EU Parliament and Council reach agreement on FuelEU Maritime Regulation

Early on the morning of 23 March the European Parliament and the Council agreed on FuelEU Maritime – a new EU regulation ensuring that the greenhouse gas intensity of fuels used by the shipping sector will gradually decrease over time, by 2% in 2025 to as much as 80% by 2050. This measure increases the maritime transport sector’s contribution to reaching the EU-wide target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

FuelEU Maritime will set maximum limits on the yearly greenhouse gas intensity of the energy used by a ship, with targets will becoming increasingly ambitious over time to stimulate and reflect the expected developments in technology and the increased production of renewable and low-carbon fuels. The targets cover not only CO2, but also methane and nitrous oxide emissions over the full lifecycle of the fuels.

Additionally there is an additional zero-emission requirement at berth, mandating the use of on-shore power supply (OPS) or alternative zero-emission technologies in ports by passenger ships and containerships, with a view to mitigating air pollution emissions in ports.

The Regulation takes a goal-based and technology-neutral approach, allowing for innovation and the development of new fuel technologies to meet future needs, and offering operators the freedom to decide which to use based on ship-specific or operation-specific profiles. The Regulation also provides for a voluntary pooling mechanism under which ships will be allowed to pool their compliance balance with one or more other ships, thereby making it the pool as a whole that has to meet the greenhouse gas intensity limits on average.

The political agreement must now be formally adopted, and once this is completed by the European Parliament and the Council, the new rules will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and enter into force 20 days after publication.

Caught up in the sanctions web? Not quite: a lucky escape.

The trouble with sanctions, especially with shipping, is that they can hit innocent third parties almost as hard as sanctionees themselves. Full marks, therefore, to Foxton J in Gravelor Shipping Ltd v GTLK Asia M5 [2023] EWHC 131 (Comm) for finding a way to rescue a shipowner caught in the cross-fire when its Russian financiers were fingered by the UK, the EU and the US.

Cypriot owners Gravelor had financed a couple of their small to medium bulkers by a bareboat arrangement with Russian lenders GTLK. These finance charters required hire payments into a Hong Kong account or any subsequently nominated account; they bound Gravelor to purchase the ships at expiry, but also by Clause 19 gave it an option to buy during the charter on three months’ notice on payment of all sums owing plus a “termination amount”. In the event of default, the lenders themselves had a right under Clause 18 to cancel the charter and insist on a sale to Gravelor against payment of all sums due, with a right to sell elsewhere if Gravelor would or could not come up with the money.

Following the 2022 Ukraine debacle, GTLK was sanctioned by the US, the UK and the EU. (It made a half-hearted and decidedly fishy bid to avoid the sanctions by a supposed sale of the business, but we can ignore this here.) At that point the vessels’ insurers and P&I club backed out, and it became illegal for Gravelor to credit the Hong Kong account stipulated in the charter or in any other way to make cash available to GTLK.

To protect its rights, Gravelor immediately gave notice exercising its option to purchase; it paid no more sums in Hong Kong but offered to pay to a blocked account elsewhere. GTLK declared Gravelor in default, gave notice cancelling the charter and rejected Gravelor’s notice exercising the option. It also put in a formal demand for payment under Clause 18; it did disingenuously offer to transfer the vessels against payment to a Russian Gazprom account nominated by it, no doubt hoping that if Gravelor could not do so, this might enable it to get the vessels into its own hands.

Gravelor now sought specific performance of the purchase agreement, arguing either that GTLK had exercised its option to sell under Clause 18 and thereby given them the right to buy, or (which was more advantageous to them) that they themselves had validly exercised their option under Clause 19. Accepting that the latter claim raised triable issues, in the present proceedings they concentrated on the former and sought an immediate interim order for transfer of the vessel.

Despite what might look like serious obstacles, they were largely successful. Foxton J accepted that there was no objection to such an interim order (rightly so: see The Messiniaki Tolmi (No 2) [1982] Q.B. 1248, esp at 1265-1269), if necessary on the basis of paying the higher of the sums due under Clause 18 or 19. By cancelling the charter under Clause 18 the owners had implicitly given notice to Gravelor requiring it to buy the vessels, thus creating a contractual obligation to transfer them, and their demanding payment of sums due had had the same effect.

GTLK then fell back on payment arguments. First, they said that once they had demanded payment into the Gazprom account, this was what was required under the charter, and if for what ever reason Gravelor could not make it (which they clearly could not), then any right of theirs to a transfer of the ship disappeared. Foxton J neatly disposed of this by pointing to clause 8.10, saying that if the owner was sanctioned and payment as stipulated could not be processed as a result, the parties would negotiate another means of payment. This, he said, applied to (in effect) any impossibility of payment, whether by Gravelor or to GTLK. Furthermore, the fact that payment might have to be in Euros rather than dollars did not affect the matter (a point previously decided in the slightly similar case of MUR Shipping BV v RTI Ltd [2022] EWHC 467 (Comm).

Secondly, GTLK then argued that if the only payment open to Gravelor was to a blocked account (which in EU law was the case), this could not amount to payment triggering a right to the vessel. Despite cases like The Brimnes [1973] 1 WLR 386 holding that payment was not payment unless immediately cashable by the payee, his Lordship rejected this too: payment meant payment that would be available to a payee in normal circumstances, even if this particular one had been sanctioned.

GTLK’s last line of defence was that specific performance was inappropriate and damages more appropriate, but this too was quickly disposed of. A distinct line of authority held that if damages might be difficult to extract from a defendant, that itself might make them an inadequate remedy: the judge applied that here, pointing out that quite apart from any credit risk encashing a money judgment against a sanctioned entity would be fraught with difficulty under the sanctions legislation.

Subject to a minor matter of no real importance here, he therefore said in effect that the order should go.

The news is therefore good for Gravelor. But there is an element of luck here. Had the provisions as to payment, or possibly the options to sell or purchase, been different, there might not have been the same result in the Commercial Court. There is something to be said for some general rules about the effects of sanctions on contracts, for example dealing with the effect of payment to a blocked account on contractual rights. But that is a medium to long-term idea.

Meanwhile, both vessels, presumably still manned by Gravelor crews, seem at the time of writing to have been on the high seas in the Baltic, a comfortable distance from the nearest Russian territory (at Kaliningrad). So not only does Gravelor now have an English judgment: it might even have its ships back.

The Ball is Rolling: The UK to ratify the Hague Judgments Convention?

On 15 December 2022, the UK government published a public consultation paper on the possible ratification of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HJC). With the UK-wide call open in all three jurisdictions by 9 February 2023, the Government is seeking expert views from practitioners, academics, businesses, and any other persons with an interest in or who may be affected by cross-border civil and commercial litigation in the UK on its very welcome plan to become a Contracting State to the Convention. Besides the open call and public responses, the officials including experts from the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law will get involved in the consultation before the publication of the outcomes.

The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) adopted the HJC on 2 July 2019 – 27 years after the initial proposal of a mixed instrument covering both jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement rules. Indeed, to guarantee the effectiveness of court judgments similar to what the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New York Convention) ensured for arbitral awards, the HJC has become a game-changer in the international dispute resolution landscape. As the HCCH announced, “the Convention will increase certainty and predictability, promote the better management of transaction and litigation risks, and shorten timeframes for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment in other jurisdictions.”

In August 2022, with the subsequent ratifications of the Convention by the EU and Ukraine, its entry into force became a long-awaited reality and indeed, the Convention is about to enter into force from 1 September 2023 (see my earlier blog post here: Hague Judgments Convention to enter into force! – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog).

As the jurisdiction is well-known for its strong legal traditions and robust private international law rules, the UK instantly enhances its routes of international judicial cooperation to ensure certainty and predictability for citizens and businesses involved in cross-border commercial relationships. Most likely, the EU’s opposition to the UK’s application to ratify the Lugano Convention will impede the ratification of the HJC for the provision of continuing civil judicial cooperation.

The HJC provides recognition and enforcement of judgments given in civil and commercial cases including the carriage of passengers and goods, transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average. As a complementary instrument to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (HCCCA), the HJC shares the same goals to ensure commercial certainty and access to justice, serve legal certainty and uniformity by providing free circulation of judgments and parties’ autonomy, also, advances multilateral trade, investment, and mobility. The HJC also aims at judicial cooperation and recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the courts designated in the parties’ agreement, other than an exclusive choice of court agreement whereas the HCCCA applies to exclusive jurisdiction agreements and resulting judgments.

The HJC is the only global instrument for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial disputes. It will significantly contribute to legal certainty in the post-Brexit era with its sister instrument HCCCA. Indeed, it is the UK’s turn to take appropriate measures to accede to the treaty for facilitating the free movement of judgments in civil and commercial cases between the UK and the EU.

Following the analysis, the Government will make its final decision on becoming a Contracting State to the HJC and on whether to make any reservations. If signed and ratified, the Convention would be implemented in domestic law under the terms of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020, subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. As provided in Articles 28 and 29 of the HJC, the Convention would enter into force for the UK 12 months after the date it deposits its instrument of ratification.

Further details of the paper and consultation questions are available here: Consultation on the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague 2019) – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

What’s coming in 2023?

What’s coming in 2023?

Nearly two weeks into the New Year and the IISTL’s version of ‘Old Moore’s Almanack’ looks ahead to what 2023 is going to have in store us.

Brexit. EU Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill will kick in at end of the year. It will be a major surprise if the two Conflicts Regulations, Rome I and Rome 2 aren’t retained, but not the Port Services Regulation.

Ebury Partners Belgium SA/NV v Technical Touch BV, Jan Berthels [2022] EWHC 2927 (Comm) is another recent decision in which an ASI has been granted to restrain proceedings in an EU Member State (Belgium) in respect of a contract subject to English jurisdiction.

Electronic bills of lading. Electronic Trade Documents Bill. Likely to become law in 2023 and to come into effect two months after getting Royal Assent. The Law Commission will publish a consultation paper “Digital assets: which law, which court?” dealing with conflicts of law issues in the second half of 2023.

Autonomous vessels. The Department for Transport consultation on MASS and possible amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 closed in November 2021. Maybe some results in 2023?

Supreme Court cases

Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell. The case may well go to trial in 2023, although in May 2022 the High Court EWHC 989 (TCC), held it was premature to grant a  Group Litigation Order and directed that each individual claimant should specify additional details to formulate a proper cause of action for the defendants to respond to.

In similar proceedings in the Netherlands in which the Court of Appeal in the Hague gave judgment in January 2021 relating to multiple oil pipeline leaks in the Niger Delta, it was announced just before Christmas 2022 that Shell will pay 15 million euros ($15.9 million) to the affected communities in Nigeria in full and final settlement on a basis of no admission of liability.

The Eternal Bliss appeal to the Supreme Court is likely to be heard in 2023, with possibility of judgment given in 2023.

But there must be a question mark over London Steam-ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd (Respondent) v Kingdom of Spain (Appellant), Case ID: Case ID 2022/0062 where it is stated “This appeal has been adjourned by request of the parties.”

Climate Change

IMO  Two measures aimed at reducing shipping’s contribution to GHG emissions,   EEXI and Cii, both came into force as from 1 January 2023 and will be in the forefront of the minds of those negotiating new time charters.

EU. Shipping is likely to come into the ETS system with the amendments to the 2003 ETS Directive with phasing in from 1 January 2024. Here and here.

BIMCO has produced time charter clauses to deal with all three of these measures.

Ewan McGaughey et al v. Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited is a case involving whether the investments in fossil fuels by a large pension fund in the UK breach the directors’ fiduciary duties and duties towards contributors of the pension fund. On 24 May 2022, the High Court refused permission to bring a derivative action against USSL, but the Court of Appeal gave permission to appeal in October 2022, so a hearing in 2023 is “on the cards”.

European Union

On 15 July 2022, the EU Taxonomy Complementary Climate Delegated Act covering certain nuclear and gas activities came into force on 4 August 2022 and has applied from 1 January 2023. A legal challenge against the Commission before the CJEU by various NGOs and two member states, Austria and/or Luxembourg has been threatened in connection for the inclusion of nuclear energy and natural gas in the Delegated Act. Climate mitigation and adaptation criteria for maritime shipping, were included in the EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act adopted in April 2021.

Previous requests from other NGOs asking the Commission to carry out an internal review of the inclusion of certain forestry and bioenergy activities in the EU green taxonomy had already been rejected by the Commission in 2022.

The Corporate sustainability reporting directive came into effect on 16 Dec, 2022

For EU companies already required to prepare a non-financial information statement, the CSRD is effective for periods commencing on or after 1 January 2024. Large UK and other non-EU companies listed on an EU regulated market (i.e. those meeting two of the three following criteria: more than €20 million total assets, more than €40 million net turnover and more than 250 employees) will be subject to the CSRD requirements for periods commencing on or after 1 January 2025. 

UK and other non-EU companies that are not listed in the EU but which have substantial activity in the EU will be subject to the CSRD for periods commencing on or after 1 January 2028.

Finally, a very happy 2023 to all our readers.

ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS: BACK IN STOCK?

On 18 November 2022, the English High Court handed down a judgment in Ebury Partners Belgium SA v Technical Touch BV [2022] EWHC 2927 (Comm) in favour of an anti-suit injunction against the Belgian proceedings breaching the English exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Mr. Justice Jacobs provided some welcome clarification and confirmation of the principles applicable upon breaches of exclusive jurisdiction agreements in the altered legal landscape post-Brexit. Indeed, the decision might be considered a continuing development following the anti-suit injunction granted by the English Commercial Court against the Spanish court proceedings in QBE Europe SA/NV and another v. Generali Espana de Seguros y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm).

A brief glimpse of the factual background

The dispute arose between Ebury Partners Belgium SA/NV (Claimant) and Technical Touch and Jan Berthels (Defendants) in April 2021 following their Relationship Agreement for foreign exchange currency services which was consented to electronically through the claimant’s website. The hyperlink attached to the box ticked by Mr. Berthels (director of the company) would have taken onto the webpage containing a pdf file with the terms and conditions of the claimant applicable to their business dealings. Indeed, Clause 27 entitled “Other important terms” included governing law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses as follows:

“[27.11] This Agreement and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with it or its subject matter or formation, interpretation, performance and/or termination (including non-contractual disputes or claims) shall be exclusively governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales.

[27.12] Each party irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its subject matter or formation, interpretation, performance and/or termination (including non-contractual disputes or claims). For such purposes, each party irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the English courts and waives any objection to the exercise of such jurisdiction. Each party also irrevocably waives any objection to the recognition or enforcement in the courts of any other country of a judgment delivered by an English court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this Clause 27.12.”

The parties further concluded a Guarantee Agreement signed by Mr. Berthels as a guarantor regarding TT’s obligations to Ebury. The latter agreement also contained English law and choice of court clauses as follows:

“[15] This guarantee and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with it or its subject matter or formation (including non-contractual disputes or claims) shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the law of England and Wales. If any provision hereof or part thereof shall be held invalid or unenforceable no other provisions hereof shall be affected and all such other provisions shall remain in full force and effect.

[16] Each party irrevocably agrees that subject as provided below, the courts of England and Wales shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this guarantee or its subject matter or formation (including non-contractual disputes or claims). Nothing in this clause shall limit the right of Ebury to take proceedings against the Guarantor in any other court of competent jurisdiction, nor shall the taking of proceedings in any one or more jurisdictions preclude the taking of proceedings in any other jurisdictions, whether concurrently or not, to the extent permitted by the law of such other jurisdiction.”

When TT failed to pay a margin call and further sums under their Relationship Agreement and no amicable settlement was achieved, TT brought the Belgian proceedings to seek negative declaratory relief and challenge the validity of the two agreements under Belgian law. In response to the Belgian proceedings, Ebury brought an action in England as agreed between the parties. In addition, Ebury also applied for a grant of an anti-suit injunction in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

A short recap of the judge’s legal reasoning and decision

As expressed by Mr. Justice Jacobs, the arguments brought by the parties – Ebury’s application for an anti-suit order, and the Defendants’ applications challenging the court’s jurisdiction or inviting the court not to exercise it, were pretty much different sides of the same coin.

Indeed, by considering the claimant’s application first, the judge swept away the defendant’s counter arguments. It was emphasised that, while it would not have been possible to grant an anti-suit relief upon the presence of the proceedings at an English and any other European Member State court pre-Brexit, the principles applicable upon such a request were already well-settled. In this context, the court particularly underlined Mr. Justice Foxton’s reasonings in QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali España de Seguros Y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm) at para [10]. Indeed, the judgment was based on Section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 giving power to the court to grant an anti-suit injunction for restraining foreign proceedings when it was required by the ends of justice, therefore, was “just and convenient”, furthermore, a “high degree of probability” about the existence of a jurisdiction was established.

Being the touchstone of the reasoning, and referring to already established prior authorities, the judge rejected the defendants’ application challenging the English court’s jurisdiction and seeking a stay or a relief to that end. It was confirmed that there was a good arguable case for service out (in line with CPR 6.33 (2B) (b), also pursuant to the application of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) and the English court had exclusive jurisdiction per the agreements between the parties.  Accordingly, there were no strong reasons for the English court to decline its jurisdiction – in contrast, the court was bound to accept its jurisdiction per Article 5 of the Convention.

Significance of the judgment

This decision is of high importance for several reasons: It reiterates the emphasis that has been traditionally placed on party autonomy and authentic consent in English law and practice be it in a conventional or an electronic form by incorporation of the standard terms and conditions which would bring a useful reference point for businesses.  Indeed, the Court asserted the principles of English law regarding the dealings in e-commerce and particularly click-wrap agreements.

The judgment also reasserts the termination of the prior authorities preventing the English courts from granting anti-suit injunctions against the proceedings at the European Member State courts (re: West Tankers and Turner Grovit). Indeed, the judgment follows up the Qbe reasoning which was a grand opening of a fresh chapter for anti-suit reliefs post-Brexit. It is worth noting that the availability of such reliefs might also stimulate the European courts to issue similar orders against the English courts bringing the effects of a double-edged sword.

Last but not least, the high value of the judgment derives also from the fact that it addresses the Hague Choice of Court Agreement 2005. While there is still an unreasonable lack of relevant authorities referring to this global convention, the judgment brings hope about more case law and precedents built upon by virtue of the HCCCA 2005.   

Brexit the endgame. Part 2. EU retained law in the maritime sphere.

Further items of maritime EU law that amount to retained law which were implemented through a statutory instrument pursuant to the powers given to the Secretary of State under s2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972.

– The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) (Bunkers Convention) Regulations 2006  SI 2006/ 1244 which implemented the Bunkers Convention

– the Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Passengers by Sea) Regulations 2012 which implemented the Protocol to the Athens Convention, pursuant to the powers given to the Secretary of State under s2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, and also applied it to domestic voyages within the UK on board Class A ships on or after 30 December 2016 and Class B ships on or after 30 December 2018.  When the Protocol entered into force internationally on 23 April 2014, the UK ratified the Protocol by means of the Merchant Shipping (Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea) (Amendment) (Order) 2014 no 361 in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 183(4) and (6) and 184(1) and (3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, and therefore the Protocol itself will remain part of the law of the UK after Brexit. The provision relating to domestic voyages within the UK does, however, constitute retained EU law.

– The Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) (England) Regulations 2015 SI 2015/810 (and equivalent Regulations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales);

– The Merchant Shipping (Compulsory Insurance of Shipowners for Maritime Claims) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 No. 2267.

These will all be subject to the sunset provisions of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill 2022 unless restated by regulation by a relevant national authority no later that 23 June 2026 (the tenth anniversary of the EU referendum).

Brexit, the endgame. The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill 2022.

On 22 Sept 2022 the UK Government introduced The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill 2022 which provides for two sunset dates for existing retained EU law. On 31st December 2023, all retained EU law will expire, unless otherwise preserved. Any retained EU law that remains in force after this date will be assimilated in the domestic statute book, by the removal of the special EU law features previously attached to it. The Bill provides a second sunset date by including an extension mechanism for delaying the expiry of specified pieces of retained EU law until 2026. The Bill will also reinstate domestic law as the highest form of law on the UK statute book. In case of conflict with retained EU law domestic law will prevail.

There is very little by way of retained EU law that is relevant to the maritime practitioner. The Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention both ceased to have effect as at the end of the implementation period. The Port Services Regulation survived but is currently on death row and is the subject of a government consultation as to its repeal.

What does remain, however, are the two conflicts of law regulations, Rome I for contracts and Rome II for tort/delict, both now suitably domesticated as UK law, and also the Rome Convention 1980 which was brought into UK law by the Contracts Applicable Law Act 1990, now amended so that it will continue to apply to existing contracts entered into between 1 April 1991 (the date on which the Rome Convention came into force) and 16 December 2009 (after which Rome 1 replaced the Convention in the relevant EU Member States). 

It is likely that these three pieces of retained law will either be specifically retained, or their expiry delayed until the end of 2026, but who knows? Should they disappear into the sunset, conflicts of law will return to the common law rules for contracts made after the sunset date and the rules in Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 for torts committed after the sunset date.

Harmonised cybersecurity rules? The EU proposes Cyber Resilience Act 2022

On Thursday, 15 September 2022, the European Commission proposed the first-ever EU-wide Cyber Resilience Act regulating essential cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and ensuring more secure hardware and software for consumers within the single market.

According to the Commission, cybersecurity of the entire supply chain is maintained only if all its components are cyber-secure. The existing EU legal framework covers only certain aspects linked to cybersecurity from different angles (products, services, crisis management, and crimes), which leaves substantial gaps in this regard, and does not determine mandatory requirements for the security of products with digital elements.

The proposed rules determine the obligations of the economic operators, manufacturers, importers, and distributors to abide by the essential cybersecurity requirements. Indeed, the rules would benefit different stakeholders; by ensuring secure products, businesses would maintain customers’ trust and their established reputation. Further, customers would have detailed instructions and necessary information while purchasing products which would in turn assure data and privacy protection.

According to the proposal, manufacturers must ensure that cybersecurity is taken into account in the planning, design, development, production, delivery, and maintenance phase, and cybersecurity risks are documented, further, vulnerabilities and incidents are reported. The regulation also introduces stricter rules for the duty of care for the entire life cycle of products with digital elements. Indeed, once sold, companies must remain responsible for the security of products throughout their expected lifetime, or a minimum of five years (whichever is shorter). Moreover, smart device makers must communicate to consumers “sufficient and accurate information” to enable buyers to grasp security considerations at the time of purchase and to set up devices securely. Importers shall only place on the market products with digital elements that comply with the requirements set out in the Act and where the processes put in place by the manufacturer comply with the essential requirements. When making a product with digital elements available on the market, distributors shall act with due care in relation to the requirements of the Regulation. Non-compliance with the cybersecurity requirements and infringements by economic operators will result in administrative fines and penalties (Article 53). Indeed, market surveillance authorities will have the power to order withdrawals or to recall non-compliant devices.

The Regulation defines horizontal cybersecurity rules while rules peculiar to certain sectors or products could have been more useful and practical. The new rules do not apply to devices whose cybersecurity requirements have already been regulated by the existing EU rules, such as aviation technology, cars, and medical devices.

The Commission’s press release announced that the new rules will have an impact not only in the Union but also in the global market beyond Europe. Considering the international significance of the GDPR rules, there is a potential for such an expected future. On another note, attempts to ensure cyber-secure products are not specific only to the EU, but different states have already taken similar measures. By comparison, the UK launched consultation ahead of potential legislation to ensure household items connected to the internet are better protected from cyber-attacks.

While the EU’s proposed Act is a significant step forward, it still needs to be reviewed by the European Parliament and the Council before it becomes effective, and indeed, if adopted, economic operators and the Member States will have twenty-four months (2 years) to implement the new requirements. The obligation to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and incidents will be in hand a year after the entry into force (Article 57).

Hague Judgments Convention to enter into force!

On 29 August 2019, the European Union deposited its instrument of accession to the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HJC). On the same day, Ukraine ratified the Convention.

According to Articles 28 and 29 of the HJC, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the twelve months after the second State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. On this occasion, the Convention has already two Contracting States, and as a practically effective tool, it will be utilised by commercial parties for the swift resolution of international disputes from 1 September 2023.

The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) adopted the HJC on 2 July 2019 – 27 years after the initial proposal of a mixed instrument covering both jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement rules. Indeed, with the aim of guaranteeing the effectiveness of court judgments similar to what the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New York Convention) ensured for arbitral awards, the HJC has become a game-changer in the international dispute resolution landscape. As the HCCH announced, “the Convention will increase certainty and predictability, promote the better management of transaction and litigation risks, and shorten timeframes for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment in other jurisdictions.”

The HJC provides recognition and enforcement of judgments given in civil and commercial cases including the carriage of passengers and goods, transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average. As a complementary instrument to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (HCCCA), the HJC shares the same goals to ensure commercial certainty and access to justice, serves legal certainty and uniformity by providing free circulation of judgments and parties’ autonomy, also, advances multilateral trade, investment and mobility. The HJC also aims at judicial cooperation and recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the courts designated in the parties’ agreement, other than an exclusive choice of court agreement whereas the HCCCA applies to exclusive jurisdiction agreements and resulting judgments.

The HJC is the only global instrument for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial disputes and it will significantly contribute to legal certainty in the post-Brexit era together with its sister instrument HCCCA. Now, it is the UK’s turn to take appropriate measures to accede to the treaty for facilitating the free movement of judgments in civil and commercial cases between the UK and the EU. Indeed, the EU’s opposition to the UK’s application to ratify the Lugano Convention will most likely impede the ratification of the HJC for the provision of the continuing civil judicial cooperation.

Insurance and P&I: life in Europe just got easier

Whatever you think of Brexit, there can be little doubt that English P&I Clubs have reaped a substantial dividend from it when it comes to jurisdiction. A discreet bottle or two will no doubt be cracked open as a result of Foxton J’s judgment today in QBE Europe SA v Generali España de Seguros y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm).

The facts will be entirely familiar to any P&I claims handler. The Angara, a small superyacht insured against P&I risks by QBE UK under a policy later transferred to QBE Europe, allegedly damaged an underwater cable linking Mallorca and Menorca to the tune of nearly $8 million. The cable owners’ underwriters Generali brought a subrogated claim in the Spanish courts against QBE, relying on a Spanish direct action statute (Arts. 465-467 of the 2014 Ley de Navegación Marítima). QBE pointed to a London arbitration clause requiring disputes between insurer and assured to be arbitrated in London, said that if Generali wanted to enforce the policy they had to take the rough with the smooth. This being a post-Brexit suit, they sought an ASI.

Generali resisted. They argued that they were enforcing a direct delictual liability under Spanish law, and that in any case since the arbitration clause merely referred to assured and insurer (and indeed the whole policy excluded any third party rights under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1999) they were unaffected by it.

Pre-Brexit, QBE’s position would have been fairly hopeless: intra-EU ASIs were banned, and furthermore the effect of Assens Havn (Judicial cooperation in civil matters) [2017] EUECJ C-368/16 (noted here in this blog) would have largely pre-empted the matter in the Spanish courts.

But in this, one of the first post-Brexit P&I cases to come to the English courts, QBE won hands down. Solid first instance authority had extended the rule in The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (i.e. that very good reasons had to be shown for not granting an ASI to halt foreign proceedings brought in blatant breach of contract) to cases where the person suing was enforcing transferred rights, as where a subrogated insurer sought to take advantage of contractual provisions between its insured and the defendant. That line of decisions applied here: and Foxton J duly followed it, confirmed it and lengthened it by one.

He then asked whether, properly characterised, Generali’s suit was a tort claim or in substance a claim to piggy-back on the policy QBE had issued. His Lordship had no doubt that it was the latter. True, the Spanish direct action provisions disapplied certain limitations in the policy, such as pay to be paid provisions and a number of defences based on misconduct by the assured; but the matter had to be viewed in the round, and overall the cause of action arising under the 2014 Spanish law, being based on the existence of a policy and limited to sums assured under it, was clearly contract-based. It remained to deal with Generali’s further point based on the limited wording of the arbitration clause. Here his Lordship accepted that parties could provide that an arbitration clause in a contract did not apply to those suing under some derivative title, but said that much more would be required to demonstrate such an intent: the mere fact of reference to the original parties to the contract was not nearly enough.

And that was it: having failed to show any substantial reason why the ASI should not go, Generali were ordered to discontinue the Spanish proceedings.

What messages can P&I clubs and other insurers taker away? Three are worth referring to. One is that the enforcement of jurisdiction and arbitration clauses in a European context is now fairly straightforward. Another refers to the specific case of Spain, which altered its direct action statute in 2014: the QBE case has confirmed that under the new dispensation, as much as under the old, an attempt to use direct action as a means of getting at insurers abroad will continue to be be regarded as essentially an attempt to enforce the insurance contract. And third, judges in the UK are unlikely to be very receptive to attempts by claimants desperate to litigate at home to give arbitration or jurisdiction clauses an unnaturally narrow meaning.

Life, in short, has got a good deal easier for P&I interests. Now, where’s that bottle of cava?