EU to get tough on GHG emissions from shipping?

 

In October 2014, the EU set domestic GHGs reduction target of at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. Shipping is currently outside those targets with climate change regulation for international shipping being parked in the slow lane in the International Maritime Organization. That may be about to change over the next two years.

 

  1. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The European Green Deal Brussels, 11.12.2019 COM(2019) 640 final

 

The Commission indicated that it would be looking at measures extending the emissions trading system (ETS) to shipping and would look closely at the current tax exemptions including for aviation and maritime fuels and at how best to close any loopholes will take action in relation to maritime transport, including to regulate access of the most polluting ships to EU ports and to oblige docked ships to use shore-side electricity.

 

  1. On 4 March 2020 the Commission proposed a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) under which, by September 2020, the Commission would review the Union’s 2030 target for climate referred to in Article 2(11) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 in light of the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1), and explore options for a new 2030 target of 50 to 55% emission reductions compared to 1990.

 

  1. On 24 January 2020 Green MEP, Jutta Paulus, as Rapporteur for the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety produced a draft report (COM(2019)0038 – C8-0034/2019 -2019/0017(COD)) on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/757 in order to take appropriate account of the global data collection system for ship fuel oil consumption data. The report recommends the following amendments to the 2015 MRV Regulation ((Regulation (EU) 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC)):

– the inclusion of maritime transport in the ETS;

– the establishment of a maritime transport decarbonisation fund to foster research and development in the energy efficiency of ships and support investments in innovative technologies and infrastructure to decarbonise maritime transport, including short sea shipping and ports, and the deployment of sustainable fuels. The fund would be established for the period from 2021 to 2030 and would be financed from revenues of the ETS;

– Establishing a target of reduction of CO2 emissions per transport work by at least 40 % by 2030 over the first reporting year of the MRV, 2018;

– The extension of the scope of the amended regulation to all GHG emissions, especially methane, from ships of 5000 grt or above. The amended regulation would cover GHG emissions released during voyages of such ships from their last port of call to a port of call under the jurisdiction of a Member State and from a port of call under the jurisdiction of a Member State to their next port of call, as well as within ports of call under the jurisdiction of a Member State;

– The Commission to set targets for member states for deployment of shore side electricity.

 

These proposed changes to EU law may make last year’s anxiety over the IMO’s Sulphur Cap come to seem like very small beer indeed.

Another cautionary time bar tale for owners. Do copies of bills of lading need to be submitted to support demurrage claims?

 

This was the question before Robin Knowles J in Tricon Energy Ltd v MTM Trading LLC [2020] EWHC 700 (Comm).  The MTM Hong Kong was voyage chartered on an amended Asbatankvoy form for a voyage from Antwerp to Houston. The most relevant provisions of the Charterparty were as follows:

By clause 10:

“Laytime/Demurrage

… …

(e) If load or discharge is done simultaneously with other parcels then laytime to be applied prorate between the parcels.

(g) In the event of Vessel being delayed in berthing and the Vessel has to load and / or discharge at the port(s) for the account of others, then such delay and/or waiting time and /or demurrage, if incurred, to be prorated according to the Bill of Lading quantities”.

 

By clause 12:

“Statement of Facts

Statement of facts must be signed by supplier or receiver, respectively. If they refuse to sign, the Master must issue a contemporaneous protest to them. Owner shall instruct each port agent to release port information to Charterer on request and to forward to Charterer the statement of facts and N.O.R. as soon as possible after Vessel has completed loading or discharge there”.

 

By clause 38:

“Time Bar Clause

Charterer shall be discharged and released from all liability in respect of any claim/invoice the Owner may have/send to Charterer under this Charter Party unless a claim/invoice in writing and all supporting documents have been received by Charterer within 90 days after completion of discharge of the cargo covered by this Charter Party or after other termination of the voyage, whichever occurs first. Any claim/invoice which Owner may have under this Charter Party shall be waived and absolutely barred, if claim/invoice and all supporting documents are not received by Charterer before the time bar”.

 

The owners made their claim and submitted supporting documentation within 90 days of completion of discharge, but did not include copies of the bills of lading.

 

The statement of facts provided did not accurately record the bill of lading quantities, at least insofar as the bill of lading for the Charterers’ parcel was concerned.

 

Permission to appeal was granted on the following question of law. “Where a charterparty requires demurrage to be calculated by reference to bill of lading quantities, and contains a demurrage time bar which requires provision of all supporting documents, will a claim for demurrage be time-barred if the vessel owner fails to provide copies of the bills of lading?”

 

The tribunal had found that copies of the bills of lading did not need to be submitted, and provision of the statement of facts was sufficient.

 

Robin Knowles J, however, found that copies of the bills of lading did need to be submitted. The Charterparty in the present case contains an express reference to “Bill of Lading quantities” in clause 10(g) in which it is made clear that “pro rating” means a division according to bill of lading quantities. Furthermore the Charterparty in the present case referred not simply to “supporting documentation” but “all” such documentation.

 

There was no evidence that the bills were unavailable to the Owners and if there were sensitive elements to the bill of lading, those could very easily be redacted and the redaction would not realistically include the quantities. If a bill of lading was not available then a proper explanation of that fact would need to be provided for the purposes of clause 38 alongside what was available.

 

Failure to submit the third-party bill barred the claim in its entirety of her claim and not just that part of the claim attributable to delays in berthing. However, the clause here referred to a claim/invoice as a single item and did not (in contrast to the clause in The Adventure) refer to “constituent part[s]” of a claim for demurrage.

Switch bills. Initial shipper off the hook for freight due under bill of lading.

 

The effect of switch bills with a new shipper in the second set has the effect of a novation of the initial contract contained or evidenced in the initial bill with the shipowner as carrier under the bill. So held Stevenson J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in The Illawarra Fortune [2020] NSWSC 183. Both sets incorporated the freight payable under a voyage charterparty with the time charterer of the vessel. The initial shipper, whose parent company was the voyage charterer, ceased to be liable for unpaid freight once the second bills were issued naming a different shipper. Had the original bills not been switched the time charterer, as assignee of the shipowner’s rights under the bills of lading,  would have been able to sue the original shipper for freight due under the voyage charter with the shipper’s parent company.

A new climate change tort in New Zealand?

The month of March brings a second exotic possible tort claim to the table in the common law world. Following the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Nevsun v Arraya not to strike out a claim against a company for violating customary international law, we now have a novel tort raising its head in the Southern hemisphere.

Smith v Fontera Co-Operative Group Ltd and Ors  [2020] NZHC 419 saw the recognition of a possible new tort in connection with causing harm through emission of greenhouse gases. A claim was brought against various defendants who are either involved in an industry which releases greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, or who supply products which release greenhouse gases when they are burned. The plaintiff was  Mr Smith who claims customary interests in lands and other resources situated in or around Mahinepua in Northland. The statement of claim raised three causes of action, all in tort – public nuisance, negligence, and breach of an inchoate duty. Mr Smith did not claim damages but declarations that each of the defendants had unlawfully caused or contributed to the public nuisance alleged or breached duties said to be owed to him. He also sought injunctions requiring each defendant to produce, or cause, zero net emissions from its activities by 2030.

The defendants applied to strike out the claims on the grounds that the pleadings disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action.

Wylie J struck out the public nuisance claim. The damage claimed was indirect and consequential. The interference with the rights of the public pleaded by Mr Smith was interference with public health, safety, comfort, convenience and peace. If the pleading could be made out, the defendants’ interference with those rights had no direct connection with the pleaded damage to Mr Smith’s interests in the land in question. Furthermore there was no unlawful conduct in the activities of any of the defendants.

The negligence claim went the same way. The damage claimed by Mr Smith could not be said to be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ acts or omissions. The defendants’ collective emissions were miniscule in the context of the global greenhouse gas emissions which are causing climate change and it is the global greenhouse gas emissions which are pleaded as being likely to cause damage to Mr Smith. Causation was also a problem. The proportion of the damage pleaded that is caused by climate change effects contributed to by each defendant, or even the extent to which anthropogenic interference with the climate system has caused, or will cause, the damage pleaded was impossible to measure.

Proximity was a further problem as there was no relationship between the parties from which it could be established. The claim opened up the spectre of indeterminate liability for the defendants. The claimed duty would be owed anybody who can claim damage as a result of the widespread effects of climate change. Everyone is a polluter, and therefore a tortfeasor, and everyone is a victim (and therefore a possible plaintiff).

However, Wylie J was reluctant to conclude that the recognition of a new tortious duty which makes corporates responsible to the public for their emissions, was untenable, noting “it may be that a novel claim such as that filed by Mr Smith could result in the further evolution of the law of tort. It may, for example, be that the special damage rule in public nuisance could be modified; it may be that climate change science will lead to an increased ability to model the possible effects of emissions. These are issues which can only properly be explored at trial. I am not prepared to strike out the third cause of action and foreclose on the possibility of the law of tort recognising a new duty which might assist Mr Smith.”

Wylie J concluded by noting a problem with the remedy sought, that of injunction which would be extraordinarily difficult and would require continued judicial supervision up to 2030, and maybe beyond.

 

.

 

When does time start to run for an indemnity claim?

 

 

In London Arbitration 1/20 owners claimed an indemnity from voyage charterers in respect of payment of funds by their P&I Club to satisfy a judgment on a cargo claim brought against them in Brazil. The owners’ claim was brought under an express indemnity provision in the charterparty, clause 10, which read:

“Bills of Lading shall be presented and signed by the Master as per the ‘Congenbill’ Bill of Lading form, Edition 1994, without prejudice to this Charter Party, or by the Owners’ agents provided written authority has been given by Owners to the agents, a copy of which is to be furnished to the Charterers. The Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liabilities that may arise from the signing of bills of lading as presented to the extent that the terms or contents of such bills of lading impose or result in the imposition of more onerous liabilities upon the Owners than those assumed by the Owners under this Charter Party.”

The relevant time line was that discharge took place in 2006, with a first instance decision in the Brazilian courts in August 2010 which held owners liable. In September 2017 this was upheld on appeal and in October 2017 funds were remitted to cargo interests to satisfy the judgment. Owners commenced arbitration proceedings against charterers in August 2018.

There were various competing dates for starting the firing gun for the running of the six years under the Limitation Act 1980. If time started when the claim arose, or after the first instance judgment, then owners’ arbitration would be clearly barred. However, if the relevant time were that of the appeal decision or the payment of the judgment soon after, then owners would be in time.

The tribunal, by a majority, declined to follow the decision of McNair J in Bosma v Larsen [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 22 in which McNairJ held that the cause of action under clause 9 of the Baltime form arose at the date when the facts came into existence which created a liability of the owners to the cargo owners or their insurers. That date was the date when the cargo was discharged damaged. The case had not been overruled but had not been followed on two subsequent occasions at first instance, in particular in The Caroline P [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 466, where Neill J said:

“I have therefore come to the conclusion, though not without hesitation, that the … indemnity … did not become enforceable by action until at the earliest the liability of the owners to the receivers had been ascertained by the court of first instance …”

In the majority’s view, Neill J was saying that he preferred to run time from the date of the court adjudication at the earliest rather than from the time of discharge. In their view time started running when owners paid the judgment in favour of cargo interests sometime between 27 September and 6 October 2017.

A new tort in the common law world. Corporations in Canada can be liable for aiding and abetting violations of customary international law.

 

Eritrea is a new country, having only been in existence since 1993. It is also a very poor country, ranking 164th out of the world’s 194 states. 80% of its population are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Eritrea’s major source of foreign currency is its Bisha mine at Asmara. Construction began in 2008 and by 2013 gold exports amounted to US$143m, almost all derived from the Bisha mine. The mine is owned by the Bisha Mining Share Company (BMSC) in which a Bermudan subsidiary of a Canadian mining company, Nevsun, holds a 60% share.

However, all that glitters is not gold. Eritrea has a national service programme requiring its adult citizens to serve in the military for 18 months. In 2002 this was extended to an indefinite period of service. Conscripts in the national service programme (NSP) have provided the labour for the Bisha mine. Three Eritrean refugees, Gize Yebeyo Araya, Kesete Tekle Fshazion, and Mihretab Yemane Tekle, brought an action against Nevsun in the courts of British Columbia. They allege that they were conscripted into the NSP and then forced to provide labour to two for profit construction companies, Segen and Mereb, the latter allegedly owned by members of the Eritrean military. They allege that Nevsun and/or its Eritrean subsidiary, BMSC, engaged Segen and Mereb for the construction of the Bisha Mine.

As well as framing their claims under domestic tort law, the plaintiffs also brought the action against Nevsun for violations of customary international law (CIL) as incorporated into the law of Canada, for: the use of forced labour; torture; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity. Nevsun mounted a jurisdictional challenge to the claims on three grounds: forum non conveniens; Act of State; denial of the existence of a cause of action based on CIL.

At first instance, Abrioux J dismissed the application to stay proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens finding that Nevsun had not established that Eritrea was the more appropriate forum. He also dismissed the Act of State application and decided that the CIL claims were not bound to fail and should proceed to trial. The case then proceeded to the Court of Appeal of British Colombia  which upheld the decision on forum non conveniens, decided that in the light of the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Belhaj v Straw [2017] UKSC 3; [2017] A.C. 964. the Act of State doctrine would not bar the claims against Nevsun and that there was enough plausibility to the existence of a cause of action base on CIL to allow those claims to proceed.

In January 2019 the Canadian Supreme Court heard Nevsun’s appeal on the Act of  State and CILissues. It has now decided (1) 7-2 that the Act of State doctrine does not form part of the law of Canada and (2) 5-4 that a cause of action based on CIL exists. The trial judge will now have to decide whether Nevsun breached customary international law and—if it did—how it should be held responsible.

So is Canada the new frontier for claims against transnational corporations of the sort that we have seen in the US under the Alien Tort Statute? And if Canada, why not the UK? Maybe, but some unanswered questions remain. The claim is against the parent corporation, but the mine was operated by a subsidiary? How is the parent corporation implicated in the alleged aiding and abetting of the Eritrean State’s violations of CIL? What is the mens rea of this new tort – knowing assistance or purposive assistance? What is the applicable statute of limitations for such a tort?

In the meantime, a useful corrective to the excitement that this decision will inevitably provoke may be found by looking at the 2009 decision of Judge Shira Schiendlin in the South African Apartheid claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute in New York.  The basis of the claim was aiding and abetting  by foreign corporations of violations of CIL by the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1980s. The mens rea of the tort was knowing assistance. Companies who had supplied military vehicles to the regime which were used to suppress civilian protests, and companies who had supplied IT systems which were then used in the denationalisation of South African citizens could potentially be liable, but not banks who had provided finance to the South African government. Merely doing business in the apartheid state was not enough to constitute aiding and abetting. To supply a violator of the law of nations with funds, even funds that could not have been obtained but for those loans, was not sufficiently connected to the primary violation.

Sounds a bit like the relationship of Nevsun and the Bermudan subsidiary to the Bisha mine project.

 

[1] Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd  2016 BCSC 1856

[2] Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd., 2017 BCCA 401

Yes Minister. The 2015 Paris Agreement is part of government policy and you do have to take account of it.

 

In Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214 the Court of Appeal has decided that the government’s policy in favour of a third runway at Heathrow was not produced lawfully. The policy is contained in the “Airports National Policy Statement: new runway capacity and infrastructure at airports in the South East of England” (“the ANPS”), designated by the Secretary of State for Transport (“the Secretary of State”) under section 5 of the Planning Act 2008 (“the Planning Act”) on 26 June 2018. The designation of the ANPS was unlawful because the Secretary of State, in breach of section 10(3)(a) of the Planning Act, failed to have regard to the desirability of mitigating, and adapting to, climate change in the light of the United Kingdom’s commitment to the Paris Agreement, the non-carbon dioxide (“non-CO2”) climate impacts of aviation, the effect of emissions beyond 2050, and to the ability of future generations to meet their needs. In making the designation the Secretary of State had acted on legal advice that consideration should be given only to existing domestic legal obligations and policy commitments in relation to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change, which did not include the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Section 5(8) of the Planning Act requires that the ANPS should explain how the Secretary of State has “taken into account” government policy and it was necessarily implicit in that obligation that the Secretary of State must indeed first have taken that government policy into account. The Paris Agreement represented firm government policy on climate change and ought to have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in the preparation of the ANPS, but was not – which was legally fatal to the ANPS in its present form. The Court of Appeal stressed that they were not making any finding that there will be no third runway at Heathrow, nor that a national policy statement supporting this project is necessarily incompatible with the UK’s commitment to reducing carbon emissions and mitigating climate change under the Paris Agreement. What the Government now had to do was to reconsider the ANPS in accordance with the clear statutory requirements that Parliament has imposed, including taking account of government policy – and its international commitments under the Paris Agreement.

The Court of Appeal also found the Divisional Court erred by failing to give reasons for rejecting Friends of the Earth’s argument on the non-CO2 climate impacts of aviation and the effect of emissions beyond 2050, having regard to the ability of future generations to meet their needs. In line with the precautionary principle, which was well established under international law, these impacts also needed to be taken into account by the Secretary of State.

 

 

England v Spain grudge match. Appeal against registration of ‘Prestige’ judgment against London Club likely to be heard in December 2020.

 

Following the break up of ‘The Prestige’, Spain brought proceedings for compensation for the resulting pollution against various defendants, including the owner’s P&I Club. The Club got its response in early by obtaining an arbitration award against Spain which declared that, as a result of the “pay to be paid” clause in the policy the Club had no liability to Spain. The arbitrator’s jurisdiction was challenged unsuccessfully in the English Courts and the award was converted into a judgment. London SS Mutual v Kingdom of Spain, [2015] EWCA Civ 333; [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 33

In 2016 the Spanish Supreme Court held that the owners and their club were liable for the damage caused and in execution proceedings in La Coruna the court held that the club would liable in respect of the claims up to a global limit of liability in the sum of approximately €855 million. Spain has obtained an order in England registering the Spanish judgment to enable its enforcement here in England. The Club have appealed against that order, principally on the ground that, under art 34.3 of the Brussels Regulation the judgment is irreconcilable with the previous decisions of the English courts converting the award into a judgment.

In a Case Management Conference before Teare J [2020] EWHC 142 (Comm) it was ordered that the trial be after 1 December 2020. It is estimated that it will last 5-6 days. Disclosure has been ordered of documents held by Spain which relate to the alleged refusal of the Spanish Courts  to allow the master to participate in an underwater investigation of the strength of the vessel’s hull and to disclose the results of the investigation (so that there was a breach of the master’s right to equality of arms and to be able to prepare a defence) or whether the results were disclosed to the master in sufficient time to allow him to prepare his defence.

The Club were also given permission to adduce evidence of a naval architect on the question whether the results of the underwater inspections enabled conclusions to be drawn as to the strength of the hull and if so what those conclusions were. On both issues the Club is to provide its evidence first.

English multi-national not liable for conduct of Sierra Leone police.

 

Kalma & Ors v African Minerals Ltd & Ors is a case reported in this blog last March https://iistl.blog/2019/03/06/a-fair-cop-transnational-torts-and-trouble-at-the-mine/.

The claims arose out of violent police suppression of protests in 2010 and 2012 by a local community in Sierra Leone against a mine created and operated by the defendant, African Minerals Ltd (“AML”), a UK company, and its two Sierra Leonean subsidiaries. The protests prompted a significant overreaction from some members of the Sierra Leone Police (“SLP”) whose response to disruptive protests and threats against the personnel, property and business of AML soon degenerated into violent chaos during the course of which many villagers were variously beaten, shot, gassed, robbed, sexually assaulted, squalidly incarcerated and, in one case, killed. After an extensive review of the law of tort on vicarious liability, joint tortfeasors, direct liability for breach of a non-delegable duty Turner J found that AML were not liable in tort.

The Court of Appeal have now upheld the decision of Turner J, [2020] EWCA Civ 144. Coulson LJ, who gave the principal judgment, found as follows.

 

  1. The judge found that there was no relevant intention on the part of the respondents. The common design case therefore failed on both its required ingredients: assistance and intention.

 

  1. A new case was raised based on ‘inferred intention’. The appellants argued that could foresee that the SLP might use excessive force and that, by providing them with money, vehicles, and accommodation, they intended that the protests should be quashed, if need be by the use of unlawful force. In this way, he sought to infer the necessary intent, presumably as a way round the judge’s express findings that there was no actual intent on the part of the respondents. In addition, the appellants also suggested that the judge’s findings confused intent with desire: they argued that, although the respondents may not have wanted violence to be used, their intent could still be conditional (“to quash protest if need be by violent means”). The new case was held to be unsustainable. It took what were, on the judge’s findings, neutral acts of assistance to the SLP – the provision of money, vehicles and accommodation – and uses the foreseeability that (regardless of that assistance) the SLP might over-react to the unrest, in order to disregard the judge’s findings as to actual intent and found an entire case based on inferred, conditional intent. The new case was also based on foreseeability but on its own this was never enough to create a legal liability. To establish tortious liability for common design, there needs to be something more than the foreseeability that, in certain circumstances, a tort might be committed by a third party.

 

  1. As regards the creation of a duty of care by AML, this was a case where the underlying complaint was an omission: that the respondents had failed to protect the claimants from the harm caused by the SLP. Here the conclusion must be that the respondents were not carrying out any relevant activity, and the damage was not caused by anything which the respondents did. The case did not fall within the creation of danger exception. The respondents could not be said to have created the danger or assumed any liability simply because they had called in the SLP. The provision of money, vehicles and accommodation to the SLP did not create a danger, and, without them, the situation might have been even worse.

 

  1. There was no freestanding duty of care owed by AML. Applying the three stage criteria set out in Caparo there was no proximity. this was a case in which a large commercial concern called in the police of the host country to restore law and order in degenerating circumstances of lawlessness and unrest. The police overreacted but sadly that is not uncommon in cases of this sort. There are no unique factors here which would justify a finding of proximity. The relationship with the police was not a close one, but one based on necessity. Nor would it be fair, just or reasonable to impose a duty of care. The judge had expressly found that the respondents’ employees were not involved in the unlawful acts and did not encourage or incite those unlawful acts. The assistance they provided was reasonable and proportionate in all the circumstances and did not cause the alleged or any loss.

 

  1. The position was not changed by reference to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights produced by the United Nations which were general in nature and primarily concerned with the need for liaison with the local community and the like. Coulson LJ concluded [151]:

“More significantly, there is nothing in the Voluntary Principles which make companies operating abroad generally liable for the unlawful acts of the police forces of the host countries in which they are operating: on the contrary, the Voluntary Principles are drafted on the basis that, whilst companies operating abroad may properly help to facilitate the law and order expected to be provided by host countries, it is the governments of those countries (and not the companies) who have “the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights.”

Anti-suit injunctions in Singapore. The ‘quasi-contractual’ ground recognised.

 

Hai Jiang 1401 Pte. Ltd v. Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd. [2020] SGHC 20 involved an anti-suit injunction granted by Quentin Loh J on the ‘quasi-contractual’ ground under which a claim made in foreign proceedings is based on a contract subject to an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause although the claimant is not a party to that contract.

A yard in Singapore had done work upgrading cranes on the ‘Seven Champion’ which was at that time on demise charter. The contract was with the demise charterer who were later wound up by the vessel owners who then concluded a new demise charter with another company. The yard subsequently arrested the vessel at Sharjah for unpaid sums due under the contract to upgrade the cranes and sought to have the substantive claim against the vessel owners  heard there. Owners sought an anti-suit injunction before the courts of Singapore on two grounds. First, they were the assignees of the former demise charterer’s arbitration clause in its contract with the yard. There was held to be a prima facie case of assignment to the shipowner of the arbitration clause in its contract with the yard to justify remission to the tribunal. Second, the yard’s claim was based on a contract with an exclusive Singapore law and arbitration clause. They sought to enforce the contract against third parties to that contract, the shipowner, and were bound by the arbitration clause in it. The proceedings in Sharjah were vexatious and oppressive. This was a situation recognised by the English courts as the ‘quasi-contractual’ ground for granting an anti-suit injunction and this ground was also recognised under the law of Singapore.