Updated BIMCO versions of TOWCON, TOWHIRE and BARGEHIRE forms. Work in progress on new Force Majeure clause.

BIMCO have released new versions of their TOWCON, TOWHIRE and BARGEHIRE forms. New to TOWCON 2021 are a provision for mid-voyage bunkering on longer tows, and a mechanism for calculating compensation due to slow steaming or deviation. BARGEHIRE 2021 now contains clearer wording relating to off-hire surveys, repairs and redelivery. These have often been a source of dispute in the past.

BIMCO has also announced details of progress on its new Force Majeure clause. It takes the approach that neither party may terminate the contract while the vessel is carrying cargo. It notes that termination by owners with cargo on board will entail their continuing responsibility for the cargo as bailees, with no rights of recourse against charterers for discharge costs.

The new bolt-on to the clause sets out a number of liberties if force majeure prevents the completion of loading, or the departure from the load port, or discharge, for more than 21 days from when force majeure notice was declared. Extra costs incurred thereby should be allocated in accordance with the contract, in particular terms as to allocation of responsibility for loading or discharge, such as FIOST terms.

Any extra costs incurred in exercising any of the liberties should be allocated in accordance with the contract. This will require examining how the responsibility for loading and discharge has been allocated in the underlying contract, for example, if it is on FIOST (Free In Out Stowed and Trimmed) terms.

The BIMCO sub committee also considered how the draft clause would relate to other BIMCO clauses in the same contract such as the war, piracy and infectious or contagious diseases clauses. These allow owners to reject proceeding to a risk area, and if they do, to provide a cost allocation mechanism. By contrast the purpose of the Force Majeure clause is to protect a party from liability in damages in case of force majeure, and as a last resort to allow termination, something complementary to the other BIMCO clauses, and not in conflict with them.

The sub-committee noted that it is for the parties to decide whether a Force Majeure clause belongs in a period time charter, and the triggers for the clause have been set deliberately high. Firstly, the party claiming force majeure must prove the existence of the force majeure event; that the event was beyond its control; that it could not have been foreseen; and that its effects were unavoidable. Secondly, the right to terminate will only be available if performance becomes impossible, illegal or radically different, or substantially affects the whole contract during an agreed number of days.

This second aspect is similar to the doctrine of frustration but BIMCO state that “However, there is an important difference – if a party can bring itself within that termination provision, it will be able to terminate immediately, from day one. Under frustration, the contract would only be considered frustrated and terminated after a very long time compared to the overall contract period. There are two termination provisions in the clause and the other one provides a longstop right to terminate after an agreed amount of time has passed. The number of days will have to be negotiated depending on the contract in question.”

The BIMCO Force Majeure Clause and the additional bolt-on provision will be presented for adoption in May this year.

Apparent good order and condition: apparent to whom?

Shippers are in the nature of things in a position to know rather more about a cargo they are shipping than the carrier who transports them. This can cause problems, as appears from the Court of Appeal’s decision a couple of days ago in Noble Chartering v Priminds Shipping [2021] EWCA Civ 87. The Tai Prize, a 73,000 dwt bulker owned by Tai Shing Maritime, was voyage-chartered by Priminds from time-charterers Noble to carry a cargo of Brazilian soya beans from Santos to Guangzhou in southern China. They presented clean bills of lading to agents who signed it on behalf of the head owners Tai Shing. On arrival the beans were mouldy and damp; this was due to the fact they had been shipped too wet, something which the master had had no reason to suspect, but which Priminds ought to have realised.

The consignees sued Tai Shing in China and got $1 million (in round figures). Tai Shing claimed in turn from Noble, who settled the claim for $500,000. Noble then claimed this sum from Priminds. They relied on their right of indemnity under the charter and an allegation that a dangerous cargo had been shipped, and also argued that the bill of lading that Priminds had sent for signature had been inaccurate, since a cargo which Priminds had had reason to know was over-wet could not be said to have been shipped in apparent good order and condition. The first two claims were rejected by the arbitrator, and nothing more was heard of them; but the arbitrator allowed the third claim. HHJ Pelling on a s.69 appeal held that she had been wrong to do so (see [2020] EWHC 127 (Comm)). Noble appealed.

The issue was simple. “Apparent good order and condition” means good order and condition “as far as meets the eye” (e.g. Slesser LJ in Silver v Ocean SS Co [1930] 1 K.B. 416, 442). But whose hypothetical eye matters here? The master’s, or that of the shipper presenting the bill? The Court of appeal had no doubt: upholding HHJ Pelling, it decided that it was the former. The master here had had no reason to suspect anything wrong with the soya beans in Santos; Tai Shing had there therefore been entitled (and indeed bound) to sign a clean bill. It followed that the clean bill presented had been correct and not misleading, and equally that Priminds had not been in breach.

The arbitrator’s decision on this had, we suspect, been seen by most as heterodox. We agree, and join what we suspect will be the majority of shipping lawyers in welcoming the Court of Appeal’s decision. It is worth making three points, however.

First, this is actually a hard case, even though it does not make bad law. It is difficult not to have some sympathy for the head owners (and through them Noble). On any normal understanding of the law the head owners, having issued entirely legitimate clean bills, were not liable to the receivers at all. It is perhaps tactful not to inquire too closely into how judgment was given against them for $1 million. Priminds, by contrast, were pretty clearly liable for a breach of contract in shipping wet beans. One can see why the head owners’ P&I Club might have felt sore at becoming piggy-in-the-middle and bearing a loss that by rights ought to have fallen on the shippers who escaped scot-free.

Incidentally, it is worth noting one possibility in this respect. A consignee not infrequently has the option, in a case where it is alleged that a clean bill was improperly issued, to sue either the carrier for failing to deliver a cargo in good condition, or his seller for breach of contract in not shipping it in like good condition. It is in most cases more convenient to sue the carrier, if necessary by threatening to arrest the ship at the discharge port. Nevertheless all may not be lost for P&I interests. It seems at least arguable that they may be able to lay off at least some of the risk by bringing contribution proceedings against the seller as a person who, if sued by the consignee, might also have been liable for the same loss. They do not even have to show that they were in fact liable to the consignee: merely that the claim alleged against them was good in law (see s.1(4) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978).

Thirdly, Males J in the Court of Appeal at [57] left open the possibility of the liability of a shipper who presented clean bills when he actually knew of hidden defects in the cargo. This will have to remain for decision on another day. But it is certainly hard to have much sympathy for such a shipper: particularly since there are suggestions that a carrier who knows that a cargo is defective cannot legitimately issue a clean bill merely by looking complacently at impeccable outside packaging and then sanctimoniously turning a Nelsonian blind eye to the horrors he knows lurk beneath it (see e.g. Atkinson J in Dent v Glen Line (1940) 67 Ll.L.L.R. 72, 85).

Got a claim against a subsidiary but would like to go against the parent? We have some bad news.

You have an important ongoing contract with X, a subsidiary of a major foreign conglomerate Y. Then Y re-organises its business in a way that doesn’t involve you. X tells you it is regretfully going to break its contract. Obviously you can sue X; but can you sue Y as well? The result of this morning’s deision of the Court of Appeal in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v James Kemball Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 33 is that in practice, in the vast majority of cases the answer is No.

Shipping lawyers will know the background. KKK a couple of years ago completed a reorganisation of its business; the container side was merged down into ONE, a joint venture with a couple of ex-competitors. Before the reorganisation, ancillary trucking etc in Europe had been organised by a sub-subsidiary of KKK called K-Euro, which had signed up the claimant JKL to do the haulage. This arrangement was now redundant, and K-Euro told JKL it would not be performing further.

JKL seems to have had a clear breach claim against K-Euro, but was not satisfied with it. History and legal confidentiality do not relate why, but there may have been doubts about K-Euro’s long-term solvency and/or a troublesome limitation of liability clause in the JKL – K-Euro contract. Be that as it may, JKL sued KKK for inducing a breach of contract, and sought to serve out in Japan. Teare J allowed this (see [2019] EWHC 3422 (Comm)); but the Court of Appeal disagreed, on the basis that on the evidence the claim had no realistic prospect of success..

The difficulty was twofold. First, despite the existence of a relationship of corporate control, and indeed substantial overlapping directorships, as between KKK and K-Euro, there was no element of persuasion or inducement by the former of the latter. KKK had not induced or persuaded K-Euro to break any contract. Instead, it had been a matter not so much of persuasion as practical compulsion: KKK had reorganised its business wholesale, with the inevitable (and admittedly entirely foreseen) result that K-Euro was forced to break the old arrangement. That, said the Court of Appeal, was something different. Furthermore, inducement of breach of contract required the defendant in some sense to have aimed his actions against the claimant. But here KKK had in no sense aimed its act at JKL, as might have been the case had it told K-Euro directly to appoint another haulier in its stead: instead, the loss to JKL had been, as it were, mere collateral damage.

This seems right. True, the suggested distinction between persuasion and compulsion needs to be taken with some care: if I threaten never to deal with X again unless X breaks his contract with you, I remain liable under Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216, and pointing out that I bullied X rather than gently cajoling him will do me no good at all. Perhaps it is better expressed as the difference between the defendant who at least in some way desires the breach of contract, if only as a means to an end, and is liable, and the defendant who knows the result will be a breach but is otherwise indifferent, who is not. But the precise drawing of the line can be left to another day.

What we are left with is what we said at the beginning. If you contract with a subsidiary company, your chances of visiting the consequences of a breach of contract by the latter on its parent concern are low. As, at least in the view of this blog, they should be. If you contract with one entity, then generally it is to that entity that you should look if something goes wrong: to give you a cause of action against some other part of the corporate pyramid, you should need to show something fairly egregious – like a deliberate subornation of breach. Nothing short of that will, or should, do.

COVID 19. Lengthy delays for discharge of coal cargoes in two Chinese ports.

COVID 19 has caused numerous delays in loading and discharging at ports throughout the world. Sometimes we have seen total exclusion of ships from specified countries, as with the UK’s exclusion of all ships from Denmark for a time in November due to the ‘covid-mink’ scare, and with the brief exclusion by France of accompanied road freight from the UK shortly before Christmas.  

News has now come in of very serious delays in certain Chinese ports. Two Indian ships carrying coal from Australia are still waiting at anchorage for a very long time. The ‘Anastasia’ with 23 crew members on board arrived off Jingtang in Hebei Province on 13 June and the ‘Jag Anand’ with 16 crew members arrived off Caofeidian port on September 20. On New Year’s day India said it was looking at several options to repatriate the 39 Indian sailors on the two ships, including a crew change at sea or at a Chinese port. 

War Risks and Kidnap & Ransom in charter do not exclude GA claim for piracy under bills of lading.

The Polar [2020] EWHC 3318 (Comm) – HERCULITO MARITIME LIMITED v. GUNVOR INTERNATIONAL BV – involved an appeal pursuant to section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, in respect of a claim by shipowners against cargo owners under six bills of lading for general average  in respect of ransom payments made by owners to pirates. under the relevant bills of lading. The general average expenditure was the payment of a ransom to pirates to enable the release of the vessel so that she could complete her voyage.  Cargo owners contended that the GA claim was barred because the bills of lading incorporated the terms of the relevant charterparty under which the shipowners’ only remedy in the event of having to pay a ransom to pirates was to recover the same under the terms of a Kidnap and Ransom insurance policy and a War Risks policy taken out by the shipowners, the premium for which was, pursuant to the charterparty, payable by the charterers. Previous cases on incorporation had involved demurrage clauses and jurisdiction and arbitration clause. Incorporation of insurance terms and their possible constitution of a complete code excluding other remedies, such as claiming in GA, was a novelty.

The clauses were incorporated as directly germane to the loading, carriage and discharge of the cargo, but they provided  for payment of the premiums

by charterers and this language would not be manipulated so as to include bills of lading holders. Sir Nigel Teare, acting as a Judge of the High Court, held that “to substitute “bill of lading holders” for “Charterers” when reading clause 39 into the bills would be inconsistent with the obligation of the bill of lading holders to pay freight as per the charterparty as the price for the performance by the Owners of the contract of carriage. It would mean that the holders of the bills of lading, in the event that certain liberties were exercised by the Owners, had to pay may more than the agreed freight for the performance of the contract of carriage. Moreover, such additional sums would be unknown and unlimited.”  Similar provisions applied as regards kidnap and ransom insurance premiums payable under the Gulf of Aden clause.

As regards, the argument that the charter provisions on payment of the premiums constituted a ‘complete code’ excluding owners’ remedies in the event of piracy, this was certainly the position as regards the charterers. On the true construction of the charter the parties had agreed to look to the additional policies for the recovery of relevant losses and so the Owners were precluded by that agreement from seeking to recover that loss by way of a contribution in general average. However, as regards the position under the bill of lading, the only parts of the clauses in question which have been incorporated into the bills so as to bind the holders of the bills were the liberties conferred on the Owners not to complete the voyage or to depart from the usual or expected route. There was an important difference between the position under the Charter and the position under the bills of lading –  it could not be said of the bill of lading holders, as Lord Roskill said of the charterers in the Evia No.2, that theyhad paid the premiums not only for no benefit for themselves but without shedding any of their liability to contribute in general average in respect of losses caused by the additional insured perils. The point was not that the Owners had agreed to transit the Gulf of Aden at no cost to themselves, but that the charterers had agreed to pay for the insurance.

For these reasons the contract of carriage contained in or evidenced by the bills of lading did not contain an agreement by the Owners not to seek a contribution in general average from the holders of the bills from liability in respect of losses covered by the additional insurance taken out by the Owners.

UK lifts embargo on vessels from Denmark in ‘Covid-mink’ crisis.

On 18 November the UK lifted its embargo on vessels from Denmark coming into UK ports which was imposed on 8 November. The new rules are:

Vessels and aircraft travelling directly from Denmark are not permitted to moor or land in England if they carry any passengers.

Aircraft and vessels which do not carry passengers (freight-only) will be allowed to land and moor in England as usual.

Any crew members who land or dock in the UK, who have been in Denmark in the 14 days before their arrival, must self isolate.

Crew members will only be allowed to enter (cross border control) if they are British nationals, Irish nationals or have the right to reside in the UK.

Off-hire Clauses- Normally Construed Narrowly Unless the Wording Is Expansive!

Disputes concerning ‘off-hire’ clauses often require various legal construction techniques to be employed and can be rather challenging for the courts/arbitrators. However, the arbitrator managed to resolve the dispute under the relevant off-hire clause in London Arbitration 25/19 with not much difficulty.

The chartered vessel arrived at a port on the US West Coast on 23 October to discharge a cargo of steel products. The vessel’s cranes were inspected on behalf of the charterers’ stevedors by or on behalf of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the vessel failed that inspection. The owners maintained that the cranes were in good working order as they complied with all statutory and Class requirements and they had been inspected and used for loading and discharging in the US three months earlier. They also put forward a recent report from the crane manufacturers. The relevant off-hire clause in the charter party was worded in the following manner:

‘The Vessel will comply with any and all safety regulations and/or requirements applicable during the currency of this Charter Party, including those in effect of any port of loading and/or discharge. If the Vessel does not comply with said safety regulations or requirements, the Vessel will be off-hire until the Vessel is compliant with the said safety regulations or requirements… ‘

The charterers’ argument was that the vessel was off hire from the time when she failed the inspection to the time when she passed (i.e. after the cranes were repaired) and discharging started. The arbitrator found that the vessel’s failing the inspection amounted to breach of the Pacific Coast Marine Safety Code. This Code governed safe working practices and conditions for the whole of the US West Coast when ILWU labour was employed. The arbitrator found that the Code was at the very least a ‘safety requirement’ and quite possibly, for practical purposes also a ‘safety regulation’. The views of crane manufacturers, Class and engineering company were treated as irrelevant as they only reflected the earlier experience of the ship.

Given that the off-hire clause made explicit reference to ‘safety requirements’ as well as ‘safety regulations’, the outcome does not come as a surprise. Had it made reference only to ‘safety regulations’, a closer legal scrutiny of the nature and status of the Pacific Coast Marine Safety Code would have been necessary. The fact that the arbitrator refers to the Code as a ‘safety regulation for practical purposes’ indicates that from a technical perspective it might not qualify as a safety regulation! The message to charterers is very clear. Off-hire clauses are often construed in a narrow fashion so to be able to bring themselves under the off-hire clause they need to ensure that the wording used is expansive! Charterers in this case were glad that the wording in the off-hire clause was very broad i.e. made explicit reference to ‘safety requirements’. Few doubts can be raised for a finding that a Code that provides safe working practices and conditions in a port for stevedors, who are members of a trade union, is a ‘safety requirement’ for that port.                    

Mink to human spread of COVID 19. UK restrictions on travel from Denmark.

As from 0400 GMT on Sunday 8 November new rules begin in relation to travel from Denmark as a result of the release of “further information” from health officials in Denmark, where some 200 people have been found to have mink-related mutations of virus, most of them connected to farms in the North Jutland region. Any UK citizens who have travelled to Denmark must isolate for 14 days, along with their household.

Passenger planes and ships carrying freight from Denmark will also not be allowed to dock at English ports.

Cabin crew are also no longer exempt from the quarantine rules

The Department for Transport (DfT) has said that the rules will be reviewed after a week.

Times’ up. NBF gets s.12 extension.

The fate of Times’ anti-suit injunction against National Bank of Fujairah was reported in this blog on May 6 2020 –  they got their injunction on condition not to take any time bar point in any subsequent arbitration against them commenced by NBF.

Shortly afterwards, in National Bank of Fujairah v Times Trading Corp [2020] EWHC 1983 (Comm) Foxton J came part two of the saga. NBF had commenced arbitration against the registered owners, Rosalind, within the one year time limit under the Hague Rules, in respect of misdelivery. This expired on 20 June 2019. Shortly after receiving a copy of the bareboat charter, after months of asking, on 20 March NBF then made an application under s.12 of the Arbitration Act 1996, in respect of its claim against bareboat charterer, Times, on the assumption that the one year time bar applied to that claim.

In the first period before 18 January 2019 Times, through their solicitors, Waterson Hicks (WH), communicated in a manner which implied, and contributed to the belief of R&T, acting for NBF, that WH acted for the carrier liable under the Bills of Lading, and for the entity to whom the claims were appropriately addressed. WH acted innocently but Times knew the true position. In the second period after 18 January 2019, the conduct of WH, and of Times, was open to more criticism. The objective effect of the communications of WH and Holman Fenwick and Willan, solicitors for charterers Trafigura who became responsible for handling NBF’s misdelivery claims on behalf of Rosalind and Times, conveyed an impression which did not accord with the facts as Times and the parties acting for them understood them.

The question before Foxton J was whether the effect of this conduct such as to render it unjust hold NBF to the strict terms of the time bar. As regards the first period, the impression given on Times’ behalf, in ignorance of the true position up to 18 January 2019 and with knowledge of it thereafter, was a significant factor in NBF missing the time bar, such that the requisite causative nexus is established which made it unjust to hold NBF to the strict terms of the time bar. The jurisdictional threshold under s.12(3)(b) – whether the respondent’s conduct makes it unjust not to extend time – was satisfied.

On the matter of discretion, it was right to say that there had been significant culpable delay by NBF in failing to seek s.12 relief before it did – delay measured in months rather than merely weeks or days. The delay was particularly difficult to justify from early November 2019, when NBF did not appear to have taken the possibility that Times might be the carrier seriously. However, this was not a case in which it could be said that Times itself played no part in NBF’s delay in the period after 18 July 2019 when Reed Smith sent its letter advising that Rosalind was not the carrier, and that it was Times. However, the continuing refusal to provide a copy of the demise charter could be regarded as a continuation of the approach which had been adopted by or on behalf of Times before 18 July 2019, and which made it unjust to enforce the strict time bar against NBF. Its clear contribution to NBF’s delay in seeking s.12 relief was seen in the fact that, once the Bareboat Charter was produced for the purposes of Times application for an anti-suit injunction, NBF prepared and issued its s.12 application within short order.

The fault of NBF was not a reason for denying its application for relief under s.12, and NBF got its extension.

The Legal Effect of “Subject-to” in Charterparty Contracts

When negotiating charterparties, it is very common to make such negotiations “subject to” a variety of conditions. Justice Foxton in Nautica Marine Ltd v. Trafigura Trading (The Leonidas) [2020] EWHC 1986 (Comm) offered a valuable guidance on the legal effect of such clauses in charterparty contracts.

In the case, the owners entered into negotiations between 8-13 January 2016 to conclude a voyage charterparty for their crude carrier, the Leonidas, with Trafigura. These negotiations were initially subject to “Charterers’ Stem/Suppliers’/Receivers’/Management Approval” latest 17.00 Houston time, Tuesday 12 January, 2016. The loading ports were to include Aruba and St. Eustasius (collectively referred to as Statia). The intended loading terminal rejected the Leonidas on the basis that the vessel was too large to load at that particular berth (the vessel could have been able to load from the Statia SBM- another nearby terminal not chosen by the charterers).

The owners brought an action against Trafigura arguing that this was a performance condition, meaning that it is a condition which does not prevent a binding contract coming into existence, but if not satisfied the contract would cease to be binding. Building up on that, the owners argued that it was an implied term of the charterparty that Trafigura would take reasonable steps to satisfy the suppliers’ approval subject. It was maintained that Trafigura took no such steps to obtain that approval, or alternatively, that Trafigura bearing the burden of proof, would have to show that the suppliers’ approval would not have been obtained even if reasonable steps had been taken.

Foxton, J, held that the “Suppliers’ Approval Subject” was a pre-condition to a contract (condition precedent to contract) and, therefore, Trafigura was not required to take steps to obtain its suppliers’ approval. A few factors led him to conclude in this manner:

  • a “subject” is more likely to be a pre-condition than a performance condition where the subject involves the exercise of a personal or commercial judgment of one of the potential parties to a contract. Here, it was a commercial choice for Trafigura to determine who the relevant supplier would be and which terminals and berths/tanks within terminals, cargo would be loaded from;
  • the particular negotiating language of the parties referring to agreements as “on subjects” and “lifting” subjects, point towards a subject in the chartering context being more likely to be a pre-condition because it connotes that the subject is resolved by one or both parties removing it, rather than the subject being resolved automatically on the occurrence of an external event; and       
  • based on previous authority, the “Stem Subject” and “Management Approval Subject” were both pre-conditions; where “subjects” appear as a compendious phrase, it is more likely that they are all intended to have the same effect.

Obiter dictum, Foxton, J, considered how damages were to be assessed if the clause had been a performance condition. He held that because the alleged lost benefit (loss of profit under a concluded charterparty) was dependent on the decision of a third party (supplier) to approve the vessel, damages in that case had to be assessed on a “loss of chance” basis (Wellesley Partners v. Withers [2015] EWCA 1146)

Two points emerge from the judgment that have implications for the market. First, the judgment strongly indicates that a “subject to” clause in a charterparty will normally be construed as a condition precedent to a contract given that such clauses often involve the exercise of a personal or commercial judgment of one of the parties to the contract. Obviously, it is still possible that a “subject to” clause could be treated as a performance clause if it depends on the approval or performance of those other than the parties to the contract; e.g. “subject to the approval of the Ministry”. In that case, the question may arise whether or not one of the parties to the contract must act reasonably or in good faith in taking steps to ensure that the condition is lifted (See, The John S Darbyshire [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457). Second, there was a disagreement in the case as to whether the suppliers referred to in the subject were only terminals from which cargo was intended to be loaded or included the charterers’ contractual suppliers. Foxton, J was adamant that the phrase encompassed all those approvals which the charterer commercially wished to obtain on the supply side. This sounds sensible but naturally makes such conditions more challenging from the shipowners’ perspective.