriting systems through which applications for insurance are evaluated and processed without the need for individual underwriter involvement. In some recent cases, the vagueness of such questions has raised legal issues (see, for example, Ristorante Ltd T/A Bar Massimo v. Zurich Insurance Plc [2021] EWHC 2538 (Ch)). For example, if a consumer had a “declined to quote” decision from a pervious insurer, how would s/he be expected to respond to a standard question on such an automated system asking him/her to specify whether s/he has been refused insurance previously? Would a standard customer expected to appreciate that “decline to quote” might not necessarily mean refusal of insurance? The insurers need to think how they phrase such questions, and it would be advisable in the light of the new Duty to provide additional explanation on such a question posed on an automated underwriting platform.
However, more interesting questions might arise in cases where insurance companies utilise AI and algorithms for pricing, risk assessment and consumer support purposes.
Naturally, there is an expectation on any insurance firm that utilise AI in risk assessment process to ensure that the system in use does not inadvertently lead to discriminating outcomes and the new Consumer Duty amplifies this. That is easy to say but difficult to achieve in practice. It is well-known that it is rather difficult, if not impossible, when algorithms are used for risk assessment purposes to know what data has been used by the algorithm and what difference any factor made in such risk assessment (commonly known as the ‘black-box problem’). Insurers rely on programmers, designers and tech experts when they employ AI for risk assessment purposes and as much as they expect such experts to assist them in fulfilling their “Consumer Duty”, it is ultimately something they have very little control over. More significantly, it is rather doubtful that the FCA will have that degree of expertise and technical knowledge to assess whether an algorithm used could deliver good outcomes for the customers. To put differently, it is not clear at this stage whether the new Consumer Duty will in practice enhance the position of consumers when underwriting decisions are taken by AI and algorithms.
Another advantage that algorithms could provide to insurers is to differentiate in price not simply based on risk related factors but other factors (such as the tendency of an individual to pay more for the same product). If allowed or left unchecked, an algorithm by taking into account factors (i.e. number of luxury items ordered by an individual online), might quote a higher premium to an individual than it would have quoted for another individual with a similar risk portfolio. We have a similar problem here- could the algorithm be trained not to do this and more significantly how can a regulator check whether this is complied with or not?
Also, today many insurance companies use chatbots when interacting with customers. Given that the Customer Duty requires insurance companies to provide adequate support to consumers, it is likely that an insurer might fall short of this duty by employing a chatbot that could not deal with unexpected situations or non-standard issues. Checking whether a chatbot is fit for purpose should be easier than trying to understand what factors an algorithm has utilised in making an insurance decision. I suppose the new Consumer Duty would mean that insurers must invest in more advanced chatbots or should put in place alternative support mechanisms for those customers who do not get adequate or satisfactory answers from chatbots.
There is no doubt that the objective of the new Consumer Duty is to create a culture change and encourage retailers, and insurers, to monitor their products and make changes to ensure that their practices and products are “appropriate” and deliver good outcomes for customers. This will also be the motivating factor when insurers utilise AI and algorithms for product development, underwriting and customer support. However, it is also evident that the technical expertise and knowledge within the insurance sector is at an elementary level, and it will probably take some time until the insurers and regulators have the knowledge and expertise to assess and adapt AI and algorithms in line with the consumers’ needs.
The vessel was chartered on a trip basis on an amended NYPE form for carriage of bulk titanium slog and bulk rutile sand. On arrival at the first loading port, the surveyors appointed by the charterers to inspect the cargo holds found that the holds were not ready for loading of the intended cargo. The relevant charterparty form stipulated (cl 49):
Vessel holds on arrival at the first load port(s) to be clean, dry, free of rust and/or scale and cargo residues and ready in all respects to load any/all permissible cargoes under the charterparty to the satisfaction of charterers’ nominated surveyor. If the vessel is not approved by the surveyor, the vessel is to be placed off-hire from the time of that failure until the vessel passed a subsequent survey. All expenses, losses and liabilities arising from the failure are for owners’ account.
It was not in dispute that the failure in inspection triggered the application of cl 49 and the chartered vessel was off-hire from the date the formal inspection was carried out until the surveyor found that the vessel was ready for loading on 12 October (this was a typical period off-hire clause). The dispute here was whether the vessel was off-hire at an earlier date (i.e. 2 October)- this was the date when an informal survey was carried out at anchorage by the same surveyor. The request for this survey was made by the charterer and the owners agreed to it so as to save time at the berth but the report was evidently “advisory to master” and the tribunal had no difficulty disregarding the contention that the vessel was off-hire from 2 October highlighting that the language used in the report was not a language of a report with consequences.
This was the easy part. Two further contentions of the charters, however, required the tribunal to engage in a more analytical legal discussion.
The charterers pointed out that if the holds had been clean, the vessel would have been at a berth at an earlier date (at 11.20 on 9 October) whereas the vessel on facts managed to berth on 18 October (at 1605). On that basis, the charterers were claiming damages for the delay in addition to the vessel being off-hire until 12 October. Their claim was US$ 39,062.50 (hire based on the rate of US$ 6,250 per day) from the time when the holds were found at an acceptable state by the surveyor (at 1010 on 12 October) until the vessel berthed at 1605 on 18 October.
This is an interesting debate especially given that there was certainly a causal link between the delay in berthing and the failure to pass the inspection. However, from the contract law perspective the key issue is whether the remedy stipulated in the contract (here the “off-hire remedy”) allows any other remedy than deduction from hire for the period of time lost. The tribunal found that cl 49 was clear in setting out the consequences of the vessel’s holds being rejected by the charterers’ surveyor: namely the vessel would be off-hire from the time of failure until she passed a subsequent survey. This precludes any further remedy being awarded to the charterers (an application of the principle that “specific remedy” displaces the general one). Furthermore, the fact that cl 56 of the charterparty conferred the option on the charterer to add any off-hire period to the end of the charter term was viewed as a clear indication that the remedy expressly conferred by the charterparty provided a complete code for failure of holds inspection and according to the tribunal this weakened any case for a claim in damages generally. The argument was put in a sophisticated manner but it was essentially an attempt to bypass the established rule that to claim additional damages on the top of off-hire, one needs to show separate breach of the charterparty. The tribunal, correctly in the view of the author, refused to alter this well-established principle.
The second argument put forward by the charterers was an interesting one too. The charterparty contained a clause concerning the rate of hire. Clause 4 provided that the hire would be “at the rate of US$ 6,250 per day pro-rata including the overtime for the first 55 days and US$ 12,000 per day thereafter.”
The chartered vessel was delivered to service at 0900 of 24 September and re-delivered at 0430 on 30 November. Given that the off-hire at the first port occurred during the first 55 days of the hire period, the owners calculated off-hire at the rate of US$ 6,250 per day. However, the charterers claimed that they were entitled to damages as they were required to pay hire at in increased rate of US$ 12,000 per day after the first 55 days of the charter period had expired- essentially they were claiming the differential between the basic hire rate and higher hire rate for the time from when the vessel would have berthed at 1120 on 9 October until 1605 on 18 October when she in fact berthed (US$ 47,138.50).
The tribunal was firmly of the view that this argument was reliant on the construction of the language used in cl. 4 of the charterparty. On that premise, it concluded that the charterers would have had a strong case had cl 4 made specific reference to “on hire days”. If it had, this would have possibly implied that the increased rate should have applied after the off-hire period added to the time which was the threshold for higher hire rate. However, as this was not the case, there was no reason to look beyond the plain meaning of the term “the first 55 days”, and the manner in which the owners dealt with the off-hire at the first loading port correctly reflected the terms of the charterparty.
There is a message for charterers here especially if they agree to a hire clause that introduce a higher rate after a period of time. In those instances, if they do not wish the hire deduction to be made at the lower rate in a case when the vessel is redelivered after the threshold for higher hire is passed (for loss of time occurring earlier during the charterparty), they need to say so explicitly in the charterparty. Most charterparties used in practice do not say so!
What happens if parties agree that the chartered vessel (time or trip charter) would deviate to perform a specific task (e.g. crew change) but after the agreed task is completed further delay arises as a result of other factors (e.g. bad weather) and consequently additional time is lost? Is this a risk that shipowner assumes or is it simply an operational hazard that charterer in a time/trip charter is normally expected to bear?
This was the main issue that the tribunal was asked to address in London Arbitration 11/22 (a proceeding brought under LMAA Small Claims Procedure). The vessel was chartered under an amended NYPE 93 form for a trip from a sole load port in the Sea of Japan to a discharge port in the South China Sea carrying a cargo of steel billets and with an estimated duration of 25 to 30 days. The parties agreed in the charter that the vessel would have had a crew change at Hongai (Vietnam) and the deviation time and bunker costs to be at owners’ account. After the crew change had taken place on departing Hongai the vessel encountered bad weather in the South China Sea and her speed was reduced. The charterers made a deduction of 1.05 day from hire for the delay caused by bad weather following departure from Hongai. The owners argued that the charterers’ deduction was unlawful and breach of charterparty.
In effect, this is a dispute concerning the application of “causation principles” in the context of a term in a charterparty. There can be no doubt that any time lost during the process of deviating to Hongai for crew exchange is on the owners’ account. However, does the owner remain responsible for any delay that occurs after the crew change had been completed on the premise that further delay would not have happened had the vessel not deviated to Hongai in the first instance?
There is little doubt that the deviation was a “but for” cause of the further delay arising due to bad weather after leaving Hongai but is this adequate to make owners’ liable? The tribunal thought “not”! And rightly so! Imagine that a taxi driver is involved in an accident after dropping a customer at a cottage in a remote location. Will it be possible for the driver to revert to the customer seeking compensation for the loss asserting that s/he would not have ben at that location if the customer had not engaged his/her services in the first place. Naturally not! One might say this is a different situation here as the charterer and owner are still in a contractual relationship. That is true but to make one party liable for consequential losses emerging in a contract, it is necessary that the term in question adopts a broad “causation trigger” to that effect. The clause in question here did not, but merely stated that “the deviation time/bunker/costs to be at Owners’ time/account”. In a similar context (indemnity for charterer’s orders) , the Supreme Court in The Kos [2012) UKSC 17, [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 292 making a distinction between “effective causes” and “but for” causes ruled that in the absence of contrary wording in the relevant clause only losses emerging from an effective cause of the loss are recoverable. Here it can plausibly be argued that the relevant clause (enabling deviation for crew change) did not introduce a broad causation trigger and the loss arising due to bad weather was a “but for” cause and not an effective one.
Charterparty agreements in contemporary practice invariably deal with risk allocation between parties and to that end incorporate lengthy provisions. However, such provisions might not always secure the outcome one party hopes to achieve as their legal construction are bound to be influenced from legal precedents and/or legal causation still plays a vital role in the outcome as charterers and also owners in the current dispute found out to their detriment. Several legal issues raised in this dispute, but it is worth elaborating 3 of them which might provide guidance to parties in future when it comes to drafting similar clauses in their agreements.
Speed and consumption calculations (performance)
The charterparty in question (which was on amended NYPE 1946 form), inter alia, stipulated:
Clause 29:
Speed/consumption based on good weather conditions up to Beaufort Scale 4 and Douglas Sea State 3. No adverse current and no negative influence of swell.
Clause 88:
… no hire to be deducted for alleged underperformance claim until it has been agreed by both parties.
In the absence of consistent discrepancy between deck log and weather routing service and in the absence of amicable settlement the matter will be referred to arbitration.
Charterers argued that the vessel did not perform as warranted on four voyages (in breach of cl 29) and they, accordingly, made deductions from hire. These deductions were based on the report prepared by a weather bureau appointed by the charterers. The reports found that the vessel’s performance was short of what was warranted on four voyages and time was lost consequently. The weather expert appointed by the owners doubted the methodology adopted by the charterers’ expert highlighting several technical reasons why the calculations were not accurate.
The tribunal agreed in general with the evidence provided by the owners’ weather expert especially stressing that:
The charterers’ expert seems to include in calculations performance assessment during periods of adverse currents or when there was a negative influence of swell in contradiction with good weather indices of cl. 29;
The vessel’s log was a more reliable indicator of currents than AIS positioning alone in moderate weather conditions:
Satellite telemetry records did not provide sufficient accurate data regarding localised wind and sea state so as to automatically cast immediate doubt on ship’s observations.
From a legal pointy of view, the tribunal’s decision makes the point again that in instances where the relevant performance provision is silent on the beneficial currents, the owners are entitled to any benefit gained as a result of such currents (a point also made in The Divinegate [2002] EWHC 2095 (Comm)). More significantly, the tribunal’s decision demonstrates that in determining the performance of the chartered vessel, the data in the logbook will not automatically taken into account but equally calculations from weather experts would only be preferred if they are scientifically sound to doubt the accuracy of logbook data.
Hull fouling
Clause 82 of the charterparty provided that the charterers are responsible for the cost of hull and/or propeller cleaning if such cleaning is required following the vessel remaining idle at any safe anchorage for a total of 20 consecutive days.
The vessel stayed at Bin Qasim for 22 days and the owners sought to recover the cost of cleaning at the next drydock. The owners also attempted to claim the cost of cleaning hard barnacle roots became embedded in the vessel’s hull discovered just before re-delivery after a report from an underwater operation carried out in Taiwan.
The tribunal found that the hull and propeller fouling was the result of the vessel’s call at Bin Qasim and the charterers were in breach of cl 82 for failing to arrange an underwater inspection and carrying out the necessary cleaning required. However, it was held that the claim for future freshwater washing and sandblasting was not covered by cl 82 as it was unlikely that hard barnacle roots became embedded in the vessel’s hull during the time spent at Bin Qasim. This highlights the need to demonstrate the existence of a causal link between the alleged loss and breach.
Damage to hull
The owners claimed that one of the holds was damaged during loading and discharging operations. The claim was backed by a post-discharge survey and the master’s reports and indemnity for this damage was sought from the charterer under clause 8 of the charterparty which obliged the charterer to undertake all cargo operations and indemnify the owners for the consequences of the charterers’ employment orders.
The tribunal found that it was very likely that the damage was caused during cargo operations but the owners failed in their claim for indemnity as they submitted no invoice following the drydocking giving the tribunal the impression that repairs were either not carried out or had been incorporated with other repairs. Put differently, the owners’ claim was not successful as they failed to prove loss. This is a timely reminder to owners that such indemnity claims need to be documented for recovery.
Eastern Pacific Chartering inc v. Pola Maritime Ltd (The Divinegate) [2022] EWHC 2095 (Comm)
The Divinegate was trip chartered on an amended NYPE 1946 form with additional clauses for a carriage of pig iron from Riga via the Baltic Sea to the Mississippi River in the United States. Following discharge of the cargo, the owners sought unpaid hire, bunkers and expenses totalling US$ 99,982.79 and the charterers sought deductions from hire of US$ 93,074.55 for the failure to proceed with utmost despatch on the voyage and hull fouling. The charterers also made a counterclaim for US$ 72, 629.01 as damages in tort on grounds of the owners’ allegedly wrongful arrest of the vessel, The Polo Devora, of which charterers believed to be the beneficial owner. The wrongful arrest counterclaim failed and will not be discussed here.
The charterparty contained a performance warranty to the effect that “Speed and consumption basis no adverse currents and valid up and including Douglas Sea State 3/ Beaufort Force 4.”
The essence of the litigation was the assessment of the chartered vessel’s performance to determine whether there was, in fact, a failure to proceed with utmost despatch on the voyage. The owners contended that the performance of the vessel should be assessed in a conventional way, i.e. by reference to the vessel’s speed during “good weather”. The charterers, on the other hand, suggested that underperformance could be established by reference to the vessel’s measured RPM (revolution per minute) which reflects the engine speed maintained by the crew.
The Judgment and Lessons for the Future
Ms Clare Ambrose, sitting as a High Court Deputy Judge, made significant observations on the state of law in this area and reached interesting conclusions which are likely to inform the judges and arbitrators who are often called in to deal with performance related claims in the context of time (and trip) charters.
It was stressed that traditional way of establishing breach and loss in performance claims is the “good weather” method and in instances where the parties have adopted such a formulation in their contracts (which was the case here) this will be the primary method of assessment used by the court.
2. The judge also appreciated that this is not the only available methodology for making calculations and there is no bar for alternative methods being used to measure vessel’s performance. However, any alternative method must be consistent with the express wording contained in the charterparty and must also be established as “reliable”. On the facts of this case, the RPM method was not found to be reliable in identifying loss of time as it made incorrect assumptions as to the resistance on the hull and made no allowance for weather conditions being a reason for a reduction in engine speed, as well as ignoring the fact that there were periods the vessel could not achieve the warranted speed due to other factors, e.g. currents.
Therefore, the judge left it open to parties to argue that alternative methods (especially in the light of emerging technologies) could be used to assess a chartered vessel’s performance but strongly hinted that so far no satisfactory method has been put forward to sway judges/arbitrators away from the traditional method and legal principles that have been developed for years. Referring to the “good weather” method, Ms Ambrose said (at [90]):
“The approach adopted in the authorities reflects commercial practice in assessing performance and the specific wording chosen by the parties, rather than the court imposing legal methodologies.”
3. An interesting debate in the case related to the impact of currents in the assessment of performance of the vessel. It was contended by the charterer that allowance should be made for the positive currents and positive currents should be, therefore, a factor in determining whether the vessel’s performance is at the warranted level. This argument found no support from the judge. It was held that in the absence of wording excluding the benefits of positive currents, such benefits should not be deducted in measuring the vessel’s speed for the purposes of the performance warranty. This provides a judicial clarity on the matter and is logical from a commercial perspective. A contrary solution would have meant that the owners would be penalised for its master finding a favourable current and ensuring that the vessel goes faster and burns less fuel (something that is economically beneficiary for both parties).
The judge applying the “good weather” method, reached the conclusion that the chartered vessel failed to meet the warranted speed so there was underperformance giving rise to a loss of time of 16 hours.
4. The judge also rejected the claim for hull fouling indicating that the use of good weather method for calculating loss from slow steaming would otherwise lead to double recovery.
The judgment is a reminder to the market that in the absence of clear and contrary wording it will be rather difficult to shift the traditional method of assessing a chartered vessel’s performance with reference to good weather method. However, especially in trip charters there remains a realistic possibility that it might not be possible to obtain good weather sample so as to be able to assess the performance of the vessel. In those instances, with the advances in technology, the courts and arbitrators might come under pressure to consider alternative assessment methods that could shed light on the performance of the chartered vessel.
The vessel was charted for a single voyage (from Bilbao to Paulsboro on the Delaware River) pursuant to the terms of an amended Shellvoy 6 form. A period of 72 hours was allocated as laytime in the charterparty for loading and discharge and 68 hours and 54 minutes of the laytime had been used at the loading port (Bilbao).
The water depth at the intended discharge berth at Paulsboro was 12.19m. The vessel draft was 12.15m but the tide was expected to vary by 1.6m. Accordingly, in line with charterparty provisions, the master submitted a risk assessment and sought a waiver from the technical operators of the under keel clearance policy as stipulated in the charter form. The technical operators granted the waiver for the transit from anchorage and for the berthing. The waiver was issued on the assumption that the vessel’s draft was equal to or less than the draft of the river/berth at high water. The master was also asked to ensure that prompt commencement of discharge was discussed with the terminal officers.
The chartered vessel arrived at the discharge berth on 31 March 2019. The terminal informed the master that unloading needed to be conducted at a reduced rate initially. This could, in master’s calculations, mean that the discharge rate would be less than the rate necessary to maintain a safe under keel clearance. On that basis, the master took the decision to leave the berth (a short while berthing) and return to anchorage.
Another berth became available on 1 April and the master prepared a fresh under keel clearance calculation, and risk assessment and sought another waiver from the technical operators. The technical operators refused to give waiver on this occasion stating that the safety for margin was too small and there were not sufficient controls in place to mitigate the risk of the vessel touching bottom.
The vessel managed to berth only after a portion of the cargo was lightened on 4 April 2019. This caused a further delay and laytime ended on 6 April (10.24). By that time, a further 154.63 hours were used at Paulsboro, bringing the total time used to 226.63 hours. The owners sought demurrage in the sum of US$ 143,153.64. The charterers raised objection to the demurrage claim arguing:
Two incidents (the owner’s decision to leave the discharge terminal within 12 minutes of berthing on 31 March 2019 and the owner’s refusal to comply with the charterer’s request to return to berth at 21.00 on 1 April) had the effect of suspending the running of laytime;
The notice of readiness (NOR) given by the owner upon arrival at Paulsboro was not valid because “free pratique” certificate had not been granted.
His Honour Judge Bird found on both of these points in favour of the owners:
The running of the laytime is suspended only when time is lost due to “default on the owner’s part, or on the part of those for whom they are responsible” (The Fontevivo [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 339). This was not the case here as the owner acted in a way permitted and required by the relevant charterparty (the need to operate the vessel safely was explicitly specified in the charter and the contract made clear that under keel clearance was binding and not to be breached without consent). It was also noted that the power to grant or refuse a waiver of the policy was not limited in any way in the charterparty.
The evidence indicated that there was no formal mechanism for the grant of “free pratique” at the discharge port and the port appeared to have operated a free pratique by default system, with decisions communicated if there was disease on board. Accordingly, the NOR had been valid.
Comment
The running of laytime can only be suspended by express terms of the contract or if there is a “fault” on the part of the owners preventing the loading or discharging operations. It is clear that the “fault” does not need to be an actionable breach of the charterparty, but the present decision (in line with earlier authorities) also makes clear that no fault can be established in cases where the master takes steps that cause delay for safety reasons and such decisions are deemed to be “entirely justifiable” in the circumstances. In the present context, a “capricious refusal” to grant a waiver of keel clearance policy by the operators, for example, could have amounted to a “fault” capable of suspending the running of the clock but that was not the case.
The obtaining of a “free pratique” certificate was a mere formality prior to the commencement of the global pandemic and the finding in this case reflects that position. The matter might be rather different now especially given that some countries have introduced strict quarantining and/or testing requirements for Covid. It is very unlikely that in today’s commercial world we could easily assume that any port operates on a “free pratique” default system. And, in those instances lack of “free pratique“ certificate could prevent the chartered vessel from being regarded as an “arrived ship” which is vital for the commencement of the laytime period.
Piraeus Bank A.E. v. Antares Underwriting Ltd (The ZouZou) [2022] EWHC 1169 (Comm)
In practice mortgagee’s interest policies (MIPs) provide financiers (e.g. banks) a supplementary cover to the shipowner’s policies (marine and war risks) to ensure that the mortgagee will still have cover in the event of the cover is declined under owners’ policies for an insured risk by reason of: a) misrepresentation or non-disclosure; b) breach of a promissory warranty, c) the failure to exercise due diligence insofar as it is required under the owners’ policies d) the expiry of a time limitation period; and, even in case of a total loss where there is a judgment or award holding that the shipowner’s claim is not recoverable under the owner’s hull or war risk policies on the grounds that the loss has not been proved to have been proximately caused by a peril insured against, but is not otherwise excluded by any exclusion or provision. However, on the last point it needs to be stressed that there will be no cover under MIPs, if the loss is proximately caused by a peril excluded from cover under owners’ policies.
In the present case, the mortgaged ship was detained in Venezuela in late August 2015 on the suspicion that the crew had attempted to smuggle part of a cargo of high sulfur diesel oil by diverting it from the cargo tanks nominated for loading to other tanks through the cargo lines. Four members of the crew allegedly involved in this smuggling attempt were tried and acquitted. The ship was detained for about 14 months and two weeks before its release, the owners tendered a notice of abandonment (NOA) and sought indemnity under its war risk policy for constructive total loss. The vessel’s war risk insurer (Hellenic Club) declined indemnity on the basis that an excluded peril (cl. 3.5 which excluded cover for losses arising out of steps taken “under the criminal law of any state”).
The mortgagee bank turned to mortgagees’ interest insurer, which insured the risk under a standard MIP, and claimed their net loss (indemnity quantified by reference to the outstanding indebtedness). The mortgagee’s interest insurer declined the claim on various grounds which will be briefly discussed below.
The cause of loss is an excluded peril under the war risk policy
Whilst providing cover for seizure, arrest and detention and the consequences thereof, there was an exclusion in the policy stipulating that loss arising out of action taken “under the criminal law of any state” would not be covered under the policy. The mortgagee bank claimed that this exclusion did not apply as detention was unlawful. Relying on the expert advice, the Court was able to find that the detention was carried out in line with Venezuelan criminal law by the order of the Venezuelan Criminal Court and was accordingly lawful. Therefore, the exclusion certainly was relevant in this context.
The alternative argument of the bank was that the exclusion did not apply as the owners themselves were not guilty (or alleged to be guilty) of the offence. The Court, rightly, in the opinion of the author, rejected this alternative argument stating that the exclusion in question did not draw such a distinction (i.e. excluding losses arising out of steps taken under the criminal law of any state only when the assured themselves are involved in the criminal activity and not so when this is not the case). This is in line not only with literal wording of the clause but also the decision of Hamblen J in Atlasnavios-Navegação v. Navigators (The B Atlantic) [2014] EWHC 4133 (Comm) in connection with the equivalent exclusion in the Institute War and Strikes Clauses.
Additional coverage provided by the MIP in question?
When setting out the coverage terms, clause 1 of the policy provided for an indemnity in the event of loss, damage to, or liability, arising in connection with the vessel:
Which prima facie would have been covered by the Owners’ policies but for any act or omission by the Owners (amongst others and/or their servants and/or their agents- referred to as the “Relevant Parties”; or
Which occurred because of “any alleged deliberate, negligent or accidental act or omission … of any of the Relevant Parties”.
The Bank’s alternative argument was that it was entitled indemnity under cl 1(ii) as the wording of this clause did not expressly cross-refer to the owners’ insurance policies thus providing wide coverage for any loss or damage to the ship as a consequence of any act of omission by any of the crew or any other servant or agents of the owners or charterers or by any allegation of such and act or mission. The Court rejected this argument as well stressing that cl 1(ii) could not be construed in isolation and was dependent on the war risk policy. Put differently, it was held that the words “relevant party” in this clause referred to the owners’ or their employees/agents acting in the context of the relevant insurance contract (war risk insurance) and claim only. This means that this clause only applies in a case where the loss of the ship is prima facie covered by the owners’ insurances and the owners’ insurers refuse to pay by alleging involvement of the owners or agents in the loss.
As highlighted by the Court, a contrary interpretation would have led to outcomes which would have been wholly uncommercial, such as:
The bank recovering losses which would have never recovered under the owners’ policies as they would have been excluded;
The bank recovering sums far in excess of anything recoverable under the owner’s policies, even if covered; and
The bank recovering from mortagees’ interest insurers even where the loss had already been paid under the owners’ policies.
Was there a loss under the war risk policy in any event?
Most war policies contain a detainment clause, and the owner’s war policy here was no exception, which provided that the vessel will be deemed to be a constructive total loss (CTL) when the owner is deprived of possession of the insured vessel for a period of 12 months. Although, the vessel in question was detained by Venezuelan authorities more than 12 months in the present case, given that the detention was lawful and this was an excluded peril under the relevant war risk policy, there can be no prospect of claiming CLT unless it was found that the detention was in fact unlawful. The Court’s finding that the vessel had not been detained unlawfully at any point meant that there was no CLT under the detainment clause.
What is the key message coming out of the case?
From the perspective of the application of principles of legal construction, the outcome of the case makes sense and does not break any new ground. However, the judgment reiterates the point that MIPs are secondary in nature and issues a stark warning to financiers that there might be several instances where they might fail to recover under their MIPs. Where, for example, drugs placed by criminal carters on board of a ship which eventually lead to detention of the vessel in question, even if the owners are not involved in this criminal activity, the resulting loss will be excluded from most war risk policies given that there is often an exclusion for loss resulting from “detainment… by reason of infringement of any customs or trading regulations in standard war policies (see The Kleovoulos of Rhodes [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138) and The B Atlantic [2018] UKSC 26). This would mean that any claim of a bank under a MIP will also fail. Similarly, claims airing out of any detention for alleged breach of government sanctions are likely to be excluded from war risk policies as there is an exclusion for loss, damage, cost or expense arising out of “ordinary judicial process” (see cl 4.1.6 of the Institute War and Strikes Clauses- Hulls- Time (1/10/1983). The banks, therefore, need to appreciate the limitations of standard MIPs and consider negotiating tailor-made coverage clauses in their policies.
Disputes often arise in time charters on whether any deduction from charter hire can be made especially when there is an alleged underperformance of the chartered vessel.
It is well established principle of law that if a deduction is made from hire, such deduction must be made in good faith and be based on reasonable grounds (otherwise such deduction amounts to breach of contract on the part of the charterer). This effectively means that in case of a deduction for underperformance of the chartered vessel, the charterer might be called upon at short notice to demonstrate that its deductions were made bona fidei and its calculations were based in reasonable grounds (The Kostas Melas [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 18).
This was the central issue in this dispute. The charterers withheld US$ 53,550.40 gross in respect of what they claimed was time loss due to underperformance to the extent of 6.6938 days (off-hire).
When the tribunal asked the charterers to demonstrate a prima facie case as to whether the deduction from hire was made bona fidei and on reasonable grounds, they responded with a report of weather routing company they appointed, some further comments from that company and the fact that the owners did not appoint their own weather routing company.
The tribunal found that charterers failed to address the question of good faith nor had they made any attempt to show that they had a claim for off hire. It was also noted by the tribunal that the charterers did not address the point made by the owners that there was no speed/consumption warranty in the charterparty as the fixture description of the ship was qualified by the words “all details about/in good faith”.
The tribunal here was simply deciding that the charterers had not shown that their deduction was made in good faith and on reasonable grounds so they were wrong to withheld the deduction from hire. It is theoretically open to charterers to claim that there was an underperformance of the chartered vessel but as hinted by the tribunal, based on the wording in the charterparty qualifying the performance of the vessel, it will be an uphill struggle to prove the existence of a speed/consumption warranty and the fact that it was breached!
