Arbitration agreements — for once, perhaps we should be the world’s policeman

Whatever the position as regards English jurisdiction clauses, we’ve known for nigh on a quarter-century that you can’t get an ASI in London to protect the agreed jurisdiction of a foreign court. In 1998 Airbus Industrie G.I.E. v Patel [1999] 1 A.C. 119, our judges firmly eschewed the idea that they should operate as a kind of Global Good Litigation Police, and said that that foreign fora wanting to guard their jurisdiction as a choice of place to litigate could be expected to do their own dirty work.

But what about arbitration? Does a similar rule apply to complaints that a defendant is blithely suing away in Ruritania under a contract containing on the face of it a clause calling for arbitration in Utopia? A decision a week ago from Sir Nigel Teare suggests a possible Yes.

In G v R [2023] EWHC 2365 (Comm) suit was brought in Russia on a performance bond governed by English law. The claimant pointed out that the bond provided for any disputes to be settled by ICC arbitration in Paris, and to make sure this happened sought an ASI from the High Court. Could it get it? The answer was a fairly resounding no. In fact the claimant fell at the first fence; having failed to show that the agreement to arbitrate, as against the main contract, was governed by English law, he failed to seise the court of the matter in the first place.

But apart from that, even if the contract to arbitrate had been governed by English law, the judge thought England was not shown to be the appropriate jurisdiction. The fact that England could grant ASI relief whereas the French court, as the court of the seat, could not, went for little: the parties having chosen a French seat, there was nothing wrong with saying that having made their bed they should lie in it, and thus be stuck with the limited remedies available in France. Nor was there much relevance in a (hypothetical) English governing law, even if that had been chosen, since there was unlikely to arise any serious issue of English law that it would be difficult for a foreign tribunal to determine.

We have, if we may say so with great respect, our doubts about this decision.

First, there is an argument that if parties choose to have an arbitration agreement governed by English law, that should incline a court in favour of doing their best to make available the remedies normally applying in English law for breach of it. If so it should actually be a strong pull in favour of the English courts being an appropriate venue. The parties in G v R, had they (as the claimant argued) chosen English law as the lex arbitri, would one suspects have been somewhat nonplussed at the information that the English courts were nevertheless closed to them as an inappropriate forum. To that extent, the differing view of the Court of Appeal on an interlocutory appeal in SQD v QYP, decided the day before G v R (and noted here), and also a similarly divergent view expressed in March this year by Calver J (noted here), seem to carry more conviction.

Secondly, unlike choice of court agreements, there is something approaching an agreed international regime in force for international arbitration agreements under the New York Convention, which very strongly favours giving the most robust protection possible to such agreements. (Indeed, it was the notoriously casual attitude of the Russian courts towards the New York Convention that spawned the satellite litigation in G v R in the first place.) There is something to be said for an “all hands to the pumps” approach here, with the English courts doing their best to uphold the New York system.

This issue is clearly heading fast towards the Court of Appeal, if not further. Meanwhile, what should practitioners do if they wish to feel secure in reserving their seat on the Eurostar for that ICC session in Paris? First, they must make clear, preferably expressly, that the lex arbitri is English – something doubly important, if the Law Commission’s recommendation is enacted that the presumptive lex arbitri should always be that of the seat, rather than that of the matrix contract.

They should also – as some already do — expressly confer at least non-exclusive jurisdiction on the English court in matters related to the arbitration agreement. Not only will this make service out easier: it will make it much harder for another party to deny that the English court is indeed the appropriate one to seek relief in. True, the parties cannot force the court by agreement to exercise its discretion in favour of the always-discretionary remedy of an injunction. But they can sure use tactful means to smooth its way to that destination.

A DAY TO REMEMBER: THE 2019 HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE

At last, we no longer lack functional global rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Only a couple of days ago, on 1 September 2023, the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HJC) entered into force. This is a momentous event for private international law and a real game-changer for international dispute resolution. With its entry into force, the HJC can now be utilised by commercial parties and contribute to a swift resolution of disputes by shortening expenses and timeframes for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in other jurisdictions. Having adopted the HJC, the Hague Conference achieved its target to guarantee the effectiveness of court judgments similar to arbitral awards as ensured by the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

A year ago and almost around the same time we provided some comments on the provisions of the Convention determining the procedure for becoming effective (see here: Hague Judgments Convention to enter into force! – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog). According to Articles 28 and 29 of the HJC, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the twelve months after the second State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. On this occasion, the Convention was ratified by Ukraine and the EU on 29 August 2022, and now has a force of law for both. In addition, Uruguay ratified the treaty on 1 September, and it will come into force for the latter 12 months later.

The HJC provides recognition and enforcement of judgments given in cross-border civil and commercial cases, excluding the carriage of passengers and goods, transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average. That being said, the HJC is not an ideal framework and does not include every issue that might arise from civil and commercial cases. Yet, it complements the HCCCA not only by sharing the same objectives but also by covering judgments given by non-exclusively designated courts; therefore, it indeed serves party autonomy and ensures the effectiveness of an entire range of choice of court agreements.

The Convention further contributes to certainty and access to justice post-Brexit since it is the only international treaty providing rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in cross-border commercial disputes. However, the UK has not ratified the Convention yet and even if it does, the Convention will enter in and for the UK only twelve months after the date it deposits an instrument of ratification. Following the analysis, the Government will make its final decision on becoming a Contracting State to the HJC and on whether to make any reservations. If signed and ratified, the Convention would be implemented in domestic law under the terms of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020, subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, if ratified, the HJC will not only contribute to access to justice and effectiveness of judgments involving EU-related civil and commercial cases but also the UK’s global judicial cooperation with the other Hague Contracting States will be enhanced. For the previous post related to the UK’s plans to ratify the HJC see: The Ball is Rolling: The UK to ratify the Hague Judgments Convention? – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog.

Yet, we must admit the HJC leaves significant matters unresolved. Besides excluding extremely important commercial matters from its application scope, the Convention does not contain any specific regulation of parallel proceedings, lis pendens, and related actions – the famous yet infamous Brussels terminology. In this regard, there is a hope that the Hague Conference will succeed in its Jurisdiction Project. Indeed, if the latter is achieved the three Conventions might well function together and provide safeguards for international commercial parties and global justice.

The UK’s commitment to ADR: Compulsory mediation

On 25 July 2023, the UK Government – the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) adopted a compulsory mediation for all small civil claims valued up to £10,000 starting with specified money claims which amount to 80% of small claims. Indeed, this should not come as a surprise as the Government has been employing innovative manners to ease effective dispute resolution without any need for a mandatory court referral. It was only a year ago when the Government published a Public Consultation on “Increasing the use of mediation in the civil justice system”. Further, there is already serious work being done across the Government to implement the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Convention), which the UK signed on 3 May 2023 (The Singapore Convention on Mediation: The UK’s Serious Commitment to ADR – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog). As an integral part of the UK justice system, mediation may save businesses around £5.9 billion per year in management time, relationships, productivity, and legal fees with the value of UK mediated cases each year being estimated at approximately £20bn as of February 2023. The UK’s implementation of the Singapore Convention is expected to bolster the UK’s £17.5 billion mediation sector and underscore its leading role in international commercial dispute resolution and the MoJ’s latest decision will incredibly serve to this target. Along these lines, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill will also strengthen oversight of dispute resolution opportunities available to consumers; an initiative which would have been more constrained whilst in the EU. According to the newly adopted system, after he filed a defense on a small claim and allocation of the case to the court, mediation will be the next phase and parties will get notified about this. Once they have filled out a ‘directions questionnaire’ the case will move to HM Courts & Tribunals’ free small claims mediation service in a form of an hour-long telephone conversation with the mediator. In case parties will agree on a settlement, the court will register a legally binding formal agreement between them. Otherwise, a judge will hear the dispute. This is indeed a very welcome policy decision and legal reform to ensure easy and accessible dispute resolution by everybody and save both time and expenses while decreasing the workload of the courts. On another note, the intended reforms such as setting a compulsory mediation for all claims issued under the Civil Procedure Rules Part 7 will necessitate a serious planning and strategy. Indeed, the new scheme will provide an avenue for learning the best lessons and adopting them in the later reform stages.  

The Singapore Convention on Mediation: The UK’s Serious Commitment to ADR

Following the public consultation on the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the “Singapore Convention on Mediation”), which ran from 2 February to 1 April 2022, the UK Government signed the treaty on 3 May 2023. Once the UK has implemented the Convention into domestic legislation and deposited the instrument of ratification, it will enter into force six months later as provided in Article 14.1 of the treaty. To date, 56 countries have signed the Singapore Convention, and 11 of the signatories have also ratified it.

The Singapore Convention on Mediation was adopted by UNCITRAL in 2019 as a multilateral treaty providing a uniform and efficient framework for the enforcement and invocation of international settlement agreements resulting from the mediation of commercial disputes. Mediation is the most common form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and probably the quickest way of resolving disputes. As for the settlement of disputes, a neutral third party facilitates a negotiated agreement without any decision-making power.

There is a tendency in the UK to stimulate parties to mediate their arisen or potential disputes instead of litigating in courts, therefore, to immerse mediation as an integral step in the court process. In this regard, the Ministry of Justice’s Call for Evidence on Dispute Resolution in England and Wales set out the goals of the civil justice system to integrate dispute resolution processes, including resolving disputes consensually through mediation. Following this, the Government made proposals on the automatic/mandatory mediation of civil disputes valued up to £10,000 by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) as part of the court process. The latter is at the consultation stage.  

By signing the Singapore Convention, the UK has demonstrated its serious outlook for becoming a leader in the promotion of mediation as an essential part of the civil justice system. In the absence of such an international treaty, there is a process to be followed for a settlement agreement to get enforced. A party would need to make a claim for breach of contract and get a judgment that is to be enforced first unless the terms of the settlement have been recorded in a “Tomlin order”.

With the UK’s membership to the Singapore Convention, international mediation agreements or iMSAs (settlement agreements qualifying under the Convention) as well as settlements will become directly enforceable without any further need to issue a claim for breach of contract or to litigate the case on the merits. Having the Singapore Convention together with the New York Arbitration Convention and Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in its armoury will enhance the UK’s credibility as an attractive dispute resolution hub as well as promote its relations with global trading partners. Furthermore, membership in these fundamental Private International Law instruments will also have serious Brexit implications. Needless to say, the UK’s plans to ratify the Hague Judgments Convention significantly contribute to these ends (for more on this see the blogpost here: The Ball is Rolling: The UK to ratify the Hague Judgments Convention? – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog.

The next step in the reform of the Arbitration Act 1996

Recently, the Law Commission for England and Wales published the Second Consultation Paper on the Review of the Arbitration Act 1996 containing provisional law reform proposals to ensure that the arbitration law remains state of the art. Back in 2021, the Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of the Arbitration Act 1996. Following this, the Commission published its first public consultation paper unfolding provisional law reform proposals. The consultation period was open by December 2022. See the previous post about the first consultation paper here: Law Commission to review the Arbitration Act 1996

The consultation questions in the previous paper were around the shortlisted aspects of the arbitration, including confidentiality, independence of arbitrators and disclosure, discrimination, immunity of arbitrators, summary disposal of issues that lack merit, interim measures ordered by the court in support of arbitral proceedings (section 44 of the Act), jurisdictional challenges against arbitral awards (section 67), and appeals on a point of law (section 69). In addition, the Commission encouraged consultees to suggest and comment on any other topics which were not covered but might need reviewing.

It is worth reiterating the main points of my response to the first consultation paper:

  • As of the status quo based on the existing legislation and authorities, relitigation and reconsideration by the court following the challenges brought under Section 67 not only double the waste of time and expenses by the repetitive proceedings and potential parallel or inconsistent judgments but also go against the whole idea of arbitration and the fundamental principle “Kompetenz-kompetenz”.
  • The courts’ powers to grant interim injunctions derive from the two fundamental legal frameworks – Arbitration Act 1996, Section 44 and Senior Courts Act 1981, Section 37. The revision of the existing legal frameworks to reflect the interrelationship and boundaries of the instruments with regard to the court’s powers to make orders in support of arbitral proceedings would be in line with the objectives and general principles of the Arbitration Act 1996 to improve the law relating to arbitration, in general. Indeed, the revision would bring clarity about the application scope of the Act (see the Introductory Act to the Arbitration Act 1996) and contribute to the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense.

Based on the suggestions made by the consultees involved in the first round of the reform project, in its second consultation paper, the Commission has made new proposals about the proper law of the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the Commission considers the following two issues as the most controversial ones among the others and seeks the views of consultees on the revised proposals: (1) challenges to awards under section 67 on the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction; and (2) discrimination in arbitral appointments.

The second consultation paper will be open by 23:59 hours on 22 May 2023. The responses of consultees to this second consultation paper will be taken along with responses to the first consultation to inform the final report and recommendations. All the details of the project and relevant consultation documents are available here: Review of the Arbitration Act 1996 – Law Commission

Anti-assignment clauses and subrogation under foreign law

Dassault Aviation SA v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co Ltd [2022] EWHC 3287 (Comm) involved the effect of an anti-assignment clause in a contract on statutory rights of subrogation under an insurance policy subject to Japanese law taken out by one of the parties. Mitsui Bussan Aerospace Co Ltd (“MBA”) and Dassault entered into a sale contract governed by English law under which Dassault would manufacture and deliver to MBA two aircraft and certain related supplies and services for supply to the Japanese Coast Guard. Article 15 of the Sale Contract, titled “Assignment-Transfer”, provided:

“Except for the Warranties defined in Exhibit 4 that shall be transferable to Customer, this Contract shall not be assigned or transferred in whole or in part by any Party to any third party, for any reason whatsoever, without the prior written consent of the other Party and any such assignment, transfer or attempt to assign or transfer any interest or right hereunder shall be null and void without the prior written consent of the other Party.

Notwithstanding the above and subject to a Seller’s prior notice to Buyer, Seller shall have the right to enter into subcontracting arrangements with any third party, for the purpose of the performance of this Contract”

The Sale Contract contained an arbitration agreement providing for arbitration under the ICC rules and for the seat of arbitration to be London.

MBA entered into a contract of insurance with MSI, governed by Japanese law, without seeking Dassault’s consent. The Policy covered the risk of MBA being held liable to the Japanese Coast Guard for late delivery under the Sale Contract. In fact, delivery was delayed and the Japanese Coast Guard claimed liquidated damages for late delivery. MBA claimed that sum from MSI (less a deductible) under the Policy, and MSI accepted that claim and paid MBA in turn.

Article 25 of the Japanese Insurance Law provides:

“An insurer, when the insurer has made an insurance proceeds payment, shall, by operation of law, be subrogated with regard to any claim acquired by the insured due to the occurrence of any damages arising from an insured event (under a non-life insurance policy which covers claims arising due to default or any other reason, such claims shall be included; hereinafter referred to as the ‘insured’s claim’ in this Article), up to the smaller of the amounts listed below:

(i) the amount of the insurance proceeds payment made by the insurer; or

(ii) the amount of the insured’s claim (if the amount set forth in the preceding item falls short of the amount of damages to be compensated, the amount that remains after deducting the amount of the shortfall from the amount of the insured’s claim).”

Article 26 of the Japanese Insurance Law provides: “A contractual provision that is incompatible with the provisions of […] [Article 25] that is unfavourable to an insured shall be void.” However it permits of agreement that an insurer would not be subrogated, as not being “unfavourable to the insured”.

The mechanism of subrogation under Japanese Law is the transfer of rights: the insurer acquires the right to sue in its own name, including the right to initiate proceedings. This was reinforced by Article 35 (1) of the Policy which essentially reproduced Article 25 of the Japanese Insurance Law and provide:

“In the event that the Insured acquires a right to claim for damages or other claim […] as a result of the occurrence of Losses, such claims shall be transferred to [MSI] when [MSI] pays the insurance benefits for said Losses..”

30 April 2021, MSI submitted a request for arbitration under the arbitration agreement in the Sale Contract against Dassault. The Tribunal considered the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary issue. In its Partial Award on jurisdiction by a majority decision, the Tribunal dismissed Dassault’s jurisdictional objection. The Tribunal held that: (i) Article 15 of the Sale Contract did not apply to involuntary assignments and/or assignments by operation of law; (ii) as a matter of Japanese law, the transfer of rights from MBA to MSI occurred by operation to law pursuant to Article 25 of the Japanese Insurance Act. The majority found that, since the transfer occurred by operation of law, Article 15 did not apply to it

On appeal under s.67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 Cockerill J that the effect of Article 15 was that the subrogation to MSI was of no effect and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear its claim against Dassault. So far as the authorities went, there was a presumption that the court should not be prevented from giving effect to such a clause when the transfer is one which is voluntary (in the sense of consented to). The authorities did not justify a conclusion that prohibitions on assignment should not be taken to carve out transfers which occur “by operation of law” in a broad sense. The relevant test was whether the transfer was voluntary in that it was in the power of MBA to prevent the transfer. The answer was that it was. MBA might have chosen not to insure or might have chosen a policy governed by another system of law. It might have excluded the operation of Article 25 instead positively reinforcing it with Article 35 of the Policy. It might have chosen not to make a claim. It was therefore in the power of MBA to comply with the provision. It acted voluntarily or consented to take a step which on a certain contingency would put it in breach of that provision.

MSI pointed out that it was difficult to say that subrogation under English law was acceptable, whereas the subrogation equivalent of another legal system was not. Dassault replied that an English law subrogation does not involve a transfer and there simply is a relevant difference for the purposes of a clause such as this. Secondly, the assumption that there is no problem with English law subrogation might not be a safe one.

This required a consideration of the nature of subrogation in English law. Would the third rule of English law subrogation, that an insurer can pursue a claim in the name of the insured, but not pursuant to a transfer of right, be affected by Article 15 or a clause like it?  Cockerill J was not prepared to decide that Dassault’s argument would probably gain traction based on a fairly slight and somewhat abstract argument and its case must therefore (for present purposes) stand or fall on the basis that English law subrogation would not fall foul of Article 15.

MSI argued that “a question of public policy arises… because the general view of English contractual law is that it’s sensible for parties to obtain insurance and they should not be penalised for doing so“. Cockerill J rejected this because one could not imply into the clause a blanket exception for insurance: it would be contrary to the express words of the contract and it would fail the business efficacy test.

The moral of this tale is that if your contract contains a ban on assignment, you need to take care with taking out insurance under a policy subject to a foreign law. If subrogation under that system of law operates by a direct transfer of rights to the insurer, it will be caught by the ban on assignment in your contract.

Charters, subjects and arbitrators’ jurisdiction

Hopeless appeals sometimes clear the air. One such was today’s appeal by the claimants in the arbitration decision of The Newcastle Express [2022] EWCA Civ 1555.

Owners of a largish bulker fixed her for a voyage carrying coal from Australia to China. The charter was on the terms of an accepted proforma containing a London arbitration clause, and subject to Rightship approval. The recap, however, contained the words SUB SHIPPER/RECEIVERS APPROVAL, and no sub was ever lifted. The charterers declined to accept the vessel, alleging that Rightship approval had not been obtained on time; the owners alleged wrongful repudiation, and claimed arbitration.

The charterers argued that because the necessary approvals had not been forthcoming no agreement of any kind had been concluded, and politely sat out the owners’ proceedings. The arbitration tribunal decided that there had been a concluded contract; that it therefore had jurisdiction; and that the owners were entitled to something over $280,000 in damages. On an appeal under ss.67 and 69 of the Arbitration Act Jacobs J allowed the charterers’ s.67 appeal, holding that there had never been either a contract or an agreement to arbitrate anything; hence neither the charter nor the arbitration bound the charterers. For good measure he also said that he would have allowed a s.69 appeal on the law.

The owners unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. They argued first, one suspects without much enthusiasm, that the “sub shipper/receivers approval” term was not a precondition of there being any contract, but instead acknowledged the presence of an agreement and merely qualified the duty to perform it. The Court of Appeal had little difficulty sweeping this point aside. Terms fairly clearly giving a person the right to disapprove a transaction on commercial grounds, as here, were fairly consistently construed in the same way as other “subject to contract” terms: and this one was clearly intended to allow either party to walk away without penalty.

This left the separability point: why not invoke the “one-stop-shop” preference adumbrated in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951 and engage in a bit of constructive interpretation, so as to treat the parties as having agreed that even if the main agreement hadn’t been concluded they had agreed on any dispute, including whether the agreement was enforceable, being decided by arbitrators? To this, however, there was a simple answer. Harbour Assurance v Kansa Insurance Co [1993] QB 701 before the 1996 Act, and the post-1996 Fiona Trust case itself, showed that this chicken wouldn’t fight. It was all very well to separate out the arbitration agreement in cases where the parties had seemingly agreed but there was some alleged vitiating factor, such as mistake or duress, in their agreement. But here the very point at issue was whether there had been agreement on anything in the first place: if there had not, any arbitration provision fell with the agreement itself. Game set and match, therefore, to the charterers.

This must all be right. Admittedly it does leave claimants in a quandary when faced with defendants who, like the charterers in this case, deny that parties ever reached agreement and refuse to arbitrate. Do they have to go to the expense of an arbitration in the full knowledge that they may then have to traverse the same ground again in a court to prove that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide in their favour?

The solution suggested by Males LJ at [86], an agreement ad hoc to arbitrate the jurisdiction point, is certainly useful, though it requires agreement from the other party. A further possibility might be to amend s.32 of the Act. Currently this allows an application to the court to determine jurisdiction, but only with the agreement either of both parties or of the tribunal and the court. There is something to be said for relaxing this requirement where one party refuses to take part in the proceedings at all, and saying that in such a case either party can demand a court determination as of right. Ironically the threat to force on the other party a quick trip to the Commercial Court, with the extra costs that involves, might act as a wholesome encouragement to agree to the one-stop-shop businesspeople are always said to want and which Males LJ advocates.

The Law Commission, as it providentially happens, is currently looking at s.67 and s.32, and has a consultation paper out (in which it tentatively suggests, among other things, that a s.67 appeal should not be a rehearing except where the other party plays no part in the arbitration). This is perhaps another idea that could be discreetly fed to it. You have till 15 December, when the consultation closes, to get any proposals together.

Misdelivery by the carrier after discharge and the Article III Rule 6 time bar: the ‘Alhani gap’ is filled

FIMBank p.l.c. v KCH Shipping Co., Ltd [2022] EWHC 2400 (Comm)

The Commercial Court (Sir William Blair) has recently handed down judgment in FIMBank p.l.c. v KCH Shipping Co., Ltd, an appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, holding that the time bar in Article III rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules can apply to claims in relation to misdelivery after discharge. The Court’s decision resolves an important question which had not previously been decided by the English courts, and which has divided leading academic commentators as well as judges in other common law jurisdictions.

Background

The appeal relates to a claim brought by FIMBank p.l.c. (“FIMBank”), as the holder of bills of lading, for the alleged misdelivery of cargo by the contractual carrier, KCH Shipping Co., Ltd (“KCH”). The bills were concluded on the Congenbill form, and were subject to the Hague-Visby Rules, including the time bar in Article III r 6 of one year after delivery which applies to claims against carriers.

FIMBank served a Notice of Arbitration on KCH after that time bar expired. Its position was that its claim was nevertheless not caught by the time bar, contending that: (a) on the facts, delivery took place after discharge; and (b) as a matter of law, the time bar did not apply to claims for misdelivery occurring after discharge. In its submission, this was so given that the Hague-Visby Rules do not regulate a carrier’s obligation to deliver cargo (as opposed to the carriage of goods by sea), and only relate to a ‘period of responsibility’ which ends with the discharge of cargo. FIMBank further argued that the parties had, in any event, contractually disapplied the Rules in respect of the period after discharge, insofar as Clause 2(c) of the Congenbill form provided: “The Carrier shall in no case be responsible for loss and damage to the cargo, howsoever arising prior to loading into and after discharge from the Vessel …”.

In an Award on preliminary issues, the arbitral tribunal determined that FIMBank’s claim was time-barred irrespective of whether delivery post-dated discharge on the facts (which remained a matter in dispute). This was because: (i) the Hague[1]Visby Rules time bar can apply to claims relating to misdelivery occurring after discharge; and (ii) Clause 2(c) of the Congenbill form does not disapply the Rules in respect of the period after discharge.

The Court’s reasoning

The Court upheld the tribunal’s decision on both questions, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

On the first question, it concluded that, on its true construction, Article III r 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to claims for misdelivery of cargo after discharge. The Court noted that this conclusion avoided the need for fine distinctions as to the point at which discharge ended, and accorded with the objective of the rule which was intended to achieve finality and to enable the shipowner to clear its books. It further observed that, although certain common law authorities and commentaries might be said to support the construction of Article III r 6 for which FIMBank contended (including Carver on Charterparties and Voyage Charters), there was no international judicial or academic consensus to that effect.

The Court held that, even if its conclusion above was wrong, the tribunal’s decision was in any event justified by its finding that the bills of lading contained an implied term providing that the Hague-Visby Rules obligations and immunities are to continue after actual discharge and until delivery takes place, in line with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in The MSC Amsterdam [2007] EWCA Civ 794.

On the second question, the Court held that, on a proper construction, Clause 2(c) did not disapply the Hague-Visby Rules to the period after discharge. Although FIMBank relied in this regard on The MSC Amsterdam, in which the express terms of the bill of lading concerned were held to have disapplied the Hague Rules after discharge, the Judge held that that decision did not warrant a different result, insofar as it featured a bill of lading with materially distinguishable terms.

Simon Rainey K.C. of Quadrant Chambers and Matthew Chan of Twenty Essex acted for KCH, instructed by Kyri Evagora and Thor Maalouf of Reed Smith LLP














Law Commission to review the Arbitration Act 1996

Yesterday, on 22 September 2022, the Law Commission for England and Wales published a public consultation paper unfolding provisional law reform proposals to ensure that the Arbitration Act 1996 remains state of art. After the Ministry of Justice asked the Commission to undertake a review of the Arbitration Act 1996 in 2021, the work began in January 2022. While consulting with a wide range of stakeholders in the field and assessing the current legal framework, the Commission has concluded that the Arbitration Act works very well, without any need for substantial reforms. However, it has been revealed that several discrete topics might necessitate amendments to ensure that the Act fits its purpose and continues to promote the UK as a leading destination for commercial arbitration. The Commission has drafted the consultation questions around the shortlisted aspects of arbitration:

1. Confidentiality

2. Independence of arbitrators and disclosure.

3. Discrimination. 

4. Immunity of arbitrators. 

5. Summary disposal of issues that lack merit. 

6. Interim measures ordered by the court in support of arbitral proceedings (section 44 of the Act). 

7. Jurisdictional challenges against arbitral awards (section 67). 

8. Appeals on a point of law (section 69). 

In addition, the Commission encourages consultees to suggest and comment on any other topics which are not covered in the consultation paper but might need reviewing.

The Commission welcomes responses to the paper between 22 September 2022 and 15 December 2022 using an online form, email, or post. After the consultation has been completed, the Commission will analyse the responses and ensure further stakeholder engagement as appropriate. The follow-up report of the final recommendations for law reform will be published by the Commission, and the Ministry of Justice together with other interested departments will decide whether to implement them.

More information on the reform project and the consultation paper are available at Review of the Arbitration Act 1996 | Law Commission.