The LOGIC of freedom of contract

A ringing vindication of freedom of contract, and of grown-up contract interpretation, from the English Court of Appeal today in Transocean v Providence.

Transocean provided a drilling rig to Providence to explore for oil off the shores of the Emerald Isle. The contract was a bespoke version of the LOGIC offshore construction, etc contract.  Problems arose when operations had to stop for 4 weeks owing to problems with Transocean’s rig, which were found to be due to Transocean’s breach of contract. Providence sued for “spread costs” (accountant-speak for capital equipment left idle) during that time. Transocean countered with a reference to Clause 20, part of a complex and comprehensive knock-for-knock arrangement:

“20. CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS. For the purposes of this Clause 20 the expression “Consequential Loss” shall mean:

(i) any indirect or consequential loss or damages under English law, and/or

(ii) to the extent not covered by (i) above, loss or deferment of production, loss of product, loss of use (including, without limitation, loss of use or the cost of use of property, equipment, materials and services including without limitation, those provided by contractors or subcontractors of every tier or by third parties), loss of business and business interruption, loss of revenue (which for the avoidance of doubt shall not include payments due to CONTRACTOR by way of remuneration under this CONTRACT), loss of profit or anticipated profit, loss and/or deferral of drilling rights and/or loss, restriction or forfeiture of licence, concession or field interests whether or not such losses were foreseeable at the time of entering into the CONTRACT and, in respect of paragraph (ii) only, whether the same are direct or indirect. The expression “Consequential Loss” shall not include CONTRACTOR’S losses arising in connection with (1) failure by COMPANY to provide the letter of credit as required by Clause 3.13 of Section III or resulting termination of this CONTRACT or (2) any termination of this CONTRACT by reason of COMPANY’S repudiatory breach.

Subject to and without affecting the provisions of this CONTRACT regarding (a) the payment rights and obligations of the parties or (b) the risk of loss, or (c) release and indemnity rights and obligations of the parties but notwithstanding any other provision of the CONTRACT to the contrary the COMPANY shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the CONTRACTOR GROUP from the COMPANY GROUP’S own consequential loss and the CONTRACTOR shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the COMPANY GROUP from the CONTRACTOR GROUP’S own consequential loss.”

This seemed comprehensive enough, but Providence still thought it worth arguing the toss. They argued that the clause only covered claims for replacement costs; that it should be aggressively construed contra proferentem; that it was apt to reduce Transocean’s obligations to nil; and that as such the courts should simply disregard it (!).

The judge at first instance accepted some of these arguments and rejected Transocean’s defence. Moore-Bick LJ, who gave the only judgment in the CA, was having none of it. Read in any sensible way the clause covered the loss; contra proferentem was inappropriate in a case of this sort between sophisticated grown-up contractors; and the freedom of parties in situations like this to make unreasonable agreements needed to be preserved.

This is, if one may say so, the sort of entirely well-reasoned and sound decision which gives us continuing confidence in English law and jurisdiction as the best system to adopt if  businessmen want to know where they stand.

See Transocean Drilling v Providence Resources [2016] EWCA Civ 372, available on BAILII.

The Commission has spoken. No EU civil liability regime for offshore oil and gas operations.

The 2013 Offshore Safety Directive is the EU’s response to the ‘Deepwater Horizon’ incident in 2010. Although article 4(3) requires Member States to require the licensee to maintain sufficient capacity to meet their financial obligations resulting from liabilities for offshore oil and gas operations, and to put in place compensation procedures, the Directive does not address the question of civil liability in the event of pollution from an offshore installation. This remains to be dealt with by national laws. However, article 39 mandated the Commission to prepare three reports on liability: (1) on the “availability of financial security instruments, and on the handling of compensation claims, where appropriate, accompanied by proposals”; (2) on the “assessment of the effectiveness of the liability regimes in the Union in respect of the damage caused by offshore oil and gas operations”; (3) on “the appropriateness of bringing certain conduct leading to a major accident within the scope of Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law.”

On 14 September 2015 the Commission produced a single report on all three issues COM(2015) 422. It proposes no new EU legislation in these areas. With regard to financial security, although there were currently only two compensation mechanisms in the EEA, namely OPOL and Norway’s Oil Pollution Act 1998, the provisions in art. 4 of the OSD should lead to significant improvements. With regard to civil liability, it was not currently appropriate to broaden liability provisions through EU legislation, noting that in certain cases, the Brussels I and Rome II regulations would prevent differences in national regimes from disadvantaging claimants from other EU Member States. Also the financial security requirements of the OSD might lead some Member States to reappraise their existing liability regimes for offshore accidents. The Commission would be able to conclude on the need for further steps by the time of the OSD’s first implementation report in 2019. With regard to criminal liability, given the transposition deadline for the OSD of 19 July 2015, it was too early properly to assess whether EU criminal law measures were needed for achieving effective levels of offshore safety in the Union