Non-Disclosure, Materiality and Inducement in Commercial Insurance Context (Again)!

What happens if an assured fails to disclose to the insurer the fact that special conditions were imposed by another insurer as part of another insurance contract? Could that amount to an actionable non-disclosure under s. 18 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906? This was the main issue in Niramax Group Ltd v. Zurich Insurance plc [2020] EWHC 535 (Comm). The assured, Niramax, is a company carrying out the business of waste collection and waste cycling from various sites in north-east England. Niramax held a suite of insurance policies with the insurer, Zurich, which provided cover for a variety of risks relating to its plant and machinery. One of these policies was a contractor’s plant policy which provided all risks cover for a mobile plant owned by the assured (the Policy). Niramax also held buildings cover separately with a variety of other insurers. One of these insurers was Millennium Insurance. In the process of providing insurance cover for a building owned by Niramax in 2014, a risk survey report was prepared by Millennium which laid out seven risk requirements. One of these requirements was the installation of a fire suppression system at the main recycling facility of Niramax located at Hartlepool. Even though the assured was reminded by Millennium of the need to install the fire suppression system on several occasions, the system was never installed and as a result special conditions stipulated by the policy came into force on 22 October 2014 increasing the deductible to £ 250,000 and requiring Niramax to self-insure for thirty five percent of the balance of any loss.

In December 2014, Niramax renewed its policy with Zurich on the mobile plant. In 2015, Niramax acquired another mobile plant (Eggersmann plant) and in September 2015, Zurich was persuaded to amend the Policy to extend cover to the newly acquired plant until the renewal date of mid-December 2015. On 4 December 2015, a fire broke out at Niramax’s premises and the Eggersmann plant along with the other plant was destroyed.
Niramax made a claim, which, at trial was valued at around £ 4.5 million, under the Policy. The majority of the claim related to the loss of the Eggersmann plant, which was valued around £ 4.3 million. Zurich refused to pay stating that it was entitled to avoid the Policy for material non-disclosure and/or misrepresentation. Niramax brought the current proceedings against Zurich.

It was held that the assured’s non-compliance with risk requirements under the buildings policy with Millennium and the imposition of special terms under that policy were materials facts which needed to be disclosed under s. 18(1) of the MIA 1906. However, the insurer (Zurich) failed to demonstrate that, if the facts had been fully disclosed, the Policy for the plant (effected in December 2014) would have been renewed. On the other hand, Zurich was able to demonstrate that, if the facts had been fully disclosed (especially imposition of special circumstances for the assured company (Niramax) by another insurer), the extension of cover for the Eggersmann plant would have been refused. Accordingly, it was held that the insurer, Zurich, was entitled to avoid the cover for the endorsement under the Policy and no indemnity was due for the loss of the Eggermanns plant. The insurer was required to return the premium received for the endorsement. Otherwise, the original Policy stood and the insurer was bound to indemnify Niramax for the items of mobile plant which were covered by the original Policy (as renewed in December 2014) and damaged in the fire.

Two comments are in order. First, it is interesting to see that the trial judge (Mrs Justice Cockerril) found that the original policy stood (i.e. there was no inducement) even though it would have not been written on the same terms (i.e. with higher premium to reflect the correct multiplier) if full disclosure had been made by the assured. This certainly raises an interesting question going forward on the application of the test of inducement and seems to be at odds with the sentiments expressed by Clarke, LJ, in Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 1642; [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 131, at [62] (emphasis added):
In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer must show that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was an effective cause of his entering into the contract on the terms on which he did. He must therefore show at least that, but for the relevant non-disclosure or misrepresentation, he would not have entered into the contract on those terms. On the other hand, he does not have to show that it was the sole effective cause of his doing so.

Second, the contract was obviously concluded before the Insurance Act 2015 (IA) came into force but is highly unlikely that the application of the AA 2015 would have led to a different outcome. The materiality test applicable under the IA 2015 (under s. 7(3) of the IA 2015) is practically the same and there is still a need to prove inducement for actionable non-disclosure under the 2015 Act.

Microsoft Exchange Email Hacks!

numbers projected on face
Photo by Mati Mango on Pexels.com

Another cyber-attack labelled ‘Microsoft Exchange Email hacks’ hits the news again! This attack has been concerningly described as ‘zero day’ attack. A zero-day attack means that the points of vulnerability were unknown before the attack therefore the cyber-attack occurs on the same day that the weakness is discovered in the software. Like so many things happening around the world at this point, the race is on to get on top of these attacks which are believed to be state sponsored and cultivated in China by the hacking group Hafnium. Chinese government denies any involvement. This method of attack has already been replicated and used to infiltrate companies and public bodies in more than 115 countries around the world.  It is still early days, so many UK companies may still be unaware that their systems have been hacked. The European Banking Authority has reported that their system has been compromised and that there is a possibility that personal data has been exposed.  

What happened?

Microsoft announced that the hacking group exploited four (4) zero-day vulnerabilities in the server’s system to enter the Microsoft Exchange Server which is used by large corporations and public bodies across the world. The calendar software of governments and data centres were also compromised. The hackers also sometimes used stolen passwords to gain unauthorized access to the system. The hackers would then take control of the server remotely and steal data from the network. The attack has affected thousands around the world.

Tom Burts, a VP at Microsoft described in a sequential order how the attack was carried out;

First, it would gain access to an Exchange Server either with stolen passwords or by using the previously undiscovered vulnerabilities to disguise itself as someone who should have access.

Second, it would create what’s called a web shell to control the compromised server remotely.

Third, it would use that remote access – run from the U.S. based private servers to steal data from an organization’s network.[1]

What is not affected?

The identified vulnerabilities do not affect Exchange Online, Microsoft’s cloud-based email and calendar services that’s included in commercial Office 365 and Microsoft 365 subscriptions.

International Response

In response Microsoft issued a software update for its 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019 versions of Exchange. The UK National Cybersecurity Centre, the US and the Norwegian governments are already issuing warnings and guidelines to businesses about the hacks.

But what does this mean for insurers?

This is an extra dent in the cyber security efforts of companies and public bodies yet another opportunity for a lesson to the insurance market of the potential global and high aggregate loss from just one attack. This incident is another illustration of how susceptible computer systems and servers are to cyber-attacks. Similarly, it is another indication to corporations and public bodies that foreign entities are working assiduously to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within their systems to achieve their motives, whatever they may be. So far, the impact is widespread, and victims include organisations such as infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defence contractors, NGOs. Cybersecurity group Huntress has reported many of their partners servers have been affected and they include small businesses for example small hotels, ice cream company, senior citizen communities, banks, local government and electricity companies[2].

In light of the recent business interruption decision from the Supreme Court, it will be interesting to see how many of these UK companies will present their claims to insurers and how insurers will respond to claims from assured whose businesses may have been interrupted by the Exchange Email hacks.

There will be gaps and exclusions in these Business Interruption policies which may not provide adequate protection against cyber risks so it is the assured with a cyber risk policy / insurance coverage who will be the most protected during and after these attacks.

Applicable cyber insurance clauses and possible response of insurers

Most cyber insurance policies cover data loss and business interruption as a result of a security breach so this will not be much of an issue for assureds with cyber insurance coverage. There are exclusions in most cyber insurance policies which may leave an assured vulnerable when hacking of this nature (Microsoft Exchange hack) occurs. Let us consider some of these exclusions and their potential impact further:

  1. First Party Loss

costs or expenses incurred by the insured to identify or remediate software program errors or vulnerabilities or update, replace, restore, assemble, reproduce, recollect or enhance data or computer systems to a level beyond that which existed prior to a security breachsystem failuredependent security breachdependent system failure or extortion threat;

  • Betterment

for repairing, replacing or restoring the Insured’s Computer System to a level beyond that which existed prior to any Claim or Loss;

The inclusion of this or any clause with similar wording means the assured may not be covered for the expenses and cost incurred to hire experts to identify or remediate vulnerabilities within their IT systems. Consequently, the assured will not be indemnified for the expenses or costs incurred to install the patches as recommended by Microsoft as these will be classified as updates or enhancement to the computer system beyond a level that which existed prior to the security breach.

  • Infrastructure failure

We will not make any payment for any claim, loss or any other liability under this section directly or indirectly due to:

  1. Any failure or interruption of service provided by an internet service provider, telecommunications provider, utilities supplier or other infrastructure provider. However, this exclusion does not apply where you provide such services as part of your business.

OR

ii.     failure or malfunction of satellites or of power, utility, mechanical or telecommunications (including internet) infrastructure or services that are not under the insured organization’s direct operational control.

OR

  • Third party providers
  1. arising out of the failure of any third party provider including any utility, cloud, internet service provider or telecommunications provider, unless arising from a failure of the Insured to protect against unauthorised access to, unauthorised use of, or a denial of service attack or damage, destruction, alteration, corruption, copying, stealing or misuse by a Hacker of the Insured’s Computer system;

OR

ii.   The Insurer shall not be liable to indemnify the Insured against any Loss arising as a result of the failure of a third party service provider or cloud provider unless they are hosting hardware or software that is owned by the Insured.

Could the relationship between Microsoft and its clients fall into the category of ‘other infrastructure provider’ to relieve the insurer of any liability to the assured? As software service providers of Microsoft 365 and Azure it will be no surprise to see claims being denied based on clauses with the same or similar wording. However, the assured may object to the insurer’s denial of the claim by the applying ejusdem generis rule in stating that ‘or other infrastructure provider’ should be limited to companies such as Virgin Media, British Gas or Welsh Water and not extend to software providers. According to Cambridge dictionary, infrastructure as it relates to IT means the ‘equipment, software, etc. that a computer system needs in order to operate and communicate with other computers.’ If this definition is accepted by the parties, the challenge for the insurer will be to establish that the Microsoft Exchange Server qualifies as a software needed for a computer system to operate and communicate with other computers. Rather, the function of the Microsoft exchange server is to aid with email storage and calendaring and is unrelated to other operational functions necessary to communicate with other computers.

Certainly ‘infrastructure or services that are not under the insured organization’s direct operational control’ will create less problems for the insurer to establish that the exclusion applies as this broad construction will exclude losses and expenses from incidents such as Microsoft Email Exchange Hack.

  • Government intrusion
  1. which results, directly or indirectly, from access to, confiscation or destruction of the Insured’s Computer system by any government, governmental agency or sub-agency, public authority or any agents thereof;

Since the Microsoft Exchange Email are believed to be carried out by Hafnium which is a government backed group, it is reasonable to identify them as agents of the government of China.  Therefore, assureds whose policies include a government intrusion exclusion may be denied coverage for their loss or expenses arising directly or indirectly from access to or destruction of the assured’s computer system by groups such as Hafnium.

Conclusion and the way forward

As aforementioned, it is early days and the real financial impact if any from these attacks are not yet known. However, what is certain is that hackers, whether state sponsored are not are using very sophisticated techniques to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within computer servers and networks. Therefore, companies and public bodies must continue to invest in employee training and take reasonable steps to manage and mitigate their losses from potential cyber-attacks which unfortunately will happen at one point. Among those decisions should be the purchase of cyber insurance policies that addresses the needs of the business with particular attention being placed on the exclusions clauses and ensuring that as an assured you are adequately protected against the cybersecurity risks to which you are most directly and indirectly prone .

While large corporations and government entities may have the requisite IT expertise to support them, the real concern remains for those small and medium sized businesses that do not have the resources for a complete check and cleaning of their systems. Therefore, larger corporations within the supply chain must offer their expertise to the small and medium sized businesses with which they trade to respond to this and other cyber security threats.  Since Microsoft Exchange Online servers have not been affected, many small and medium sized businesses may begin to switch to using cloud-based email storage. However, this does not mean they will be immune from cyber-attacks.

Tokio Marine in their Cybersecurity Insurance Policy wording 0417 went as far as to include a list of reasonable steps that an insured should take to avoid / mitigate their loss and these along with government and industry guidelines should be a good starting point in your fight against cyber attacks and their debilitating impacts.

Reasonable steps to avoid Loss

The Insured shall protect its Computer system by:

a. having Virus protection software operating, correctly configured and regularly or automatically updated;

b. updating Computer systems with new protection patches issued by the original system or software manufacturer of supplier;

c. having a fire wall or similar configured device to control access to its Computer system;

d. encrypting and controlling the access to its Computer system and external devices including plug-in devices networked to its Computer system;

e. controlling unauthorised access to its Computer system by correctly configuring its wireless network;

f. changing all passwords on information and communication assets at least every 60 days and cancel any username, password or other security protection once an Employee’s employment has been terminated or after it knew or had reasonable grounds to suspect that it had become available to any unauthorised person;

g. taking regular back-up copies of any data, file or programme on its Computer system are taken and held in a secondary location;

h. having an operational system for logging and monitoring user activity on its Computer system;

i. remote wipe functionality is installed and enabled on all portable devices where such functionality is available


[1] Tom Burts, ‘New Nation – State Cyber attacks’ (02 March 2021) < https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/> accessed 14 March 2021.

[2] John Hammond, ‘Rapid Response: Mass Exploitation of On-Prem Exchange Servers’ (03 March 2021) < https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-mass-exploitation-of-on-prem-exchange-servers?__hstc=1139630.77196394391fe1afb6fc8e7d1d6a8bc9.1615725167878.1615725167878.1615725167878.1&__hssc=1139630.5.1615725167882&__hsfp=3684379411&hsutk=77196394391fe1afb6fc8e7d1d6a8bc9&contentType=listing-page> accessed 14 March 2021.

Who is an “operator of a seagoing ship” for the purposes of the 1976 Limitation Convention?

In a recent blog post I commented on various gaps in the limitation regime and the Admiralty court has now given guidance as to how another gap may be plugged – namely whilst an “operator of a seagoing ship” is a “person entitled to limit liability” pursuant to article 1.2 of the 1976 Limitation Convention, what is meant by the term “operator”? That is a term that is not defined in the Convention nor in the travaux preparatoires to the Convention, Furthermore, the issue has not been considered in any prior case and there is no helpful commentary in any of the leading textbooks on the subject.

In the case of the “Stema Barge II”(2020) EWHC 1294 (Admlty) Teare J has engaged in a careful and cogent analysis of the issue. The judge notes firstly that article 2.1 refers to the “manager and operator of a seagoing ship” and comments that in many instances there is considerable overlap between “manager” and “operator” and that the terms may often be used interchangeably:

“I therefore consider that the ordinary meaning of “the operator of a ship” includes the “the manager of a ship”. Indeed, in many cases involving a conventional merchant ship there may be little scope for operator to have any wider meaning than that of manager”. (para 74)

However, he goes on to say that a person may be an “operator” even if that person does not engage in the more conventional management activities which would include manning, fuelling, technical and safety supervision, trading, deployment of the ship etc.

The “Stema Barge II” was an unmanned dumb barge which required unique handling as explained by the judge:.

“The present case does not involve a conventional merchant ship but a dumb barge, laden with cargo, which is towed from the loading port to the discharge location, left there by the tug and thereafter “attended” (to use a neutral word) by a company which places men on board with instructions to operate the machinery of the dumb barge. The question which arises in these circumstances is whether the ordinary meaning of “the operator of a ship” in article 1(2) can include those who physically operate the machinery of the ship and those who cause the machinery of the ship to be physically operated, or whether the ordinary meaning of “the operator of a ship” is limited to the manager of the ship.” (para 75)

The judge concludes that:

“I have therefore concluded that the ordinary meaning of “the operator of a ship” in article 1(2) of the 1976 Limitation Convention embraces not only the manager of the ship but also the entity which, with the permission of the owner, directs its employees to board the ship and operate her in the ordinary course of the ship’s business.”

Whilst the facts of the case may have been somewhat special the decision may have an impact on the wider issue of who is deemed to be an “operator” of an unmanned ship and whether an entity that operates the controls of an unmanned ship “in the ordinary course of the ship’s business” from shore can limit its liability. It is true that in the case of the “Stema Barge II” the entity that sought the right to limit had actually boarded the barge in order to be able to operate its machinery. However, it does not seem that the physical boarding of the vessel should necessarily be a restricting factor and there are indications  that the judge was thinking in more general terms. For example, he makes the following more general observations:

“The question which arises in these circumstances is whether the ordinary meaning of “the operator of a ship” in article 1(2) can include those who physically operate the machinery of the ship and those who cause the machinery of the ship to be physically operated…” (para 75)

“Those who cause an unmanned ship to be physically operated…” (para 81)

It is true that the judge says at para 74 that:

“Indeed, in many cases involving a conventional merchant ship there may be little scope for operator to have any wider meaning than that of manager.”

However, it is equally true that an unmanned ship is not a “conventional merchant ship.”

“But you weren’t going to perform anyway!”: A new hurdle when invoking Force Majeure

Classic Maritime Inc v Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1102

Simon Rainey QC and Andrew Leung

Is it necessary when a party seeks to rely on a force majeure or exceptions clause to show that it would have performed “but for” the force majeure or excepted event? And if the party is liable for failing to perform, but performance would have been impossible in any event, is the innocent party entitled to damages?

These important questions were considered by the Court of Appeal in Classic Maritime Inc v Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1102. The judgment, which is the sequel to the first instance decision discussed here, clarifies that:

  1. Contrary to what textbooks such as Chitty and Treitel on Frustration and Force Majeure suggest, there is no general principle that it is not necessary to show “but for” causation in order to invoke a force majeure or exceptions clause.
  • The innocent party is entitled to substantial damages even if it would never have received performance in any event.

The dam burst and the COA

The litigation was fuelled by the Samarco dam burst on 5 November 2015. The charterer under a COA, Limbungan, claimed it was prevented from supplying cargoes for shipment as a result and was excused from having to perform under Clause 32 of the COA, which provided in material part:

“Neither the Vessel, her Master or Owners, nor the Charterers, Shippers or Receivers shall be responsible for…failure to supply, load…cargo resulting from: Act of God…floods…landslips…accidents at mine or production facility…or any other causes beyond the Owners’, Charterers’, Shippers’ or Receivers’ control; always provided that such events directly affect the performance of either party under this Charter Party.”

The first instance decision

At first instance, Teare J held that though the dam burst had rendered performance impossible, Limbungan could not rely on Clause 32 as it required the charterer to prove that it would have performed but for the collapse of the dam, and Limbungan would have defaulted anyway. However, the owner, Classic, was only entitled to nominal damages. Even if Limbungan had been able and willing to perform, the dam burst would inevitably have prevented performance. The compensatory principle would be breached if Classic was awarded substantial damages when it would never have received freight in any event.

The Court of Appeal’s decision

The Court of Appeal upheld Teare J’s decision that Clause 32 required Limbungan to prove but for causation and reversed his decision in relation to damages.

Limbungan had submitted that the House of Lords decision in Bremer Handelgesellschaft v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 laid down the general principle that a party relying on force majeure need not show it would have performed but for the force majeure event.

However, the Court of Appeal, like Teare J, treated Bremer v Vanden as a case concerning a “contractual frustration” clause (Clause 21 of the GAFTA 100 form), i.e. a clause which automatically discharged the parties from an obligation to perform in the future, much like the common law doctrine of frustration. The automatic cancellation effected by Clause 21 meant it was not necessary to meet the test of but for causation.

Starting from first principles, it was open to the parties to agree a clause which only excused non-performance if that test was met. The Court of Appeal considered that Clause 32 was just such a clause. Unlike the “contractual frustration” clause in Bremer v Vanden, it was an exemption clause which relieved a party of liability for a past breach. It was hard to see why the dam burst should make any difference to Limbungan’s liability when it was never going to perform anyway.

On the issue of damages, what Teare J thought was an orthodox application of the compensatory principle the Court of Appeal viewed as a “sleight of hand”. When assessing Classic’s loss, the Judge should have compared the freights Classic would have earned with the actual position it was in due to Limbungan’s breach. Teare J had instead drawn a comparison between Classic’s actual position and its position if Limbungan had been ready and willing to perform.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the present case from two cases in which events occurring after a breach of contract were taken into account:

  1. In The Golden Victory [2007] 2 A.C. 353, the House of Lords held that the owners could not recover hire for the full-term of a charterparty prematurely cancelled by the charterers. The charterparty would not have run its full course anyway as the charterers would have lawfully cancelled due to the Second Gulf War.
  • In Bunge v Nidera [2015] 3 All E.R. 1082, the Supreme Court held that a buyer had suffered no loss despite the repudiation of a sale contract by the seller. A subsequent embargo would however have prevented the sale from taking place in any event.

Both cases were however concerned with assessing damages for an anticipatory breach. Contrastingly, the present case was concerned with an actual breach. Since Clause 32 gave Limbungan no defence to liability, Limbungan had to pay damages for failing to perform.

Comment

The Court of Appeal has underlined the fact that, whatever the current understanding of Bremer v Vanden in the textbooks,there is no default position whereby it is unnecessary to prove but for causation in order to rely on a force majeure or exceptions clause. The specific Force Majeure remedy afforded by Clause 21 of GAFTA 100 was held to be the reason that clause did not import a requirement of but for causation. Why this remedy should determine the test for causation is not entirely clear, when the effect of contractual cancellation and an exemption from liability is for practical purposes the same: the non-performing party cannot be successfully sued.

In other respects, this case presents a number of novelties:

  1. The Court of Appeal held that Clause 32 was not even a force majeure clause, but an exemption clause. It was not previously clear that these categories were mutually exclusive (see e.g. Lewison, Interpretation of Contracts, 13.02).
  • Both Treitel and Lewison suggest in the light of the authorities that a clause which makes provision for the consequences of supervening events which occur without the fault of either party and are beyond their control (i.e. Clause 32) defines the parties’ obligations rather than operating as an exemption clause. This now needs to be reconsidered.
  • The Court of Appeal’s take on The Golden Victory and Bunge v Nidera is that subsequent events and their potential effect on the parties’ rights and obligations are only relevant when assessing damages caused by an anticipatory breach accepted as terminating the contract. They are not relevant in the case of an actual breach. This is arguably a new development and suggests there is not one compensatory principle, but two.

Permission to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal but an application for permission to appeal is being made to the Supreme Court. The authors are Counsel for Limbungan and appeared below and in the Court of Appeal.

Inherent Vice: Who proves what and how?

Volcafe Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA (“CSAV”) [2016] EWCA Civ 1103.

It’s indeed a good day for carriers as the CA has now restored the balance between carriers’ and cargo owners’ interests by reversing the controversial first instance judgement in Volcafe Ltd  v CSAV [2015] EWHC 516 (Comm).

This case arose out of condensate damage to nine consignments of coffee, which were carried in unventilated containers from Buanaventura in Colombia to destinations in North Germany. The High Court (Mr David Donaldson) rendered a judgement in favour of the cargo owners on the basis that, although the cargo damage was attributed to inherent vice of the goods carried, the carrier had not disproved his negligence. The carrier had failed to establish that he had adopted a sound system as underpinned by a theoretical calculation or empirical study.

The CA (Lady Justice Gloster, Lady Justice King and Mr Justice Flaux, sitting in the Court of Appeal) allowed the carrier’s appeal in respect of his defences of inherent vice.

Flaux J, who delivered the leading judgement, ruled that that once the carrier had established the inherent vice exception, the burden of proof shifted to the cargo owners to show that there had been negligence on the part of the carrier. He further held that such an approach is consistent with the weight of the authorities, which have applied the principles enunciated in The Glendarroch, even where the contract of carriage is governed by the Hague Rules, as well as with the principle that “he who alleges must prove”. In addition, he found that the adopted approach is supported by the wording of the “catch all exception” which is the only excepted peril that expressly requires the carrier to disprove his negligence before relying on this exception.

In addition, Flaux J rejected trial judge’s analysis of ‘complete circularity’ between Hague Rules, art. III, r.2 and art. IV, r. 2(m) because this approach deprives the exception in paragraph (m) of its force and that it has been long recognised as an excepted peril. Furthermore, he rejected trial judge’s approach to a “sound system” and in particular his requirement for a scientific calculation or empirical study. He held that such an interpretation imposes a standard beyond what the law requires. He also reiterated the well-established position that one of the indicia of a sound system is that it is in accordance with general industry practice.

The CA decision in Volcafe is welcome not only because it strikes a fair balance between carriers’ and cargo owners’ competing interests but also because it promotes the uniform application of the Hague and in turn the Hague-Visby Rules. In particular, the CA decision brings English case law in line with authorities in the United States and New Zealand who have held that, in case of inherent vice or other excepted perils (excluding the q defence), it is the shipper who bears the burden of showing that the damage resulted from negligence or fault caused by the carrier (See for example, Quaker Oats Co. v. M/V TORVANGER, 734 F.2d 238, 1984 AMC 2943 (5th Cir. 1984), U.S. v. Ocean Bulk Ships, Inc. 248 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2001), Terman Foods, Inc.v. Omega Lines 707 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1983) and Shaw Savill & Albion Company Ltd v Powley & Co [1949] N.Z.L.R. 668).

As a final remark, one should not underestimate the impact of Volcafe on the approach to the burden of proof in all of the defences (except from the “catchall exception”) enumerated in Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, art. IV, r.2. Flaux J found the wording of the “catchall exception” as supporting the analysis that, in the case of all other exceptions, the carrier’s reliance on any excepted peril is not dependent upon the carrier disproving his negligence.

Shot by both sides? Interpleader proceedings in the OWB saga.

 

The bankruptcy of OW Bunkers in November 2014 has led to many shipowners facing competing claims for the supply of bunkers from ING as assignee of OWB and from physical bunker suppliers. In Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. Oil Trading LLC, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-97/15-97-2016-02-24.html, an interpleader was filed on behalf of shipowners and an injunction obtained preventing the imminent arrests of three of vessels by U.S. Oil Trading LLC, the physical supplier of bunkers. The Second Circuit has now rejected U.S. Oil Trading’s appeal. This contrasts with the position in Singapore last year where the Court of Appeal denied interpleader proceedings in similar circumstances. It reasoned that the suppliers’ in rem claims did not compete with ING’s contractual, in personam, claims. In the UK the shipping world awaits with bated breath the decision of the Supreme Court on whether the Sale of Goods Act applies to contracts for the supply of bunkers.

Peripatetic seamen and the Pensions Act 2008

In The Queen (on the application of Fleet Maritime Services (Bermuda) Ltd) v The Pensions Regulator [2015] EWHC 3744 (Admin) it has been held that the Pensions Act 2008, requiring automatic enrolment of workers into a pension scheme, does not apply to seafarers who began and ended their tours of duty outside the UK, and who spent most if not all of those tours of duty outside the UK, although they travelled to and from the UK at the start and end of their tours of duty .

Latest instalment of the Prestige saga — over to Madrid

Nearly 14 years ago the tanker Prestige sank, grievously sullying the coasts of France and Spain. The vessel’s P & I club (London SS) was understandably concerned. But it had taken care in granting cover to make sure that the contract was governed by English law; that its exposure was clearly restricted to CLC limits; that any dispute as to cover was to be arbitrated in London; and that there was a “pay to be paid” provision. There were good reasons for this. Many civil law courts take an impatient view of the English attitude that insurers’ liability is an aspect of the contract to indemnify, preferring the view that the liability is a direct one to the victim. The club rightly wanted to avoid the prospect of a court in an affected country giving large judgments against it on the basis of this civil law doctrine (accompanied, no doubt, by a disdain for such niceties as arbitration clauses and the small print in the P & I cover, not to mention in certain cases a large degree of national amour propre). The point was, of course, that if these were EEA courts, then however cavalier or misguided those judgments were, they would be enforceable under Brussels I or Lugano.

The club were right, in spades. Criminal Spanish proceedings, carrying with them under Spanish law the possibility of civil-law-style partie civile liability, were started. To forestall the giving of an enforceable judgment against it, the club demanded arbitration, got an arbitration award saying that the Spanish and French governments could only enforce the cover subject to the terms of the contract — including the arbitration clause, of course — and then successfully got that award translated into an English judgment (see London SS Mutual v Kingdom of Spain, etc [2015] EWCA Civ 333; [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 33). In fact the original criminal proceedings failed. But a few days ago the Spanish supreme court (Tribunal Supremo) reversed that decision and gave judgment against the master of the Prestige (he got two years in clink) and, more importantly, directly against the club as a matter of civil liability. The news report is here; the judgment text (unfortunately only in Spanish) here.

With conflicting judgments from London and Madrid we now have the irresistible force meeting the immovable object. One suspects we haven’t heard the last of this saga.

AT

Temporal scope of Hague Rules

Volcafe v CSAV [2015] EWHC 516 (Comm); [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 639.

Loading of a cargo of coffee inland by the carrier into its containers has been held to fall within the temporal scope of the Hague Rules. This may seem somewhat surprising in the light of Article 1 (e) of the Rules which provides: “(e) “Carriage of goods” covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship.” However, David Donaldson QC in the London Mercantile Court has held that the initial loading into the carrier’s containers and the subsequent loading of the container onto the vessel were to be regarded as part of a single loading process. Even if this were not the case, the parties had exercised their freedom to agree what constituted loading under art 1. (e) which they had done by providing that the carrier would stuff the cargo into its own containers.

Simon Baughen