First Intergovernmental Standard on AI & Cyber Risk Management

In giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) on Cybersecurity in the UK Sir Mark Sedwill (Cabinet Secretary, Head of the UK Civil Service and UK National Security Advisor) asserted, “the law of the sea 200 years ago is not a bad parallel” for the “big international question” of cyberspace governance today (see Public Accounts Committee Oral evidence: Cyber Security in the UK, HC 1745 [1st April 2019] Q93).

In making this assertion Sir Mark may have had in mind articles such as Dr. Florian Egloff’s Cybersecurity and the Age of Privateering: A Historical Analogy in which the author asserted: 1. “Cyber actors are comparable to the actors of maritime warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 2. The militarisation of cyberspace resembles the situation in the sixteenth century, when states transitioned from a reliance on privateers to dependence on professional navies. 3. As with privateering, the use of non-state actors by states in cyberspace has produced unintended harmful consequences; the emergence of a regime against privateering provides potentially fruitful lessons for international cooperation and the management of these consequences.”

In our IP Wales Guide on Cyber Defence we note: “Since 2004, a UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GEE) has sought to expedite international norms and regulations to create confidence and security-building measures between member states in cyberspace. In a first major breakthrough, the GGE in 2013 agreed that international law and the UN Charter is applicable to state activity in cyberspace. Two years later, a consensus report outlined four voluntary peace time norms for state conduct in cyberspace: states should not interfere with each other’s critical infrastructure, should not target each other’s emergency services, should assist other states in the forensics of cyberattacks, and states are responsible for operations originating from within their territory.

The latest 2016-17 round of deliberations ended in the stalling of the UN GGE process as its members could not agree on draft paragraph 34, which details how exactly certain international law applies to a states’ use of information and communications technology. While the U.S.A. pushed for detailing international humanitarian law, the right of self-defence, and the law of state responsibility (including the countermeasures applying to cyber operations), other participants, like China and Russia, contended it was premature.”

Indeed China has gone further and condemned the U.S.A. for trying to apply double standards to the issue, in light of public disclosures of spying by their own National Security Agency (NSA).

Sir Mark went on to reveal that because cyberspace governance is being only partly addressed through the UN, “we are looking at coalitions of the willing, such as the OECD and some other countries that have similar systems to ours, to try to approach this.”

Evidence of this strategy in operation can be seen at Ministerial Council Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) on the 22nd May 2019 when 42 countries adopted five value-based principles on artificial intelligence (AI), including AI systems “must function in a robust, secure and safe way throughout their life cycles and potential risks should be continually assessed and managed.”

The recently created UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has sought to give substance to this principle through offering new guidance on cybersecurity design principles. These principles are divided into five categories, loosely aligned with the stages at which a cyberattack can be mitigated: 1. “Establishing the context. All the elements that compose a system should be determined, so the defensive measures will have no blind spots. 2. Making compromise difficult. An attacker can target only the parts of a system they can reach. Therefore, the system should be made as difficult to penetrate as possible. 3. Making disruption difficult. The system should be designed so that it is resilient to denial of service attacks and usage spikes. 4. Making compromise detection easier. The system should be designed so suspicious activity can be spotted as it happens and the necessary action taken. 5. Reducing the impact of compromise. If an attacker succeeds in gaining a foothold, they will then move to exploit the system. This should be made as difficult as possible.”

Alec Ross (Senior Advisor for Innovation to Hillary Clinton as U.S. Secretary of State) warns that, “small businesses cannot pay for the type of expensive cybersecurity protection that governments and major corporations can (afford)” A Ross, Industries of the Future (2016). It remains to be seen to what extent cybersecurity design principles will become a financial impediment to small business engaging with AI developments in the near future.

EU takes action against cyber-enabled ‘IP theft’ perpetrated from outside the EU

In the first EU measure of its type, Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States [17th May 2019] contains targeted sanctions against online “external threats” to IP. This Regulation is aimed at threats which originate from outside the EU, use infrastructure from outside the EU, or otherwise the person(s) instrumental in such a cyberattack are established abroad (Article 1).

Amongst other criteria, Article 2 of the Regulation targets an actual or attempted cyberattack on IP which has a, potentially, “significant effect”, on the “loss of commercially sensitive data”. Such commercially sensitive data will fall within the definition of a ‘trade secret’ under Council Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [8 June 2016] if that data: 1. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; 2. has commercial value because it is secret; 3. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.

Article 3 of this new Regulation imposes an asset freeze on natural or legal persons, entities or bodies who are responsible for the actual or attempted cyberattack; provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in the cyberattack; or are associated with the natural or legal person, or bodies involved. As a result of such an asset freeze, all funds and economic resources belonging to, or controlled by, such listed persons and that fall under EU jurisdiction (e.g. held by EU banks) will be frozen. In addition, no funds or economic resources may be made available to or for the benefit of the said listed person by parties falling under EU jurisdiction.

This latest EU Regulation should serve to remind us that the “big international question” of cyberspace governance still remains to be resolved, albeit Sir Mark Sedwill (Cabinet Secretary, Head of the UK Civil Service and UK National Security Advisor) would note that the major private sector providers are more receptive than ever to its resolution (see Public Accounts Committee Oral evidence: Cyber Security in the UK, HC 1745 [1st April 2019] Q93).

In his article Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces Darrel Menthe asserts that, “unless it is conceived of as an international space, cyberspace takes all of the traditional principles of conflicts-of-law and reduces them to absurdity.” Akin to the “law of the flag” on the high seas, nationality of a vessel (manned or unmanned) in outer space or the nationality of the base in Antarctica, Menthe advocates, even in the absence of such a sui generis treaty regime as regulates the other three international spaces, that jurisdictional analysis requires cyberspace should be treated as a fourth international space governed by a comparable set of default legal rules (see Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces 4 MICH.TELECOMM.TECH.L.REV 69 (1998)).

Carriage contracts mean what they say, OK?

Open any contract textbook at the chapter on exception clauses, and you will come across a long list of cases on the restrictive interpretation of such clauses, saying that (for example) they will not lightly exonerate a party from the consequences of his own fault in the absence of clear words; that if a clause could cover both negligence and strict liability it will presumptively only cover the latter; that ambiguities will be construed contra proferentem; and so on.

As usual, however, things are not as they seem. No doubt such matters have formed the stuff of contract lectures and provided law professors with enjoyment for as long as most of us can remember. Outside academia, however, commercial lawyers today can pretty safely treat them as a mere empty ritual incantation and then go on quietly to ignore them.

The latest demonstration of this point comes in a case decided six weeks ago but only just reported, Aprile SpA v Elin Maritime Ltd [2019] EWHC 1001 (Comm). On the facts as assumed, steel fabrications were carried on deck from Thailand to Algeria under a straight bill stating that they were so carried and continuing: “ The Carrier shall in no case be responsible for loss of or damage to the cargo, howsoever arising prior to loading into or after discharge from the Vessel or while the cargo is in the charge of another Carrier, nor in respect of deck cargo or live animals.” The cargo did not arrive in one piece, and cargo — or its insurers — wanted to bring a claim. Faced with the unpromising terms of the bill of lading (which was unaffected by the Hague Rules because of the statement of deck carriage), they argued, with a touching hope, that for all its wideness the exemption did not cover any damage caused by negligence or unseaworthiness.

The deputy judge, Stephen Hofmeyr QC, was having none of it. In line with a series of recent authorities such as Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup & Partners [2017] EWCA Civ 373, he held that the exception clause had to be read, like any other contract term, with a view to seeing what it would mean to a reasonable businessperson, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the contract. He saw no reason to interpret the words “howsoever arising” as meaning anything other than what they said, or to regard claims alleging negligence or unseaworthiness as raising any special issue in this connection. He expressed the view that Langley J had been right to suggest as much in The Imvros [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 848, and saw no justification in criticisms later made of that case. Equally he joined in the general tendency to sideline Canada SS v R [1952] AC 192 and its suggestions for cutting down the presumptive meaning of clauses that did not mention negligence in so many words. The argument that there might be strict liability as a common carrier and that the exception clause might have been intended to be limited to that he treated with the disbelief it richly deserved.

In short, in carriage as elsewhere commercial contracts mean what they say; complex rules of interpretation, and outdated presumptions about exoneration for fault, have little part to play. And rightly so. Carriers and cargo interests alike are keen on English law and jurisdiction precisely because they know their contracts will be read in a common sense and businesslike way. The deputy judge here needs, if one may say so, to be commended for approaching this case with a realistic and hard-headed attitude, and not disappointing them.

Supplytime 2017. Pay now, counterclaim later.

Boskalis Offshore Marine Contracting BV v Atlantic Marine and Aviation LLP (The “Atlantic Tonjer”) [2019] EWHC 1213 (Comm) is the first case to consider Supplytime 2017. A multi-purpose support vessel was chartered by disponent owners, Atlantic Marine, to Boskalis for 21 days on Supplytime 2017 form. Atlantic Marine rendered invoices for hire, accommodation, meals and other services which Boskalis did not pay on the grounds that the largest item in dispute was not due because the vessel was offhire throughout.

Clause 12(e) of Supplytime 2017 provides:
“Payments – Payments of hire, fuel invoices and disbursements for the Charterers’ account shall be received within the number of days stated in Box 24 from the date of receipt of the invoice. Payment shall be received in the currency stated in Box 20(i) in full without discount or set-off to the account stated in Box 23… If payment is not received by the Owners within five (5) Banking Days following the due date the Owners are entitled to charge interest at the rate stated in Box 25 on the amount outstanding from and including the due date until payment is received.
If the Charterers reasonably believe an incorrect invoice has been issued, they shall notify the Owners promptly, but in no event no later than the due date, specifying the reason for disputing the invoice. The Charterers shall pay the undisputed portion of the invoice but shall be entitled to withhold payment of the disputed amount…”
In this case the due date was 21 days.
Sir Ross Cranston, acting as a judge of the High Court has held that clause 12(e) does debar charterers from raising defences against owners’ invoices if and to the extent that they have failed to notify owners that they believed those invoices to be incorrect because of those defences by the due date of those invoices. Clause 12(e) is not a time bar provision. It gave Boskalis a relatively short period of 21 days within which to dispute an invoice and once that period has expired, Boskalis came under an obligation to pay any undisputed sum to Atlantic Marine, whether they were liable for such sums or not, with disputed sums left over to be subsequently resolved. Boskalis’s obligation to pay any undisputed sum to Atlantic Marine was also subject to their right subsequently to challenge their liability for such sums either by requiring an audit under clause 12(g) and a credit (if appropriate) or by way of a counterclaim.

The clause was clear and unambiguous. “A reasonable person with the background knowledge available to the parties at the time of the contract would understand that invoices had to be paid within 21 days of their being received. namely, that charterers are barred from disputing the payment of invoices unless done within the 21 days referred to in the contract.”

If charterers reasonably believed that there was an error in the invoice they could withhold payment of the disputed amount by notifying the owners under the clause within the period agreed in the contract. Charterers also had the audit rights under clause 12 (g) to reclaim amounts paid through accounting-type errors (wrong hire rate, wrong number of meals and so) up to four years ahead, as well as the right bring a counterclaim, for breach of contract or for unjust enrichment, if they had paid sums which they later believed were not properly payable.

Brexit. UK to exit with no deal on 31 October unless Parliament passes vote of no confidence in the government.

With the resignation of Mrs May and the end of any prospect of Parliament passing the withdrawal agreement reached with the EU last November, it is looking very likely that the UK will leave the EU with no deal on 31 October. This is the default position under the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. Analysis by Maddy Thimont of the Institute of Government shows that the only way a no-deal exit could be stopped would be by Parliament passing a vote of no-confidence in the government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/new-prime-minister-intent-no-deal-brexit-cant-be-stopped-mps-0

The ‘Cooper’ clause added to the 2018 Act would only have effect in relation to any proposed ratification of the proposed withdrawal agreement with the EU. The clause in the 2018 Act requiring required the Government to hold a vote in the Commons if no agreement had been reached with the EU by 21 January is somewhat time expired now.

Who’d want to be PM now?

Shipping casualties and clearing-up

After a casualty the clear priority for shipowning, P&I and insurance interests alike is to clear up the mess as soon as possible and start trading again. The last thing they want is a run-in with well-meaning administrators saying that nothing can be done until form after form has been filled in, checked, rubber-stamped and filed, and permission to act obtained from Old Uncle Tom Cobleigh and all. Yet this was exactly what happened in 2012 to the owners of the 86,000 dwt container vessel MSC Flaminia. A fire broke out on a voyage from Charleston to Antwerp, forcing the crew to abandon ship and resulting in the vessel being towed dead to Wilhelmshaven in Germany. The owners wanted to send her directly to an entirely reputable ship-repairer in Romania for cleanup and repair, but the German environmental authorities were having none of it. The vessel was full of filth, sludge, metal debris and the dirty water used to extinguish the fire. This was, they said, waste and subject to the Waste Directive 2008 and Regulation 1013/2006, requiring extensive documentation, planning and administrative oversight before any transfer could take place. Owners argued in vain that Art.1.3(b) specifically excepted waste produced on board ships, trains, etc and later discharged for treatment: debris from a casualty, said the bureaucrats, was not within the exception. The result was that the ship remained marooned in Wilhelmshaven for seven months before it was finally allowed to go to Romania. The German courts, in proceedings to recover the resulting losses from the state, initially supported the Teutonic bureaucracy, but the Munich Landgericht then sent the question off to the ECJ: was waste resulting from a marine casualty within the exception?

The ECJ, much to everyone’s relief, today said that it was. The Directive had to be interpreted purposively and there was no reason to give special treatment to waste resulting from a casualty, especially as the terms of Art.1.3(b) were unqualified. Within the EU this now means that vessels can get out of ports of refuge quickly and be sent with due expedition to wherever they can be cleaned up and repaired most efficiently. And a good thing too.

The decision, under the name of Conti II v Land Niedersachsen (Case C‑689/17) [2019] EUECJ C-689/17, is here (unfortunately only in French).

When is a bill of lading ‘spent’?

 

In The Yue You 9023 [2019] SGHC 106 the High Court of Singapore has considered the issue of title to sue when spent bills of lading are involved under section 2(2)(a) of the Bills of Lading Act (equivalent to UK COGSA 1992). The bank held bills of lading as security for a loan to the buyer and sued the shipowner for misdelivery in delivering the cargo to a party nominated by the seller before the loan was made without production of a bill of lading. The court held that delivery of cargo to a party that was not entitled to delivery did not cause a bill of lading to be spent (a point noted obiter by the Court of Appeal in The Erin Schulte).

If, however, the bill had been spent the bank would have obtained title to sue under s.2(2)(a) as the loan facility agreement made several years earlier between the bank and the buyer was the contractual arrangement in pursuance of which the transaction had been effected for the purpose of section 2(2)(a). Further the bank had become the holder of the bills in good faith as required by s.5(2) of the Bills of Lading Act and its decision to grant the loan to the buyer against security over the bills, even on the assumption that it knew that the cargo had been discharged, could not be said to have been dishonest; nor could the bank be said to have consented to delivery of the cargo without production of the bills of lading.

The Norstar case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Panama wins but awarded less than 1% of its claims.

 

In the Norstar case (Panama v Italy) on 10 April 2019, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea found that: Italy had violated article 87, paragraph 1, of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; article 87, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS was not applicable in the case; and that Italy did not violate article 300 of UNCLOS. The Tribunal awarded Panama compensation for the loss of the M/V “Norstar” in the amount of US$ 285,000 with interest.

The Norstar, a Panamanian-flagged vessel was engaged in supplying gasoil to mega yachts in the Mediterranean Sea. On 11 August 1998, the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona, Italy, issued a Decree of Seizure against the M/V “Norstar”, in the context of criminal proceedings instituted against eight individuals for alleged smuggling and tax evasion. At the request of Italy, the vessel was seized by Spanish authorities when anchored in the bay of Palma de Mallorca, Spain, in September 1998. The Tribunal found that art. 87 might be applicable as the bunkering activities of the M/V “Norstar” on the high seas in fact constituted not only an integral part, but also a central element, of the activities targeted by the Decree of Seizure and its execution.

The Tribunal noted that article 87 “proclaims that the high seas are open to all States” and that “save in exceptional cases, no State may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign ship on the high seas”. In this context, it observed that the “[f]reedom of navigation would be illusory if a ship … could be subject to the jurisdiction of other States on the high seas” Recalling its jurisprudence in  The Virginia G, the Tribunal then expressed the view that “bunkering on the high seas is part of the freedom of navigation to be exercised under the conditions laid down by the Convention and other rules of international law” and found that the bunkering of leisure boats carried out by the M/V “Norstar” on the high seas fell within the freedom of navigation under article 87.

In the view of the Tribunal, “if a State applies its criminal and customs laws to the high seas and criminalizes activities carried out by foreign ships thereon, it would constitute a breach of article 87 of the Convention, unless justified by the Convention or other international treaties” and “[t]his would be so, even if the State refrained from enforcing those laws on the high seas” adding that, “even when enforcement is carried out in internal waters, article 87 may still be applicable and be breached if a State extends its criminal and customs laws extraterritorially to activities of foreign ships on the high seas and criminalizes them” . The Tribunal concluded that Italy, through the Decree of Seizure by the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona against the M/V “Norstar”, the Request for its execution, and the arrest and detention of the vessel, had breached article 87(1) of UNCLOS.

The Tribunal found that art.87(2) which provides “These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,…” was not applicable in this case as it was Panama, not Italy, that was subject to the obligation of due regard. The Tribunal held that Italy had not violated art. 300 (Good Faith and Abuse of Rights). Article 300 cannot be invoked on its own and a State Party claiming a breach of article 300 must, inter alia, “establish a link between its claim under article 300 and ‘the obligations assumed under this Convention’ or ‘the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention’.

The Tribunal turned to reparation and held that Panama was entitled to compensation for damage suffered by it as well as for damage or other loss suffered by the M/V “Norstar”, including all persons involved or interested in its operation and emphasized the requirement of a causal link between the wrongful act committed and damage suffered.  The causal link between the wrongful act of Italy and damage suffered by Panama was interrupted on 26 March 2003” – when the shipowner received an official communication from the Court of Savona that the vessel was unconditionally released from detention – and any damage that may have been sustained after 26 March 2003 was not directly caused by the arrest and detention of the M/V “Norstar”.

The Tribunal awarded US$ 285,000 as the value of the M/V “Norstar” together with interest This was less than 1% of the total claims put forward by Panama. The tribunal did not award compensation with regard to Panama’s other claims: loss of profits; continued payment of wages; payment due for fees and taxes; loss and damage to the charterer of the M/V “Norstar”; and material and non-material damage to natural persons.

Waiver of Further Disclosure- The First Case Under the Insurance Act 2015

The Insurance Act (IA) 2015, which came into force on 12 August 2016, applies in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (s. 23 of the IA 2015). It fell to the Court of Session (Outer House) in Scotland to deliver the first judgment under the Act in Young v. Royal and Sun Alliance plc [2019] CSOH 32.

The co-assureds (Mr Young and Kaim Park Investments Ltd, a company of which Mr Young was a director) brought a claim of £ 7.2 million for extensive fire damage to commercial premises insured. The insurer, Royal and Sun Alliance plc, rejected the claim on the basis that the assured failed to disclose material information (a commercial assured is under a duty of fair presentation under the IA 2015).

The policy had been entered through an insurance broker. The assured was requested by the insurance broker to fill in a proposal form which was prepared using the broker’s software. One part of the proposal form required the proposer to select from various options in a drop-down menu. The instruction read: “Select any of the following that apply to any proposer, director or partner of the Trade or Business or its Subsidiary Companies if they have ever, either personally or in any business capacity: …” The drop-down menu that followed this instruction included an option that any of the persons identified had been declared bankrupt or insolvent. Neither Mr Young nor Kaim Park Investments had been declared bankrupt or insolvent, however, Mr Young had previously been a director of four other companies which had entered into insolvency. The option which was selected on the proposal form was “None”. Accordingly, the proposal forwarded to the insurer showed the option selected, i.e. “None”, and the list of persons to which the declaration related. Once receiving the presentation, the insurer sent an e-mail to the brokers providing a quote for cover and a list of conditions. The conditions, inter alia, included: “Insured has never been declared bankrupt or insolvent.

In the present case, the assured’s argument was that the insurer’s e-mail response amounted to a waiver by the insurer of its right to receive the undisclosed information regarding the four insolvent companies.

The 2015 Act introduces no fundamental change on the law on waiver (a point which both parties agreed). By virtue of s. 3(5) (e) of the Act, the assured is not required to disclose a circumstance “if it is something as to which the insurer waives information.”

The judge, Lady Wolffe, reviewing the case law under the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 reiterated that waiver in this context can typically arise in one of two ways:

  • Where the insured had submitted information that would prompt a reasonably careful insurer to make further enquiries but the insurer had failed to do so (WISE (Underwriting Agency) Ltd v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 613); and
  • Where the insurer had asked a “limiting question” such that the insured could reasonably infer that the insurer had no interest in knowing information falling outwith the scope of the question (Doheny v New India Assurance Co [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 382). The classic example is where the proposal form asks about convictions within the last 5 years and which can instruct waiver of information about convictions more than 5 years ago.

It was decided by Lady Wolffe that only the second of these forms of waiver could be relevant in the present case. Therefore, the key issue was whether it could be inferred from the e-mail of the insurer to the broker stating that the “assured has never been declared bankrupt or insolvent” that the insurer waived information regarding the involvement of Mr Young in other companies which had entered insolvency.

Reviewing the case law on the point, Lady Wolffe stressed that in determining whether the insurer’s email response amounted to waiver, the key consideration was whether a reasonable person in the position of the assured would be justified in thinking that the insurer had restricted its right to receive all material information. It needs to be borne in mind that when presenting the risk to the insurer, the broker utilized its own form rather than the insurer’s proposal form. The relevant part of the proposal form required the proposer to select from various options in a drop-down menu. The instruction read: “Select any of the following that apply to any proposer, director or partner of the Trade or Business or its Subsidiary Companies if they have ever, either personally or in any business capacity: …” The choices that followed this instruction included an option that any of the persons identified had been declared bankrupt or insolvent, but when assessing the risk, the insurer had only seen the selected option of “None” in the presentation. They had not seen the full list of options which the assured had selected from (which the judge referred to as matters concerning “Moral Hazards”). Therefore, the insurer’s email response intended to clarify that unknown matter. The insurer had done this by listing in the email the various hazards that required to be included. As a result, it was held that the reference in the email response to “the Insured” was not intended to limit the scope of the information being provided but had simply been used as shorthand for the group of persons identified in the presentation. Accordingly, there was no waiver on the part of the insurer with regard to the information not fully disclosed (i.e. the involvement of Mr Young in four insolvent companies).

Even though the case is the first one considered under the Insurance Act 2015, it does not shed any light on any of the novel concepts introduced by the Act. The decision was concerned with the preliminary question of waivers and was decided in light of authorities on the subject which have already existed for some time. Essentially, the fact that the broker’s own proposal form was used meant that the scope of information provided had been controlled by the assured and that it was impossible to be found as a waiver.

‘Howsoever caused’ in exception clause in bill of lading covers loss due to negligence and unseaworthiness.  

 

The Elin (Aprile S.PA. v Elin Maritime Ltd) [2019] EWHC [1001] (Comm) involved a claim under a bill of lading for damage to a cargo carried on deck which was stated to be so carried, and was therefore not subject to the Hague Rules. Owners sought to rely on two clauses.

1- the provision on page 1 of the Bill of Lading that “The Carrier shall in no case be responsible for loss of or damage to the cargo, howsoever arising … in respect of deck cargo”

2- the provision on page 2 of the Bill of Lading that the 70 packages identified on the attached list were “loaded on deck at shipper’s and/or consignee’s and/or receiver’s risk; the carrier and/or Owners and/or Vessel being not responsible for loss or damage howsoever arising”.

Owners argued that these two provisions must be interpreted as excluding all liability for carriage of deck cargo, including liability for negligence and unseaworthiness.. The phrase “howsoever arising”, which appeared in each of the clauses referred to all causes of loss or damage. The Owner relied on the decisions of Saville J,  Langley J and Hamblen J in The Danah [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 351, The Imvros [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 848 and The Socol 3 [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 221, respectively.

Stephen Hofmeyr QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court agreed. Nothing in the authorities to justify departing from that point of construction. The same or similar words of exclusion have been held to be effective to exclude both liability for negligence causing the loss of cargo (Travers v Cooper [1915] 1 K. B. 73 and  [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 351) and liability for unseaworthiness causing the loss of cargo (The Imvros). It would be difficult to imagine words of exemption which are wider in effect than “howsoever caused”. Over the last 100 years, they had become “the classic phrase” whereby to exclude liability for negligence and unseaworthiness. Accordingly on a true construction of the Bill of Lading, the Owner was not liable for any loss of or damage to any cargo carried on deck, including loss of or damage to any cargo carried on deck caused by the unseaworthiness of the Vessel and/or the Owner’s negligence.