First Intergovernmental Standard on AI & Cyber Risk Management

In giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) on Cybersecurity in the UK Sir Mark Sedwill (Cabinet Secretary, Head of the UK Civil Service and UK National Security Advisor) asserted, “the law of the sea 200 years ago is not a bad parallel” for the “big international question” of cyberspace governance today (see Public Accounts Committee Oral evidence: Cyber Security in the UK, HC 1745 [1st April 2019] Q93).

In making this assertion Sir Mark may have had in mind articles such as Dr. Florian Egloff’s Cybersecurity and the Age of Privateering: A Historical Analogy in which the author asserted: 1. “Cyber actors are comparable to the actors of maritime warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 2. The militarisation of cyberspace resembles the situation in the sixteenth century, when states transitioned from a reliance on privateers to dependence on professional navies. 3. As with privateering, the use of non-state actors by states in cyberspace has produced unintended harmful consequences; the emergence of a regime against privateering provides potentially fruitful lessons for international cooperation and the management of these consequences.”

In our IP Wales Guide on Cyber Defence we note: “Since 2004, a UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GEE) has sought to expedite international norms and regulations to create confidence and security-building measures between member states in cyberspace. In a first major breakthrough, the GGE in 2013 agreed that international law and the UN Charter is applicable to state activity in cyberspace. Two years later, a consensus report outlined four voluntary peace time norms for state conduct in cyberspace: states should not interfere with each other’s critical infrastructure, should not target each other’s emergency services, should assist other states in the forensics of cyberattacks, and states are responsible for operations originating from within their territory.

The latest 2016-17 round of deliberations ended in the stalling of the UN GGE process as its members could not agree on draft paragraph 34, which details how exactly certain international law applies to a states’ use of information and communications technology. While the U.S.A. pushed for detailing international humanitarian law, the right of self-defence, and the law of state responsibility (including the countermeasures applying to cyber operations), other participants, like China and Russia, contended it was premature.”

Indeed China has gone further and condemned the U.S.A. for trying to apply double standards to the issue, in light of public disclosures of spying by their own National Security Agency (NSA).

Sir Mark went on to reveal that because cyberspace governance is being only partly addressed through the UN, “we are looking at coalitions of the willing, such as the OECD and some other countries that have similar systems to ours, to try to approach this.”

Evidence of this strategy in operation can be seen at Ministerial Council Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) on the 22nd May 2019 when 42 countries adopted five value-based principles on artificial intelligence (AI), including AI systems “must function in a robust, secure and safe way throughout their life cycles and potential risks should be continually assessed and managed.”

The recently created UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has sought to give substance to this principle through offering new guidance on cybersecurity design principles. These principles are divided into five categories, loosely aligned with the stages at which a cyberattack can be mitigated: 1. “Establishing the context. All the elements that compose a system should be determined, so the defensive measures will have no blind spots. 2. Making compromise difficult. An attacker can target only the parts of a system they can reach. Therefore, the system should be made as difficult to penetrate as possible. 3. Making disruption difficult. The system should be designed so that it is resilient to denial of service attacks and usage spikes. 4. Making compromise detection easier. The system should be designed so suspicious activity can be spotted as it happens and the necessary action taken. 5. Reducing the impact of compromise. If an attacker succeeds in gaining a foothold, they will then move to exploit the system. This should be made as difficult as possible.”

Alec Ross (Senior Advisor for Innovation to Hillary Clinton as U.S. Secretary of State) warns that, “small businesses cannot pay for the type of expensive cybersecurity protection that governments and major corporations can (afford)” A Ross, Industries of the Future (2016). It remains to be seen to what extent cybersecurity design principles will become a financial impediment to small business engaging with AI developments in the near future.

EU takes action against cyber-enabled ‘IP theft’ perpetrated from outside the EU

In the first EU measure of its type, Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States [17th May 2019] contains targeted sanctions against online “external threats” to IP. This Regulation is aimed at threats which originate from outside the EU, use infrastructure from outside the EU, or otherwise the person(s) instrumental in such a cyberattack are established abroad (Article 1).

Amongst other criteria, Article 2 of the Regulation targets an actual or attempted cyberattack on IP which has a, potentially, “significant effect”, on the “loss of commercially sensitive data”. Such commercially sensitive data will fall within the definition of a ‘trade secret’ under Council Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [8 June 2016] if that data: 1. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; 2. has commercial value because it is secret; 3. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.

Article 3 of this new Regulation imposes an asset freeze on natural or legal persons, entities or bodies who are responsible for the actual or attempted cyberattack; provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in the cyberattack; or are associated with the natural or legal person, or bodies involved. As a result of such an asset freeze, all funds and economic resources belonging to, or controlled by, such listed persons and that fall under EU jurisdiction (e.g. held by EU banks) will be frozen. In addition, no funds or economic resources may be made available to or for the benefit of the said listed person by parties falling under EU jurisdiction.

This latest EU Regulation should serve to remind us that the “big international question” of cyberspace governance still remains to be resolved, albeit Sir Mark Sedwill (Cabinet Secretary, Head of the UK Civil Service and UK National Security Advisor) would note that the major private sector providers are more receptive than ever to its resolution (see Public Accounts Committee Oral evidence: Cyber Security in the UK, HC 1745 [1st April 2019] Q93).

In his article Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces Darrel Menthe asserts that, “unless it is conceived of as an international space, cyberspace takes all of the traditional principles of conflicts-of-law and reduces them to absurdity.” Akin to the “law of the flag” on the high seas, nationality of a vessel (manned or unmanned) in outer space or the nationality of the base in Antarctica, Menthe advocates, even in the absence of such a sui generis treaty regime as regulates the other three international spaces, that jurisdictional analysis requires cyberspace should be treated as a fourth international space governed by a comparable set of default legal rules (see Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces 4 MICH.TELECOMM.TECH.L.REV 69 (1998)).

The Norstar case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Panama wins but awarded less than 1% of its claims.

 

In the Norstar case (Panama v Italy) on 10 April 2019, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea found that: Italy had violated article 87, paragraph 1, of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; article 87, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS was not applicable in the case; and that Italy did not violate article 300 of UNCLOS. The Tribunal awarded Panama compensation for the loss of the M/V “Norstar” in the amount of US$ 285,000 with interest.

The Norstar, a Panamanian-flagged vessel was engaged in supplying gasoil to mega yachts in the Mediterranean Sea. On 11 August 1998, the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona, Italy, issued a Decree of Seizure against the M/V “Norstar”, in the context of criminal proceedings instituted against eight individuals for alleged smuggling and tax evasion. At the request of Italy, the vessel was seized by Spanish authorities when anchored in the bay of Palma de Mallorca, Spain, in September 1998. The Tribunal found that art. 87 might be applicable as the bunkering activities of the M/V “Norstar” on the high seas in fact constituted not only an integral part, but also a central element, of the activities targeted by the Decree of Seizure and its execution.

The Tribunal noted that article 87 “proclaims that the high seas are open to all States” and that “save in exceptional cases, no State may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign ship on the high seas”. In this context, it observed that the “[f]reedom of navigation would be illusory if a ship … could be subject to the jurisdiction of other States on the high seas” Recalling its jurisprudence in  The Virginia G, the Tribunal then expressed the view that “bunkering on the high seas is part of the freedom of navigation to be exercised under the conditions laid down by the Convention and other rules of international law” and found that the bunkering of leisure boats carried out by the M/V “Norstar” on the high seas fell within the freedom of navigation under article 87.

In the view of the Tribunal, “if a State applies its criminal and customs laws to the high seas and criminalizes activities carried out by foreign ships thereon, it would constitute a breach of article 87 of the Convention, unless justified by the Convention or other international treaties” and “[t]his would be so, even if the State refrained from enforcing those laws on the high seas” adding that, “even when enforcement is carried out in internal waters, article 87 may still be applicable and be breached if a State extends its criminal and customs laws extraterritorially to activities of foreign ships on the high seas and criminalizes them” . The Tribunal concluded that Italy, through the Decree of Seizure by the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona against the M/V “Norstar”, the Request for its execution, and the arrest and detention of the vessel, had breached article 87(1) of UNCLOS.

The Tribunal found that art.87(2) which provides “These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,…” was not applicable in this case as it was Panama, not Italy, that was subject to the obligation of due regard. The Tribunal held that Italy had not violated art. 300 (Good Faith and Abuse of Rights). Article 300 cannot be invoked on its own and a State Party claiming a breach of article 300 must, inter alia, “establish a link between its claim under article 300 and ‘the obligations assumed under this Convention’ or ‘the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention’.

The Tribunal turned to reparation and held that Panama was entitled to compensation for damage suffered by it as well as for damage or other loss suffered by the M/V “Norstar”, including all persons involved or interested in its operation and emphasized the requirement of a causal link between the wrongful act committed and damage suffered.  The causal link between the wrongful act of Italy and damage suffered by Panama was interrupted on 26 March 2003” – when the shipowner received an official communication from the Court of Savona that the vessel was unconditionally released from detention – and any damage that may have been sustained after 26 March 2003 was not directly caused by the arrest and detention of the M/V “Norstar”.

The Tribunal awarded US$ 285,000 as the value of the M/V “Norstar” together with interest This was less than 1% of the total claims put forward by Panama. The tribunal did not award compensation with regard to Panama’s other claims: loss of profits; continued payment of wages; payment due for fees and taxes; loss and damage to the charterer of the M/V “Norstar”; and material and non-material damage to natural persons.

Trump, the IMO and scrubbers

 

US President Trump’s plans last week for delaying the 0.5%  sulphur cap were defeated in the IMO who have introduced a supplementary measure about banning carriage of non compliant fuels unless the ship is fitted with scrubbers, to come into effect on 1 March 2020.

One method of ensuring compliance with the sulphur cap which comes into effect on 1 January 2020 would be the fitting of scrubber systems which though costly initially may prove more economical than the use of low sulphur diesel. Maersk has recently outlined its plans to go down the scrubber route, backtracking from its earlier position not to fit them to its fleet.

An article in todays ‘Guardian’ claims that the use of open-loop scrubbers which discharge wash water into the sea will simply transfer pollution from air to sea. Such discharges would have to comply with IMO regulations but there may still be a risk of some pollution involved. A 2015 study by UBA, a German environment agency, concluded that “wet scrubbers influence the marine environment through ph decrease, temperature increase, pollutant discharges and possibly through the use of active substances. Open scrubbers in particular have a greater environmental impact than closed or dry scrubbers due to their high water consumption and significantly larger amounts of generated washwater…The discharges of large amounts of washwater with partially persistent substances, lower ph and elevated temperature, however, are not compatible with the precautionary principles of [the EU’s] waste framework directive and Marine Strategy Framework Directive.”

The use of open-loop scrubbers is effectively banned in German and Belgian waters. However, the use of low sulphur diesel fuel in ports will contribute to other forms of air-borne pollution, such as from Nitrogen Dioxide emissions.

Sea here? What’s with the Caspian?

 

On August 12 2018 the five Caspian states- Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan – signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The surface of the Caspian is treated as a sea and the five states are granted jurisdiction over 15 nautical miles of water from their coasts and fishing rights over an additional ten miles. However, allocation of the seabed and its mineral deposits is left to the five countries to agree on a bilateral basis. Pipelines along the seabed may be constructed, with the approval of the countries whose seabed they cross, subject to environmental conditions. The Convention forbids deployment of military vessels by non-Caspian countries in the waters of the Caspian.

 

Oil spill in EEZ. Rights of coastal state to instigate proceedings against offending vessel.

 

 

In The Bosphorus Queen Case C-15/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:557, the CJEU has ruled on the interpretation of art. 220(6) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) in relation to the rights of a coastal state to initiate proceedings against a vessel arising out of pollution in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The vessel spilt oil on the edge of Finland’s EEZ and on its return through the Finnish EEZ it was detained and required to provide security to cover the amount of a possible fine for the spill. A fine of 17,112 Euros was subsequently imposed on the ground that the spill had caused  major damage to or a threat of major damage to Finland’s coastline or related interests, or to resources of its territorial sea or EEZ. In the event the oil spilt did not reach the coastline, caused no damage, and no counter-measures were taken.

The CJEU held:(1) The EU as a party to UNCLOS, had jurisdiction to interpret its provisions. UNCLOS had primacy over secondary EU legislation. The EU was not a party to the 1969 Intervention Convention but could take account of it as it formed part of the relevant rules for interpreting UNCLOS.

(2) The relevant EU legislation was art.7(2) of Directive 2005/35 which incorporated  into EU law the provisions of art.220(6) with almost identical wording, and had to be interpreted in accordance with art. 220(6).

(3) Article.220(6) provides: “ Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the [EEZ] or the territorial sea of a State has, in the [EEZ], committed a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to any resources of its territorial sea or [EEZ], that State may, subject to section 7, provided that the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws.” Paragraph 3 of art.220 refers to “violations of applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that State conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards.”

The coastal state’s powers under paragraph 6 were subject to clear objective evidence both  of the commission of a violation under paragraph 3 and also of the consequences of that violation.

(4) The reference to ‘coastline or related interests’ in art. 220(6) and art 7(2) of Dir 2005/35 could be interpreted as having the same meaning as the definition of these terms in art II(4) of the 1969 Intervention Convention, bearing in mind UNCLOS also applied to non-living resources. ‘Resources’ referred to harvested species and living species associated with them or which depended on them.

(5) It was not necessary to take account of the concept of ‘significant pollution’ referred to in art. 220(5) when assessing the consequences of a violation under art. 220(6). In assessing the extent of damage caused or threatened to the resources or related interests of the coastal state account should be taken of, inter alia,

– the cumulative nature of the damage on several or all of those resources and related interests and the difference in sensitivity of the coastal State with regard to damage to its various resources and related interests;

–  the foreseeable harmful consequences of discharge on those resources and related interests, not only on the basis of the available scientific data, but also with regard to the nature of the harmful substance(s) contained in the discharge concerned and the volume, direction, speed and the period of time over which the oil spill spreads .

The specific geographical and ecological characteristics and sensitivity of the Baltic Sea area have an effect on the conditions of applicability of Article 220(6) would have an effect on this assessment.

(6) Although art 1(2) of Dir 2005/35 allowed Member States to impose more stringent measures, it did not allow them to impose more stringent measures in accordance with international law that those laid down in Article 7(2) which authorised coastal states to take measures equivalent in scope to those laid down in Art. 220(6).

Autonomous Ships- Regulatory Work Begins

The idea of developing smart ships that have ability to navigate without human input has been around for some time and as a result of technological developments in recent years, it is believed that this could be a reality in near future.

The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) at its most recent meeting (MSC 99) in May 2018 agreed to establish a Working Group (WC) (named as Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) WC) to undertake a scoping exercise with a view to identifying which of the existing international instruments dealing with maritime safety should be amended and what new instruments should be developed to facilitate the operation of such vessels in international waters.

For the purposes of this exercise, a number of provisional definitions have been prescribed. Most significantly, MASS is defined as “a ship which, to varying degree, can operate independent of human interaction”. This is a very broad definition and encompasses all of the ships that are currently under consideration. The WG has prescribed four degrees of autonomy: (MSC 99/WP.9 Annex 1, para 4)

  1. Ship with automated processes and decision support. Such ships have on board seafarers to operate and control shipboard systems and functions.
  2. Remotely controlled ships with seafarers on board. The ship is controlled and operated from a distant location.
  3. Remotely controlled ships without seafarers on board. The ship is controlled and operated from a distant location.
  4. Fully autonomous ships. Here, the operating system of the ship is able to make decisions and determine actions by itself.

The categorisation seems to be rather basic but perhaps simplicity is necessary at this early stage. We suppose in case of (ii), it is envisaged that seafarers on board will have technical knowledge and knowhow to intervene and take control in case of an emergency. It is also worth noting that ever increasing cyber risks should be taken into account and especially in case of (iii), it is curious to know what steps can be taken to ensure that the safety is not compromised in a case where contact between the ship and offshore operator is lost. This could be also a significant issue with regard to vessels which have full autonomy (e.g. iv).

It is worth reminding ourselves that the scope of this exercise is restricted to instruments concerning maritime safety (i.e. COLREG 1972, SOLAS 1974, STCW 1974, SAR 1979 and International Convention on Loadlines 1966). Once smart ships become operational other problems, i.e. the liability of manufacturers/software producers, impact of cyber risks on traditional division of liability, salvage law, are also likely to arise. These issues do not form at this stage part of the IMO’s work on the subject.

It is expected that the work of the MASS WC will be completed by the end of 2020. Even then, this is only beginning of a long journey. It will possibly take another decade or so to formulate new legal rules and amend existing ones to enable autonomous ships to engage in cross-border commercial operations. However, as Lao Tzu once famously said:

“The journey of a thousand miles begins with one step”.

Please note that smart ships will form part of the discussion in our 14th Annual Colloquium to be held on 10-11 September 2018:

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/new-technologies-and-shippingtrade-law-tickets-46148370017

 

IMO sets greenhouse gas targets for shipping.

Shipping currently contributes about 2.2% of global greenhouse gas emissions and emissions are predicted to increase between 50% and 250% by 2050 – depending on future economic and energy developments. However, shipping is excluded from the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, so responsibility for reducing its contribution to climate change falls on the IMO.

Last Friday, 13th April, at the 72nd session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), a meeting attended by 100 states, the IMO adopted an initial strategy on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships, setting out a vision to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping and phase them out, as soon as possible in this century. The initial strategy envisages a reduction in the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008, while, at the same time, pursuing efforts towards phasing them out entirely. The strategy sets a carbon intensity reduction target – the amount of emissions relative to each tonne of shipping cargo – of at least 40 per cent by 2030, rising to 70 per cent by 2050. The strategy includes a specific reference to “a pathway of CO2 emissions reduction consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals”.

The MEPC agreed to hold the fourth Intersessional meeting of the Working Group on Reduction of GHG emissions from ships later in 2018. This working group will be tasked with developing a programme of follow-up actions to the Initial Strategy; further considering how to progress reduction of GHG emissions from ships in order to advise the committee; and reporting to the next session of the MEPC (MEPC 73), which meets 22-26 October 2018.

 

Compensation for the unlawful arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew

Arbitral Tribunal orders the Russian Federation to pay a little under 5,4 million euros to the Netherlands

On 18 July 2017, almost two years after that an Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) found that the Russian Federation must compensate the Netherlands following the wrongful arrest of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew, the Tribunal handed down its Award on the issue of compensation.

Background

Before looking at this recent decision in more in depth, the history of the dispute will be laid out. Starting on 18 September 2013, when Greenpeace activists tried to enter the Russian offshore oil platform (the Prirazlomnaya) in order to protest against attempts to begin exploiting oil and gas resources in the Arctic. One day later, the Russian Federation boarded and arrested the Arctic Sunrise and detained its crew. Subsequently, the vessel was brought to the port of Murmansk and the crew was charged with having committed a range of administrative and criminal offences, including acts of terrorism and hooliganism.

The Netherlands initiates Proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal 

Some two weeks later, on 4 October 2013, The Netherlands, being the flag State of the Arctic Sunrise, started proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal that was established pursuant to Annex VII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Russian Federation refused to participate in the Arbitral proceedings that were initiated by the Netherlands. The position of the Russian Federation was, that this type of dispute was beyond the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal, due to a declaration it had made at the time of becoming a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. However, the proceedings went ahead, despite the non-participation of the Russian Federation.

The Netherlands requests Interim Measures from the ITLOS

On 21 October 2013, the Netherlands requested interim measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). According to the Netherlands, the Russian Federation had to immediately release the Arctic Sunrise and its crew, after the posting of a bond, upon which they would be free to leave Russian territory as well as any maritime areas under its jurisdiction. ITLOS gave an Order on interim measures on 22 November 2013. Initially, the Russian Federation did not comply with the Order of the ITLOS – eventually, however, the vessel and crew were released in late November 2013. The Russian release of vessel and crew was based on its national laws, the Order of the ITLOS played no decisive role in this, according to the Russian Federation  – as it happened, the effect of the national laws and regulations on which the Russian Federation relied, coincided with what was set out by the ITLOS in its Order containing interim measures.

Arbitral Award on the Merits

One of the main substantive issues on which the Arbitral Tribunal was asked to rule during the merits phase, was the (un)lawfulness of the response of the Russian Federation to the presence of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew. The gist of the argument of the Netherlands was that, as the flag State, it had sole jurisdiction over the ship and the crew on-board during the entirety of this incident (Article 58 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention). On 14 August 2015, the Tribunal released its Award on the merits. The Arbitral Tribunal found that the Netherlands had exclusive jurisdiction over the Arctic Sunrise whilst it was operating in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. This means that the Russian Federation could have only lawfully initiated steps against the vessel that was flagged to the Netherlands and its crew with the latter’s consent. After coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal went on to state that the Netherlands had to be compensated.

Arbitral Award on Compensation

In its recent Award on compensation, the Tribunal set the total amount of compensation owed by the Russian Federation to the Netherlands at a little under 5,4 million euros. This sum was arrived at by adding up the damage that was done to the Arctic Sunrise (EUR 1,695,126.18); compensation related to the unlawful arrest, prosecution and detention of its crew (EUR 600,000); a variety of other damages incurred by the Netherlands, including the failure to release the vessel and crew in a timely manner (EUR 2,461,935.43); costs made by the Netherlands in issuing a bank guarantee (EUR 13,500); and lastly, the Netherlands had to be reimbursed for paying the full amount of deposits required by the Tribunal (EUR 625,000) – meaning that the Russian Federation had to pay the half it owed of the costs that were needed for the proceedings to be initiated. Although the Russian Federation is required under international law to abide by the ruling on compensation, whether it will actually do so remains to be seen.

 

IISTL’s Engagement with Insurance Industry on IUU Fishing

The Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law (IISTL), a research centre within the College of Law and Criminology, continues to expand its operations. On 26 June, it collaborated with marine advocacy group Oceana to organise an afternoon seminar in London on the insurance and regulatory aspects of irregular fishing (known in the trade as fishing that is illegal, unreported and uncontrolled (IUU)). The main purpose of the event was to disseminate as widely as possible the results of a study carried out by three members of the Institute (Barış Soyer, George Leloudas and Dora Nikaki) in collaboration with researchers from University of British Columbia (Canada). In summary, the study found that it had been disconcertingly easy for vessels involved in IUU fishing to get liability insurance in the market. The study recommended an urgent review of underwriting processes and consideration of regulatory changes to put insurers under a legal duty to deny cover to vessels known to be connected with IIU activities.

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Professor Soyer delivering the findings of the project to the delegates

The event, which attracted an impressive 60 delegates, provided an excellent opportunity for those throughout the sector to engage in the debate. Presentations from Lasse Gustavsson (Senior Vice President of Oceana Europe) , Kjetil Saeter (Norwegian Business Daily), David Vajnai (Vice President Marsh Global Marine Practice),  Baris Soyer and Gerorge Leloudas (IISLT) and Dana Miller (a marine scientist with Oceana Europe) were followed by a lively debate led by insurers, brokers and policy-makers. The afternoon ended with a reception generously sponsored by the Waterloo Foundation, which was also the funder of the project. An academic article, which is co-written by Professor B. Soyer, Associate Professor G. Leoudas and Dr D. Miller, detailing main findings of the project is to appear in Transnational Environmental Law later this year.

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Mr David Vajnai (Marsh Global Marine Perspective) debating the matter from the perspective of the insurance brokers

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Dr Leloudas talking about the regulatory aspects of the issue