Jurisdiction – The Institute of International Shipping & Trade Law (IISTL) Blog

Time to stop trying? Attempting to sidestep the ‘rehearing’ nature of a s.67 jurisdiction challenge

GPF GP S.à.r.l. v Republic of Poland [2018] EWHC 409 (Comm)

Overview

The recent decision of the Commercial Court in GPF GP S.à.r.l. v Republic of Poland [2018] EWHC 409 (Comm) reinforces what should, by now, be well-known to be the unassailable position that a challenge to jurisdiction under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 takes place as a full rehearing of that challenge and not as a review of the arbitral tribunal’s prior decision on the same issue of jurisdiction.

The patent unpopularity of that position in many quarters of the arbitral community is illustrated by the most recent hard-fought attempt in this case to argue that this approach is not justified and should be restricted wherever possible. The decision demonstrates however that attempts to pick away at the position, post the Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate v Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, or to seek by other routes to sidestep the effect of a rehearing will be unavailing.

The decision of Bryan J unsurprisingly but usefully confirms that:

(a) that there is no difference between a question of jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae: both are subject to a rehearing;

(b) that the position is no different where a party fails to raise issues in the arbitration and seeks to raise wholly new points on the s.67 challenge, irrespective of the nature of the jurisdictional aspect in play; and

The decision also contains a useful analysis of the concept, in the context of a BIT, of creeping expropriation qualifying as an expropriation in aggregate effect and the application of a BIT arbitration clause in that context (not addressed in this case note).

The Background

In a dispute between GPF (Griffin) and Poland under a BIT between Belgium, Luxembourg and Poland, Griffin claimed that a Polish court judgment constituted an expropriation measure. Griffin financed a property group seeking to invest in the redevelopment of ex-State properties for commercial and residential use. It claimed for violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the BIT and for indirect or creeping expropriation, similarly in breach of the BIT, relying on a series of acts or course of conduct by authorities and the court, attributable to Poland. A distinguished tribunal (Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Prof. David Williams QC, Prof. Philippe Sands QC) held that aspects of Griffin’s claim fell outside the arbitration clause in the BIT and could not be pursued, effectively tying Griffin to reliance solely on the court judgment and not the “prior measures” on which it also relied in support of its FET / expropriation claims.

Griffin challenged the Award under section 67 and, in so doing, supplemented in material aspects its case with new evidence as to the drafting history of the BIT and the “prior measures” and developed additional and different arguments. Poland contended that this was not permissible.

Poland’s Two Points and Bryan J’s Decision

Poland took two points, against the background of the general undesirability of the rehearing rule as eroding the efficacy of international arbitration, buttressed with reference to what the Judge referred to as “the spirited attack on the re-hearing approach undertaken by the editors of Arbitration Law 5th edn” (Robert Merkin and Louis Flannery QC).

(1) A difference between identity of party and scope of dispute jurisdictional issues?

First, Poland argued that the rehearing approach, enshrined in Dallah, was on analysis only applicable in a case which involved a question of jurisdiction ratione personae, i.e., a fundamental issue concerning a claimant who claimed not to be party to the arbitration agreement, and not where the issue arising is one of jurisdiction ratione materiae, or the scope of disputes referred to arbitration.

It argued that the seminal decision of Rix J. in Azov Shipping Co. v Baltic Shipping Co. [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68, on which Lord Mance’s speech in Dallah was said to hinge, concerned only a substantial issue of fact as to whether a party had entered into an arbitration agreement, not a scope of disputes issue. Reference was also made to a s.67 decision of Toulson J in Ranko Group v Antarctic Maritime SA [1998] ADRLN 35 (post Azov) in which, he held that it would be wrong for the courts to rely on new evidence which “could perfectly well have been put before the arbitrator, but was not placed before him, and with no adequate explanation why it was not”. Toulson J based his decision, in part, on the reduced role of the courts under the Arbitration Act 1996. With that in mind, Poland argued that the Court should not seek to extend the rehearing principle any further than was strictly justified, i.e. to ratione personae issues only.

Bryan J’s decision was an emphatic rejection of any distinction either in the cases or in principle and a vigorous endorsement of the validity of the Dallah principle [70]:”In each case, where it is said the tribunal has no jurisdiction, it is on the basis that either there is no arbitration agreement between the particular parties, or that there is no arbitration agreement that confers jurisdiction in respect of the claim made. In each case if the submission is proved, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction as no jurisdiction has been conferred upon it by the parties in an arbitration agreement. In such circumstances it is for the Court under section 67 to consider whether jurisdiction does or does not exist, unfettered by the reasoning of the arbitrators or indeed the precise manner in which arguments were advanced before the arbitrators.”

(2) Waiver by Griffin of its Right to Raise New Points / New Evidence

Secondly, Poland argued that the doctrine of waiver applied, because Griffin could have advanced the new materials and arguments before the arbitrators but failed or chose not to do so and should therefore be taken to have waived them or to be precluded from running them, even at a rehearing. The argument is, unfortunately, only shortly summarised in the judgment.

The difficulty with this argument, as explained by the Judge, is that once it is recognised that a rehearing is an entirely de novo determination, it is difficult to see how and where waiver will arise.

He put it this way [72]: “it is difficult to see how a waiver could arise in circumstances where it is well established that there can be a re-hearing under section 67, a fact parties are taken to know), and in the context of no restriction being set out in section 67 itself restricting what arguments may be re-run, no question of any loss of a right to advance particular arguments on a re-hearing under section 67 can arise”.

However, while conceivably some form of formal abandonment of a point in the arbitral jurisdiction hearing on which the other relied to its prejudice and detriment and which could not be redressed at the rehearing might amount to a waiver, in the present case (as in most if not all) Poland dealt with the ‘new’ points in detail and could not point to any prejudice.

Conclusion

While the logical underpinning, the justifications and the demerits of a Dallah approach will doubtless and understandably continue to be discussed in the arbitral community (as illustrated by an entertaining debate between Sir David Steel and Louis Flannery QC at the recent Quadrant Chambers International Arbitration Seminar), in practical ‘practitioner’ terms it has been a wholly sterile one since 2010, and perhaps it is time to recognise that fact.

More from the OWB bunker saga. Agency and conversion.

In The Cosco Felixstowe Shipowners ordered bunkers from D2, a bunker trader in Singapore who had contracted with OWBS to supply the bunkers. OWBS had in turn contracted with OWBC who had contracted with the plaintiff who physically supplied the bunkers to the vessel. Leave was granted pursuant to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction on D2 and OWBC under Order 11 rule 1(1)(f) of the Rules of the High Court that D2 had committed a tort (ie the tort of conversion) within the jurisdiction, and/or under rule 1(1)(d) on the basis that it was arguable that OWBC had entered the contract with P as agent for D2.

The Hong Kong Court of First Instance (Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon) [2016] HKCFI 492 – 18 March 2016, has now denied D2’s application to set aside the grant of leave. It was arguable that there was a material difference between the terms of OWB’s contract in The Res Cogitans and P’s standard terms in the present case in that the latter provided no unambiguous authorisation to consume the bunkers for propulsion purposes prior to payment. The conversion would be constituted by OWBS’ contractual obligation to procure use of the bunkers before payment had been made. A clause in P’s contract that the buyer and the vessel owner would only use the bunkers for the operation of the vessel did not amount to consent by P to immediate consumption of the bunkers.

It was also arguable that there was an agency chain running from D2 to OWBC who contracted with the physical supplier, in which case there would be a contract with P made by an agent within the jurisdiction.

Piggy back jurisdiction under CMR? The Supreme Court answers ‘No’

Where jurisdiction is established over the first road carrier under the CMR, can proceedings against successive carriers be brought in that forum? In British American Tobacco Switzerland S.A. and Others v Exel Europe Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1319, [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 503, the Court of Appeal said ‘yes’. The Supreme Court has now reversed the decision, [2015] UKSC 65.

The cargo owner entered into a CMR contract of carriage with a carrier, based in England, and agreed exclusive English jurisdiction for disputes arising out of the contract of carriage. The claims arose out of thefts of cigarettes from two cargo containers while in the custody of Dutch sub-contractors, the first in Belgium, the second near Copenhagen. The cargo sued the first carrier and the two Dutch sub-carriers. An advantage of suing in England would be that recovery of customs duty is allowed in full under art. 23(4) CMR by the English courts.

Although it was entitled to bring proceedings in England against the first carrier, this was not the case as regards the successive carriers who did not fall within any of the grounds of jurisdiction in art. 31 of CMR. What about art. 34 which has the effect of joining a successive carrier to the contract of carriage on the terms of the consignment note? The jurisdiction clause did not appear in the consignment note and it would be contrary to principle to hold a party to a choice of court clause of which he had no express notice. Then there is art. 36, under which joint and several liability is imposed on the first, the last, and the guilty carrier. However, this was not to be interpreted to include an additional head of jurisdiction allowing for a defendant domiciled in one member state to be sued in the courts of the place where a co-defendant was domiciled. The 2001 Brussels Judgments Regulation did not provide any other basis for jurisdiction over the two sub-contractors or otherwise act as an aid to the interpretation of the CMR.

Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption both considered that the commercial logic of articles 34 and 36 points towards the recognition of a jurisdiction to receive claims against all three carriers in one set of proceedings. However, they agreed with Lord Mance that the language of the CMR clearly provides otherwise. The only way for a cargo owner to ensure that its claims against all the carriers that are potentially liable under art. 34 is to ensure that the jurisdiction clause in the head contract is expressly referred to in the consignment note.

Anti-suit injunctions (or rather anti-enforcement injunctions) again

An international high-net-worth employment case decided last week, Ecobank Transnational Inc v Tanoh [2015] EWCA Civ 1309 (accessible on the excellent BAILII website), has a good deal of meat for international transaction lawyers too. The CEO of a Togolese bank had a contract of employment governed by English law and with a provision for arbitration of differences in London under the UNCITRAL Rules. In early 2014, following a textbook exercise in corporate character assassination, he was fired. He immediately sued in Togo for wrongful dismissal, and shortly afterwards in the Ivory Coast for defamation, recovering a cool $11 million-odd in the former, and in the latter about $15 million. Both courts held that under their respective laws the arbitration provision could not deprive them of jurisdiction. The employer claimed arbitration, and in April 2015 sought an anti-enforcement injunction in respect of the Togolese and Ivorian proceedings (i.e. an anti-suit injunction for the time after judgment has been obtained). The CA held an anti-enforcement injunction available on principle, but upheld its refusal on the grounds of delay.

Essentially this judgment makes clear a number of points of very general application. First, s.32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, dealing with the question of the recognition in England of foreign proceedings brought in breach of jurisdiction or arbitration agreements, is likely to precluded recognition of the relevant proceedings. Despite the exception to non-recognition where the jurisdiction / arbitration agreement is “illegal, void or unenforceable or was incapable of being performed”, it is irrelevant that an arbitration agreement is ineffective under the law of the place where the proceedings are brought or the law of the place where the contract was made. What matters is its enforceability under English law. Secondly, if people agree under a contract governed by English law to arbitrate disputes, the English courts will have little compunction where appropriate in granting anti-suit or anti-enforcement relief. Such relief is not as such a breach of the rules of comity: as Christopher Clarke LJ pertinently pointed out, the preservation of overseas judicial amour propre is not a particularly important aim these days. Thirdly, however, delay in seeking relief continues highly relevant, both on general equitable grounds and also because it is undesirable to render fruitless the expenditure of large amounts of curial time and litigants’ cash on ultimately unproductive proceedings abroad. In short, while anti-enforcement injunctions remain possible, in practice they are likely to be rare, as litigants will normally be expected to act earlier in the judicial process.

Get your skates on for an anti-suit injunction

The English courts may be very willing on principle to give you an anti-suit injunction against someone who sues elsewhere while putting up two fingers to a binding London arbitration clause. But you must play your part and act quickly. You can’t lackadaisically ask the foreign court to decline jurisdiction and then seek to injunct the other guy in London several months later when it’s apparent that it won’t. A hapless shipowner found this out on his unlucky Friday 13. For details see Essar Shipping Ltd v Bank of China Ltd [2015] EWHC 3266 (Comm) (13 November 2015), available on BAILII.