UK withdraws accession to 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court.

As expected, 31 Jan 2020 saw the following

 

31-01-2020
With reference to depositary notification Choice of Court No. 01/2019, dated 2 January 2019, regarding the accession to the Convention by the United Kingdom, and with reference to depositary notifications Choice of Court No. 03/2019, dated 29 March 2019, Choice of Court No. 04/2019, dated 12 April 2019, and Choice of Court No. 07/2019, dated 31 October 2019, regarding the suspended accession of the United Kingdom to the Convention, the depositary communicates that the Instrument of Accession, Note Verbale and Declarations were withdrawn by the United Kingdom on 31 January 2020.

 

In the meantime the UK keeps riding along in the Convention due to the EU’s accession.

Don’t worry, another UK accession will probably be along later in the year as the UK approaches ‘third party state’ day (TPS day) on 31 December 2020 – possibly to be followed by another ‘withdrawal’ in the event that the UK and the EU conclude an agreement on judgments and jurisdiction before the end of the implementation period.

No indemnity for loading of damaged goods when clean bill of lading issued.

 

 

There is no right to an indemnity to be implied into a voyage charter in relation to the accuracy of a statement in the draft bill presented to the master that the good are loaded clean on board, in the event that they turn out to be pre-damaged. The Tai Prize  [2020] EWHC 127 (Comm) involved a cargo claim under the bill of lading for which the shipowner received 50% contribution from the disponent owner who then sought to recover that sum from the voyage charterer under a charter which incorporated the Hague Rules.

The shipper presented a draft bill of lading to the shipowner at the loading port which described the cargo, under the heading “Shipper’s description of Goods”,  as being “63,366.150 metric tons Brazilian Soyabeans Clean on Board Freight pre-paid”. The bill of lading that was issued noted that the cargo was loaded in apparent good order and condition. On discharge charred cargo was found in two of the vessel’s holds and discharge was suspended. The remaining cargo was discharged without complaint and the cargo in the affected holds was discharged but the receiver maintained that the cargo in those holds had suffered heat and mould damage. The disponent owner commenced arbitrationto recover from the voyage charterer the contribution paid to the owner. The arbitrator found that the cargo had been loaded in a pre-damaged condition and the shipper as agent for the voyage charterer had impliedly warranted the accuracy of any statement as to condition contained in the bill of lading and had impliedly agreed to indemnify the defendant against the consequences of inaccuracy of the statement

HHJ Pelling QC found that

(1) By presenting the draft bill of lading for signature by or on behalf of the master, in relation to the statement concerning apparent good order and condition, the shipper was doing no more than inviting the master to make a representation of fact in accordance with his own assessment of the apparent condition of the cargo.

(2) The bill of lading was not inaccurate as a matter of law because the master did not and could not reasonably have discovered the relevant defects because they were not reasonably visible to him or any other agent of the claimant at or during shipment.

(3) No guarantee or warranty was to be implied into the voyage charter. It would be wrong in principle to imply into the contract a provision making the claimant liable to indemnify the defendant, when the drafters of the Hague Rules,which were incorporated into the voyage charter,  could have but decided not to provide expressly for such a provision in relation to statements by the shipper as to the apparent order and condition of the cargo. Under Art. III, Rule 5 a warranty is deemed to have been supplied by the shipper to the carrier in respect of the information “… furnished in writing by the shipper” pursuant to HR, Art. III, Rule 3, which relates to the “… leading marks necessary for identification of the goods …” and “… the number of packages or pieces or the quantity or weight …” However,  there is no such guarantee deemed to be given in respect of the apparent order and condition of the goods , This information in the bill is exclusively an assessment by the carrier.

The Judge concluded:

 

[35] The Arbitrator’s concern that the defendant would be left without recourse was misplaced because its liability did not and could not arise as a result of the wrongs of anyone on the charterer’s “… side of the line” because its liability to the Shipowner was the result of its decision to pay the Shipowner rather than defend the claim by reference to the true condition of the goods. There is nothing unfair, unjust, uncommercial or unconscionable about an outcome that leaves ultimate liability with the defendant because there was no misrepresentation, no evidence or finding that the Master had acted on the alleged misrepresentation rather than, or even as well as, attempting to and/or being unable reasonably to verify the condition of the goods before his agents signed the B/L and because it decided to pay the Shipowner.

 

Going, going, gone (but no Bong!). UK leaves EU at 11 tonight.

 

Tonight at midnight Brussels time, 11 pm for us Brits, the UK ceases to be a member of the european union. So what will change? Very little. The UK now enters the implementation period which will see it subject to EU law, the customs union and the internal market. It will not participate in the institutions of the European Union so today our MEPs will be packing their bags and coming home.

The implementation period will cease at 11 pm our time on 31 December. In the meantime the UK government is now free to start official negotiations with the EU and with the US and other states for free trade agreements.  These cannot be implemented, though until the implementation period comes to an end.

The Brussels Regime on Jurisdiction and Judgments would cease to be part of UK domestic law on ‘exit day’ pursuant to  2019 No. 479 Exiting the European Union Private International Law. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. This has not been repealed, but under ss 1and 2 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 the whole corpus of EU law will remain effective in the UK during the implementation period, including the Brussels Regime.

The UK acceded to The Hague Convention on choice of court agreements on 28 December 2018, followed by a series of suspensions until exit day which come to an end on 1 February 2020. Cometh the exit day cometh the Convention. Previously the UK was a party to the Convention via its EU membership. That will cease at 11pm tonight. At 00.01 tomorrow it will now be a party in its own right. However, in its declaration of 30.10.2019 the UK Government stated

“In the event that a Withdrawal Agreement is signed, ratified and approved by the United Kingdom and the European Union and enters into force prior to or on 1 February 2020, the United Kingdom will withdraw the Instrument of Accession which it deposited on 28 December 2018.”

This does not appear to have happened yet.

Global warming and international shipping. The costs of decarbonisation.

 

Currently, the shipping world is focussed on bunkers, and in particular the adaptations required following the introduction of the 0.5% Sulphur Cap on 1 January 2020. However, bunkers are also going to feature high on the list of possible ways of meeting the IMO’s target of reducing reducing carbon emissions from shipping by at least 50% by 2050 over 2008 levels. A new study https://u-mas.co.uk/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=03IebWyJns8%3d&portalid=0 by UMAS and the Energy Transitions Commission for the Global Maritime Forum for the Getting to Zero Coalition costs the scale of cumulative investment needed between 2030 and 2050 to achieve the IMO target at approximately USD 0.8-1.2 trillion, or on average between USD 40- 60 billion annually for 20 years.

However, if the target is raised to decarbonisation by 2050, the study estimates extra investments would be needed of approximately USD 400 billion over 20 years, making the total investments needed between USD 1.2-1.6 trillion dollars. The estimate is based on ammonia (NH3) as the primary zero carbon replacement fuel  adopted by the shipping industry and although other fuels such as hydrogen and synthetic methanol, may compete with ammonia, their investment costs will not significantly change from those of ammonia.

The biggest share of this extra investment, 87%, will be in the on shore infrastructure and production facilities for low carbon fuels, with hydrogen production making up around half of this, and ammonia synthesis and storage and bunkering the other half. 13% will relate to ships include the machinery and onboard storage required for a ship to run on ammonia both in newbuild ships and, in some cases, for retrofits, and will include investments in improving energy efficiency, estimated to be higher due to the higher fuel costs of ammonia compared to traditional marine fuels.

Parent company duties of care. Hearing date set for Okpabi appeal to Supreme Court.

I have been informed by Leigh Day, acting on behalf of the appellants, that their appeal will be heard by the UK Supreme Court on 23 June 2020

These observations of Lord Briggs in Lungowe v Vedanta [61] may prove to be significant in the forthcoming appeal.

“[I]t seems to me that the parent may incur the relevant responsibility [for the
tort of a subsidiary] to third parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in
fact do so.   In such circumstances its very omission may constitute the
abdication of a responsibility which it has publicly undertaken.”

Juliana climate change case. Ninth Circuit full of sympathy but dismisses suit for failure to establish redressability.

The last few years have seen several public law suits against governments by NGOs seeking, not unreasonably, that they do more to combat global warming. The one victory so far has been that in the Netherlands with the Supreme Court’s decision in the Urgenda case in December 2019 upholding the decisions of the lower courts that the Dutch Government must cut greenhouse gas emissions by 25% over 1990 levels by the end of 2020. Apart from that, it has been supportive words and defeats all the way. That trend has continued with last Friday’s majority decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Juliana v US, the so-called Childrens’ Climate case.

The case was brought in 2015 by various schoolchildren who asserted that the US Government’s conduct in relation to global warming constituted violations of: their substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;  their rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; their rights under the Ninth Amendment; and the public trust doctrine. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].”

The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due process right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”

The Court of Appeals noted the evidence supporting the fact that the world now faces an imminent climate catastrophe, evidence supported by government scientists. Judge Hurwitz stated:

“As early as 1965, the Johnson Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties. In 1983, an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) report projected an increase of 2 degrees Celsius by 2040, warning that a “wait and see” carbon emissions policy was extremely risky. And, in the 1990s, the EPA implored the government to act before it was too late. Nonetheless, by 2014, U.S. fossil fuel emissions had climbed to 5.4 billion metric tons, up substantially from 1965. This growth shows no signs of abating. From 2008 to 2017, domestic petroleum and natural gas production increased by nearly 60%, and the country is now expanding oil and gas extraction four times faster than any other nation

The record also establishes that the government’s contribution to climate change is not simply a result of inaction. The government affirmatively promotes fossil fuel use in a host of ways, including beneficial tax provisions, permits for imports and exports, subsidies for domestic and overseas projects, and leases for fuel extraction on federal land.”

The majority of the Court of Appeals however dismissed the claim on the grounds that to establish redressability under Article III of the Constitution, the plaintiffs must show that the relief sought is (1) substantially likely to redress their injuries; and (2) within the district court’s power to award. The crux of the plaintiffs’ requested remedy was an injunction requiring the government not only to cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuel use, but also to prepare a plan subject to judicial approval to draw down harmful emissions. This would draw the judiciary into policy making, a matter which was something for the ballot box. Judge Hurwitz stated:

“There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change, both as a policy matter in general and a matter of national survival in particular. But it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan.

These decisions range, for example, from determining how much to invest in public transit to how quickly to transition to renewable energy, and plainly require consideration of “competing social, political, and economic forces,” which must be made by the People’s “elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of Government for the entire country.”

…the plaintiffs’ request for a remedial plan would subsequently require the judiciary to pass judgment on the sufficiency of the government’s response to the order, which necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking.”

Judge Staton, dissenting, stated:

“In these proceedings, the government accepts as fact that the United States has reached a tipping point crying out for a concerted response—yet presses ahead toward calamity. It is as if an asteroid were barreling toward Earth and the government decided to shut down our only defenses.”

And

“What sets this harm apart from all others is not just its magnitude, but its irreversibility. The devastation might look and feel somewhat different if future generations could simply pick up the pieces and restore the Nation. But plaintiffs’ experts speak of a certain level of global warming as “locking in” this catastrophic damage. Put more starkly by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Harold R. Wanless, “[a]tmospheric…warming will continue for some 30 years after we stop putting more greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. But that warmed atmosphere will continue warming the ocean for centuries, and the accumulating heat in the oceans will persist for millennia” (emphasis added). Indeed, another of plaintiffs’ experts echoes, “[t]he fact that GHGs dissipate very slowly from the atmosphere and that the costs of taking CO2 out of the atmosphere through non-biological carbon capture and storage are very high means that the consequences of GHG emissions should be viewed as effectively irreversible” (emphasis added). In other words, “[g]iven the self-reinforcing nature of climate change,” the tipping point may well have arrived, and we may be rapidly approaching the point of no return.”

 

Indeed.

 

The current concentration of CO2 in the earth’s atmosphere is 413.25 ppm. To have a 67% chance of keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees over pre-industrial levels, the  CO2 concentration in the earth’s atmosphere should not exceed 430 ppm. The annual mean rate of increase of CO2 in the earth’s atmosphere in the last ten years is around 2.5ppm.

Demurrage time bar. Do documents and claim have to come together?

 

Following a recent decision on a time charter time bar clause, we now have another time bar decision, this time by Peter MacDonald Eggers QC, in The Amelie Essberger [2019] EWHC 3402 (Comm). The vessel was chartered on amended Asbatankvoy form for a voyage from Rotterdam to Castellon in Spain. At Castellon the receiver refused to accept delivery of part of the cargo carried in one of the vessel’s tanks (tank 5S), because that cargo was contaminated with mono ethylene glycol. After discharge of the remainder of the cargo at Castellon the vessel then shifted to an anchorage off Castellon, remaining there for nine days before sailing to Valencia for discharge of the cargo in tank 5S.

The charter contained a demurrage time bar clause in the rider.

5) TIME BAR

Any claim for demurrage, deadfreight, shifting expenses or other charges or invoices shall be considered waived unless received by the Charterer or Charterer’s broker in writing with all supporting calculations and documents, within sixty (60) 90 days after completion of discharge of the last parcel of Charterer’s cargo (es). Demurrage, if any, must be submitted in a single claim at that time, and the claim must be supported by the following documents:

  1. Vessel and/or terminal time logs; B. Notices of Readiness; C. Pumping Logs; and D. Letters of Protest …

The Charterers applied for summary judgment pursuant to CPR rule 24.2 on the ground that the Owners had no real prospect of succeeding in their claim for demurrage because of the time bar defence. The demurrage claim was submitted in time but did not include two of the specified documents – (a) the Vessel’s pumping log at Rotterdam and (b) a letter of protest issued by the Master of the Vessel dated 30th November 2017, noting that the Charterers’ and the shippers’ surveyor had not supplied the Vessel with sealed samples of the cargo upon completion of loading. Owners had already provided the charterers with these documents before submitting their demurrage claim.

The Judge was inclined to adopt either a construction of the time-bar clause that requires the Owners to submit documents on which they relied in support of their demurrage claim or one that required the submission of documents which taken at face value established the validity of the demurrage claim. The clause required the submission of “all” such supporting documents. Furthermore, the four listed documents had to be supplied whether or not the listed documents might be said to be “supporting documents”  as this was clear from the mandatory language of the second sentence (“must be supported”).

However, there was no express requirement that the supporting documents must be provided at one time and at the same time as the demurrage claim. The word “Demurrage” at the beginning of the second sentence was to be construed as a reference to the demurrage claimed and not as a reference to the demurrage claim and supporting documents The requirement that the demurrage claim “with” all supporting documentation must be received by the Charterers within 90 days after the completion of discharge meant no more than that the claim and supporting documents must be received before the expiry of the 90 day period. The reference to a “single claim” means that only one claim may be submitted. In other words, separate demurrage claims, for example at loadport or at each discharge port, were not permitted.  The commercial purpose of Clause 5 did not require the simultaneous submission of the demurrage claim and the supporting documents, but merely the submission of the claim and the supporting documents before the end of the 90 day period.

Accordingly, the claim was not time barred. Had supporting documents not been supplied to charterers within 90 days, the entire demurrage claim would have been barred and not just that part to which those documents related. The clause did not provide that only a part of the demurrage claim will be waived if anything less than “all supporting … documents” are provided and contemplated only a “single claim”. However, the Judge could see the sense of “an approach that if there are two parts of the demurrage claim which are unrelated and if a supporting document is relevant for one part of the demurrage claim, but not the other, there is no pressing reason why the unaffected part of the claim should be time-barred [62].”

 

 

New year, new sulphur cap.

The Sulphur cap is here. If you’re a shipowner still running on High Sulphur Fuel Oil (HSFO) you need to trust to your Fuel Oil Non-Availability Report (FONAR), unless you are fitted with scrubbers. If you’re running on Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (LSFO) now you still need to get any HSFO off your vessel by 1 March 2020 due to the Carriage Ban. Apart from increasing the cost of running a vessel, the IMO’s two regulation are likely to see various additional costs being incurred by shipowners: costs of disposal of remaining onboard HSFO including costs of tank and line cleaning to avoid residual HSFO mingling with LSFO and pushing the Sulphur level over 0.5%; time lost in performing such operations; effect of LSFO on owners’ performance warranties under time charters; fines and detention due to inability to get remaining HSFO off the vessel by 1.3.2020 (there is no equivalent of a FONAR to cover this eventuality). A report from S&P Global Platts last week reveals that a lot of debunkering is going to have take place between now and 1.3.2020. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/shipping/122719-shipowners-rush-to-de-bunker-hsfo-as-imo-2020-looms

Added to that there is the greater risk of engine damage due to use of LSFO. Today Reuters carries a report that testing companies examining newer, low-sulphur marine blends acquired in Antwerp, Belgium, Houston and Singapore have found sediment at levels that could damage the engines of ocean-going vessels. Depressing news with which to welcome in the new year. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-shipping-imo-fueloil/tests-raise-alarms-over-fuel-blends-coming-for-ocean-going-vessels-idUKKBN1YZ1ED

It is likely that the new decade will see a spate of claims arising out of the sulphur cap and the carriage ban, particularly under time charters, with renewed interest by owners in the indemnity as a means of clawing back costs from time charterers.

“All supporting documents” in time charter time bar clause means what it says.

 

Mur Shipping BV v Louis Dreyfus Company Suisse SA [2019] EWHC 3240 (The Tiger Shanghai) concerned the construction of the following time bar in additional clause 119 of a time charter on NYPE form.

“[Owners] shall be discharged and released from all liability in respect of any claim or claims which [Charterers] may have under Charter Party and such claims shall be totally extinguished unless such claims have been notified in detail to [Owners] in writing accompanied by all available supporting documents (whether relating to liability or quantum or both) and arbitrator appointed within 12 months from completion of charter”.”

The charter was terminated due to a problem with the feeder holes in the hatch covers which were positioned so that the loading crane at the loading port, Carbenaros, was not quite long enough to reach those on the starboard side of the Vessels. To solve this problem the Charterers wanted to cut new cement feeder holes into the hatch covers. Disponent owners refused permission for the work to be done. Shortly after the vessel arrived at the load port, a survey was conducted at charterer’s request by CSS on the cutting of new cement holes in the hatch covers. The following day disponent owners stated that their refusal was final and non-negotiable and  charterers terminated the charter.

The express basis for that termination was that the cutting of additional feeder holes fell within the ambit of Clause 46 which provided “The Charterers, subject to the Owners’ and Master’s approval which is not to be unreasonably withheld, shall be at liberty to fit/weld any additional equipment and fittings for loading … cargo. Such work shall be done at the Charterer’s expense and time, and the Charterers shall remove such equipment and fittings at their expense and time prior to redelivery, if so required by the Owners …” Charterers argued that Owners’ refusal for permission to cut such holes had been unreasonably withheld, so that Owners were in repudiatory breach and Charterers were entitled to terminate.

Charterers appointed their arbitrator within 12 months of the termination of the charter and claimed in respect of “all disputes connected with the Charterparty” which was stated to include claims for:

  1. i) The return of hire and value of delivery bunkers paid in advance,
  2. ii) costs incurred on the Owners’ behalf;

iii) damages in respect of claim from the sub Charters for the termination of the Charter; and

  1. iv) the Owners’ failure to obey instructions/ breach of Clause 46 of the Charter.

Nearly a year later charterers served claim submissions to which was attached the CSS Report dealing with the feasibility of drilling cement holes in the hatch covers, and relied on it to allege that disponent owners had unreasonably withheld consent to the works

The submission of the CSS report led disponent owners to take the timebar point, arguing that it went to the heart of the issue of liability and that had it been presented it was likely that the parties could have resolved the dispute without the need for arbitration. Charterers argued that the CSS Report was a document compiled for the purposes of the arbitration in the light of the dispute and that expert reports and other arbitration documents fell outside the category of “supporting documents” that are to be provided and Clause 119

The majority of the Tribunal found that this document was a “supporting document”, that it was not privileged; and that the claim was consequently time barred. On appeal two issues arose.

i) Is a document which would otherwise be a supporting document one which should not be counted as such if it was arguably privileged?

This point concerned arguably privileged documents as opposed to actually privileged documents. This was because: (i) Charterers accepted that the document was not privileged and (ii) Owners are prepared to proceed on the assumption that the clause does not require provision of a privileged document. Charterers submitted that if a document is reasonably arguable to be privileged, then its disclosure is not required by an “all supporting documents” time bar clause and it does not matter even if, in the final analysis, it is held not to be privileged. Cockerill J rejected this submission as the argument was “profoundly uncommercial”. Such an approach would sit very ill with the requirements of certainty which underpin clauses of this sort

ii) Is a document which is not at least at the time of commencement of the arbitration of relevance to either the identification of or support for a relevant claim as referred to arbitration, a “supporting document”.

Cockerill J held that the CSS report was a supporting document and it could not be the case that simply because a document emerges later it cannot give rise to a time bar argument. An “all documents” clause is naturally geared to the provision of more than the bare essentials; and even in the simpler cases it may be the case that the party receiving the documents may not know the full extent of the documentation available.

The question of “supporting documents” had to look to the claim being advanced. If for some reason the claim somehow changed in essence at a later stage, for example, if a timing point not previously apprehended was made, or a correction needed to be made, this should not mean that documents later relied on became retrospectively relevant at the point of the time bar. However, here, there was no change in the case or correction. Charterers’ claim was predicated on the refusal by disponent owners having been wrongful, because unreasonable. Without that, the termination was not valid. The material in the CSS Report went to this question of reasonableness.

If the reasonableness of the refusal was in play at the time when the claim was made, this document was relevant and supportive. It was significant that the clause combined both specific reference to “all” and specific reference to “liability and quantum”, while not confining itself to any particular sort of claim. The parties intended the clause to cover all disputes under the Charterparty, including inferentially claims arising out of wrongful termination. While the case had not refined itself so far as it had done at the time of the hearing, the claim (at least as to quantum) in fact depended on the date of termination and the date of termination depended on being entitled to terminate, which itself depended on unreasonable refusal on the part of the Owners. Therefore, the report was on its face within the ambit of the claim that charterers advanced and supportive of it.

The appeal against the Award was therefore dismissed.

A tale of targets. Dutch Supreme Court decides on climate change and State’s duty to protect its citizens.

 

 

A new feature of the legal landscape is climate change litigation – be it tort claims against carbon majors in the US, investor fraud allegations in the US, and public law challenges in Europe. The last of these yielded an interesting decision just before Christmas when the Dutch Supreme Court gave its decision in the Urgenda case, reported in this blog on 25 October 2018, upholding the judgments of the lower courts that the Dutch State must reduce GHG emissions by 25% over 1990 levels by the end of 2020.

 

The Dutch Supreme Court has summarised its decision as follows (an English translation of its judgment is not yet available).

 

  • The Supreme Court based its judgment on the UN Climate Convention and on the Dutch State’s legal duties to protect the life and well-being of citizens in the Netherlands, which obligations are laid down in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR).
  • There is a large degree of consensus in the scientific and international community on the urgent need for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020. The Dutch State has not explained why a lower reduction would be justified and could still lead, on time, to the final target accepted by the Dutch State.
  • The Dutch State has argued that it is up to politicians to decide on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Supreme Court, however, the Dutch Constitution requires the Dutch courts to apply the provisions of the ECHR. This role of the courts to offer legal protection is an essential element of a democracy under the rule of law. The courts are responsible for guarding the limits of the law. That is what the Court of Appeal has done in this case, according to the Supreme Court.
  • Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal was allowed and could decide that the Dutch State is obliged to achieve the 25% reduction by the end of 2020, on account of the risk of dangerous climate change that could also have a serious impact on the rights to life and well-being of residents of the Netherlands.

The decision is the first successful climate change challenge to a government’s targets for reducing GHG emissions. In May 2019 a challenge to the EU’s targets of a 40% reduction by 2030 over 1990 levels in Carvalho v European Parliament and Council of EU, Case T-330/18 failed, and a similar challenge to the UK’s targets under the Climate Change Act 2008 in the Plan B case, reported here on 3 September 2018, also failed.