Time charter trip. Quantifying shortfall of bunkers remaining on board on redelivery.

In London Arbitration 19/21 the bunker clause in a trip time charter from the Far East to Egypt provided:

“8. BUNKER CLAUSE:

BOD about 830 metric ton IFO 380 CST about 78 metric ton LSMGO.

Prices both ends: USD425 PMT for IFO 380 and USD685 PMT for LSMGO. 

BOR about same as BOD of IFO and BOR as onboard of LSMGO.”

The vessel was delivered with 888.56 mt of IFO on board and redelivered with 686.07 mt. The owners were prepared to allow a margin of 2 per cent for the term “about” but submitted that even on that basis the charterers had redelivered with a shortfall of 184.7188 mt of IFO. They said that the prevailing market price of IFO at the place of redelivery in Egypt was US$510 per mt, and claimed the difference between that price and the charterparty price of US$425 per mt on the shortfall, a total of US$15,701.10.

The Tribunal  held that the word ‘about’ without further clarification imported a 5 percent margin for both delivery and redelivery. Owners argued that this was not the case on redelivery because the charterers had the opportunity of supplying further bunkers to make up the shortfall but deliberately decided not to do so. Although the Tribunal could see the attraction of the argument it rejected it as adding such a gloss to the usual understanding of the term ‘about’ would cause uncertainty and leave the parties in the dark as to the nature and extent of their obligations.

The Tribunal then held that the charter prices on redelivery only applied to legitimate quantities on delivery and redelivery and not to any quantities as submitted by the charterers. The appropriate comparison to be made was between the charterparty price and prevailing market price at the place of redelivery. Speculation as to where and at what price the owners might have taken on bunkers after redelivery had to be discounted as a matter of an independent commercial decision of the owners after redelivery. 

The Tribunal rejected Charterer’s argument that they had requested the owners to load more bunkers at Singapore but were told that the vessel did not have sufficient tank capacity to load the quantity proposed by the charterers. The charterers had not then taken on additional bunkers in Egypt because the supply of bunkers there was unreliable both in terms of service and quality. There was no warranty as to the bunker capacity of the vessel and/or its ability to take on board any quantity of bunkers required by the charterers at any time at Singapore, or elsewhere, during the course of the trip.

Repudiation of time charter. Owners’ claim for summary judgment for damages.

The Marquessa (Giorgis Oil Trading Ltd v AG Shipping & Energy PTE Ltd) [2021] EWHC 2319 (Comm) involved repudiation of a time charter on Shelltime 4 form (as amended). Following repeated non-payment of instalments of hire, owners eventually accepted this conduct as Charterers’ repudiation and terminated the charter.  The vessel was then carrying a cargo, loaded on the orders of Charterers, for sub-sub-charterers, and having exercised a lien, as an act of mitigation, Owners agreed with Voyage Charterers to complete the voyage in exchange for payments to escrow.

 Owners applied for summary  judgment in respect of:

i)  unpaid hire accrued due prior to the termination of the Charterparty (the “Pre-Termination Claim”), and,

ii) damages consequent upon Owners’ termination of the Charterparty on the basis of Charterers’ repudiation or renunciation (the “Post-Termination Claim”), but excluding damages in respect of the period after the discharge of Charterers’ cargo from the Vessel.

Henshaw J rejected Charterers’ assertion that Owners had failed to allow for off-hire periods, presumably for the periods during which Owners suspended performance. Suspension of performance was permitted by the following clause in the charter.

“… failing the punctual and regular payment of hire …  [Owners] shall be at liberty to at any time withhold the performance of any and all of their obligations hereunder … and hire shall continue to accrue …”

Owners’ right to suspend performance was not a penalty. Nor was it arguable that Owner’s exercise of the right to suspend performance was an unlawful exercise of a contractual discretion.  The nature of the right is such that owners could reasonably have regard purely to their own commercial interests.  In any event, the suspension of performance in the present case was not arguably irrational, arbitrary, or capricious. Neither were Owners obliged to mitigate. Their claim was for liquidated sums due under the contract, not damages for breach. Further, any obligation to mitigate did not require them to refrain, while the Charterparty remained on foot, from exercising their right to suspend performance.  In any event, Owners did subsequently take reasonable steps to mitigate by means of their arrangement with the Voyage Charterers.

Henshaw J agreed that by the time Owners treated the Charterparty as having come to an end by reason of Charterers’ breaches a reasonable owner would have concluded from Charterers’ conduct that they would not pay hire punctually in advance as required by the Charterparty:

i) Charterers had failed to pay hire from the outset, and this continued over the ensuing months. 

ii) At most, Charterers expressed a willingness to perform, but repeatedly proved unable or unwilling to do so. 

iii) Charterers’ conduct in the present case deprived Owners of “substantially the whole benefit” of the Charterparty, and they were seeking to hold Owners to an arrangement “radically different” from that which had been agreed. 

It was not arguable, that Owners themselves were in repudiatory breach, for suspending performance and then reaching an agreement with Voyage Charterers: The charter entitled Owners to suspend performance, and the arrangement with the Voyage Charterers was a lawful step in mitigation, realising value from the exercise of Owners’ lien, and in any event post-dated the contract having come to an end upon their acceptance of Charterers’ breaches.

When the Charterparty came to an end in November 2020, the Vessel was laden with cargo and until discharge, no replacement charterparty at the current market rate was possible, and therefore there was no scope for entering into a mitigation charterparty. Accordingly damages ran at the charter rate up until discharge, from which Owners gave credit for address commission, Charterers’ payments and relevant sums received from the Voyage Charterers.  Credit was also given credit for the value of bunkers remaining on board at the date of discharge at the contractual rate in the absence of any evidence from Charterers as to the actual sums paid for the bunkers.

The correct date for assessing the credit for bunkers remaining on board was that of discharge on completion of the voyage for which Charterers had given orders, and not the date of termination. Clause 15 of the Shelltime 4 form (as amended) provides that “… Owners shall on redelivery (whether it occurs at the end of the charter or on the earlier termination of this charter) accept and pay for all bunkers on board …”.

The relevant date must, logically, be the date of actual redelivery, even if it was in fact later than the (natural) end of the charter or the date on which it was contractually brought to an end.  In any event, even if clause 15 were not construed in that way, owners would be still entitled to recover the bunkers used to complete Charterers’ voyage on a different basis, viz as damages or in bailment – as in The Kos [2012] UKSC 17.

Accordingly, Henshaw J found that Owners were entitled to summary judgment for a sum equivalent to hire from when they accepted Charterer’s repudiation to the date of discharge on the laden voyage in progress at that date, less credit for commission and bunkers remaining on board at the latter date.

Smart claims for bill of lading freight by owners.

If an owner’s bill of lading incorporates the freight provisions of a time charterer’s voyage charter, can owners intervene to require payment of the freight to themselves rather than to the time charterer? That was the issue recently before Butcher J in Alpha Marine Corp v Minmetals Logistics Zhejiang Co Ltd (MV Smart) [2021] EWHC 1157 (Comm) (05 May 2021).


Claim were made by owners against charterers in respect of the loss of the vessel for breach of the safe port warranty. the Tribunal found that the Charterers had provided a safe port warranty in respect of Richards Bay and that there were some shortcomings in the running of the port. However, the Master had been negligent in his handling of the Vessel and it was this that caused the grounding of the Vessel. Owners had issued bills of lading which stated ‘freight as per charter’.  After the vessel was lost the Owners gave notice to the bill of lading holder, the voyage charterer to pay full freight to them. At that time only a sum in respect of bunkers was due to Owners.  Charterers claimed damages in respect of losses sustained as a result of owners’ intervention in respect of freight due under the bill of lading through the incorporation of the terms of the voyage charter. They also claimed in tort on the basis of procuring breach of contract by the voyage charterer and/or knowingly and/or unlawfully interfering with the Voyage Charter. The Tribunal found that Owners were not entitled to revoke Charterers’ right to obtain the bill of lading freight or to direct it be paid to the Owners. This is because the Charterparty contained an implied obligation that Owners would not revoke unless hire and/or sums were due to them under the Charterparty

On appeal, Butcher J considered three possible terms constraining owners’ exercise of their rights to intervene to claim freight under the bill of lading. First, the “all freight” implied term whereby if the Charterers were in default of their obligations under the Charterparty, then the Owners would be entitled to collect the entirety of the freight, even if it exceeded the amount of the Owners’ claim against the Charterers arising out of their default. Second, “All Freight (Sum Identified) Implied Term”) by which the Owners were not entitled to revoke the Charterers’ authority to collect any freight unless a sum was due to the Owners under the Charterparty and the relevant sum was identified at the time of any revocation of the Charterers’ authority; and (3) the “Dollar for Dollar” Implied Term whereby the Owners were only entitled, in the event of a default by the Charterers, to revoke the Charterers’ authority to collect freight in respect to an amount up to, but no more than, the amount due from the Charterers under the Charterparty.

Butcher J rejected the implication of any term.  Owners’ duty to account to the charterer for any excess in the amount of freight collected over the amount due under the charterparty meant that the present charterparty, or other time charters in similar form, did not lack commercial or practical coherence without an implied term restricting the owners’ right to intervene.  If owners claimed freight in excess of sums due to them under the time charter the owners would have to account for the balance to the time charterers, and that was the charterers’ protection.

The Award was set aside insofar as it awarded damages for breach of the implied term found by the Tribunal; and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the Charterers’ freight counterclaim on the alternative Tortious Basis, having regard to this judgment.

Off-hire and arrests unconnected with the vessel detained.

On 15 December 2018, while under time charter to Navision the “Mookda Naree” was arrested at Conakry in respect of a claim against sub-sub charterers Cerealis, and remained under arrest for nearly a month. The claim related to an alleged shortage claim against them by SMG in respect of cargo discharged at Conakry from a previous, unrelated vessel. The head charter and the sub-charter were time charters on the Asbatime form with additional clauses. In both cases, additional clause 47 put the ship off hire inter alia upon her being detained or arrested by any legal process, until the time of her release, “unless such … detention or arrest [was] occasioned by any act, omission or default of the Charterers and/or sub-Charterers and/or their servants or their Agents.” Additional clause 86 of the head charter, not included in the sub-charter, provided as follows:

“Trading Exclusions

When trading to West African ports Charterers to provide adequate security guards during port stays in these countries to protect the vessel her crew and cargo.

When trading to West African ports Charterers to accept responsibility for cargo claims from third parties in these countries (except those arising from unseaworthiness of vessel) including putting up security, if necessary, to prevent arrest/detention of the vessel or to release the vessel from arrest or detention and vessel to remain on hire.

…”

By cl.43 the Inter-Club Agreement was incorporated into the head charter.

Owners claimed that the vessel never went off-hire and that Navision was liable in damages for breach of cl.86. It was common ground that in the context of both time charters, Cerealis was a “sub-Charterer” within the clause 47 proviso.

The tribunal heard separate references by the sub charterer against the time charterer, and by the time charterer against the owners. They held that the clause 47 proviso applied, so that the vessel was not off hire after 12:00 hrs on 17 December 2018, because by that time her detention under arrest thereafter was occasioned by Cerealis’ failure promptly to deal with or secure SMG’s claim so as to procure her release.

In the head charter reference, the arbitrators held that the second paragraph of cl.86 applied, and was not limited to claims concerning cargo carried under the head charter. Therefore, the vessel was off -hire for the entire period under arrest.

On appeals by sub-charterers and time charteres against the awards, Andrew Baker J held, [2021] EWHC 558 (Comm) 10.3.21, that the tribunal had correctly concluded that the detention of “Mookda Naree” after 12:00 hrs on 17 December 2018 was occasioned by Cerealis’ failure to act. It ought reasonably to have acted to deal promptly with the claim being made against it by SMG, that being an “act or omission or default of … sub-Charterers” within the meaning of the proviso to clause 47 of both charters. As regards s.86 under the head charter which concerned the award of hire up to 12,00 on 17 December 2018 it was clear that clause 86 was intended to create a different regime to that generally applicable by reason of clause 47. The vessel never went off-hire during the period of the arrest.

The arbitrators had erred in their construction of clause 86 and should have said that SMG’s claim, though it related to a cargo that had been carried to a West African port, was not a cargo claim within clause 86 of the charter between the Owner and Navision because it did not concern “Mookda Naree’s” West African trading pursuant to that charter but a different ship altogether. It was therefore not a claim allocated to be Navision’s full responsibility by clause 86, any more than it would have been a claim to be dealt with under the Inter-Club Agreement pursuant to clause 43 in the absence of clause 86. Navision’s appeal against the award in the head charter reference succeeded to the extent that because the arbitrators misconstrued clause 86 they wrongly held that the ship never went off hire, whereas they should have held that when arrested she went off hire under clause 47 until the proviso bit from 12:00 hrs on 17 December 2018. They had also wrongly held that Navision had a liability for damages to be assessed for breach of clause 86.

Rescinding A Charterparty or Not! That is the Question SK Shipping Europe plc v. Capital VLCC 3 Corp and another (C Challenger) [2020] EWHC 3448 (Comm)

The charterers entered into a charterparty contract with the owners of the C Challenger in February 2017 for a period of two years. The charterparty contained a term warranting fuel consumption and speed. Following problems with a turbocharger, the charterers alleged inter alia that the owners had misrepresented the vessel’s performance capabilities. The charterers raised the issue concerning potential misrepresentation on the part of the owner of the capabilities of the chartered vessel during a meeting in London on 21 March 2017. It was not until 19 October 2017 that the charterers purported to rescind for misrepresentation or to terminate for repudiatory breach. During the period of March- September 2017, the charterers continued to use the vessel (by fixing occasionally sub-fixtures); deduct periodically from hire and reserve their rights. The following day, the owners purported to terminate on the basis that the charterers’ message was itself a renunciation.

Was there a misrepresentation on the part of the owners?

Under common law, for the charterers to be able to rescind the contract (i.e. set the charterparty aside) it is essential that they demonstrate that the owners made an inaccurate representation with regard to the capabilities of the chartered vessel in terms of speed and consumption. The main argument put forward by the charterers was that the details of the vessel’s consumption circulated to the market by the owners constituted a representation of fact (and this representation was substantially inaccurate). Foxton, J, rather appropriately, held that an owner by offering a continuing speed and consumption warranty in a charterparty could not be assumed to make an implicit representation as to the vessel’s current or recent performance. This certainly makes sense given that the warranty in question did not require the owners to act or refrain from acting in a certain way. The so-called “speed and consumption” warranty in the contract simply related to a particular state of affairs and was only concerned with the allocation of responsibility for certain costs in relation thereto.   

However, this was not the end of the matter! The charters also argued that in a letter sent by the owners, historical speed and consumption data provided which was not reasonably consistent with the average performance of the vessel over its last three voyages and therefore untrue. Foxton, J, found that the owners did not have reason to believe that the statement based on the three recent voyages was true and accordingly this amounted material misrepresentation. However, he also found that this would not have given the charterers the right to rescind the contract as there was no inducement. This was the case because if the same warranty had been offered, but no representation made as to the vessel’s performance, the charterparty would have been concluded on the same terms.

The effect of ‘reserving rights’

It is rather common for most parties in shipping practice to add a ‘reservation of rights’ statement to the end of messages in pre-action correspondence. Usually, such a statement has the effect of preventing subsequent conduct of an innocent party constituting an election. The trial judge found that the charterers were aware at the latest in July 2017 that the fuel consumption of the chartered vessel was misdescribed by the owners. Whilst the charterers sent messages to the owners that they wished to reserve their rights emerging from the misconduct of the owners, they went ahead to fix a voyage with a sub-charterer expecting the owners to execute this voyage. Foxton, J, on that basis, held that such actions of the charterers were incompatible with an attempt to reserve rights to set it aside the charterparty ab initio for misrepresentation of which they had complained. Put differently, the judgment illustrates that in a case where the innocent party demands substantial contractual performance from the other, this is unlikely to be prevented from being treated as an “affirmation” simply because the innocent party earlier attempted to reserve its rights.

Was the owner in repudiatory breach?

The judge accepted that the owner was in breach of the charterparty i) by refusing to accept the legitimacy of the Charterer’s refusal to pay hire or make deductions from hire and ii) by sending messages demanding payment of hire, wrongly asserting that the Charterer was in breach. The terms breached were deemed to be innominate terms. However, it was held that the breaches complained of, taken cumulatively, had not deprived the charterers of substantially the whole benefit which they were intended to obtain under the charterparty for the payment of hire, or “go to the root” of the charterparty. As a result, the charterers had not been entitled to terminate the charterparty and their communication to that effect was itself a renunciation, entitling the owners to damages representing the loss it suffered by reason.              

The facts of the case provided a great opportunity to the trial judge to construe and apply several key principles of contract law (note that in the judgment there is also an obiter discussion on the application of s. 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967). Perhaps the most significant contribution of the case to the development of the contract law is the trial judge’s observation on the effect of reserving rights in this context. As noted, the previous authorities have not provided any extensive consideration to this matter. It is now emphasised clearly that a reservation of rights will often have the effect of preventing subsequent conduct from constituting an election to keep the contract alive, but this is not an inevitable rule. One might say in this context “actions might speak louder than words”. So in any case whether a statement reserving the rights of an innocent party has the desired impact will depend on the actions of the innocent party!

Off-hire Clauses- Normally Construed Narrowly Unless the Wording Is Expansive!

Disputes concerning ‘off-hire’ clauses often require various legal construction techniques to be employed and can be rather challenging for the courts/arbitrators. However, the arbitrator managed to resolve the dispute under the relevant off-hire clause in London Arbitration 25/19 with not much difficulty.

The chartered vessel arrived at a port on the US West Coast on 23 October to discharge a cargo of steel products. The vessel’s cranes were inspected on behalf of the charterers’ stevedors by or on behalf of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the vessel failed that inspection. The owners maintained that the cranes were in good working order as they complied with all statutory and Class requirements and they had been inspected and used for loading and discharging in the US three months earlier. They also put forward a recent report from the crane manufacturers. The relevant off-hire clause in the charter party was worded in the following manner:

‘The Vessel will comply with any and all safety regulations and/or requirements applicable during the currency of this Charter Party, including those in effect of any port of loading and/or discharge. If the Vessel does not comply with said safety regulations or requirements, the Vessel will be off-hire until the Vessel is compliant with the said safety regulations or requirements… ‘

The charterers’ argument was that the vessel was off hire from the time when she failed the inspection to the time when she passed (i.e. after the cranes were repaired) and discharging started. The arbitrator found that the vessel’s failing the inspection amounted to breach of the Pacific Coast Marine Safety Code. This Code governed safe working practices and conditions for the whole of the US West Coast when ILWU labour was employed. The arbitrator found that the Code was at the very least a ‘safety requirement’ and quite possibly, for practical purposes also a ‘safety regulation’. The views of crane manufacturers, Class and engineering company were treated as irrelevant as they only reflected the earlier experience of the ship.

Given that the off-hire clause made explicit reference to ‘safety requirements’ as well as ‘safety regulations’, the outcome does not come as a surprise. Had it made reference only to ‘safety regulations’, a closer legal scrutiny of the nature and status of the Pacific Coast Marine Safety Code would have been necessary. The fact that the arbitrator refers to the Code as a ‘safety regulation for practical purposes’ indicates that from a technical perspective it might not qualify as a safety regulation! The message to charterers is very clear. Off-hire clauses are often construed in a narrow fashion so to be able to bring themselves under the off-hire clause they need to ensure that the wording used is expansive! Charterers in this case were glad that the wording in the off-hire clause was very broad i.e. made explicit reference to ‘safety requirements’. Few doubts can be raised for a finding that a Code that provides safe working practices and conditions in a port for stevedors, who are members of a trade union, is a ‘safety requirement’ for that port.                    

BIMCO COVID-19 Crew Change Clause – An Attempt to Facilitate Crew Changes

On 25 June, BIMCO announced the publication of their novel COVID-19 Crew Change Clause for Time Charter Parties. The clause provides shipowners with the right to deviate for crew changes ‘if COVID-19 related restrictions prevent crew changes from being conducted at the ports or places to which the vessel has been ordered or within the scheduled period of call’. Shipowners can exercise their right to deviate by giving charterers a written notice as soon as reasonably possible. The crew change costs will rest on shipowners, unless shipowners and charterers agree that the vessel will remain on hire during the deviation period, but at a reduced rate. In such case, the cost of bunkers consumed will be shared equally between shipowners and charterers.

With more than 200,000 seafarers currently working on board after the expiry of their contracts of employment, the COVID-19 Crew Change Clause at least ensures that shipowners can sail to those few ports were crew changes are possible, without facing the risk of breaching their contractual obligations under time charters. It should be noted, however, that this is not a panacea to the issue of crew changes. Recognising seafarers as ‘keyworkers’ and designating ports where crew changes can take place safely following the Protocols designed by the IMO (Circular Letter No 4204/Add 14 (5 May 2020) should remain a priority. 

 

In London Arbitration 3/20 the Tribunal considered the effect of the time bar provision in cl.6 of the Inter-Club NYPE Agreement 2011 (the ICA) .

“(6) Recovery under this Agreement by an Owner or charterer shall be deemed to be waived and absolutely barred unless written notification of the Cargo Claim has been given to the other party to the charterparty within 24 months of the date of delivery of the cargo or the dates the cargo should have been delivered, save that, where the Hamburg Rules or any national legislation giving effect thereto are compulsorily applicable by operation of law to the contract of carriage or to that part of the transit that comprised carriage on the chartered vessel, the period shall be 36 months. Such notification shall if possible include details of the contract of carriage, the nature of the claim and the amount claimed.”

The vessel was time-chartered on the NYPE form. Clause 27 of the charter expressly incorporated the ICA and contained a Clause Paramount. Under a booking note on the charterer’s house form dated 19 December 2014 between the charterer as carrier and G as merchant, the charterer contracted to carry a cargo of engine equipment (the Cargo) from a United States port to a North African port. During the voyage the vessel’s crew accidentally pumped water into No 2 cargo hold.  G gave notice to the charterer of its intention to pursue a cargo claim against it as contractual carrier, although no claim had yet been formally presented. By various emails, information was passed by G to the charterer and by the charterer to the owners, and extensions of time were given by the charterer to G, and by the owners and their P&I Club to the charterer.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether, following the expiry of 24 months from the date of delivery of the cargo, the charterer was now precluded by the time bar provision in clause (6) of the ICA from bringing any claim against the owners in respect of G’s intended cargo claim.

The Tribunal found that the “notification” did not have to refer to the ICA, either expressly or impliedly. Clause (6) required simply “written notification of the Cargo Claim” to be given to the other party. It was not in itself the claim for recovery under the ICA but was a notice required if a claim over was later to be made, which could only happen when the cause of action accrued, which necessitated the proper settlement or compromise and payment of the third-party claim under the terms of clause (4)(c).

To be an effective “notification”, the written notice did not have to comply with the requirements of the second sentence, namely to include details of the contract of carriage, the nature of the claim and the amount claimed, so far as it was possible to do so. The intention of the draftsman was to distinguish between the absence of a written notification which would bar the recovery claim and the absence of details to be included within it, if possible, which would not have that effect. The words “if possible” suggested that the provision of details was not essential to the giving of notification. The breach of such an obligation would give rise to a right to damages if any loss could be established, which appeared unlikely in most situations.

In consequence, as the tribunal had found that a notification was valid, even if details which could have been provided were not provided, and the recourse claim which the charterer wished to pursue was not deemed waived or barred.

Clause (6) of the ICA operated in an entirely different way from a conventional time bar for a cargo claim. The period allowed for notification ran from the date of delivery and not from the date when the cause of action accrued which, in the case of an indemnity might not be for a number of years, as and when the liability to cargo interests crystallised. To stop time running, the prospective claimant did not have to commence proceedings but merely to give notification of the claim under clause (6), with the six-year time bar operating from the date of accrual of the cause of action.

 

Security clauses in charters — by hook or by crook they will be enforced

Behind Teare J’s decision today in Trafigura Maritime Logistics PTE Ltd v Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd (Rev 1) [2020] EWHC 995 (Comm) lies a fairly standard series of shipping lawyer’s nightmares.

Trafigura time-chartered the Miracle Hope, a big (320,000 dwt) VLCC, from Ocean Light. They voyage-chartered her to Clearlake and Clearlake sub-voyage-chartered to Petrobras, both charters being back-to-back under Shellvoy 6. Petrobras demanded that the cargo be delivered without production of the bill of lading; the demand was passed up the chain and the cargo (worth, before the recent oil debacle, something over $70 million) released.

Thereupon Natixis, a Dutch bank which had financed Petrobras’s buyers, emerged brandishing a bill of lading apparently issued by Ocean Light, demanded the value of the cargo, and arrested the ship in Singapore. Ocean Light immediately demanded an indemnity from Trafigura: Trafigura, relying on a duty in the charterer in such cases to “provide an LOI as per Owners’ P&I Club wording”, demanded an LOI from Clearlake and Clearlake did the same from Petrobras. Following clear practice (e.g. The Laemthong Glory [2004] EWHC 2738 (Comm); [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 632), Henshaw J granted mandatory orders down the line requiring the charterers to provide such bail or other security required to secure the release of the vessel.

Unfortunately at this point problems arose. Clearlake and Petrobras negotiated with Natixis; the result was deadlock. Furthermore, owing to the worldwide contagion the Singapore courts could not break the deadlock for some weeks. And, of course, all the time the Miracle Hope was mewed up in Singapore: something which, with tanker hire rates now sky-high, would not do.

In other words, Henshaw J’s order was unworkable. As a result the matter came back to the Commercial Court. To order the provision of a guarantee satisfactory to Natixis would be unsatisfactory: furthermore, since the matter was likely eventually to reach the Singapore courts, it risked prejudging the issue in that forum.

The solution reached was workmanlike. The court had to do something. Security to obtain the release of a vessel could take the form of a payment into court; and, faute de mieux, Teare J ordered just that. Clearlake and Petrobras were ordered to arrange for payment into the Singapore court of $76 million within 8 days, no doubt with Petrobras bound to indemnify Clearlake, who in the circumstances were little more than piggy-in-the-middle. If this was necessary to secure the release of the vessel, this would be what was ordered.

And rightly so, in our view. As the title of this blogpost implies, an obligation to secure the release of a vessel has to be given effect. As with Coronavirus, so with the release of a ship: it is a case of doing all that it takes. Even if that takes a slightly unorthodox form.

Switch bills. Initial shipper off the hook for freight due under bill of lading.

 

The effect of switch bills with a new shipper in the second set has the effect of a novation of the initial contract contained or evidenced in the initial bill with the shipowner as carrier under the bill. So held Stevenson J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in The Illawarra Fortune [2020] NSWSC 183. Both sets incorporated the freight payable under a voyage charterparty with the time charterer of the vessel. The initial shipper, whose parent company was the voyage charterer, ceased to be liable for unpaid freight once the second bills were issued naming a different shipper. Had the original bills not been switched the time charterer, as assignee of the shipowner’s rights under the bills of lading,  would have been able to sue the original shipper for freight due under the voyage charter with the shipper’s parent company.