US Companies win aiding and abetting ATS case in US Supreme Court; but ATS not dead yet.

Nestle Inc v Doe & Others. Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 17 June 2021. Slip opinion.

Six individuals from Mali claimed that they were trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa. They sued Nestlé USA and Cargill, U.S.-based companies that purchase, process, and sell cocoa. The companies did not own or operate farms in Ivory Coast, but did buy cocoa from farms located there as well as provided those farms with technical and financial resources—such as training, fertilizer, tools, and cash—in exchange for the exclusive right to purchase cocoa. The plaintiffs alleged that this constituted a violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, in that the companies had thereby aided and abetted slavery in that they “knew or should have known” that the farms were exploiting enslaved children yet continued to provide those farms with resources and also had economic leverage over the farms but failed to exercise it to eliminate child slavery. Although the resource distribution and the alleged slavery occurred outside the United States, it was argued that suit under the ATS was possible because the companies allegedly made all major operational decisions from within the United States.

Justice Thomas gave the majority opinion in Part I & II of his judgment. Even if all these disputes were resolved in respondents’ favour, their complaint would impermissibly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. Nearly all the conduct that they say aided and abetted forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. Although the Ninth Circuit let the suit proceed because respondents pleaded as a general matter that “every major operational decision by both companies is made in or approved in the U. S.” allegations of general corporate activity—like decision making—cannot alone establish domestic application of the ATS.

Justice Thomas also gave an alternative reason for his judgment in Part III by finding federal courts should not recognize private rights of action for violations of international law beyond the three historical torts identified in Sosa. He was joined by Justices Gosruch and Kavanaugh.

 Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan agreed with Justice Thomas in Parts I & II of his judgment but not as regards Part III.

Justice Alito agreed with Part I of Justice Soyomayor’s judgment that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation. dissented because the complaint sought extraterritorial application of the ATS, a question tied to the question whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint so as to reach the question of extraterritoriality. Justice Alito would vacate the judgment below, and remand these cases for further proceedings in the District Court.

Hit the targets. Climate change litigation in Belgium and Germany.

On 17 June 2021, the Brussels French-Speaking Court of First Instance (the “Court”) released a  ruling that the four Belgian governments were in breach of Article 1382 of the Belgian Civil Code and Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) by failing to take all necessary measures to prevent the impacts of climate change on the Belgian population. However, as opposed to Dutch courts in Urgenda, the Court refused to order an injunction to meet stricter targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions due to the principle of separation of powers. The case was brought on behalf of 58,000 Belgian citizens and by an NGO,Climate Change. The Court was asked to recognise the failure of the governments to decrease by 2020 the global volume of annual greenhouse gas emissions originating on Belgian territory by 40% (or at least 25%) compared to the 1990 level. They also sought an injunction to compel have the Belgian governments to make further reduce greenhouse gas emissions originating on the Belgian territory: by 48% (at least 42%) compared to 1990 by 2025; a reduction by 65% (at least 55%) compared to 1990 by 2030 and zero net emissions reached in 2050.

The Court acknowledged the standing of the 58,000 Belgian Citizens in holding governments liable under Article 1382 of the Belgian Civil Code due to the real threat of dangerous climate change, which poses a serious risk to current and future generations living in Belgium and elsewhere that their daily lives will be profoundly affected. The NGO also had  standing due to case the case law of the Belgian Supreme Court according to which an environmental protection association has the personal and direct interest required by Article 17 of the Belgian Judicial Code to bring a claim for compensation on the basis of Article 1382 of the Belgian Civil Code, if it believes that damage has been caused to the environment whose defence it has set itself as its statutory object.

The Court found that the federal government and the governments of the three Belgian regions failed to comply with their duty to exercise due caution and diligence in pursuing their climate policy. The Court noted that in 2019 the overall volume of annual greenhouse gas emissions from the Belgian territory had not decreased by 20% compared to the 1990 level. Therefore, Belgium does not comply with the objective set by the 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Nor had it complied with the EU 15% reduction target for 2020 as targets in EC Decision 406/2009  because Belgium, as of October 2020, had only achieved a reduction of 11% compared to 2005. Looking to the future, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 35% compared to 2005 levels imposed by the EU Regulation 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 would not be met. Further experts were of the view that the federal government’s target of reducing the emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels would also not be met.

As regards the ECHR Articles 2 and 8 imposed on public authorities a positive obligation to take necessary measures to repair and prevent harmful consequences of global warning which threatens their life and private and family life – which, at this time, the four governments do not. However, the Court could not infer from Articles 6 and 24 of the UNCRC any positive obligation on the part of the signatory states, as the text leaves the authorities full latitude to meet the objectives they set out.

So far so good for the applicants, but the Court did not grant the requested injunction. Belgium was not required under European or international law to meet the targets referred to by the Applicants, and the only binding target is the one established by the EU Regulation 2018/842 which imposes a reduction of 35% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. Second, the jurisdiction of the Court was limited to the finding of a deficiency on the part of the public authorities, but did not extend to setting itself  Belgium’s targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as this would violate the principle of separation of powers. This is in contrast to the position of the Dutch Supreme Court in Urgenda.

The Belgian decision follows hot on the heels of a decision on April 30 2021 by Germany’s Constitutional Court  that that Germany’s Climate Action Law was partly unconstitutional in that it postponed the decision for emissions reduction targets post-2030 to a later date.The German legislator was ordered to regulate the continuation of the reduction targets for the post-2031 period by 31 December 2022 at the latest.

Things go better for Shell? Not in the Netherlands (again).

Judgment has recently been given by a first instance court in the Netherlands in an action brought by various NGOs in which Royal Dutch Shell has been ordered to take as a guideline that the Shell group’s CO2 emissions (Scope 1, 2 and 3) in 2030 must be net 45% lower relative to 2019 levels, with net referring to the sum of the reduction of CO2 emissions of the Shell group’s entire energy portfolio (Scope 1, 2 and 3).

The Judgment covers three sources of emissions. Scope 1 concerns direct emissions from sources that are fully or partly owned or controlled by the organisation (such as a refinery). Scope 2 is for indirect emissions from third-party sources from which the organisation has purchased or acquired electricity, steam, or heating for its operations. Scope 3 includes all other indirect emissions resulting from activities of the organisation, but occurring from greenhouse gas sources owned or controlled by third parties such as other organisations or consumers, including emissions from the use of third-party purchased crude oil and gas. Scope 3 includes the emissions from cars using the fuel purchased from companies of Shell and the court took as a basis that 85% of Shell group emissions were in this category. Emissions.

The court decided, and that class action was appropriate for the suits brought by NGOs on account of the interests of current and future generations of Dutch residents and (with respect to the Waddenvereniging) of the inhabitants of the Wadden Sea area, a part of which is located in the Netherlands. Class action was not appropriate for the suits which looked to that the interests of current and future generations of the world’s population. The interest served with the class action must align with the objects stated in the articles of association and must also actually be promoted. Milieudefensie, Greenpeace Nederland,Fossielvrij NL, Waddenvereniging, Both Ends and Jongeren Milieu Actief met this requirement, but not that of ActionAid as it did not promote the interests of Dutch residents sufficiently for its collective claim to be allowable

The Court held that Dutch law applied, under art. 7 of the Rome II Regulation. Every contribution towards a reduction of CO2 emissions may be of importance, and these distinctive aspects of responsibility for environmental damage and imminent environmental damage must be included in the answering the question as to what in this case should be understood as ‘event giving rise to the damage’ in the sense of Article 7 Rome II. Although Article 7 Rome II refers to an ‘event giving rise to the damage’, i.e. singular, it left room for situations in which multiple events giving rise to the damage in multiple countries can be identified, as is characteristic of environmental damage and imminent environmental damage. When applying Article 7 Rome II, RDS’ adoption of the corporate policy of the Shell group therefore constituted an independent cause of the damage, which may contribute to environmental damage and imminent environmental damage with respect to Dutch residents and the inhabitants of the Wadden region.

RDS’ reduction obligation derived from the unwritten standard of care laid down in Book 6 Section 162 Dutch Civil Code, which means that acting in conflict with what is generally accepted according to unwritten law is unlawful. This standard of care entailed that when determining the Shell group’s corporate policy, RDS had to observe the due care exercised in society. The interpretation of the unwritten standard of care called for an assessment of all circumstances of the case in question, and the court considered fourteen factors.

 (1.) the policy setting position of RDS in the Shell group, (2.) the Shell group’s CO2 emissions, (3.) the consequences of the CO2 emissions for the Netherlands and the Wadden region, (4.) the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life of Dutch residents and the inhabitants of the Wadden region, (5.) the UN Guiding Principles, (6.) RDS’ check and influence of the CO2 emissions of the Shell group and its business relations, (7.) what is needed to prevent dangerous climate change, (8.) possible reduction pathways, (9.) the twin challenge of curbing dangerous climate change and meeting the growing global population energy demand, (10.) the ETS system and other ‘cap and trade’ emission systems that apply elsewhere in the world, permits and current obligations of the Shell group, (11.) the effectiveness of the reduction obligation, (12.) the responsibility of states and society, (13.) the onerousness for RDS and the Shell group to meet the reduction obligation, and (14.) the proportionality of RDS’ reduction obligation. The court went on to weigh the policy, policy intentions and ambitions of RDS for the Shell group against RDS’ reduction obligation

RDS’ responsibility was defined by the influence and control it can exercise over the Scope 1 through to 3 emissions of the Shell group and what is needed to prevent dangerous climate change. The most disputed aspect was in relation to Scope 3 emissions. RDS did not contest that it could exert control and influence through its energy package, and the composition thereof, produced and sold by the Shell group. This was not altered by the circumstance, emphasized by RDS, that the Shell group has contractual obligations as well as obligations ensuing from long-term concessions, which may limit its freedom of choice as regards the Shell group’s energy package. Rather surprisingly, the court noted that “it is internationally endorsed that companies bear responsibilities for Scope 3 emissions. The court has included this widely endorsed starting point in its interpretation of the unwritten standard of care.”

RDS was subject to an obligation of results as regards the Scope 1 emissions of the Shell group as well as a significant best-efforts obligation as regards the business relations of the Shell group, including the end-users, whereby RDS may be expected to take the necessary steps to remove or prevent the serious risks ensuing from the CO2 emissions generated by them, and to use its influence to limit any lasting consequences as much as possible.

The Court went on to note: “Moreover, RDS has insufficiently contested the standpoint of Milieudefensie et al. that RDS’ planned investments in new explorations are not compatible with the reduction target to be met. The Shell group’s policy, as determined by RDS, mainly shows that the Shell group monitors developments in society and lets states and other parties play a pioneering role. In doing so, RDS disregards its individual responsibility, which requires RDS to actively effectuate its reduction obligation through the Shell group’s corporate policy.”

The reduction made was provisionally enforceable but the claim 1(b), pertaining to the future actions of RDS, was rejected as it was not an established fact the RDS would act unlawfully in the future, and there were no indications that RDS would not comply with the order and not meet its obligations.

The judgment is very much an ‘Urgenda moment’ for RDS Shell, although the judgment will almost certainly end up being appealed and then proceeding to the Dutch Supreme Court. However, the prospects for any similar claim in tort against English companies in the oil and gas industry look far less promising. The decision of the New Zealand court in Smith v Fontera Co-Operative Group Ltd and Ors  [2020] NZHC 419 https://iistl.blog/2020/03/11/a-new-climate-change-tort-in-new-zealand/ looks a far more likely bet on the issue of liability in negligence and in public nuisance.

Incorporation of Bulk Terminal Terms into Charter. Effect on Laytime and Demurrage Regime.

In London Arbitration 15/21 the Tribunal considered the effect, if any, of the incorporation into the fixture of what were referred to as UBT (United Bulk Terminal) Rules, which were rules imposed contractually by the berth operators on users of the berth. These provided:

 “2.2 NOTICE OF READINESS

In the case of an Ocean Vessel to be loaded, issuance of the Notice of Readiness shall mean that the Ocean Vessel (1) has obtained all requisite governmental approvals, inspections and clearances, including, but not limited to, those required by the US Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and (2) is located at the Berth or Closest Available Anchorage (as defined in section 2.5 below); and (3) is ready and suitable in all respects to receive the Cargo in all holds to be loaded; and (4) has confirmed with the Terminal that the Cargo is to be loaded to Vessel is in storage at the Terminal or, if Cargo is to be direct transferred, is in barges in the Terminal’s fleet; and (5) has determined that the Cargo is in a condition satisfactory to the Vessel Party and all regulatory authorities for shipment. Notice of Readiness shall be considered invalid unless the aforementioned five conditions are met…”

By contrast the recap setting out the fixture provided

“- SHOULD THE BERTH BE OCCUPIED OR SHOULD THE VESSEL BE PREVENTED FROM PROCEEDING TO THE BERTH AFTER HER ARRIVAL AT OR OFF THE PORT NOTICE OF READINESS MAY BE TENDERED BY TELEX, FAX WWWW (an acronym for “wibon, wccon, wifpon, wipon”, ie “whether in berth or not, whether customs cleared or not, whether in free pratique or not, whether in port or not”).

– AT BOTH ENDS PORT LAYTIME SHALL COMMENCE TO  COUNT 12 HRS AFTER VALID NOR IS TENDERED UNLESS OPERATIONS SOONER COMMENCED.  IN CASE SOONER COMMENCED, ACTUAL TIME USED TO COUNT.”

Clause 6 of the charter in effect confirmed what was agreed in the recap.

Owners gave notice of readiness at the port of Davant on the Mississippi on arrival at the South West Anchorage, having to wait there due to congestion at the berths. The tribunal held that there was no requirement in the contract for the vessel to have passed any inspections, etc before giving a valid notice of readiness. Nor was there any requirement in the contract that notice be accepted by the charterers or their agents. Similarly it contained no requirement that notice be given within the laycan.

Under English law was that where an incorporated document conflicted with the terms of the primary agreement entered into by parties, the conflicting terms had to give way to those in that primary agreement with which they were inconsistent, as had been held in a similar case The Linardos [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 28.

Accordingly the aspects of the UBT Rules relied on by the charterers conflicted with the terms of the fundamental agreement as found in the recap, and reinforced by the incorporated charter terms. As in The Linardos, the UBT Rules were designed to govern contractual relationships between the terminal and users of the berth so, when reading them into a charterparty, great caution had to be exercised in interpreting them in the charterparty context so as to ensure that only those provisions in the Rules that were truly relevant to and compatible with the charter agreement were given effect to.

In the light of the charter provisions agreed in the recap, the vessel was entitled to give notice of readiness at the Southwest Pass as that was the nearest available anchorage off the port at the time she arrived there, and the UBT Rules did not affect that position. Accordingly the owners’ demurrage claim succeeded, and they would be awarded the claimed amount of US$109,495.83 plus interest and costs.

INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR THE SEAFARER. “SAILING” IS HERE!!

Today Ince & Co’s Global Choir for Seafarers release a global choir version of Rod Stewart’s 1975 song ‘Sailing’. We are pleased to announce that at least one member of the IISTL contributed to the global choir.

‘Sailing’ is available from all the usual download platforms – iTunes link HERE – and its aim is to highlight the role of seafarers as keyworkers during this continuing pandemic. There is a donations page HERE. All monies donated through the page are split four ways and go directly to the seafaring charities from Virgin.

There is also a music video (HERE) and a series of testimonials which underline the struggles our seafarers face and have faced throughout the pandemic – ONE / TWO / THREE / FOUR / FIVE / SIX / SEVEN / EIGHT / NINE.

See the inside story HERE from Tradewinds.

Climate Change and International Shipping. Life in the slow lane, and life in the fast(er) lane.

The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 76), meeting from 10 to 17 June 2021, adopted amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annex VI that will require ships to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.

All ships will be required to calculate their Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) following technical means to improve their energy efficiency and to establish their annual operational carbon intensity indicator (CII) and CII rating. Carbon intensity links the GHG emissions to the amount of cargo carried over distance travelled.

Ships will get a rating of their energy efficiency (A, B, C, D, E – where A is the best).  A ship rated D for three consecutive years, or E, is required to submit a corrective action plan, to show how the required index (C or above) would be achieved.

The amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (adopted in a consolidated revised Annex VI) are expected to enter into force on 1 November 2022, with the requirements for EEXI and CII certification coming into effect from 1 January 2023. The first annual reporting will be completed in 2023, with the first rating given in 2024.

A review clause requires the IMO to review the effectiveness of the implementation of the CII and EEXI requirements, by 1 January 2026 at the latest, and, if necessary, develop and adopt further amendments. 

The MEPC also adopted related guidelines to support the implementation of the amendments. 

The guidelines include the 2021 Guidelines on the operational carbon intensity reduction factors relative to reference lines (CII Reduction factor Guidelines, G3). This includes the required reduction (Z) factor, which is set at a rate, relative to 2019, of 11% by 2026 (about a 1.5% annual reduction, as opposed to the 7% annual reduction that would be needed for shipping to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement 2015). This would  be further strengthened after that date, taking into account the review of the measure and latest climate science.

These combined technical and operational measures, referred to as short term carbon intensity measures, are stated as being in line with the ambition of the Initial IMO GHG Strategy, which aims to reduce carbon intensity of international shipping by 40% by 2030, compared to 2008.

The MEPC adopted a work plan on the concrete way forward to make progress with candidate mid- and long-term measures including measures to incentivize the move away from fossil fuels to low- and zero-carbon fuels to achieve decarbonization of international shipping.

A proposal initially considered by MEPC suggested a mandatory levy of $100 per tonne carbon dioxide equivalent on heavy fuel oil will be further considered at the intersessional working group meeting in the context of the adopted workplan along with other proposals for mid-term measures. A proposal to establish an International Maritime Research Board, funded by a tax on oil fuel used by shipping and discussion will resume at the Committee’s next session.

The MEPC also adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex I (addition of a new regulation 43A) to introduce a prohibition on the use and carriage for use as fuel of heavy fuel oil (HFO) by ships in Arctic waters on and after 1 July 2024.

The prohibition will cover the use and carriage for use as fuel of oils having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50°C higher than 180 mm2/s. Ships engaged in securing the safety of ships, or in search and rescue operations, and ships dedicated to oil spill preparedness and response would be exempted. Ships which meet certain construction standards with regard to oil fuel tank protection would need to comply on and after 1 July 2029.

A Party to MARPOL with a coastline bordering Arctic waters may temporarily waive the requirements for ships flying its flag while operating in waters subject to that Party’s sovereignty or jurisdiction, up to 1 July 2029.

Meanwhile the EU is also active with plans regarding the reduction of carbon emissions from international shipping. Its plans for inclusion of international shipping in the emissions trading scheme were due to have been announced this month but will now be announced on July 14, Bastille Day, as part of its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

Ever Given latest.

Yesterday, 23 May, the appeals chamber of the Ismailia Economic Court upheld a ruling issued by the Ismailia Court of First Instance on May 4, rejecting the appeal made by the owners of the ship (Shoei Kisen Kaisha) against keeping the ship under arrest. In a second case that was filed by the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) to keep the seizure of the ship valid, the Court recused itself and referred this case back to the Economic Court of First Instance to be considered on May 29.

The Suez Canal Authority initially demanded $916 million in compensation, which it later lowered to $600 million which would cover the salvage operation, costs of stalled canal traffic and lost transit fees for the week the Ever Given blocked the canal. It seems the claim for reputational damage totalling $300 million may have been jettisoned.

The vessel’s owners have denied that the accident was their fault and are claiming fault on the part of the SCA in allowing the vessel the ship to enter the canal amid bad weather, and claim that at least two tugs suitable for the vessel’s size should have been supplied. Owners are claiming $100,000 in initial compensation for losses related to the vessel’s seizure.

Charterers orders to wait off berth not an extra contractual service; time falls within the laytime and demurrage regime.

London Arbitration 14-21 involved a claim by owners that time spent waiting on charterer’s orders following tender of NOR at the discharge port was a non-contractual service which should be remunerated by way of quantum meruit. This would be at the demurrage rate and would include bunkers consumed while waiting.

The Tribunal rejected the claim. Laytime had already started to run when the charterers ordered the vessel to wait off berth. This was not a non-contractual order as in The Saronikos [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 277 and Glencore Energy UK Ltd v OMV Supply & Trading Ltd [2018] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223. The charterers were entitled to use the whole of the agreed laytime, whether  by holding the ship off the berth, or by berthing her and not working her for some time, or by berthing her and working her immediately. Once laytime had started to count the charterers were entitled to use it in full. Even if owners had been right, they would not have been entitled to anything for bunker consumption. Assuming the demurrage rate was to be taken as a genuine pre-estimate of damages for detention, it had to follow that running expenses, including bunker costs, were to be taken as included in the agreed rate.

Smart claims for bill of lading freight by owners.

If an owner’s bill of lading incorporates the freight provisions of a time charterer’s voyage charter, can owners intervene to require payment of the freight to themselves rather than to the time charterer? That was the issue recently before Butcher J in Alpha Marine Corp v Minmetals Logistics Zhejiang Co Ltd (MV Smart) [2021] EWHC 1157 (Comm) (05 May 2021).


Claim were made by owners against charterers in respect of the loss of the vessel for breach of the safe port warranty. the Tribunal found that the Charterers had provided a safe port warranty in respect of Richards Bay and that there were some shortcomings in the running of the port. However, the Master had been negligent in his handling of the Vessel and it was this that caused the grounding of the Vessel. Owners had issued bills of lading which stated ‘freight as per charter’.  After the vessel was lost the Owners gave notice to the bill of lading holder, the voyage charterer to pay full freight to them. At that time only a sum in respect of bunkers was due to Owners.  Charterers claimed damages in respect of losses sustained as a result of owners’ intervention in respect of freight due under the bill of lading through the incorporation of the terms of the voyage charter. They also claimed in tort on the basis of procuring breach of contract by the voyage charterer and/or knowingly and/or unlawfully interfering with the Voyage Charter. The Tribunal found that Owners were not entitled to revoke Charterers’ right to obtain the bill of lading freight or to direct it be paid to the Owners. This is because the Charterparty contained an implied obligation that Owners would not revoke unless hire and/or sums were due to them under the Charterparty

On appeal, Butcher J considered three possible terms constraining owners’ exercise of their rights to intervene to claim freight under the bill of lading. First, the “all freight” implied term whereby if the Charterers were in default of their obligations under the Charterparty, then the Owners would be entitled to collect the entirety of the freight, even if it exceeded the amount of the Owners’ claim against the Charterers arising out of their default. Second, “All Freight (Sum Identified) Implied Term”) by which the Owners were not entitled to revoke the Charterers’ authority to collect any freight unless a sum was due to the Owners under the Charterparty and the relevant sum was identified at the time of any revocation of the Charterers’ authority; and (3) the “Dollar for Dollar” Implied Term whereby the Owners were only entitled, in the event of a default by the Charterers, to revoke the Charterers’ authority to collect freight in respect to an amount up to, but no more than, the amount due from the Charterers under the Charterparty.

Butcher J rejected the implication of any term.  Owners’ duty to account to the charterer for any excess in the amount of freight collected over the amount due under the charterparty meant that the present charterparty, or other time charters in similar form, did not lack commercial or practical coherence without an implied term restricting the owners’ right to intervene.  If owners claimed freight in excess of sums due to them under the time charter the owners would have to account for the balance to the time charterers, and that was the charterers’ protection.

The Award was set aside insofar as it awarded damages for breach of the implied term found by the Tribunal; and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the Charterers’ freight counterclaim on the alternative Tortious Basis, having regard to this judgment.

No-go Lugano?

The UK’s application, submitted on 8 April 2020, to join the Lugano Convention in its own right appears to be foundering on opposition from the EU. Although the three non-EU Members (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) have expressed support for admitting the UK, the European Commission is less favourably disposed, and its consent is essential if the UK is to become a party to the convention. On 12 April the Commission stated.

“The Commission has conducted a thorough assessment of the request and has discussed it with Member States. It will come forward with a Communication in the coming weeks.

It is worth noting, however, that the Lugano Convention is a tool used within the EU-EFTA/EEA context. The UK has chosen to leave the EU, the Single Market and the Customs Union. It has chosen to have a more distant relationship with the EU than EEA-EFTA countries. These choices have to be taken into account when determining the EU’s position.”

The final decision, however, lies with the European Council, which comprises EU Member State heads of state or government and is expected soon. We wait with bated breath.