As welcome as flowers in May: The new Arbitration Act on the horizon

A long-desired development in the arbitration sector: Having included into the King’s Speech only a couple of days ago, the draft Arbitration Bill is taking its course to the UK Parliament. Brief key points below.

In March 2021, the Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission to conduct a review of the Arbitration Act 1996 to ensure that the legislation remains fit for its purpose and continues to promote England and Wales as a leading destination for commercial arbitration. The consultation process that began in January 2022 analysed the existing law in two consultation papers (the papers were published in September 2022 and March 2023 respectively). See the related blog posts here Law Commission to review the Arbitration Act 1996 – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog and here The next step in the reform of the Arbitration Act 1996 – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog

Following the Law Commission’s completion of the review of the Arbitration Act, the final report was published in September 2023.  With the Law Commission’s estimations of at least 5,000 domestic and international arbitrations taking place in England and Wales each year, it was vital to modernise the arbitration framework and respond to global competition in the sector. Indeed, several competing jurisdictions have updated their legislation more recently: Singapore in 2023, Hong Kong in 2022, and Sweden and Dubai in 2018. Further, Singapore ranked equal first to London as the preferred choice of seat for the first time in 2021.

The Commission’s conclusions and recommendations were accompanied by a draft Arbitration Bill which was announced by King Charles in his speech at the State Opening Parliament on 7 November 2023. The King’s Speech points out that the Bill modernises the law on arbitration as recommended by the Law Commission. It has been stated that the reforms clarify the law governing arbitration agreements, strengthen the courts’ supporting powers, and facilitate quicker dispute resolution. The King’s speech also indicates that the new measures will bolster England, Wales, and Northern Ireland’s world-leading domestic and international arbitration sector with benefits for individuals and businesses seeking to resolve disputes, as well as boosting economic growth.

With the Government’s acceptance of the recommendations introduced by the Commission in the proposed Bill means that we can now anticipate a draft legislation to come before the parliament soon. The Bill will update the Arbitration Act 1996 that is currently in force. The territorial scope of the expected legislation covers England and Wales whereas the Arbitration Act 1996 also applies to Northern Ireland. Subject to the agreement of the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, the Bill might also extend and apply to Northern Ireland.

The King’s Speech 2023 is available here: The King’s Speech 2023: background briefing notes – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

Misdelivery by the carrier after discharge and the Article III Rule 6 time bar: the ‘Alhani gap’ is filled

FIMBank p.l.c. v KCH Shipping Co., Ltd [2022] EWHC 2400 (Comm)

The Commercial Court (Sir William Blair) has recently handed down judgment in FIMBank p.l.c. v KCH Shipping Co., Ltd, an appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, holding that the time bar in Article III rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules can apply to claims in relation to misdelivery after discharge. The Court’s decision resolves an important question which had not previously been decided by the English courts, and which has divided leading academic commentators as well as judges in other common law jurisdictions.

Background

The appeal relates to a claim brought by FIMBank p.l.c. (“FIMBank”), as the holder of bills of lading, for the alleged misdelivery of cargo by the contractual carrier, KCH Shipping Co., Ltd (“KCH”). The bills were concluded on the Congenbill form, and were subject to the Hague-Visby Rules, including the time bar in Article III r 6 of one year after delivery which applies to claims against carriers.

FIMBank served a Notice of Arbitration on KCH after that time bar expired. Its position was that its claim was nevertheless not caught by the time bar, contending that: (a) on the facts, delivery took place after discharge; and (b) as a matter of law, the time bar did not apply to claims for misdelivery occurring after discharge. In its submission, this was so given that the Hague-Visby Rules do not regulate a carrier’s obligation to deliver cargo (as opposed to the carriage of goods by sea), and only relate to a ‘period of responsibility’ which ends with the discharge of cargo. FIMBank further argued that the parties had, in any event, contractually disapplied the Rules in respect of the period after discharge, insofar as Clause 2(c) of the Congenbill form provided: “The Carrier shall in no case be responsible for loss and damage to the cargo, howsoever arising prior to loading into and after discharge from the Vessel …”.

In an Award on preliminary issues, the arbitral tribunal determined that FIMBank’s claim was time-barred irrespective of whether delivery post-dated discharge on the facts (which remained a matter in dispute). This was because: (i) the Hague[1]Visby Rules time bar can apply to claims relating to misdelivery occurring after discharge; and (ii) Clause 2(c) of the Congenbill form does not disapply the Rules in respect of the period after discharge.

The Court’s reasoning

The Court upheld the tribunal’s decision on both questions, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

On the first question, it concluded that, on its true construction, Article III r 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to claims for misdelivery of cargo after discharge. The Court noted that this conclusion avoided the need for fine distinctions as to the point at which discharge ended, and accorded with the objective of the rule which was intended to achieve finality and to enable the shipowner to clear its books. It further observed that, although certain common law authorities and commentaries might be said to support the construction of Article III r 6 for which FIMBank contended (including Carver on Charterparties and Voyage Charters), there was no international judicial or academic consensus to that effect.

The Court held that, even if its conclusion above was wrong, the tribunal’s decision was in any event justified by its finding that the bills of lading contained an implied term providing that the Hague-Visby Rules obligations and immunities are to continue after actual discharge and until delivery takes place, in line with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in The MSC Amsterdam [2007] EWCA Civ 794.

On the second question, the Court held that, on a proper construction, Clause 2(c) did not disapply the Hague-Visby Rules to the period after discharge. Although FIMBank relied in this regard on The MSC Amsterdam, in which the express terms of the bill of lading concerned were held to have disapplied the Hague Rules after discharge, the Judge held that that decision did not warrant a different result, insofar as it featured a bill of lading with materially distinguishable terms.

Simon Rainey K.C. of Quadrant Chambers and Matthew Chan of Twenty Essex acted for KCH, instructed by Kyri Evagora and Thor Maalouf of Reed Smith LLP














Chipping away at the ‘narrow approach’ to the Court’s powers in aid of arbitration?

A and B v C, D and E [2020] EWCA Civ 409

Simon Rainey QC looks at the Court of Appeal’s decision:

The long-standing controversy as to whether orders made by the Court “for the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings” under s. 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 can be made against non-parties to the arbitration received at least a partial resolution on Thursday 19th March 2020, when the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in A and B v C, D and E [2020] EWCA Civ 409. 

The case concerned a New York arbitration in relation to a dispute over net balances due under settlement agreements. One issue which arose was whether certain payments to a central Asian government were properly deducted as ‘signature bonuses’ (as the Respondents contended) or were bribes and therefore to be left out of account (as the Appellants submitted). The persons said to be involved in the negotiations for the making of the payments included one E, an English resident. He refused to go to New York to give evidence. With the permission of the Tribunal, the Appellants sought to compel his testimony and applied to the English Court under s. 44(2)(a) for an order under CPR34.8 for the taking of E’s evidence by deposition. 

Accordingly, the application centred on the Court’s power as to “the taking of the evidence of witnesses”.

Foxton J. refused the application (with some reluctance) on the basis of accrued first instance Commercial Court authority, making it clear that his view would have been, absent authority, that the particular order sought was one the Court had jurisdiction to make under section 44: see [2020] EWHC 258 (Comm) at [18]. Recognising the controversy over the issue, he granted permission to appeal, notwithstanding the settled first instance view, a course of action which the Court of Appeal considered “obviously sensible”: [55].

On an expedited appeal, the Court of Appeal (Flaux, Newey and Males L.JJ  held), with little hesitation, that s.44(2)(a) did give the Court power to make an order for the taking of evidence by way of deposition from a non-party witness in aid of a foreign or domestic arbitration. But the Court declined to go any further than that or to express any concluded view on the position in relation to other s.44(2) powers. 

It follows that the controversy remains a very live one, pending review by the Supreme Court or the next piecemeal pronouncement by the Court of Appeal in another s.44(2) case involving a different sub-section (2) power.

The s.44 controversy and the previous Commercial Court decisions 

On one view, the controversy might be said to be an arid one. S. 44(1) applies to all English seated arbitrations, unless contracted out of. It provides that, absent such contrary agreement, “the court has for the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of making orders about the matters listed below as it has for the purposes of and in relation to legal proceedings”. A straightforward approach might be to conclude that the Court has the same power to make orders against non-parties to an arbitration as it would have in legal proceedings to make orders against non-parties to the litigation because that is what s.44(1) says (see [7] and Foxton J. at [18]). If the parties do not like it, they can opt of the section, in whole or in part.

That approach runs up against the concern that the powers in s.44(2) are solely in aid of a consensual process of arbitration which binds only those who are party to the relevant arbitration agreement. It is argued that it would be odd if the Court were placed in a stronger position than the underlying tribunal itself and were able to exercise jurisdiction and powers over third parties, in support of an arbitration, where the arbitrators themselves would have no such jurisdiction or power. This concern has proved to be the dominant theme in the Commercial Court decisions prior to A&B.

The leading analysis remains that of Males J. (as he then was) in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd [2014] EWHC 3704 (Comm).

That case concerned the Court’s jurisdiction under s.44(2)(e) as to “the granting of an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver”. The case turned on the application of CPR 62.5(1)(c). However, after a careful examination of the textual indications in other parts of s.44. Males J. concluded obiter at [47] that “the better view is that section 44 does not include any power to grant an injunction against a non-party” to the arbitration. While limited to the grant of an injunction under section 44(2)(e), the Judge’s reasoning was generally expressed (as he acknowledged in A&B: [52]) and was equally applicable to all the different paragraphs of section 44(2), without distinguishing between them. The thrust of his reasoning was that the wording of e.g. ss.44(4) and 44(5) made it unlikely that Parliament had intended to give the English court jurisdiction to make orders against non-parties in support of arbitrations happening anywhere in the world and that “the section is simply not concerned with applications against non-parties” [48(e)].

In the subsequent decision of DTEK Trading SA v Morisov [2017] EWHC 1704 (Comm), the Court had to consider whether it had jurisdiction under section 44(2)(b) to make an order for the preservation and inspection of a document in the possession of a third party in Ukraine. Sara Cockerill QC (as she then was) rejected various commentators’ criticisms of Males J’s approach (i.e. Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 5th Edn; see now 6th Edn at 44.7.5) and reached the same analysis as Males LJ, taking a general approach (note that the application was unopposed). Thereafter later decisions applied the position as if settled at first instance (see e.g. Foxton J. and before him, Trans-Oil International v Savoy Trading [2020] EWHC 57 (Comm), Moulder J.).

The “wide” and the “narrow” questions in play on the appeal

So lay the land on the appeal. 

The Appellant’s primary case was that the appeal had to be determined first and foremost on the “narrow question” of whether the particular s.44(2) power was one which was exercisable against third parties. 

This was accepted by the Court, basing itself on the wide words of s.44(2)(a) with its reference to “witnesses”, not to “parties”, in circumstances where given the wide range of potential witnesses who would not be expected to be only “party” witnesses, “there is no justification in the wording of the statute for limiting “witnesses” to those who are in the control of one or other of the parties. If Parliament had intended that limitation, it would have said so” (Flaux LJ at [37]; see also Males LJ at [59]). Further, the nature of the “legal proceedings” referred to in s.44(1), being High Court and County Court proceedings, connoted the power which those Courts had to take evidence on deposition wherever necessary and just to do so: (; [38]; [61]).

The Appellant nevertheless also mounted an attack on the wider front that the s.44 controversy was not to be resolved by looking at the consensual nature of arbitration and that the starting point for section 44 is not the consensual nature of the arbitration agreement but what powers the Court is to have in a defined situation. 

The Court of Appeal avoided getting into the debate as to whether Cruz City and DTEK were correctly decided. Given that the position was clear for s.44(2)(a), it was not considered necessary to go any further on different s.44 powers.

The end of the wide Cruz City view?

While the Court of Appeal refrained from tackling the correctness of the Cruz City wide approach, it is difficult to see how that approach can survive its decision. Either s.44 as a section is dealing with powers against parties only (as Males LJ opined in Cruz City) or it is not. 

If it is not (as has now been held), then there are only two possible positions: either (a) the wide view that all of the s.44(2) powers are exercisable generally against non-parties is correct or (b) each separate power will turn on its own terms, so that different results may apply; indeed, it may be that only the s.44(2)(a) ‘evidence / witness’ power is a non-party power, while the remainder of s. 44(2) are powers are exercisable against arbitral parties only.

In so far as it is possible to identify the Court of Appeal’s view, this was in favour of the latter, ‘power by power’, approach.

Flaux LJ recognised that the effect of the decision and of the Court’s “narrow approach” was to posit that s.44 (2)(a) applies to non-parties, whereas the other heads of the subsection may not do so, based on the previous decisions. He left the position open by stating that “Any apparent inconsistency between the various heads of subsection (2) may be explained by the different language of those heads.” [44].

Males LJ, who had adopted obiter the wider view in his decision in Cruz City was careful to confine Cruz City to the particular power then before him. Like Flaux LJ he contemplated the possibility that different powers in s.44(2) might lead to different results. In particular, he made it clear that he saw “no reason to doubt” what he carefully referred to as “the actual decisions in in Cruz City and DTEK”(emphasis added)  and only went on (at [56]) to “reserve my opinion whether their reasoning on this point is correct as regards the other paragraphs of section 44(2). […] it may be that the position varies as between the various paragraphs of subsection (2).” He however recognised that there were “strong arguments” either way.

So where are we now?

While the Court’s decision on s.44(2(a) make the position clear for that s.44 power, the s.44(2)(b) and (e) powers remain for the present governed by the Cruz City / DTEK decisions, although arguably open to fresh challenge on the basis that the Court of Appeal chose not to endorse the decisions as such. The position for other s.44(2) powers, not yet dealt with by any current Commercial Court or other decision is fully up for grabs. It is perhaps regrettable that the opportunity for at least a much clearer obiter ‘steer’ was not grasped by the Court of Appeal, although if the Court favoured a ‘power by power’ approach (as it appears implicitly to have done) then as it heard no argument on each power, this may not be surprising. No permission to appeal was sought to take the matter further to the Supreme Court, so the s.44 controversy is unfortunately set to rumble on for a little longer yet.

Clarifying / Correcting an Award …. and the Effect on the 28 days for Challenge: Clarity at last

Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company Ltd v Songa Offshore Endurance Ltd [2018] EWHC 538 (Comm)

Overview

Where a party seeks correction or clarification of an arbitral award as a precursor to challenging the award either under s.67 or 68 or 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, when does the Act’s 28 day time period for the challenge start? From the date of the award? Or of the correction or clarification? And does that apply to any correction or clarification or only to certain types? If the latter, what types and why? And what happens if the tribunal declines to correct?

The decision of Bryan J. (handed down on 16th March 2018) in Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company Ltd v Songa Offshore Endurance Ltd [2018] EWHC 538 (Comm) brings welcome and definitive clarity to the position. It sets out what should now be regarded as the settled practice of the Court to these problems and to the correct construction of the 28 day time limit provisions in s.70(3). It resolves an apparent conflict in other first instance decisions once and for all.

In summary, after a thorough analysis of the authorities, the Court held:

  • The arbitral process of correction and clarification of an award by the tribunal under s.57 of the Act is not “any arbitral process of appeal or review” under s.70(3) for the purposes of the running of the 28 days.
  • Accordingly, simply applying for a correction will not, of itself, push back the start date for the running of time: the decision in Surefire Systems Ltd v Guardian ECL Ltd [2005] EWHC 1860 (TCC) to the contrary effect was wrong.
  • But where a correction or clarification must necessarily be sought in order to be able to bring the challenge to the award itself (pursuant to section 70(2)), then time runs from the date of that type of correction or clarification being made (a ‘material’ correction).
  • To give effect to that, the “date of the award” in section 70(3) is to be read as “the date of the award as corrected” by a correction of this kind, but this kind only.
  • The submission that the decision in K v S [2015] EWHC 1945 (Comm) was wrong would be rejected.

Leave to appeal was refused.

Simon Rainey QC, leading Tom Bird, represented the successful applicant.

The Background

DSME contracted with Songa to build a series of drilling rigs. The hull design (including the front-end engineering design (“FEED”) documentation) was to be provided by a third party design consultancy. Construction proved to be very protracted and DSME claimed in respect of delays and cost over-runs, alleging that the cause was defects in the FEED. It alleged that under the contracts, responsibility for design, including the FEED, was with Songa not DSME and DSME was entitled to recover all costs and expenses and was not responsible for delay. This was contested by Songa.

The question of design responsibility under the contracts was determined as a preliminary issue in two arbitrations. The Tribunal (Sir David Steel, John Marrin QC and Stewart Boyd QC) held that Songa was correct and that DSME bore full responsibility for the design, including for the FEED.

The Awards were published on 18th July 2017.

Under section 70(3) of the Arbitration Act, DSME had 28 days in which to apply for permission to appeal, expiring on 15th August. Section 70(3) provides:

“Any application or appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process.”

On 4th August, DSME applied to the Tribunal for the correction of what it itself described as four “clerical errors in the Awards arising from accidental slips” such as transposing Songa for DSME, etc. The corrections were unopposed.

The Tribunal issued a Memorandum of Corrections on 14th August (27 days after the Awards).

On 8th September, 24 days late, DSME issued an Arbitration Claim Form seeking permission to appeal the Awards under section 69, on the basis that the Tribunal’s construction of the contract as to design responsibility was obviously wrong in law.

Songa applied to strike the application out as being out of time.

DSME responded that the 28 days ran from the date of the Memorandum of Corrections and so was brought in time; alternatively it sought an extension of time under s. 80(5) because its management structure and intervening holidays meant that a decision to appeal could not reasonably have been taken any sooner. (Given the 24 day delay and this ‘justification’, unsurprisingly this application was dismissed on ordinary principles.)

The Issues Raised by Songa’s Application

Section 70(3) contains only two express start dates for the running of the 28 days for any challenge to the award: (a) “the date of the award” and (b) the date when the parties are notified of the outcome of “any arbitral process of appeal or review”.

How does this work in the context of a request for the correction or clarification of an award? Section 70(3) is silent on the topic and there is prima facie a lacuna in the drafting of the Act.

A connected issue is the so-called ‘Catch 22’ inherent in section 70(2) which requires a party to exhaust all available arbitral routes of recourse (including under s.57) before being entitled to challenge the award. In relation to corrections, if these are ones which have to be sought before a challenge can be made, then how can time run from the date of the original, uncorrected, award if this date is what has to be taken for s.70(3) purposes?

Question (1): Can the correction / clarification process under s.57 be regarded as an “available process of appeal or review” under section 70(3)?

DSME’s primary argument was that the term “any available process of appeal or review” covered a correction or clarification process carried out by a tribunal itself. It argued that the process of correction involved, in one sense, a process of ‘reviewing’ the award and accordingly this was enough. It also relied upon the definition of a different term (“available arbitral process”) in s. 82(1) as one which “includes any process of appeal or review by an arbitral or other institution or person” as showing that “appeal or review” did not just mean appeal or review by some other arbitral body (such as common forms of ‘two-tier’ arbitral procedures in commodity arbitration under GAFTA or FOSFA Rules) but must be wider and therefore had to cover an ‘internal’ corrective review.

DSME relied heavily on an unreported decision of Jackson J. in Surefire Systems Ltd v Guardian ECL Ltd [2005] EWHC 1860 (TCC), noted in the textbooks. In that case, Jackson J. baldly stated; “In my view, the arbitrator’s clarification issued on 2nd May 2005 constitutes “an arbitral process of … review” for the purposes of section 70(3) of the Act”.

Bryan J rejected DSME’s argument for three reasons.

(1) First, on the plain meaning of the statutory language.

The construction was contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “appeal or review” as used in section 70(3) which had to be viewed in the light of s.70(2). Section 70(2) requires an applicant seeking to challenge any award to have first exhausted, as a pre-requisite to the right of challenge, all routes of recourse to the arbitral process. It distinguishes in this context between “any available arbitral process of appeal or review” (s.70(2)(a)) and “any available recourse under section 57” (s.70(2)(b)). The Judge held that this was “a clear, and indisputable, distinction” [52]. He considered that the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the reference to “appeal or review”, in the context of a statutory provision that draws a delineation between an appeal or review and a correction, “is that it is a reference to a process by which an award is subject to an appeal or review by another arbitral body”.

(2) Secondly, on the better view of previous decisions

The Judge regarded this as being as the settled approach which had been taken in the previous cases (Price v Carter[2010] EWHC 1451 (TCC); K v S [2015] EWHC 1945 (Comm) and Essar Oilfields Services Ltd v Norscot Rig Management Pvt Ltd [2016] EWHC 2361 (Comm) as well as the commentaries. He regarded the view of Jackson J. in Surefire as wrong. [53]

(3) Thirdly, as contrary to the founding principles of the 1996 Act.

The Judge held the questions of construction of the Act before him had to be approached in the light of the guiding principles in s.1(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act. One of these is that “the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense”.

“The principles of speed and finality of arbitration are of great importance. These would be undermined if the effect of making any application for a correction is that time for appealing runs from the date the appellant is notified of the outcome of that request. This is not simply a “concern” (nor is it one that has been over-stated as alleged by DSME) rather it is contrary to the whole ethos of the Act. It would be open to parties who have freely agreed to arbitrate their disputes to frustrate and delay that agreed mechanism of dispute resolution by relying upon completely irrelevant minor clerical errors. This cannot have been the intention of Parliament …” [55].

Question (2): Is the term “the date of the award” in section 70(3) to be read as meaning the date of the award as and when corrected, irrespective of the nature of the correction?

DSME argued next that an award could not be regarded as final for the purposes of time running until and unless any process of correction started in respect of the award had been fully completed; that applied as much to a material correction impinging upon a potential ground of challenge as to an immaterial textual or other clerical correction. The date when the process was completed was the “date of the award” for s.70(3) purposes.

DSME contended that there was no warrant for treating “the date of the award” as running from a corrected award where the correction was ‘material’ (whatever that meant) but not where it was a purely typographical correction. The date was either affected by corrections for all purposes or none. The Court having previously held that it was affected for material ones, then this applied equally to all other corrections.

Songa argued that the key to the resolution of the lacuna was to recognise the inter-relationship between section 70(3) and section 70(2). Under the latter, a party had to seek a correction or clarification of the award where this affected the challenge which it intended to make against the award as a pre-condition to challenging the award. This need to exhaust arbitral recourse to the tribunal under section 57 identified a class of corrections and clarifications which were indeed ‘material’, because if they were not sought, then the challenge would be barred. It was in relation to these and these only that the lacuna arose. Therefore the distinction between ‘material’ and non-material corrections was inherent in the Act itself and the term “date of the award” would be construed accordingly.

The Judge accepted that argument. He stated at [63] (original emphasis):

“The purpose is to ensure that before there is any challenge, any arbitral procedure that is relevant to that challenge has first been exhausted. Thus if there is a material ambiguity that is relevant to the application or appeal you have first to go back to the arbitrators, however if what you are doing is seeking correction to typos then that is not a bar to you pursuing your application. Materiality is inherent within section 70(2). It is only where a matter is material that you first have to exhaust the available remedies specified in section 70(2), so that it is only in those circumstances that it is necessary for time only to run after those available remedies have been exhausted. There is no reason or necessity for time not to run, or be extended, in the context of immaterial corrections – these are not matters that have to be corrected before an appeal can be brought. This illustrates that the test of materiality is inherent in the structure of section 70(2) and 70(3).”

Again deploying the ethos of the Act and section 1(1(a), he held that it was contrary to any sensible construction of “the date of the award” to treat it as accommodating trivial or irrelevant corrections [56]. As the Judge held (and as DSME accepted) “these are classic clerical and typographical errors. They are not connected in any way, shape or form with DSME’s subsequent appeal.” [10]

Conclusions: “Materiality” and Unanswered Questions?

The decision is to be welcomed as laying to rest the ‘Surefire argument’ once and for all.

The Court, in refusing permission to appeal, considered the point to have no realistic prospect of success on appeal and stated in terms that it was “high time to draw a line under the debate” given the “consistent and continuing practice of this Court which has particular expertise in the construction of the act, and its application.”

Materiality? The Judge saw no difficulty with a ‘materiality’ test which is “clear and easy to apply” [65]. With the section 70(2) concept in mind, it is submitted that the Judge is plainly right: a party can usually easily tell the difference between points which it has to investigate under s.57 before it can make a challenge under s. 67, 68 or 69 at all and all other corrections or clarifications.

If in doubt however, as the Judge said “[one] could always issue an application for an extension of time before the 28 day time period expired, and indeed seek permission to appeal to the extent that it was able to do so at that time. No doubt in many cases (based on the content of the application for a correction showing materiality) such an application for an extension of time would not even be opposed, or if opposed, would be resolved in the applicant’s favour should any point be taken.” [65]

Refusal to correct? An unanswered question (which the Judge did not have to address) is as to the position if a material correction is sought under s.57 but the tribunal refuses to make any correction. How is the “date of award as corrected” test then to be applied? In Maclean, the Judge thought it would be the date of the notification of the refusal to correct [19]. The same view was implicitly suggested in K v S where Teare J referred to the grounds of challenge being “dependent on the outcome of the application for clarification” [24]. Given Bryan J’s general endorsement of the reasoning in these cases, the same approach to this question must follow.

This seems right. If a material correction is (and has to be) sought in the exercise by an applicant of all available recourse to satisfy the s.70(2) requirement, then the applicant’s fate cannot sensibly be dependent on the whim of the tribunal and whether it is an expansive one, happy to explain better what it has done or, as is not infrequently the case, one which is resentful of the temerity of a suggestion of the need for clarification and whose approach is the ‘nil return’.

A copy of the judgment can be found here

Time to stop trying? Attempting to sidestep the ‘rehearing’ nature of a s.67 jurisdiction challenge

GPF GP S.à.r.l. v Republic of Poland [2018] EWHC 409 (Comm)

Overview

The recent decision of the Commercial Court in GPF GP S.à.r.l. v Republic of Poland [2018] EWHC 409 (Comm) reinforces what should, by now, be well-known to be the unassailable position that a challenge to jurisdiction under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 takes place as a full rehearing of that challenge and not as a review of the arbitral tribunal’s prior decision on the same issue of jurisdiction.

The patent unpopularity of that position in many quarters of the arbitral community is illustrated by the most recent hard-fought attempt in this case to argue that this approach is not justified and should be restricted wherever possible. The decision demonstrates however that attempts to pick away at the position, post the Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate v Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, or to seek by other routes to sidestep the effect of a rehearing will be unavailing.

The decision of Bryan J unsurprisingly but usefully confirms that:

(a) that there is no difference between a question of jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae: both are subject to a rehearing;

(b) that the position is no different where a party fails to raise issues in the arbitration and seeks to raise wholly new points on the s.67 challenge, irrespective of the nature of the jurisdictional aspect in play; and

(c) that resort by a party to ‘waiver’ to preclude the other party from raising such new points on the rehearing

The decision also contains a useful analysis of the concept, in the context of a BIT, of creeping expropriation qualifying as an expropriation in aggregate effect and the application of a BIT arbitration clause in that context (not addressed in this case note).

The Background

In a dispute between GPF (Griffin) and Poland under a BIT between Belgium, Luxembourg and Poland, Griffin claimed that a Polish court judgment constituted an expropriation measure. Griffin financed a property group seeking to invest in the redevelopment of ex-State properties for commercial and residential use. It claimed for violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the BIT and for indirect or creeping expropriation, similarly in breach of the BIT, relying on a series of acts or course of conduct by authorities and the court, attributable to Poland. A distinguished tribunal (Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Prof. David Williams QC, Prof. Philippe Sands QC) held that aspects of Griffin’s claim fell outside the arbitration clause in the BIT and could not be pursued, effectively tying Griffin to reliance solely on the court judgment and not the “prior measures” on which it also relied in support of its FET / expropriation claims.

Griffin challenged the Award under section 67 and, in so doing, supplemented in material aspects its case with new evidence as to the drafting history of the BIT and the “prior measures” and developed additional and different arguments. Poland contended that this was not permissible.

Poland’s Two Points and Bryan J’s Decision

Poland took two points, against the background of the general undesirability of the rehearing rule as eroding the efficacy of international arbitration, buttressed with reference to what the Judge referred to as “the spirited attack on the re-hearing approach undertaken by the editors of Arbitration Law 5th edn” (Robert Merkin and Louis Flannery QC).

(1) A difference between identity of party and scope of dispute jurisdictional issues?

First, Poland argued that the rehearing approach, enshrined in Dallah, was on analysis only applicable in a case which involved a question of jurisdiction ratione personae, i.e., a fundamental issue concerning a claimant who claimed not to be party to the arbitration agreement, and not where the issue arising is one of jurisdiction ratione materiae, or the scope of disputes referred to arbitration.

It argued that the seminal decision of Rix J. in Azov Shipping Co. v Baltic Shipping Co. [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68, on which Lord Mance’s speech in Dallah was said to hinge, concerned only a substantial issue of fact as to whether a party had entered into an arbitration agreement, not a scope of disputes issue. Reference was also made to a s.67 decision of Toulson J in Ranko Group v Antarctic Maritime SA [1998] ADRLN 35 (post Azov) in which, he held that it would be wrong for the courts to rely on new evidence which “could perfectly well have been put before the arbitrator, but was not placed before him, and with no adequate explanation why it was not”. Toulson J based his decision, in part, on the reduced role of the courts under the Arbitration Act 1996. With that in mind, Poland argued that the Court should not seek to extend the rehearing principle any further than was strictly justified, i.e. to ratione personae issues only.

Bryan J’s decision was an emphatic rejection of any distinction either in the cases or in principle and a vigorous endorsement of the validity of the Dallah principle [70]:”In each case, where it is said the tribunal has no jurisdiction, it is on the basis that either there is no arbitration agreement between the particular parties, or that there is no arbitration agreement that confers jurisdiction in respect of the claim made. In each case if the submission is proved, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction as no jurisdiction has been conferred upon it by the parties in an arbitration agreement. In such circumstances it is for the Court under section 67 to consider whether jurisdiction does or does not exist, unfettered by the reasoning of the arbitrators or indeed the precise manner in which arguments were advanced before the arbitrators.”

(2) Waiver by Griffin of its Right to Raise New Points / New Evidence

Secondly, Poland argued that the doctrine of waiver applied, because Griffin could have advanced the new materials and arguments before the arbitrators but failed or chose not to do so and should therefore be taken to have waived them or to be precluded from running them, even at a rehearing. The argument is, unfortunately, only shortly summarised in the judgment.

The difficulty with this argument, as explained by the Judge, is that once it is recognised that a rehearing is an entirely de novo determination, it is difficult to see how and where waiver will arise.

He put it this way [72]: “it is difficult to see how a waiver could arise in circumstances where it is well established that there can be a re-hearing under section 67, a fact parties are taken to know), and in the context of no restriction being set out in section 67 itself restricting what arguments may be re-run, no question of any loss of a right to advance particular arguments on a re-hearing under section 67 can arise”.

However, while conceivably some form of formal abandonment of a point in the arbitral jurisdiction hearing on which the other relied to its prejudice and detriment and which could not be redressed at the rehearing might amount to a waiver, in the present case (as in most if not all) Poland dealt with the ‘new’ points in detail and could not point to any prejudice.

Conclusion

While the logical underpinning, the justifications and the demerits of a Dallah approach will doubtless and understandably continue to be discussed in the arbitral community (as illustrated by an entertaining debate between Sir David Steel and Louis Flannery QC at the recent Quadrant Chambers International Arbitration Seminar), in practical ‘practitioner’ terms it has been a wholly sterile one since 2010, and perhaps it is time to recognise that fact.

Arguing ‘retroactive deprivation’ of arbitral jurisdiction …and how not to make your s67 challenge

Overview

Close upon the heels of the decision in A v B [2017] EWHC 3417 (Comm) (see Commencing LCIA Arbitration: The Perils of Non-Observance of the LCIA Rules) which considered when a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction must be made in an arbitration under the rules of the LCIA and considered the impact of section 73 of the Arbitration Act 1996 upon the interpretation of the relevant LCIA provision, the recent Commercial Court decision in Exportadora de Sal SA de CV v Corretje Maritimo Sud-American Inc [2018] EWHC 224 (Comm) emphasises the need to act swiftly in raising an objection to substantive jurisdiction under section 67.

The context was a highly unusual one: namely, where arbitral jurisdiction existed when the arbitration was commenced under an admitted contract and arbitration agreement but where it was argued that it had been removed subsequently by a supervening governmental act which declared the contract (and arbitration agreement) null and void ab initio.

Does that argument give rise to a section 67 challenge to jurisdiction at all? If so, how do sections 31 and 73 apply to it?

The decision gives stringent guidance on the test under section 73(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 which is to be applied where a party  contends that it “did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection” to jurisdiction.

Further, the Court’s decision is important in emphasising that on any section 67 (or indeed section 68) challenge, the purpose of the witness statement is to set out evidence and not argument. The habit, into which most practitioners have fallen, of setting out one’s case in full in the witness statement was disapproved by the Court. This reflects the Commercial Court’s increasing insistence upon the proper (and therefore much more limited) deployment of factual witness statements.

The Factual Background to the Section 67 Challenge

Exportadora de Sal is a Mexican salt mining company owned 51% by the Mexican Government and 49% by Mitsubishi Corporation. By reason of the majority state ownership, it was viewed in Mexican law as a state entity and was therefore subject to Mexican administrative law governing the tender and contracting procedures contained in a local Mexican law (the Law of Procurement, Leasing and Public Sector Charges).

Exportadora contracted as buyer with a shipbuilder, Corretje Maritimo, for the construction and sale of a specialist salt barge on 3rd July 2014. The shipbuilding contract and arbitration agreement were governed by English law.

The builder (as the arbitrator held) lawfully terminated the contract on 27th May 2015 leaving a substantial instalment owing from Exportadora. The builder commenced arbitration against the buyer in August 2015.

Initially the buyer took no part in the arbitration. However, a hearing date having been fixed by the arbitrator for September 2016, in July 2016 and shortly before the hearing the buyer appointed solicitors who came on the record stating that they would “contest both liability and quantum (and possibly jurisdiction)”. Jurisdiction as a separate issue was not then pursued but other defences (including one of illegality) were raised. The hearing of liability and quantum was adjourned to 5th December 2016.

Separately, Exportadora’s Órgano Interno de Control (OIC) carried out an audit on 10th August 2016 to ascertain whether Exportadora had complied with the requirements of the Mexican law in question. The OIC audit led to various interventions by the OIC, culminating in a decree by the OIC on 16th November 2016 that the tender process had been irregular and that the award of the contract to the builder was and had been a nullity. Exportadora issued an ‘early termination declaration’ in respect of the contract, as directed by the OIC.

Surprisingly, Exportadora than participated fully in the December 2016 hearing on the merits. Its counsel, taxed by the tribunal with the need to explain matters if it was being alleged that the arbitral process was irregular in some way by reason of the OIC ruling, confirmed that this was “a separate matter” and recognised the validity of the arbitral process.

Shortly after the hearing, on 22nd December, Exportadora then raised the issue and made a jurisdictional challenge. The arbitrator allowed further submissions and then rejected the challenge as raised too late.

Exportadora lost the arbitration.

It then commenced a section 67 challenge, contending that the effect of the OIC decree under Mexican law was to deprive the tender of validity, with the result that it did not have power or capacity to enter into the contract and that as from 16th November 2016 the contract was null and void.

The three points dealt with by the Court

(1) ‘Retroactive deprivation’: a matter going to substantive jurisdiction at all?

While there was contested evidence of Mexican law as to the effect of the OIC decree, the highest that Exportadora could put its case was that, while the arbitrator had not lacked substantive jurisdiction at the outset of the proceedings, “this became so after the OIC Resolution” and that from that time on the arbitrator did not have substantive jurisdiction to decide any of the matters in the arbitration.

Andrew Baker J. held that the section 67 claim failed at the first hurdle, because the effect of Exportadora’s Mexican law argument as to ‘invalidity’, even if correct, was a matter going to the subsequent discharge of an existing contract and not a matter of initial and original capacity to contract and therefore arbitral jurisdiction.

As he put it at [39]: “A doctrine that accepts and acknowledges that a valid and binding contract was concluded, including a valid and binding arbitration agreement, but requires by reason of the act of an administrative body over two years later that it thereafter be treated as if it had never been validly concluded is, by nature, not a doctrine concerning capacity to contract.” Accordingly a ‘retroactive deprivation’ of authority to contract could not impugn the arbitrator’s substantive jurisdiction to make the award.

(2) How does Section 31 apply to a ‘retroactive deprivation’ case?

Section 31 deals with objections to the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal at two stages: (a) under section 31(1), lack of jurisdiction “at the outset of the [arbitral] proceedings” and (b) under section 31(2), “during the course of those proceedings” where the tribunal “is exceeding its substantive jurisdiction”.

Objectively, Exportadora was to be taken to know that it was contracting with the builder in contravention of Mexican law and (if true) in an unauthorised manner. Accordingly, any objection on that ground, even if it went to jurisdiction, was one which had to have been raised by Exportadora before taking any step in the arbitration. Under section 31(1) of the 1996 Act “must be raised by a party not later than the time he takes the first step in the proceedings to contest the merits”. The time for raising that jurisdictional issue was long past.

For this reason, Exportadora had to put its case as one founded on the OIC decree and on the contention that that decree, as from 16th November 2016, deprived the arbitrator of substantive jurisdiction. In other words, it was a matter which arose “during the course of the arbitral proceedings”. In these circumstances, Exportadora sought to put itself within the “as soon as possible” requirement under section 31(2) (: “Any objection … must be made as soon as possible after the matter alleged to be beyond its jurisdiction is raised”), arguing that its raising of the point on 22nd December shortly after the hearing and before the award met this requirement.

The builder argued that section 31(2) was inapplicable and that only section 73(1) applied, which thereby imposed a more exacting timescale for raising an objection as to jurisdiction than simply “as soon as possible”, namely “forthwith”. It was argued that continuing to act as arbitrator where the arbitrator had jurisdiction initially but then has lost it was not a case of “exceeding” jurisdiction as such, and that section 31(2) deals only with going beyond a jurisdiction which the tribunal has, not a case of subsequent loss of all jurisdiction.

It might be said that this was a hair-splitting argument in that it sought to distinguish “forthwith” from “as soon as possible”. However, the language of section 31(2) does not sit very happily with a “retroactive deprivation of all jurisdiction” argument. This is not surprising since the framers of the Model Law and then the 1996 Act were unlikely to have such a possibility in mind as a bar to arbitral jurisdiction.

The Judge approached the matter on the robust basis that section 31 should be read so as to avoid any gap in coverage, stating at [45]: “That may make the case unusual. But if it were nonetheless viable, I find it entirely natural to describe an arbitrator who continues to act after his temporally limited jurisdiction has expired as exceeding his jurisdiction. This reading of section 31(2) avoids a lacuna in section 31 that seems to me unlikely to have been intended.”

(3) Section 73(1) and the exception for late challenges to jurisdiction

Section 73(1) bars a late objection “unless [the party] shows that, at the time he took part or continued to take part in the proceedings, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection”.

The obvious problem for Exportadora was that it had known about the matters on which it relied since, at the latest, 16th November 2016 when the OIC made its decree of nullity or, at the earliest, August 2016 when the OIC carried out its audit and instituted its ‘intervention’ for breaches of the Mexican law in respect of tender procedures. It then took part in the December hearing.

In those circumstances, there was little doubt as to the outcome.

But the Court usefully stressed that given the importance of jurisdiction, a party had to act very quickly indeed, and within a timescale of days not weeks, treating the investigation of any potential jurisdictional argument as one of “the highest priority”. The Judge explained the rational for this as follows at [48]: “The general context in which that question of reasonable diligence falls to be assessed is that when faced with a legal claim asserted through arbitration, logically and practically the first question any respondent can fairly be expected to consider and keep under review throughout is whether it accepts the validity of the process.”

The Court held that Exportadora should have taken “urgent advice” as soon as it learnt of the OIC decree and “treated with appropriate priority” should have objected within one week. The Court would have gone further if necessary and said that with the background since August, it should have objected “within a working day or two” of receiving the decree.

Witness Statements in section 67 (and section 68) challenges: the Correct Approach?

The general guidance to witness statements in the Commercial Court Guide (at Part H1.1(a) of the 10th Edition) is that “the function of a witness statement is to set out in writing the evidence in chief of the witness”. The Court is increasingly hard on statements that argue the case or recite documentation with strict page limits.

No specific guidance on witness statements is given in Part O, dealing with Arbitration Claims, (beyond in relation to section 68 challenges, that these “must be supported by evidence of the circumstances on which the claimant relies as giving rise to the irregularity complained of and the nature of the injustice which has been or will be caused to the claimant”: O8.4). Generally the place to argue the case is in the Claim Form which “must contain, among other things, a concise statement of the remedy claimed and, if an award is challenged, the grounds for that challenge”: O3.1.

However, as the Judge noted in this case, on section 67 (and 68) applications, a practice has grown up of serving a very full witness statement with the Arbitration Claim Form. He saw as this as having arisen because of “the perceived convenience in a section 67 claim of setting out the claimant’s detailed case as to the material facts, with explanatory comment or an outline of the proposed argument, in a single, main supporting witness statement from the claimant’s solicitor.” [25].

Andrew Baker J. in the course of his judgment disapproved of this practice.

He laid down some ‘reminders’ which practitioners will do well to bear in mind for the future: see at [25] to [27].

  • “Where the material facts will be proved by contemporaneous documents, whether generated by the original transaction or by the arbitral proceedings, the proper function of a witness statement may well be only to serve as the means by which those documents can be got into evidence by being exhibited.”
  • “The claimant’s case as to what those documents prove, and as to the conclusions to be drawn, can and should be set out in the Arbitration Claim Form as part of the statement of the “Remedy claimed and grounds on which claim is made“, a statement often produced in the form of a statement of case attached to the Claim Form.”
  • “The content of any witness statement, beyond a bare identification of exhibited documents, can and should be limited to matters of fact intended to be proved, if disputed, by calling the maker of the statement as a factual witness at the final hearing of the claim.”

Where (as is likely) this approach has not been taken or ‘old-style’ statements are being considered, then a further requirement was stressed:

  • “If a witness statement served with the Arbitration Claim Form has not been properly limited in that way, … it is essential, if the maker of the statement is to be called as a witness at the final hearing of the claim, that proper thought is given to which parts of the statement it is necessary or appropriate to take as their factual evidence in chief. That should preferably be done well ahead of the hearing. Any dispute over what should be allowed as evidence in chief can then be identified and resolved, by the court if necessary; the parties can then prepare cross-examination limited accordingly; and the hearing can then be listed upon the basis of a time estimate that is better informed.”

In cases where the underlying facts are not in reality contentious but how they are to be argued is, this restatement of approach is likely to see the disappearance of any proper need for a full witness statement. The case can be summarised in pleading form in the Claim Form (and argued at fuller length in the skeleton, which witness statements often seek to foreshadow) and the accompanying statement limited to a vehicle for appending the relevant underlying documentation.

Arbitral Appeals under s.69…No Second Bites? – Simon Rainey QC and Peter Stevenson

Agile Holdings Corporation v Essar Shipping Ltd [2018] EWHC 1055 (Comm)

Overview: second bites at s.69(3)?

The English statutory regime for appeals against arbitration awards on questions of law under s.69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, as is well known, applies a two stage process: (i) the application of permission to appeal and, (ii), if permission is granted the appeal itself.

Section 69(3) sets out the matters on which the Court is required to be satisfied as pre-conditions for granting permission to appeal. Where a party unsuccessfully resists permission on the basis that some or all of the requirements are not met, can it nevertheless reargue the point or points all over again on the appeal proper? 

The position and the few cases in this area were recently considered by the Commercial Court in Agile Holdings Corporation v Essar Shipping Ltd [2018] EWHC 1055 (Comm).

The answer is: “it depends”.

How the issue arose

The claimant sought permission to appeal against an arbitration award on a question of law arising from the Award. The defendant opposed permission on various grounds including a submission that the tribunal had not been asked to decide the relevant question (and therefore that the threshold requirements of s.69(3) of the Arbitration Act were not met). It was contended that the argument now being sought to be run had never been argued in that way before the arbitrators. The claimant disputed that and put in evidence of the written submissions and the transcript of the oral submission. The Judge granted permission, rejected the submission and held that the point had been argued. He refused an application by the defendant for an oral hearing on the point.

On the full appeal, the defendant sought to re-open the issue and re-argue its original submission.

The Commercial Court’s decision

The Judge (HHJ Waksman QC, sitting as a deputy Judge of the High Court) allowed the appeal in full. On the s69(3)(c) point, he held that:

(i) the exercise undertaken by the judge granting leave to appeal involves a detailed consideration of the threshold questions;

(ii) once leave has been granted, there is every reason to move onto the merits of the question without the distraction of re-litigating tangential points which have already been decided;

(iii) a party cannot resist the appeal on the basis that the threshold requirements of s.69(3)(a) and (d) are not met. Those issues arise exclusively at the leave stage and the decision of the judge at that stage is final;

(iv) the position is different in respect of the requirements of s.69(3)(c) because, whether a point was put to the tribunal is tied to the issue of whether there is a question of law arising out of the award at all;

(v) however, while the Court hearing the appeal may not be bound as to whether the question arises from the award, it should give considerable weight to the decision of the judge granting leave.

Simon Rainey QC, leading Peter Stevenson, represented the successful appellant.

The Detailed Reasoning of the Court

The defendant submitted that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal because the threshold requirements of s.69(3) were not met.

In support of that proposition it relied upon two authoritiesMotor Image v SCDA Architects [2011] SGCA 58, a decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore, and The Ocean Crown [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 468 a decision of Gross J (as he was).

(1) In Motor Image v SCDA Architects, the Singaporean court considered identical appeal provisions in s.49 of the Singapore Arbitration Act 2002. The judge at first instance (Prakash J., as she was) had granted permission to appeal a question of law under those provisions. When the same judge heard the appeal she decided that the question did not arise on the facts as decided by the tribunal. She took the view that as a result the appeal should be dismissed. The Court of Appeal agreed. It held that this sort of point could be reargued on appeal because it went to the very jurisdiction of the court to hear the appeal in the first place. In other words, the grant of leave was a finding that the court had the relevant jurisdiction. So if on further analysis, one of the threshold conditions was not made out, the court was actually deprived of jurisdiction and could not hear the appeal.

HHJ Waksman QC rejected that analysis. He held that once leave has been granted, the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the appeal has been determined. Subject to any challenge to that decision, the Court has jurisdiction to determine the appeal. The effect of this finding is that it is not open to a party to meet an appeal under s.69 by re-arguing points which relate exclusively to the threshold requirements for permission. Specifically the Judge held that a party cannot re-argue (i) that the determination of the question will not substantially affect the rights of the parties (s.69(3(a)); or (ii) that it is not just and proper for the court to determine the question (s.69(3)(d)).

(2) The decision The Ocean Crown was of a different nature. In that case there were three separate questions of law for appeal for which permission had been granted. The third question involved the allegation by the appellant that the tribunal had sought to restrict the ambit of a well-known legal principle concerning salvage remuneration and had thereby committed an error of law. The respondent argued that the tribunal had done no such thing but was merely dealing with how that principle was to be applied on the particular facts of the case. On that analysis there was no error of law at all.

Gross J. held that, in determining whether a question of law arises out of the award (a pre-requisite of allowing an appeal) the court is not bound by the decision of the judge granting leave.

As HHJ Waksman QC noted, Gross J’s decision not concerned with the threshold requirements of s.69(3) of the Act. It is concerned with whether s.69 is engaged at all: s.69 only permits appeals on questions of law arising from an award (s.69(1)). The Judge described this as ‘the Law Question’ which he distinguished from the issue of whether the question of law was actually put to the tribunal (which he described as ‘the Determination Question’).

However, although not addressing the point head on, the Judge appears to have accepted that the Determination Question is connected to the Law Question and is therefore not merely a threshold requirement for obtaining leave, but may also be considered as part of the substantive appeal.

Having drawn this distinction the Judge held that he was not prohibited from reconsidering whether the question of law raised in the appeal was one that the tribunal had been asked to determine. But he emphasised that the Court should give ‘considerable weight’ to the decision of the judge granting leave to appeal, particularly if (i) the decision was made after an oral hearing; and/or (ii) the materials before the judge granting permission are the same or substantially the same as those before the appeal court.

Adopting that approach the Judge reviewed the material advanced by the defendant and held that he was in no doubt that the question of law was one that the tribunal had been asked to determine.

Conclusions

The decision of the Judge is helpful in three respects.

First, it clarifies that the decision of the judge granting permission to appeal is final and determinative of that issue. It is not open to a party to meet an appeal by arguing that the threshold requirements for leave to appeal were not met and leave should not have been granted. In that respect it drew a clear distinction between the position under English law and the approach taken by the Singaporean Court of Appeal in Motor Image v SCDA Architects.

Second, it confirms that when determining whether the question of law arises from the award, the Court hearing the appeal is not bound by the decision to grant leave and, as part of that process, can reconsider whether the question was one that the tribunal was asked to determined.

Third, it provides clear guidance as to the weight that should be given to the decision of the judge granting leave to appeal. If the judge granting leave considered the issue and had the same material before him/her, ‘very considerable weight’ should be given to the original decision.

It is to be hoped that this robust approach discourages defendants who are unsuccessful at the permission stage from re-opening such points thereby rendering the s.69 process more time-consuming and more costly.

Compensation for the unlawful arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew

Arbitral Tribunal orders the Russian Federation to pay a little under 5,4 million euros to the Netherlands

On 18 July 2017, almost two years after that an Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) found that the Russian Federation must compensate the Netherlands following the wrongful arrest of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew, the Tribunal handed down its Award on the issue of compensation.

Background

Before looking at this recent decision in more in depth, the history of the dispute will be laid out. Starting on 18 September 2013, when Greenpeace activists tried to enter the Russian offshore oil platform (the Prirazlomnaya) in order to protest against attempts to begin exploiting oil and gas resources in the Arctic. One day later, the Russian Federation boarded and arrested the Arctic Sunrise and detained its crew. Subsequently, the vessel was brought to the port of Murmansk and the crew was charged with having committed a range of administrative and criminal offences, including acts of terrorism and hooliganism.

The Netherlands initiates Proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal 

Some two weeks later, on 4 October 2013, The Netherlands, being the flag State of the Arctic Sunrise, started proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal that was established pursuant to Annex VII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Russian Federation refused to participate in the Arbitral proceedings that were initiated by the Netherlands. The position of the Russian Federation was, that this type of dispute was beyond the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal, due to a declaration it had made at the time of becoming a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. However, the proceedings went ahead, despite the non-participation of the Russian Federation.

The Netherlands requests Interim Measures from the ITLOS

On 21 October 2013, the Netherlands requested interim measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). According to the Netherlands, the Russian Federation had to immediately release the Arctic Sunrise and its crew, after the posting of a bond, upon which they would be free to leave Russian territory as well as any maritime areas under its jurisdiction. ITLOS gave an Order on interim measures on 22 November 2013. Initially, the Russian Federation did not comply with the Order of the ITLOS – eventually, however, the vessel and crew were released in late November 2013. The Russian release of vessel and crew was based on its national laws, the Order of the ITLOS played no decisive role in this, according to the Russian Federation  – as it happened, the effect of the national laws and regulations on which the Russian Federation relied, coincided with what was set out by the ITLOS in its Order containing interim measures.

Arbitral Award on the Merits

One of the main substantive issues on which the Arbitral Tribunal was asked to rule during the merits phase, was the (un)lawfulness of the response of the Russian Federation to the presence of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew. The gist of the argument of the Netherlands was that, as the flag State, it had sole jurisdiction over the ship and the crew on-board during the entirety of this incident (Article 58 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention). On 14 August 2015, the Tribunal released its Award on the merits. The Arbitral Tribunal found that the Netherlands had exclusive jurisdiction over the Arctic Sunrise whilst it was operating in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. This means that the Russian Federation could have only lawfully initiated steps against the vessel that was flagged to the Netherlands and its crew with the latter’s consent. After coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal went on to state that the Netherlands had to be compensated.

Arbitral Award on Compensation

In its recent Award on compensation, the Tribunal set the total amount of compensation owed by the Russian Federation to the Netherlands at a little under 5,4 million euros. This sum was arrived at by adding up the damage that was done to the Arctic Sunrise (EUR 1,695,126.18); compensation related to the unlawful arrest, prosecution and detention of its crew (EUR 600,000); a variety of other damages incurred by the Netherlands, including the failure to release the vessel and crew in a timely manner (EUR 2,461,935.43); costs made by the Netherlands in issuing a bank guarantee (EUR 13,500); and lastly, the Netherlands had to be reimbursed for paying the full amount of deposits required by the Tribunal (EUR 625,000) – meaning that the Russian Federation had to pay the half it owed of the costs that were needed for the proceedings to be initiated. Although the Russian Federation is required under international law to abide by the ruling on compensation, whether it will actually do so remains to be seen.

 

Know your defendant when commencing arbitration.

In London Arbitration 13/16, reported in LMLN, the claimants commenced arbitration against X and Y under a Conline booking form containing a London arbitration clause. The form evidenced a contract between X, as merchants, and the claimant. The claimants alleged that during the voyage an accident occurred due to alleged misdescription of the cargo by X and Y at the port of loading. A claim under the booking note could clearly be made against X, but what about Y? They were described in the booking note as the merchant’s representative at the loading port and were also named as the shipper in the bill of lading that was eventually issued. Y objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal as they were not a party to the booking note, an objection  accepted by the tribunal who declared that it had no jurisdiction and ordered the claimants to bear Y’s costs and the costs of the award.  Claims against Y might exist in tort or under the bill of lading, but Y was not a party to the booking note. The position was not changed by the contemplation of the claimants and X that the booking note was an interim contract which would be superseded by the bill of lading.

Loading illegal cargo by ‘Stealth’. Charterer’s libaility for the wrongs of sub-charterers.

In The CV Stealth [2016] EWHC 880 (Comm) time charterers sought permission to appeal against the award of an arbitrator who had found them liable to the shipowners in respect of the consequences of the vessel’s detention following an attempt by the sub charterer to load a cargo of oil from Venezuela without the necessary export permission. The finding was on the basis of an indemnity under cl. 13 of Shelltime 4 form, off hire under cl. 21, and for breach of cl.28 which provided …  No voyage shall be undertaken, nor any goods or cargoes loaded, that would expose the vessel to capture or seizure by rulers or governments.” The appeal was on the basis that the arbitrator had committed an error of law in not construing cl.28 as having prospective effect at the time the relevant order was given by the charterer. Popplewell J found that the arbitrator had construed the clause prospectively and found that the risk of loading the unauthorised cargo had existed at the date the order was given. He also expressed the view that by analogy with the charterer’s obligation to nominate safe ports, if the risk arises whilst the vessel is en route, the owners would be entitled to refuse to continue to comply with the order, if they were aware of it. In the event of continued compliance, the charterers would be in breach of provided that the risk arose before it became impossible for the charterers to give fresh orders which could be complied with in time to avoid the risk.

Permission to appeal was refused because the statutory criterion in s. 69(3)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996 was not fulfilled.

The case also raised a procedural issue as to the effect of cl. 41 of the charter which provided “The parties hereby agree that either party may –(a) appeal to the High Court on any question of law arising out of an award;”  The clause  was clearly drafted with the terms of section 69 of the 1996 Arbitration Act in mind. It scope was limited to a question of law whose determination by the Court may serve a useful purpose for the parties, on a question that will substantially affect the right of the parties.