No implied term qualifying free standing demurrage provision in sale contract

 In Gunvor SA v CruGas Yemen Ltd [2018] EWHC 2061 (Comm) a term contract of sale was made for the sale of  gasoline by 12 monthly consignments cif Hodeidah. The buyer was named as CruGas Ltd but the claimant argued that the contract was made with CruGas Yemen Ltd, and that it had been unaware that within the relevant group there was a Cayman Islands company named CruGas Ltd. The claimant obtained performing vessels from a separate entity within its group of companies, Clearlake Shipping Pte Ltd (Clearlake), under a long-term contract of affreightment on an amended Asbatankvoy form. It claimed demurrage totalling $18m under the sale contract and claimed against CruGas Yemen Ltd and CruGas Ltd in the alternative. The defendants denied liability for demurrage on three grounds. First, the demurrage claims were time-barred by reason of a demurrage time bar provision in the COA. Second, a term should be implied into the sale contract that the claimant was required to prove the demurrage rates claimed were “in line with the market rate”. Third, the claimant had to prove that it paid the demurrage sums it claimed under the sale contract.

Phillips J first found that the contract had been made with CruGas Yemen Ltd, and then proceeded to reject all three of the buyer’s arguments. First, it was established in OK Petroleum AB v Vitol Energy SA [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 160 that words of general incorporation in a sales contract concerning demurrage provisions in a separate charter did not bring in terms ancillary to the accrual of demurrage, such as time bars relating to the presentation of demurrage claims. Second, there was no justification for the implication of the term contended for, which was neither necessary for the business efficacy of the sale contract, nor would give effect to the obvious but unexpressed intentions of the parties at the time they contracted. In any event, expert evidence from a chartering expert, was that the demurrage rates were all consistent with the market, insofar as such a thing could be said. Third, the demurrage provision under the sale contract was free-standing and not an indemnity.

 

Condition Precedents/Warranties in Insurance Contracts

Wheeldon Brothers Waste Limited v Millennium Insurance Company Limited [2018] EWHC 834 (TCC)

Constructing the meaning of words used in insurance contracts is a regular function of courts. In this case, the meaning of various terms, which appeared in the policy that Wheeldon (the assured) had with Millennium Insurance Co Ltd (the insurer), received judicial airing. The assured owned a waste processing plant which was destroyed in a major fire in June 2014. The assured’s claim for indemnity was turned down by the insurer who argued that the assured was in breach of several terms of the policy. The assured brought this action seeking declaratory relief that the insurer is liable under the policy for the loss.

The Deputy Judge, Mr Jonathan Acton Davis QC, first of all sought to identify the cause of fire at the plant. The plant produced solid recovered fuel by removing non-combustible components from inputted waste material transported on conveyor belts. It was discovered that a failed bearing caused a misalignment of one of the conveyor belts which created a gap between it and a trommel (a rotating industrial sieve). Combustible materials which would have been otherwise caught by the sieve, dropped through the gap at the bottom of the conveyor and began to accumulate there. The friction caused by the failed bearing led to hot metal fragments dropping into the accumulated combustible material thus starting a fire.

The insurer, inter alia, argued that the assured was in breach of:

  1. A condition precedent to liability which provided that “combustible waste must be stored at least 6m away from any fixed plant” (storage condition)
  2. A warranty that required “all combustible stocks and/or wastes to be removed from picking station base and/or trommels and/or hopper feeds and balers etc when business is closed.” (combustible materials warranty)
  3. A condition precedent which required the assured “to maintain all machinery in efficient working order in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications and guidelines and keep records of all such maintenance” (maintenance condition)

At the plant, there were potentially combustible materials, such as a combination of glass, stones and soils which passed through the sieve, and were kept 6 meters of the fixed plants. Also, combustible materials had accumulated in the gap created by the conveyor belt misalignment. The Deputy Judge held that the presence of such materials did not amount to breach of the “storage condition” in the policy. It was stressed that the word “combustible” should be given the meaning, which would be understood by an ordinary person and not its scientific meaning, which is anything which burns when ignited. On that basis, a layman would not regard a combination of “glass, stones and soils” as combustible. The judge also indicated that the word “store” implied a degree of permanence and a conscious decision by the assured to designate an area to keep a particular material. On that basis, materials accumulated in the gap created by malfunctioning cannot said to be “stored” within the meaning of the condition in the policy.

With regard to (ii), the combustible materials warranty, the assured provided evidence that there was a system requiring employees to undertake a visual inspection and carry out the necessary cleaning each day. The judge held that even though the system, without more, was insufficient, the fact that it was in place and had been adhered to were adequate to comply with the warranty.

On third point, the judge found that the failure of the bearing, without more, did not conclusively mean that there was a breach of this condition. In any event, there was no evidence of any breach. As to the requirement to keep formal records, the judge agreed with the assured that their system of daily and weekly checklist was adequate. Furthermore, the judge stressed that if the insurer required records to be kept in a particular format, this should have been prescribed clearly in the maintenance condition.

Although the focus of the case is construction of certain terms in an insurance contract, it is a reminder to insurers that they need to be clear and specify the particulars carefully in the clause if they want to attribute a specific or scientific meaning to a word or requirement on the part of the assured. Otherwise, any word or requirement in a condition precedent or warranty is likely to be construed by courts as an ordinary person would read them.

It should be noted that request for permission to appeal against this judgment has recently been turned down by the Court of Appeal.

Force Majeure, Alternative Modes of Performance and “Eggs in one Basket” – Simon Rainey QC and Andrew Leung

Classic Maritime v Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2018] EWHC 2389 (Comm)

Introduction

A contract contains two modes of performance, A or B. Historically, the obligor has used mode A which becomes unavailable due to a natural disaster. If the obligor can show that it is also impossible to use mode B for reasons beyond its control, can it rely on a force majeure provision to excuse non-performance? Does it need to show it would have performed using mode A but for the mode A-disabling event? Classic Maritime v Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2018] EWHC 2389 (Comm) addresses these questions and others in an area of law that is perhaps not as well-settled in all respects as some might think.

Simon Rainey QC, leading Andrew Leung, represented the successful Defendants, instructed by Julian Clark, Winnie Mah and Trudie Protopapas at Hill Dickinson LLP. 

The dam burst and the COA

At 3.45pm on 5 November 2015, the worst environmental disaster in Brazilian history unfolded. A tailings dam operated by Brazilian mining company Samarco Mineracao SA (“Samarco”) collapsed. A tidal wave of 32 to 40 million cubic metres of mining waste swept across green valleys, villages and farmland.

Iron ore production at Samarco’s mine was brought to an abrupt halt. Shipments of Samarco’s iron ore pellets, hitherto shipped through Ponta Ubu in Brazil, were suspended.

Ponta Ubu was one of two ports from which the charterers, Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD (“Limbungan”), had the option to load iron ore pellets on the vessels of Classic Maritime Inc., under a COA for 59 shipments of iron ore pellets from Brazil to Malaysia between 2009 and 2017. The other load port was Tubarao, from which another Brazilian mining company, Vale SA (“Vale”), shipped iron ore pellets.

The parties’ rival positions

In the Samarco aftershock, it was Limbungan’s case that Vale experienced a surge in demand, earmarked its supply to existing customers, and left newcomers such as itself wanting. Limbungan was therefore prevented from shipping from Ponta Ubu and Tubarao due to circumstances beyond its control. This excused its failure to perform post-5 November 2015 under Clause 32 of the COA, a fairly typical force majeure or exceptions clause, which stated inter alia:

“Neither the Vessel, her Master or Owners, nor the Charterers, Shippers or Receivers shall be responsible for…failure to supply, load…cargo resulting from: Act of God…floods…landslips…accidents at mine or production facility…or any other causes beyond the Owners’, Charterers’, Shippers’ or Receivers’ control; always provided that such events directly affect the performance of either party under this Charter Party.”

Classic countered that Limbungan had an absolute and non-delegable obligation to provide cargo and had no arrangements to do so. Instead, it hoped to perform with the gratuitous support of two companies within the same broad corporate family, Lion DRI or Antara. Those companies had asked Limbungan to ship their iron ore pellets to their steel-making plants in Malaysia from Ponta Ubu since 2011, but without any contractual nexus existing between them. The bursting of the dam was thus of no legal relevance. The problem was that the now sole supplier, Vale, would not supply Limbungan or its affiliates, although matters would have been different if Limbungan had made proper efforts and pushed for a long-term supply contract.

What is more, Classic argued that Limbungan would not have performed anyway. It had failed to perform two pre-dam burst shipments as Lion DRI and Antara had not required Limbungan to carry iron ore pellets in a weak market, a state of affairs which would have continued irrespective of the dam burst. The dam burst was not a force majeure event and Classic was entitled to US$20.5 million in damages to compensate it for lost freight.

Against this, Limbungan argued that it had put its eggs in the Samarco/Ponta Ubu basket as it had exclusively shipped Samarco pellets since August 2011. Whether it had enforceable agreements with Samarco, Lion DRI or Antara was not determinative; its settled practice was clear. The obligation after the dam burst was to make new arrangements ex Tubarao, provided it was possible to do so. Clause 32 applied because it was not possible. This was an alternative modes of performance case per Warinco v Mauthner [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 151, 154 in that Limbungan had opted for one mode of performance which had become unavailable. As it could not avail itself of the one remaining mode, it was excused.

Further, it was sufficient that Limbungan was prevented from performing by the dam burst. It was contrary to authority to insist that Limbungan had to show it would have performed had the dam not burst and contrary to the compensatory principle to award damages to Classic in respect of shipments which would never have occurred given the dam burst.

The judgment of Teare J.

The Court rejected Classic’s claim, and in the process made findings of wider legal significance.

  1. First, Classic’s reliance on the principle that a charterer who has been let down by a particular supplier cannot plead force majeure per The Mary Nour [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep and The Kriti Rex [1996] Lloyd’s Rep 171 was not on point. Those cases were not concerned with alternative modes of performance, where the required performance was from Port A or Port B, but with performance from a single port (albeit one possibly served by many suppliers).
  2. Second, for the alternative modes of performance principle to apply, it was not necessary for Limbungan to show it had legally binding arrangements to perform from Pontu Ubu rather than Tubarao when the dam burst. What the Court had to assess were Limbungan’s “intentions or arrangements” per Moccatta J in European Grain & Shipping v J.H. Rayner [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 239, which did not need to display the element of fixity posited by Classic.   
  3. Third, Limbungan had to show that it would have performed but for the dam burst. The House of Lords decision in Bremer Handelgesellschaft v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 and a string of other cases, which Limbungan said supported the general proposition that a party relying on force majeure need not show it would have performed but for the force majeure event were, in Teare J’s judgment, cases about contractual frustration provisions, which are intended to mimic the effect of common law frustration. They had no bearing on Clause 32.
  4. Fourth, the Court concluded that neither Limbungan nor its affiliates could have sourced cargoes from Vale ex Tubarao – a topic on which the parties’ market experts spilt much ink. That said, Limbungan could not show it would have performed but for the dam burst: Lion DRI’s steel-making business had effectively been mothballed due to weak demand, Antara had a cheaper COA of its own, and the arrangement whereby Antara had used the more expensive COA and been compensated for the freight differential by Lion DRI was moribund. 
  5. Fifth, though Limbungan could not rely on Clause 32 and was therefore liable under Clause 32, Classic was not entitled to recover damages. This was because even if Limbungan had been able and willing to perform, the dam burst would have supervened and prevented performance, and Limbungan would have been excused by Clause 32. It would violate the compensatory principle, to award substantial damages to Classic when it would never have received performance in any event.
  6. Sixth, the Court rejected Classic’s case to the effect that if the dam burst was due to faulty construction or maintenance by Samarco, it was an event within the “Shipper’s [i.e. Samarco’s] control”, and thus not within Clause 32. No part of the charterers’ obligation to supply and load cargo extended to responsibility for the dam, making it unlikely the parties intended  poor dam construction or maintenance (if proved) to debar Limbungan from relying on Clause 32. This is an important decision on the typical ‘beyond the control of’ provision, analysed in the sometimes misunderstood decision in The Crude Sky [2013] EWCA Civ 905.

Conclusions

The case is believed to be the first authority since the Bremer line of authorities from the 1970s and early 1980s to consider whether the party relying on a force majeure or exceptions clause has also to show it would have performed but for the event relied upon to be excused from non-performance. The answer given in those cases was “no”. For the time being, the textbooks may need to be rewritten to reflect the affirmative answer to this question given by Teare J.

This gives pause for thought. Had Ponta Ubu and Tubarao both been wiped out by a meteor, so that any performance was unquestionably prevented, on one view, asking whether Limbungan could or wanted to perform would be academic. It might be said the parties intended Clause 32 to excuse Limbungan from liability in precisely such a case, particularly since Clause 32 is intended to deal with frustrating and force majeure events, and in the context of frustration, but for causation has always been irrelevant. Not only that: asking whether Limbungan would have performed but for the dam burst is conducive to a doubtful and speculative examination of what Limbungan’s intentions and arrangements would have been in a counter-factual setting, which Megaw LJ Bremer Handelgesellschaft v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 329 cautioned against.

This also appears to be the first case where the argument has been made (by Classic) – and rejected – that the arrangements necessary to activate the alternative modes of performance principle need to be legally binding. They do not: the arrangements can have a looser, more informal character.

Finally, this case exemplifies the compensatory principle at work: if Limbungan had performed instead of breaching the COA, it would have performed with Samarco out of Ponta Ubu. The problem from Classic’s perspective is that with the intervention of the dam burst, Limbungan would have been able to claim force majeure under Clause 32 (as on this hypothesis it would have performed but for the dam burst). The outcome in both the breach and non-breach positions is therefore that Classic would not have enjoyed the benefit of contractual performance. Classic cannot be put in a better position than if the breach had not occurred.

Teare J refused permission to appeal on the ground that Classic’s proposed appeal on the application of the compensatory principle (or perhaps more accurately Classic’s case that the principle allowed it to recover substantial damages to represent loss of charter freights which in fact it could never have earned assuming Limbungan performed rather than breached the COA) had no realistic prospect of success.

A copy of the Judgment, can be found here

Rotterdam Rules in Cameroon’s hat-trick of international trade conventions.

 

Just over a year ago on 11 October 2017 Cameroon ratified or acceded to three UNCITRAL Conventions.

  1. Cameroon ratified the Rotterdam Rules. There are now four states that have ratified. Sixteen more to go before the Convention comes into force. At the current rate we’ll be there in 2058.
  2. Cameroon acceded to the he United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) (CISG) which comes into force for Cameroon on 1 November 2018.
  3. Cameron acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005) which came into force for Cameroon on 1 May 2018.

Force majeure and counterfactuals

A nice force majeure issue — and one of considerable importance — came up before Teare J yesterday in Classic Maritime v Limbungan [2018] EWHC 2389 (Comm), argued by IISTL stalwart Simon Rainey QC. Imagine you conclude a contract (in this case a CoA under which you have to provide a number of iron ore cargoes) which in the event you can’t and don’t perform, and never could have performed. An exemption clause in the contract says that if you could have performed it but a force majeure event X (inundations in Brazilian iron ore mines) then occurs that stops you performing it, you are not liable for breach. Event X occurs. Are you (a) in breach of contract, (b) on the hook for substantial damages?

On (a) the answer is Yes. You promised to perform, you haven’t performed, and because you never could have performed in any case you can’t shelter behind the exemption clause.

But what about (b)? There are two ways to look at this. One is to say: this is a simple case of unexcused non-performance, and hence you must be liable to the shipowner for his lost profits on the carriage, a figure amounting to many millions. The other point of view runs thus. If, counterfactually, you could have performed but for X, the shipowner would in the event have had no claim to performance because of the exemption clause. Hence hence it’s no skin off his nose that you didn’t perform, and damages are nominal only. Teare J plumped for the second: nominals only.

This view is highly plausible and for the moment clearly represents the law. It also dovetails quite nicely with the general rule in cases such as The Golden Victory [2007] UKHL 12, [2007] 2 A.C. 353 and Bunge v Nidera [2015] UKSC 43, [2015] 2 CLC 120, that in assessing damages we take into account later events that would have taken away the right to demand performance.

But this case, or the issue in it, may go further. There is a respectable argument, that certainly can’t be dismissed summarily, which suggests a different answer. In so far as the inability to rely on a force majeure clause is due to a party’s own default, which was the case in Classic Maritime, should it be open to that party to argue that if he had acted differently he would have been able to invoke that very same clause? Suppose a force majeure clause requires notice to be given within 7 days after the force majeure event; a party prevented by force majeure nevertheless fails to give notice for 10 days, and thus loses the protection of the clause. Is it really open to the party then to say that if he had given the proper contractual 7 days notice he would have been protected by the clause, the counterparty would have had no right to demand performance, and hence damages are nominal only? I’m doubtful. And I’m equally not sure that this scenario is that different from what happened in Classic Maritime.  It’s just a thought. Whether it’s a good one, only time will tell.

All change for financier assignees — second time lucky with anti-anti-assignment provisions?

The good times seem likely to end finally on 31 December this year for anti-assignment clauses. The Government has published the draft Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018, which for SMEs essentially invalidate anti-assignment clauses affecting receivables — i.e. sums payable for goods or services supplied. A few pointers:

1. The prohibition is not limited to assignment to financiers: assignment to debt-collectors, etc, also seems to be protected.

2.  There are anti-avoidance provisions. Any attempt to put conditions on the assignability of receivables is outlawed. The blurb states that a set-off clause is not such a condition: this may be important where, for example, a contract allows set-offs that would not otherwise be pleadable against an assignee. On the other hand, there is some doubt about this: the Regulations do not contain any such provision, and the blurb, of course, is not part of them.

3. There are exceptions. These include financial services, swaps, energy futures, petroleum licences, public-private partnership projects and contracts with national security implications. Importantly there are also two other carve-outs. One is contracts where one or more parties is not acting in the course of a business. This means consumers can, if there is a suitable term, continue to refuse to deal with an assignee. Another is contracts which neither party entered into in the course of a business here: so genuine international contracts remain subject to the old freedom of contract rules. Perhaps suprisingly, rental contracts are also excluded, except when connected with certain forms of financial services.

All in all, these seem an improvement on last year’s regulations (not difficult). As to their effect we’ll have to wait and see.

Can an actual carrier rely on a circular indemnity clause in a multimodal bill of lading?

 

Yes, they can, in the US.

In Royal Smit Transformers BV v Onego Shipping & Chartering, and others Case 17-30543, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit  on 2nd August 2018 held that actual carriers could rely on a circular indemnity provision in a ‘Himalaya’ clause in a through bill of lading as a complete defence to a claim brought against them by the shipper under that bill. Royal Smit contracted with Central Oceans USA to ship its transformers from the Netherland to Louisiana. The arrangement was established by a multimodal through bill of lading between the parties. Central Oceans made separate contracts with actual carriers for the three legs of the journey; the sea voyage to New Orleans; rail carriage to St Gabriel; truck carriage to the final destination. The actual carriers were not involved in the multimodal bill of lading and Royal Smit were not involved in the contracts made by Central Oceans with the actual carriers.

The bill of lading contained a ‘Himalaya’ clause which provided:

  1. Defenses and limits for [Central Oceans], Servants, etc.

. . . .

(b) [Royal] undertakes that no claim shall be made against any servant, agent, or other persons whose services [Central Oceans] has used in order to perform the Multimodal Transport Contract and if any claim should nevertheless be made, to indemnify [Central Oceans] against all consequences thereof.

(c) However, the provisions of this Contract apply whenever claims relating to the performance of the Multimodal Transport Contract are made against any servant, agent or other person whose services [Central Oceans] has used in order to perform the Multimodal Transport Contract, whether such claims are founded in contract or in tort. In entering into this Contract, [Central Oceans] . . . does so not only on his own behalf but also as agent or trustee for such persons.

The transformers were delivered to the final destination in January 2016, where an inspection revealed that the transformers had been damaged by “excessive vibration” somewhere along the journey. When Royal Smit sued the three actual carriers they relied on cl.15(b), the ‘circular indemnity’ provision, by way of complete defence. The District Court agreed. . Relying on two Supreme Court opinions, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004) and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89 (2010), the court concluded that “actual carriers who fall within the scope of Himalaya Clauses can rely on those clauses to limit their liability.” This was the case with the particular Himalaya provision relied on by the actual carriers in the present case. The position was not affected by the separate contracts negotiated by the actual carriers with Central Oceans, such as the non-negotiable bill of lading issued by the sea carrier, Onego.

The Fifth Circuit has now upheld this decision. The clause did not fall foul of s.3(8) of  COGSA 46 U.S.C. § 30701.  A Himalaya Clause that protects downstream carriers from suit by a cargo owner did not, in and of itself, limit the cargo owner’s ability to receive the recovery to which it is entitled. Royal had agreed with Central Oceans to a COGSA-authorized damages limitation and the mere fact that it must recover its remedy only from Central Oceans did not prevent it from receiving the full measure of that bargain. Nothing in the Himalaya Clause precluded Central Oceans from suing the defendants to recoup its losses from Royal.

The Court also rejected Royal’s arguments that it had never agreed to be bound by the Himalaya clause in the bill of lading. Royal had based its claim on the bill of lading and had therefore accepted the terms of the bill of lading including unnegotiated clauses (Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. Mira M/V, 111 F.3d 33, 36 (5th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore,  basic principles of maritime law governing the interpretation of contracts foreclosed Royal’s argument that the court should look to extrinsic evidence to discern an intent contrary to the plain text of the bill of lading. Only if the written language of the document was ambiguous, which was not the case here, could the court look beyond the written language to determine the parties’ intent.

The decision is good news for sub-contractors under multi-modal bills of lading involving carriage to the US. The position regarding such clauses under English law is somewhat different. First, the circular indemnity provision does not provide a defence to the actual carrier but provides a right to the carrier under the bill of lading to step in and prevent suit against its sub-carrier by the shipper/holder of the bill. Second, where an actual sea carrier is involved, art III(8) of the Hague Rules has been held to render null and void a ‘Himalaya’ clause giving the sub-contractor a complete exemption from liability (The Starsin  [2004] 1 AC 715 ) and the same is probably the case with a circular indemnity clause.

 

Bank references — undisclosed principals needn’t apply

Banks will, if you will forgive the pun, be laughing all the way to themselves today courtesy of the UK Supreme Court. In Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA v Playboy Club London Ltd [2018] UKSC 43  the question was whether a Hedley Byrne duty of care could be invoked by an undisclosed principal. The Playboy Club in London was approached by a Lebanese gentleman, a Mr Barakat, who wanted a cheque-cashing facility of £800,000 to gamble with. The Club, with its usual caution, required a banker’s reference for twice that amount. With Mr Barakat’s permission, and quite properly not wishing to divulge to the bank the reason for Mr Barakat’s desire, it got an associated company, Burlington Street Services, to make the necessary inquiries as its undisclosed agent. The bank gave a positive answer despite the fact that Mr Barakat had no substantial funds deposited with it. Over four days Mr Barakat  gratefully bought £1.25 million of chips with two cheques, won and drew a cool half-million, and then departed. He never came back. His cheques did. Playboy, relying on its position as Burlington’s undisclosed principal, sued the bank for its losses.

Upholding the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court in short order held that an undisclosed principal, being someone whom ex hypothesi the person giving the advice knew nothing of, could not take advantage of a Hedley Byrne duty of care. Even though we might talk about a relationship akin to contract in connection with Hedley Byrne, said the majority, thise was no reason to extend the anomalous doctrine of the undisclosed principal beyond contract so as to allow the creation of a duty of care in favour of a given claimant when none would otherwise exist.

The Playboy Club will now no doubt either bite the bullet and write its own reference requests, or possibly investigate some more sophisticated device (an assignment by Burlington of its rights in favour of the Club might come to mind). But the decision may have further implications. Many professional negligence claims — for example, against insurance sub-brokers, specialists employed by professional advisers, consulting engineers employed by construction companies, or sub-agents generally — lie exclusively in tort under Hedley Byrne. It now seems that, while a direct client of a professional person may contract as undisclosed agent and give his principal the right to sue the professional in contract in the event of any blunder, the principal will have to be content with this. He will not be able to sue anyone further down the chain. Whether this can be got round by allowing the ostensible client to sue for some notional loss suffered by it is a question that will have to be left to another day: but that day, as a result of Playboy, may well come round sooner than you think.

Where is a debt?

In a case decided today, Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc v Government of India [2018] EWHC 1916 (Comm), IISTL member Peter Macdonald-Eggers QC in his judicial capacity faced a nice problem concerning the situs of a debt (vital for issues of third party debt orders, and also issues such as confiscation). We were always told that this was where the debtor was resident, that is, where the debt was recoverable (most recently in Taurus Petroleum Ltd v State Oil Marketing Co [2017] UKSC 64, noted here in this blog). But this can be ambiguous: what if the debtor resides in Ruritania and yet the debt, for example because of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, is recoverable only in Utopia? In this case the answer now seems to be Utopia.

In the Hardy case a claimant had the benefit of an arbitration award for $70 million or so against the Indian government. The government was for its part owed a tidy sum by an indirectly state-owned corporation incorporated in London and doing business there: but the contract creating the debt had what was effectively an Indian exclusive jurisdiction clause. Could a third party debt order be made against the corporation on the basis that the debt was situated in England? No: the debt fell to be regarded as situated in India and beyond the English court’s reach.

On the basis that this blog is for busy practitioners, we will leave it at that. For those interested, there is a great deal more in the judgment: a lot of scholarship, and also more about the third party debt order jurisdiction generally. Happy reading.

We do need a marine insurance drugs clause

Another item for the agenda at the LMA (and elsewhere where they do insurance).  If someone tries to use your ship without your knowledge for drug-smuggling and the vessel gets seized, the Supreme Court has now confirmed in Navigators Insurance Co Ltd & Ors v Atlasnavios-Navegação Lda [2018] UKSC 26 that your insurance may well not respond, with your underwriters politely but regretfully telling you that you are on your own.

While an elderly  bulker, the B Atlantic, was loading a cargo of coal in Maracaibo, Venezuela, enterprising drug smugglers strapped nearly 300 lb of cocaine to her hull with a view to retrieving it later. The drugs were found, and the vessel seized and condemned by the Venezuelan authorities. Her owners’ H&M insurance included the Institute War & Strikes Clause, which gave cover for capture, seizure and arrest; against persons acting maliciously; and against confiscation and expropriation. But specifically excluded under Clause 4.1.5 was detainment, confiscation or expropriation by reason of infringement of customs or trading regulations. The underwriters declined to pay. Flaux J decided for the owners; the smugglers’ acts were those of “persons acting maliciously”, and Clause 4.1.5 did not apply because the substantial cause of their loss was the acts of the smugglers and not the resulting infringement of the Venezuelan customs code. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the exclusion of infringement of customs or trading regulations should not be limited in this way, and in the circumstances excluded liability.

The Supremes, led by Lord Mance, agreed with the Court of Appeal, but went further. Not only did the events fall fair and square within the exclusion of confiscation for breach of customs or trading regulations, but there had been no cover in the first place. “Persons acting maliciously” meant persons deliberately out to injure the interests of the owners. Unlike terrorists, bombers or garden-variety vandals, drug-smugglers did not fall in this category: they were criminals, true, and knew that what they did might have consequences for the owners, but this was not enough.

This is, if one may say so, a sensible and convincing decision on the facts and the wording. But it does leave owners high and dry when faced with a risk against which they can quite legitimately desire protection. A specific clause protecting against seizure for drug-smuggling committed without the knowledge or connivance of the owner or the crew now seems a high priority. As we said, it’s over to you at the LMA.