Climate change reduction and the IMO. What to expect from this week’s MEPC meeting.

Crucial measures to further reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships will be discussed by IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) met between 16-20 November to discuss measures to reduce further greenhouse gas emissions from shipping.

The IMO’s website notes that the MEPC is expected to adopt amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) to significantly strengthen the “phase 3” requirements of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) – meaning that new ships built from 2022 will have to be significantly more energy-efficient. Those amendments were approved at the previous session of the Committee (MEPC 74) in May 2019. 

The MEPC will also discuss two further energy efficiency requirements comprising draft amendments which were agreed by IMO’s Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 7) in October, and would also apply to existing ships:

  • a new Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) for all ships;
  • an annual operational carbon intensity indicator (CII) and its rating, which would apply to ships of 5,000 gross tonnage and above.

If approved at this session of the Committee, they could then be put forward for adoption at the subsequent MEPC 76 session, to be held in June 2021. Under MARPOL, amendments can enter into force after a minimum 16 months following adoption.

EU Parliament suggests civil liability regulation for artificial intelligence. Possible collisions ahead with IMO civil liability collisions?

On 22 October the European Parliament sent a draft regulation to the Commission for a new strict liability regime for operators of AI systems. Its salient features are.

Scope

Art 2

This Regulation applies on the territory of the Union where a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI-system has caused harm or damage to the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss.

Definitions

Art 3

(c)  ‘high risk’ means a significant potential in an autonomously operating AI-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be expected; the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage, the degree of autonomy of decision-making, the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner and the context in which the AI-system is being used;

(d)  ‘operator’ means both the frontend and the backend operator as long as the latter’s liability is not already covered by Directive 85/374/EEC;

(e)  ‘frontend operator’ means any natural or legal person who exercises a degree of control over a risk connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-system and benefits from its operation;

(f)  ‘backend operator’ means any natural or legal person who, on a continuous basis, defines the features of the technology and provides data and an essential backend support service and therefore also exercises a degree of control over the risk connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-system;

(g)  ‘control’ means any action of an operator that influences the operation of an AI-system and thus the extent to which the operator exposes third parties to the potential risks associated with the operation and functioning of the AI-system; such actions can impact the operation at any stage by determining the input, output or results, or can change specific functions or processes within the AI-system; the degree to which those aspects of the operation of the AI-system are determined by the action depends on the level of influence the operator has over the risk connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-system;

(h)  ‘affected person’ means any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI-system, and who is not its operator;

(i)  ‘harm or damage’ means an adverse impact affecting the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, the property of a natural or legal person or causing significant immaterial harm that results in a verifiable economic loss;

(j)  ‘producer’ means the producer as defined in Article 3 of Directive 85/374/EEC. (the Product Liability Directive)

Strict liability for high-risk AI-systems

Article 4

1.  The operator of a high-risk AI-system shall be strictly liable for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by that AI-system.

2.  All high-risk AI-systems and all critical sectors where they are used shall be listed in the Annex to this Regulation…

3.  Operators of high-risk AI-systems shall not be able to exonerate themselves from liability by arguing that they acted with due diligence or that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity, device or process driven by their AI-system. Operators shall not be held liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure.

4.  The frontend operator of a high-risk AI-system shall ensure that operations of that AI-system are covered by liability insurance that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of this Regulation. The backend operator shall ensure that its services are covered by business liability or product liability insurance that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in Article 5 and 6 of this Regulation. If compulsory insurance regimes of the frontend or backend operator already in force pursuant to other Union or national law or existing voluntary corporate insurance funds are considered to cover the operation of the AI-system or the provided service, the obligation to take out insurance for the AI-system or the provided service pursuant to this Regulation shall be deemed fulfilled, as long as the relevant existing compulsory insurance or the voluntary corporate insurance funds cover the amounts and the extent of compensation provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of this Regulation.

5.  This Regulation shall prevail over national liability regimes in the event of conflicting strict liability classification of AI-systems.

Amount of compensation

Article 5

1.   An operator of a high-risk AI-system that has been held liable for harm or damage under this Regulation shall compensate:

(a)  up to a maximum amount of EUR two million in the event of the death of, or in the event of harm caused to the health or physical integrity of, an affected person, resulting from an operation of a high-risk AI-system;

(b)  up to a maximum amount of EUR one million in the event of significant immaterial harm that results in a verifiable economic loss or of damage caused to property, including when several items of property of an affected person were damaged as a result of a single operation of a single high-risk AI-system; where the affected person also holds a contractual liability claim against the operator, no compensation shall be paid under this Regulation, if the total amount of the damage to property or the significant immaterial harm is of a value that falls below [EUR 500](9).

Limitation period

Article 7

1.  Civil liability claims, brought in accordance with Article 4(1), concerning harm to life, health or physical integrity, shall be subject to a special limitation period of 30 years from the date on which the harm occurred.

2.  Civil liability claims, brought in accordance with Article 4(1), concerning damage to property or significant immaterial harm that results in a verifiable economic loss shall be subject to special limitation period of:

(a)  10 years from the date when the property damage occurred or the verifiable economic loss resulting from the significant immaterial harm, respectively, occurred, or

(b)  30 years from the date on which the operation of the high-risk AI-system that subsequently caused the property damage or the immaterial harm took place.

Of the periods referred to in the first subparagraph, the period that ends first shall be applicable.

Fault-based liability for other AI-systems

Article 8

1.  The operator of an AI-system that does not constitute a high-risk AI-system as laid down in Articles 3(c) and 4(2) and, as a result is not listed in the Annex to this Regulation, shall be subject to fault-based liability for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by the AI-system.

2.  The operator shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault, relying on either of the following grounds:

(a)  the AI-system was activated without his or her knowledge while all reasonable and necessary measures to avoid such activation outside of the operator’s control were taken, or

(b)  due diligence was observed by performing all the following actions: selecting a suitable AI-system for the right task and skills, putting the AI-system duly into operation, monitoring the activities and maintaining the operational reliability by regularly installing all available updates.

The operator shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity, device or process driven by his or her AI-system. The operator shall not be liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure.

3.  Where the harm or damage was caused by a third party that interfered with the AI-system by modifying its functioning or its effects, the operator shall nonetheless be liable for the payment of compensation if such third party is untraceable or impecunious.

4.  At the request of the operator or the affected person, the producer of an AI-system shall have the duty of cooperating with, and providing information to, them to the extent warranted by the significance of the claim, in order to allow for the identification of the liabilities.

National provisions on compensation and limitation period

Article 9

Civil liability claims brought in accordance with Article 8(1) shall be subject, in relation to limitation periods as well as the amounts and the extent of compensation, to the laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred.

 There are also provisions regarding contributory negligence, Article 10, joint and several liability, Article 11, recourse for compensation, Article 12.

There are no carve-outs as regards existing civil liability conventions for maritime claims such as the CLC, Bunker Oil Pollution Convention, HNS Convention, which are strict liability based, and the 1910 Brussels Collision Convention which is fault liability based. This is in contrast to the exclusions contained in the 2004 Environmental Liability Directive whose territorial scope was widened with the 2013 Offshore Safety Directive. The current proposal applies to the “territory of the Union” which would encompass the territorial sea of Member States and, in the light of the ECJ’s decision in Commun v Mesquer, loss or damage manifesting on land from an oil spill in the exclusive economic zone of a Member State would come within the scope of the Regulation. As such, it has the capacity to conflict with existing strict liability conventions as enacted in national laws (see the priority of the regulation stipulated in art 4(5)) where autonomous vessels come into operation at MASS Levels 3 and 4, if these are regarded as ‘high risk’. If that were the case, collision liabilities involving such vessels would be dealt with by a strict liability regime, as opposed to the current fault based regime under the Brussels Collision Convention 1910.

Norway’s ‘Urgenda’ moment? Greenpeace Nordic Ass’n v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

Between 4-12 November 2020 the Norwegian Supreme Court heard an appeal from environmental groups seeking the invalidation of the granting of licenses in 2016 to conduct exploratory drilling in the South and South East Barents Sea, an area on the Norwegian continental shelf spanning about 77 acres where oil and gas fields have recently been built. Companies were awarded licenses in 2016 to conduct exploratory drilling in the South and South East Barents Sea, an area on the Norwegian continental shelf spanning about 77 acres where oil and gas fields have recently been built. Parliament approved opening the area for exploration three years earlier.

Their action is brought under the Norwegian Constitution’s environmental provisions, art. 112, which were passed in 2014. They argue that exploratory drilling licenses violate a constitutional right to a healthy environment. They claim the oil-exploration plans were not fully researched before being approved and also rely on a previously unknown expert report throwing doubt on the economic benefit of drilling in the Barents Sea, which was commissioned by the government in 2013 but not passed onto the Parliament before its vote approving exploration in the Barents Sea. The Norwegian government has said that it fulfilled its constitutional duty by compensating for negative effects on the environment in other areas.

The action has failed in the lower courts, although both recognised the right of citizens to bring actions under the environmental provisions of the Constitution, with the higher court accepting that the right involved the impact from climate emissions — including those from oil and gas exported abroad, which is the case for most of Norway’s production.

The Norwegian government intends to continue requesting exploration licences and in June 2020 announced licensing awards in predefined areas (APA) 2020 which comprises blocks in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea.

Baltimore Climate Change litigation in State Courts. Supreme Court to wade in.

A follow on from our blog of 15 April 2020 where we stated, as regards the climate change suits in Baltimore, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s denial of the defendants’ application to remove it to the federal courts – where it would be dismissed due the decision of the Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (AEP),  and that of the Ninth Circuit in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), that such actions, at least when they relate to domestic GHG emissions caused by the defendant, are pre-empted by the Clean Air Act. .

On 31 March 2020 the Defendants submitted a petition for certiorari to the US Supreme Court. on the question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443.

Last month the United States Supreme Court stated that it will review the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling. This is on the procedural ground as to what can be reviewed by a federal appellate court. Three circuit courts – including the Fourth Circuit, which ruled on Baltimore’s case – have ruled that federal officer jurisdiction is the only issue that they can review when considering the companies’ appeal of a lower court’s remand order. The seventh circuit has taken the view that that the federal officer removal statute authorizes appellate review of the entire remand order. In the Baltimore case the District Court rejected a total of eight grounds for removal but the Fourth Circuit concluded its appellate jurisdiction was limited to determining whether the companies properly removed the case under the federal-officer removal statute.

 The oil major defendants are banking on the hope that the more grounds for removal that the Court of Appeal must consider, the more chance of a successful remand to the federal courts where the pesky case will meet its demise.

We shall see.

Mink to human spread of COVID 19. UK restrictions on travel from Denmark.

As from 0400 GMT on Sunday 8 November new rules begin in relation to travel from Denmark as a result of the release of “further information” from health officials in Denmark, where some 200 people have been found to have mink-related mutations of virus, most of them connected to farms in the North Jutland region. Any UK citizens who have travelled to Denmark must isolate for 14 days, along with their household.

Passenger planes and ships carrying freight from Denmark will also not be allowed to dock at English ports.

Cabin crew are also no longer exempt from the quarantine rules

The Department for Transport (DfT) has said that the rules will be reviewed after a week.

Hague Convention 2005. After the transition period.

As expected the UK government has made a fresh declaration agreeing to be bound by the Hague Convention on Choice of Law 2005 in its own right from the end of the transition period at 11pm, UK time, on 31 December  2020. It states “With the intention of ensuring continuity of application of the 2005 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom has submitted the Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 27(4) of the 2005 Hague Convention. Whilst acknowledging that the Instrument of Accession takes effect at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom considers that the 2005 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 October 2015 and that the United Kingdom is a Contracting State without interruption from that date.”

It has also made a reservation under art 21 of the Convention that it will not apply the Convention to insurance contracts except as stated below.

(a) where the contract is a reinsurance contract;

(b) where the choice of court agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen;

(c) where, without prejudice to Article 1 (2) of the Convention, the choice of court agreement is concluded between a policyholder and an insurer, both of whom are, at the time of the conclusion of the contract of insurance, domiciled or habitually resident in the same Contracting State, and that agreement has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that State, even if the harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State;

(d) where the choice of court agreement relates to a contract of insurance which covers one or more of the following risks considered to be large risks:

(i) any loss or damage arising from perils which relate to their use for commercial purposes, of, or to:

          (a) seagoing ships, installations situated offshore or on the high seas or river, canal and lake vessels;

          (b) aircraft;

          (c) railway rolling stock;

(ii) any loss of or damage to goods in transit or baggage other than passengers’ baggage, irrespective of the form of transport;

(iii) any liability, other than for bodily injury to passengers or loss of or damage to their baggage, arising out of the use or operation of:

         (a) ships, installations or vessels as referred to in point (i)(a);

         (b) aircraft, in so far as the law of the Contracting State in which such aircraft are registered does not prohibit choice of court agreements regarding the insurance of such risks;

         (c) railway rolling stock;

(iv) any liability, other than for bodily injury to passengers or loss of or damage to their baggage, for loss or damage caused by goods in transit or baggage as referred to in point (ii);

(v) any financial loss connected with the use or operation of ships, installations, vessels, aircraft or railway rolling stock as referred to in point (i), in particular loss of freight or charter-hire;

(vi) any risk or interest connected with any of the risks referred to in points (i) to (v);

(vii) any credit risk or suretyship risk where the policy holder is engaged professionally in an industrial or commercial activity or in one of the liberal professions and the risk relates to such activity;

(viii) any other risks where the policy holder carries on a business of a size which exceeds the limits of at least two of the following criteria:

          (a) a balance-sheet total of EUR 6,2 million;

          (b) a net turnover of EUR 12,8 million;

          (c) an average number of 250 employees during the financial year.

2. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declares that it may, at a later stage in the light of the experience acquired in the application of the Convention, reassess the need to maintain its declaration under Article 21 of the Convention.”

Times’ up. NBF gets s.12 extension.

The fate of Times’ anti-suit injunction against National Bank of Fujairah was reported in this blog on May 6 2020 –  they got their injunction on condition not to take any time bar point in any subsequent arbitration against them commenced by NBF.

Shortly afterwards, in National Bank of Fujairah v Times Trading Corp [2020] EWHC 1983 (Comm) Foxton J came part two of the saga. NBF had commenced arbitration against the registered owners, Rosalind, within the one year time limit under the Hague Rules, in respect of misdelivery. This expired on 20 June 2019. Shortly after receiving a copy of the bareboat charter, after months of asking, on 20 March NBF then made an application under s.12 of the Arbitration Act 1996, in respect of its claim against bareboat charterer, Times, on the assumption that the one year time bar applied to that claim.

In the first period before 18 January 2019 Times, through their solicitors, Waterson Hicks (WH), communicated in a manner which implied, and contributed to the belief of R&T, acting for NBF, that WH acted for the carrier liable under the Bills of Lading, and for the entity to whom the claims were appropriately addressed. WH acted innocently but Times knew the true position. In the second period after 18 January 2019, the conduct of WH, and of Times, was open to more criticism. The objective effect of the communications of WH and Holman Fenwick and Willan, solicitors for charterers Trafigura who became responsible for handling NBF’s misdelivery claims on behalf of Rosalind and Times, conveyed an impression which did not accord with the facts as Times and the parties acting for them understood them.

The question before Foxton J was whether the effect of this conduct such as to render it unjust hold NBF to the strict terms of the time bar. As regards the first period, the impression given on Times’ behalf, in ignorance of the true position up to 18 January 2019 and with knowledge of it thereafter, was a significant factor in NBF missing the time bar, such that the requisite causative nexus is established which made it unjust to hold NBF to the strict terms of the time bar. The jurisdictional threshold under s.12(3)(b) – whether the respondent’s conduct makes it unjust not to extend time – was satisfied.

On the matter of discretion, it was right to say that there had been significant culpable delay by NBF in failing to seek s.12 relief before it did – delay measured in months rather than merely weeks or days. The delay was particularly difficult to justify from early November 2019, when NBF did not appear to have taken the possibility that Times might be the carrier seriously. However, this was not a case in which it could be said that Times itself played no part in NBF’s delay in the period after 18 July 2019 when Reed Smith sent its letter advising that Rosalind was not the carrier, and that it was Times. However, the continuing refusal to provide a copy of the demise charter could be regarded as a continuation of the approach which had been adopted by or on behalf of Times before 18 July 2019, and which made it unjust to enforce the strict time bar against NBF. Its clear contribution to NBF’s delay in seeking s.12 relief was seen in the fact that, once the Bareboat Charter was produced for the purposes of Times application for an anti-suit injunction, NBF prepared and issued its s.12 application within short order.

The fault of NBF was not a reason for denying its application for relief under s.12, and NBF got its extension.

His last bow. As Teare(s) go by.

On 5 October 2020, Sir Nigel Teare gave his last judgment in the Admiralty Court, in a three handed collision case involving a pile up of three laden bulk carrier vessels in the Suez Canal in 2018. The Panamax Alexander (PA) was the final vessel in an eight vessel southbound convoy that halted some two hours after the initial convoy vessel suffered an engine breakdown and blocked the canal. The other vessels had to take emergency anchoring and/or mooring action. The sixth and seventh vessels managed to do this. About fifteen minutes later PA collided with the first of these, the Sakizaya Kalan (SK) which led to PA and SK drifting downstream and colliding with the Osios David (OD), over an hour after the initial collision. For a few minutes all three vessels were locked together and a further two sets of collisions took place.

PA was held 100% to blame in failing to appreciate that there was a risk of collision and, not mooring earlier to avoid that risk of collision. These were causative breaches of Rules 5, 7 and 8 of the International Collision Regulations (Colregs).

Although OD was at fault in that she had failed to inform SK and PA behind of her intention to moor, that fault had no causative potency as the duty to inform was owed mainly to the vessel immediately behind, which had already stopped before the first collision. Were the subsequent collisions caused by the initial collision for which PA was wholly to blame? Teare J stated:

“That question of causation depends upon whether the effect of the first collision was continuing in such a way as not merely to provide the opportunity for the later collisions but as to constitute the cause of them. The courts have answered questions of this nature (which usually arise where there has been intervening negligence) by the use of metaphors. Was the hand of negligent navigator on board PA still heavy on SK and OD at the time of the later collisions? Were those on board SK and OD not free agents by reason of the hard necessities imposed on them by the first collision? Were those on board SK and OD still in the grip of the first collision? These metaphors and their source are described by Brandon J. in The Calliope at p.101. Such questions are to be approached in a broad common sense way; see p. 102.[298].”

Teare J concluded that the initial collision “not merely provided the opportunity for the later collisions but constituted the cause of” those subsequent collisions, even though they took place over an hour after that and recognized the difficulties faced by the master of SK and of OD on the horns of a dilemma created by the fault of PA. Accordingly, PA was found wholly responsible and liable for all the collisions.   

International Shipping gets closer to the rocks of the EU Emissions Trading System

Earlier this year this blog reported on the implications for international shipping of the EU ‘Green Deal’, the topic of two papers at the IISTL’s recent Colloquium.

Things are now moving on apace. On 16 September the European Parliament voted in favour of a 40% reduction in CO2 by 2030 for all maritime transport and for the inclusion of ships of 5000 grt and over in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), with the establishment of an “Ocean Fund” to run from 2022 -2030 to contribute to protecting marine ecosystems. The Parliament is now ready to start negotiations with member states on the final shape of the legislation.

Where the EU goes, the IMO may follow – on which note in another interesting development, on 25 September, the major charterer, Trafigura, have submitted a proposal to the IMO for a partial “feebate” system to decarbonise global shipping. Trafigura’s press release states, “We propose a self-financing system where a levy is charged on the use of fuels with a CO2-equivalent intensity above an agreed benchmark level, and a subsidy is provided for fuels with a CO2-equivalent profile below that level. It is now time to put a price on carbon emissions in the shipping industry Our own in-depth analysis and commissioned independent research indicates that the levy should be between $250-$300 per tonne of CO2-equivalent. While primarily bridging the cost gap between carbon intensive and low or zero carbon fuels, this partial “feebate” would also raise billions of dollars for research into alternative fuels and could help assist small island developing states and other developing countries mitigate the impact of climate change.”

Rather more than the $2 per tonne bunker levy for financing R&D into alternative green fuels that various shipowner organisations proposed earlier this year.

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One breach, two losses. Does demurrage cover both?

Andrew Baker J today has said that it does not. In K Line PTE Ltd v Priminds Shipping (HK) Co, Ltd [2020] EWHC 2373 (Comm) the vessel was kept at the anchorage for some 31 days due to port congestion and lack of storage space ashore for the cargo. In consequence when the cargo of soyabeans was discharged it exhibited substantial mould and caking. This led to a cargo claim against owners who then settled and sought to recover from voyage charterers by way of damages for breach of their obligation to discharge within the laydays.

 Dicta of Sargant LJ in Reidar v Arcos [1927] KB 352, not the easiest of cases from which to extract a ratio, suggested that demurrage was the sole remedy for breach of that obligation, but that the case before him involved a breach of a separate obligation, a proposition applied by Potter J in The Bonde [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 136). By contrast, Webster J in The Altus [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423 held that demurrage only had the effect of providing liquidated damages for a specific type of loss, the economic loss suffered by owners in the charterers exceeding the laydays for which they had paid in the freight. It did not cover other types of loss flowing from this breach. This was the view of Bankes LJ in Reidar. The contentious point was whether Atkin LJ had been with Sargant LJ or with Bankes LJ.

The academic writings were divided: Carver on Charterparties , Voyage Charters, and Shipping Law for the view of Sargant LJ; Scrutton contra for that of Bankes LJ; Schofield undecided; and Summerskill nowhere to be seen. After a long discussion as to whether precedent required him to follow The Bonde – it did not – Andrew Baker J held that damages could be claimed for the cargo claim resulting from the delayed discharge, notwithstanding the demurrage provision. He added that had he come to a different conclusion, there would have been no scope for implying an indemnity -owners’ second string to their bow.

One suspects this will come as an unpleasant surprise to charterers, but perhaps the bigger surprise is what owners were doing settling a claim which under the Hague Rules they would have had a good chance of resisting under Art IV (2)(q)  which provides an exemption as follows: “Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.”  Deterioration of the cargo due to delay in discharge due to congestion would very likely constitute such a cause.

This looks like one for the Court of Appeal, and, maybe, the Supreme Court.