Less than two weeks to go until the UK exits the EU – or not?

 

After last week’s votes in the Commons on Thursday, the Prime Minister will put her withdrawal deal to the Commons for a third time on Tuesday. If it is passed she will ask the Council of Ministers of the EU for an extension until 30 June. If it is rejected she will ask for a longer extension and the UK will participate in the election of MEPs on 23 May.

Any extension requires unanimous agreement from all 27 Member States. There is a possibility that this may not be obtained in which case 29 March remains ‘exit day’ – or does it? Watch this space for ferocious times in Parliament in the final week before ‘exit day’ for a motion calling on the government to revoke the article 50 notice – and then to give the EU a further article 50 notice? Interesting discussion of the legalities of this can be found at http://goodlegaladvice.co.uk/?p=12486

After Speaker Bercow’s decision this afternoon not to allow the government to bring back its defeated motion of last week for a second time, we may soon be hearing about the ‘p’ word – prorogue.

“Government interference” and laytime under the  1999 Sugar Charterparty

In Sucden Middle-East v Yagci Denizcilik Ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi (The MV Muammer Yagci)[2018] EWHC 3873 (Comm) the Court heard an appeal from an arbitral decision  on the following point of law. “where a cargo is seized by the local customs authorities at the discharge port causing a delay to discharge, is the time so lost caused by ‘government interferences’ within the meaning of clause 28 of the Sugar Charter Party 1999 form?”. The case arose out of a substantial period of delay in the vessel’s discharge at Algiers due to the seizure of cargo by the authorities there following the identification of a discrepancy between the cargo and the relevant documents presented by the receivers. The cargo was eventually sold after a four and a half month delay in discharging the cargo.

Robin Knowles J found that delay fell within the laytime and demurrage exception in cl.28 of the Sugar Charterparty 1999 form as being caused by ‘government interferences’. The question put to the court was solely concerned with a seizure of cargo by local customs authorities at the discharge port. The ordinary meaning of the word “interference” was apt to include an intervention in this specific form, that is, by way of seizure. This action on the part of local customs authorities was, in this context, the action of government through its appropriate arm or agency. Seizure of cargo by the customs authorities was not a thing that could be treated as routine. The seizure caused the delay even if the submission of the false documents caused the seizure. The arbitrators had found that the key point would be that all the steps taken were in fact ordinary but that was incorrect. Seizure, of cargo, which is a significant exercise of executive power, cannot be regarded as “ordinary”.

 

The Hague Rules fire exception and barratry.

In Glencore Energy UK Ltd v Freeport Holdings Ltd, “The Lady M”,  [2019] EWCA Civ 388, the Court of Appeal has today upheld Popplewell J’s decision https://iistl.blog/2017/12/30/barratry-and-the-hague-visby-rules/   that article IV rule 2(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules is capable of exempting the carrier from liability to the cargo owner for damage caused by fire if that fire were caused deliberately or barratrously. Cargo owners argued that at common law a term which excluded liability for ‘fire’ would not have provided a defence if it were caused by the negligence or barratry of the crew; and consequently the exception in article IV.2(b) did not have the effect of excluding liability for fires which were caused either negligently or deliberately. The owners argued that the Judge’s interpretation of article IV.2(b) was correct. The words are clear and emphatic, and set out an exception for all loss or damage arising or resulting from fire, subject to the proviso: where the fire is caused with the actual fault or privity of the carrier. There is no proper basis for implying  a further proviso by adding the words ‘or the barratry of master or crew’, not least because ‘barratry’ is not a relevant concept in the Hague Rules.

The Court of Appeal agreed with owners’ contention. There was no sound policy reason for reading the word ‘fire’, both in isolation and in context, in a way that excludes fire where deliberately caused by the crew, from the carrier’s defence under Article IV.2(b). In cases of barratry the carrier’s agents are acting contrary to the carrier’s interests and in breach of the trust reposed in them. The construction of the fire exception was not affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Volcafe in relation to the construction of the inherent vice exception. It was important not to lose sight of Lord Sumption’s observation that there is ‘no unifying legal principle’ behind the list of exceptions in article IV.2. The correct approach was to construe the exceptions in their own terms, while bearing in mind that they fall under a general heading and have to be construed as part of the overall scheme of obligations, liabilities and exceptions set out in articles III and IV. 66.    Lord Sumption’s observations that the carriers bore the legal burden of disproving negligence for the purposes of invoking an exception under article IV.2 did not address any argument in relation to article IV.2(b), and did not  assist on the assumed facts where there has been a deliberate act by a crew member to the prejudice of the carrier and without the carrier’s actual fault or privity.

None of the common law cases on construction of exceptions clauses assisted. There was no pre-Hague Rules judicial interpretation of ‘fire’ as a term which had a clearly assigned meaning that excluded fire caused by the crew, so that it must be presumed that it was used in article IV.2(b) in the same way. Nor did the travaux preparatoires to the Hague Rules support such a construction. Simon LJ was very doubtful as to whether the threshold for consideration of the travaux préparatoires came close to being met. This was not a provision in respect of which there were ‘truly feasible alternative interpretations’ of the words, nor was it one of those ‘rare’ cases where the travaux ‘clearly and indisputably’ pointed to a definite legal intention.

Simon LJ added: “To adopt Lord Steyn’s analogy, Glencore’s argument not only failed to hit the bullseye, it should not have been aimed at the target.”

 

Going through the motions. What’s on the menu tonight in the Commons.

 

  1. The government motion.

“That this House declines to approve leaving the European Union without a Withdrawal Agreement and a Framework for the Future Relationship on 29 March 2019; and notes that leaving without a deal remains the default in UK and EU law unless this House and the EU ratify an agreement.”

  1. The amendment to the government motion from Jack Dromey and Dame Caroline Spelman which states “this House rejects the United Kingdom leaving the European Union without a Withdrawal Agreement and a Framework for the Future Relationship”.
  2. The ‘Malthouse Compromise’ which sets out the process for a “managed no-deal”. It requests:
  • The government publish tariff schedules
  • An extension of leaving to 22 May 2019
  • ‘Mutual standstill agreements’ between the UK and EU until the end of 2021, including payments to the EU
  • A unilateral guarantee of citizens’ rights

The third and fourth parts of the process look like the withdrawal agreement transition period but lasting another year and with no backstop at the end. Unlikely to be accepted by the EU.

 

The Brexit votes. One down two to go.

 

After the defeat of the Prime Minister’s revised withdrawal deal last night, Parliament today votes on whether to accept a no-deal exit from the EU on 29 March, and, if not, it will proceed to a third vote tomorrow on whether to ask the EU for an extension to the article 50 notice. Today’s vote is a free vote for MPs of the Conservative and Unionist Party and it is likely that the House will vote not to exit on 29 March without a deal.

The crunch comes with the third vote. An extension has to be asked for otherwise whatever Parliament decides we are out of the EU at 11 pm on 29 March. An extension for how long? Will the EU Member States grant such an extension, something that requires unanimity among the 27? Mr Juncker has indicated that a short extension might be possible, up to extension the elections for Members of the European Parliament, which run between 23 and 26 May – it is almost inconceivable that the UK could participate in these. It is possible that the extension could be granted up to 30 June the day before the new Parliament sits. There have been other indications that an extension will only be granted if the UK can explain what the purpose of the extension sought would be.

It should also be noted that, as held by the ECJ in Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the UK would still remain free unilaterally to withdraw its notice under article 50 “as long as the two-year period from the date of the notification of the intention to withdraw from the EU, and any possible extension, has not expired.”

If a short extension is granted, the UK would have to amend the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 accordingly. Furthermore, it is likely that the EU Member States would feel unable to grant a further extension as EU Member States are required to participate in the elections to the European Parliament. If the UK were to remain in the EU beyond 1 July, it would be required to hold the elections to the European Parliament but that would raise problems with the number of MEPs. Under Plan A, the current elections allocate seats to countries on the assumption that the UK will not be a Member State at the date of the elections. There is a Plan B to allow for elections on the basis of the 2014-19 allocation in the event that the UK is still a Member State at that date. If Plan B comes into effect, 73 UK MEPs have to be elected, and 73 MEPs in other Member States elected under Plan A have to pack their backs and go home.

Whatever the results of the votes today and tomorrow, the prospect of a no-deal exit from the EU remains, whether on 29 March, 24 May or 1 July.

Brexit and the return of Solomon Binding? The new UK-EU agreements on the Northern Ireland ‘backstop’.

 

 

Those of us of a certain age will remember the ‘solemn and binding’ undertaking given by TUC leaders to Harold Wilson following the rejection of his proposals for industrial relations reform in 1969. This swiftly turned into the fictitious comic character, ‘Solomon Binding’? Is Solomon’s hand hovering over the three documents that emerged after the Prime Minister’s  meeting in Strasbourg last night and which will be put before the House of Commons tonight.

First there is the INSTRUMENT RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY 

The agreement refers to arbitration under the mechanisms already established in the Protocol in the event that a party acts with the objective of applying the Protocol indefinitely and that a ruling by the panel would be binding on both parties. It does not alter the text of the withdrawal agreement. There is no time limit on the backstop. There is no procedure for either the UK or the EU to terminate the backstop unilaterally.

The key parts of the agreement as regards the backstop are set out below.

 

  1. A subsequent agreement replacing the customs and regulatory alignment in goods elements of the Protocol could stand alone or form part of a wider agreement or agreements on the future relationship, depending on the progress of the wider negotiations. Alternative arrangements, which supersede the Protocol in whole or in part, in accordance with Article 2 of the Protocol, are not required to replicate its provisions in any respect, provided that the underlying objectives continue to be met. In the event that the agreement needs to stand alone due to delays in progress on the wider negotiations, the parties will aim at establishing this agreement very rapidly after the end of the transition period in full respect of the parties’ respective legal orders.
  2. The Union and the United Kingdom agree that once negotiations on alternative arrangements have been completed to the satisfaction of both parties, the outcome will be transposed into a subsequent agreement. The subsequent agreement transposing the alternative arrangements will be applied as soon as possible after its signature, if necessary and appropriate by means of provisional application, in line with the applicable legal frameworks and existing practice.
Compliance and unilateral suspension
  1. The Union and the United Kingdom agree that it would be inconsistent with their obligations under Article 5 of the Withdrawal Agreement and Article 2(1) of the Protocol for either party to act with the objective of applying the Protocol indefinitely. Should the Union or the United Kingdom consider the other party was acting in this way after the Protocol became applicable, it could make use of the dispute settlement mechanism enshrined in Articles 167 to 181 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
  2. If a dispute arises in relation to Article 5 of the Withdrawal Agreement and Article 2(1) of the Protocol, the Union and the United Kingdom will immediately enter into consultations in the Joint Committee. They will endeavour to resolve the dispute in a timely manner, with the aim of reaching a mutually agreed solution. With a view to facilitating such a solution, each party will provide a written reasoned justification of its respective position and will respond in writing to the other.
  3. Under the dispute settlement mechanism, a ruling by the arbitration panel that a party acts with the objective of applying the Protocol indefinitely would be binding on the Union and the United Kingdom. Persistent failure by a party to comply with a ruling, and thus persistent failure by that party to return to compliance with its obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, may result in temporary remedies. Ultimately, the aggrieved party would have the right to enact a unilateral, proportionate suspension of its obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement (other than Part Two), including the Protocol. Such a suspension may remain in place unless and until the offending party has taken the necessary measures to comply with the ruling of the arbitration panel.

 

Second, there is joint statement supplementing the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK 

The meat of the statement is in paragraph six which sets out

 

6 Fifth, given the Union’s and the United Kingdom’s firm commitment to work at speed on a subsequent agreement that establishes by December 31st, 2020 alternative arrangements such that the backstop solution in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland will not need to be applied, a specific negotiating track will be established at the outset and as part of the negotiations to lead the analysis and development of these alternative arrangements. This dedicated track will consider the use of all existing and emerging facilitative arrangements and technologies, with a view to assessing their potential to replace, in whole or in part, the backstop solution in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland.
That assessment will include an evaluation of their practicability and deliverability in the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland. By virtue of being embedded in the overall negotiation structure, the negotiating track on alternative arrangements will be able to take account of progress made in the wider negotiations on the future relationship, in particular on goods regulations and customs.
In addition, and in support of their work on alternative arrangements, both the Union and the United Kingdom will consult with private sector experts, businesses, trade unions, the institutions established under the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement, and appropriate involvement of parliaments. In the first instance, the progress concerning alternative arrangements will be assessed at the first high level conference envisaged by the Political Declaration. To ensure that the negotiations are concluded in good time, further progress will be reviewed at each subsequent high level conference.

Thirdly, there is the UK’s unilateral declaration concerning the Northern Ireland Protocol. The third paragraph deals with a situation where there is a breach by the EU of the parties’ obligation under Article 5 of the withdrawal agreement which states “The Union and the United Kingdom shall, in full mutual respect and good faith, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from this Agreement”.

 

“The United Kingdom wishes to record its understanding of the effect of this provision if, contrary to the intentions of the parties, it is not possible for them to conclude an agreement which supersedes the Protocol in whole or in part due to a breach of Article 5 of the Withdrawal Agreement by the Union. The United Kingdom would not consider its application to be temporary in these circumstances, as in its view the Protocol would then constitute a permanent relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom. Article 1(4) makes clear this is not the Parties’ intention. If under these circumstances it proves not to be possible to negotiate a subsequent agreement as envisaged in Article 2 of the Protocol, the United Kingdom records its understanding that nothing in the Withdrawal Agreement would prevent it from instigating measures that could ultimately lead to disapplication of obligations under the Protocol, in accordance with Part Six, Title III of the Withdrawal Agreement or Article 20 of the Protocol, and under the proviso that the UK will uphold its obligations under the 1998 Agreement in all its dimensions and under all circumstances and to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland.”

 

The Attorney General is expected to produce his advice to the House of Commons on the legal effect of these three documents later this morning in advance of the vote scheduled for later today.

 

 

Actionable fault and general average. Due diligence and unseaworthiness.

Actionable fault and general average. Due diligence and unseaworthiness.

 

In The CMA CGM Libra  [2019] EWHC 481 (Admlty), a container vessel grounded on leaving Xiamen on a shoal in an area in which there is a risk of uncharted shoals. Salvors refloated the vessel which then proceeded on her voyage. The shipowners funded the salvage and declared general average. 8% of cargo interests refused to pay their share on the grounds of actionable fault on the part of the shipowners. The vessel’s primary means of navigation was intended to be paper charts published by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO). Before leaving Xiamen the Second Officer prepared a passage plan which the Master approved. The plan was inadequate in that it did not refer to the existence of a crucial Preliminary Notice to Mariners (NM6274/P10) that had been issued by the UKHO approximately 5 months before the grounding, alerting mariners to the presence of numerous depths less than charted in the approaches to Xiamen and confirming that the charted depths within the dredged channel were sufficient for the vessel. Nor did the passage plan refer to any “no-go areas” which had not been marked or identified on the chart. At trial the Master confirmed that had the chart been marked up with the appropriate “no-go areas” he would not have attempted to execute the manoeuvre that ultimately led to the stranding of the vessel.

Teare J considered the burden of proof. The Supreme Court’s decision in Volcafe related to the burden of proof in relation to Article III.2 of the Hague Rules and did not deal with the burden of proof for Article III.1. There had been actionable fault through a breach of Article III.1 of the Hague Rules Article IV r.1 provides that where loss or damage results from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier. Thus it deals with the burden of proof for the purposes of Article III r.1. It is implicit in Article IV r.1 that the burden of proving causative unseaworthiness must lie upon the cargo owner for the article assumes that such unseaworthiness has been established.

Teare J then found that cargo interests had established a breach of Article III.1 in that the absence of an adequate passage plan was a cause of the grounding.. The presence on board a vessel of the appropriate chart is an aspect of seaworthiness. Where the Admiralty gives notice of a correction to the appropriate chart a vessel will not be seaworthy unless the chart has been corrected. If the vessel’s navigating officer fails, before the commencement of the voyage, to correct the chart the vessel is thereby rendered unseaworthy. The production of a defective passage plan is not merely “an error of navigation” but involves a breach of carrier’s obligation that the vessel is seaworthy “before and at the beginning of the voyage.” If there is a causative breach of Article III r.1 the fact that a cause of the subsequent casualty is also negligent navigation will not protect the carrier from liability. Passage planning by the master before the beginning of the voyage is necessary for safe navigation.

The carrier’s duty under Article III r.1 was not discharged by putting in place proper systems and ensuring that the requisite materials were on board to ensure that the master and navigating officer were able to prepare an adequate passage plan before the beginning of the voyage. As set out in Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 23rd.ed at paragraph 14-046:

“The due diligence required is due diligence in the work itself by the carrier and all persons, whether servants or agents or independent contractors whom he employs or engages in the task of making the ship seaworthy; the carrier does not therefore discharge the burden of proving that due diligence has been exercised by proof that he engaged competent experts to perform and supervise the ask of making the ship seaworthy. The statute imposes an inescapable personal obligation.”

Due diligence was not exercised because the Owners’ SMS contained appropriate guidance for passage planning and that the auditors of the vessel’s practices were competent. To comply with Article III r.1, which imposes a non-delegable duty on thecarrier, it is not enough that the owner has itself exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. It must be shown that those servants or agents relied upon by the owner to make the ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage have exercised due diligence. Negligence by the master or chief engineer or other officer before the commencement of a voyage can amount to a failure by the carrier to make the vessel seaworthy.

 

Accordingly there had been actionable fault by the shipowners and cargo were not required to contribute to general average.

 

No absolute immunity for international organisations before US courts.

 

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) makes loans to private businesses to finance projects in developing countries. In 2008, it lent $450 million to finance a coal-fired power plant in India. Local residents complained of harm suffered as a result of pollution from the plant and sued the IFC before a federal court in Washington, D.C., where it is headquartered, claiming, inter alia, that the the IFC had violated provisions of the loan agreement that were included to protect the local community. The International Organizations Immunities Act 1945 gives international organizations “the same immunity from suit” as “as is enjoyed by foreign governments.”

At the time foreign governments enjoyed virtually absolute immunity and the IFC claimed immunity from suit. Since then s1605(2)(a) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, s1605(2)(a) U.S.C., has lifted the immunity of foreign governments in respect of suits based on their commercial activities, but the Act made no reference to the immunity of international organisations. In Jam et al v International Finance Corporation 586 U.S _ (2019) the US Supreme Court held on 27 Feb, Justice Breyer dissenting, that the immunity of international organisations is co-equivalent with that of foreign governments and the IFC is not absolutely immune from suit. The case was remanded for further hearing consistent with this opinion.

However under s.1605(2)(a) there are three alternative conditions for the lifting of immunity: (i) the action arises out of commercial activity in the US, or (ii) the action arises out of an act in the US in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, or (iii) the action arises out of an act outside the US in connection with commercial activity elsewhere  and the act causes a direct effect in the US. In many cases against international organisations based in the US these criteria will not be satisfied and this may prove to be the case with the further hearings in the instant case.

A fair cop? Transnational torts and trouble at the mine.

 

Kalma v African Minerals Ltd and others [2018] EWHC 3506 (QB) is an interesting recent decision involving transnational tort claims against a UK company in respect of events at and around its mine in Sierra Leone. It is, I believe, the first of these type of claims brought by London solicitors, Leigh Day, to go to trial.

 

The claims arose out of violent police suppression of protests in 2010 and 2012 by a local community in Sierra Leone against a mine created and operated by the defendant, a UK company, and its two Sierra Leonean subsidiaries. The protests prompted a significant overreaction from some members of the Sierra Leone Police (“SLP”) whose response to disruptive protests and threats against the personnel, property and business of AML soon degenerated into violent chaos during the course of which many villagers were variously beaten, shot, gassed, robbed, sexually assaulted, squalidly incarcerated and, in one case, killed.

 

The claimants alleged that they were among the victims of these abuses and contend that, although the SLP perpetrated the worst of these excesses, the defendants were nevertheless liable to compensate them by the application of a broad range of distinct common law remedies to the facts of this case.

 

It was accepted that the law of Sierra Leone applied to the issues both of liability and quantum. In respect of liability, it was agreed that the law of Sierra Leone could be treated, for all practical purposes, as being identical to that of England and Wales. Turner J dismissed the claims having considered seven possible grounds on which the defendants might incur liability for the acts of the Sierra Leone police towards the claimants.

 

  1. EMPLOYEE VICARIOUS LIABILITY

 

It was alleged, for example, that one employee of the defendant directly and violently assaulted some of the claimants and that others encouraged members of the SLP to use excessive force. Two criteria are involved.

(i)    as regards the sort of relationship which must be found to exist between an individual and a defendant before the defendant can be found to be vicariously liable in tort for the conduct of that individual; That was clearly satisfied here as the individuals concerned were employees

(ii)    as regards concerns the scope of the conduct of such an individual in respect of which vicarious liability is to be imposed on the defendant.

 

Applying Muhamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677 if any claimants could prove that they were the victims of torts perpetrated directly upon them by an employee or employees of the defendant then the means deployed, even if seriously criminal, remain sufficiently closely connected to their employment to give rise to vicarious liability on the part of the defendant. However on the facts the claimants had not made out that the employees against whom such allegations have been raised were, themselves, guilty of free-standing tortious conduct.

 

  1. NON-EMPLOYEE VICARIOUS LIABILITY

 

The claimants contended that the defendant was vicariously liable for the torts of the SLP. Various Claimants v Catholic Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1 established that the relevant test is whether or not the non-employment relationship is, upon analysis, one that is “akin to that between an employer and employee”. The most important factors tending to establish a relationship akin to that between employer and employee in this context arise in the following circumstances:

(i)             the tort will have been committed as a result of activity being undertaken by the tortfeasor on behalf of the defendant;

(ii)           the tortfeasor’s activity is likely to have been part of the business activity of the defendant; and

(iii)         the defendant, by engaging the tortfeasor to carry on the activity, will have created the risk of the tort committed by the tortfeasor.

 

This claim was unsustainable. Save for the six officers permanently stationed at the mine, in respect of whom there is no evidence of wrongdoing, the officers involved were performing duties which extended far beyond the narrow parameters of the business activity of the defendant. The defendant did not exercise any significant degree of control over the SLP. The communications between employees and the police did not amount to orders or direction but comprised, at their highest, encouragement to do a robust and thorough job.

 

  1. ACCESSORY LIABILITY

 

It was alleged that the SLP’s use of unlawful force on the protesters was part of a common plan between the defendant and the SLP the execution of which rendered the defendant liable for the entirety of the injuries and harm caused.  The principle of accessory liability was reviewed and clarified by the Supreme Court in Fish & Fish v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] AC 1229 in which Lord Toulson observed at paragraph 21:

“To establish accessory liability in tort it is not enough to show that D did acts which facilitated P’s commission of the tort. D will be jointly liable with P if they combined to do or secure the doing of acts which constituted a tort. This requires proof of two elements. D must have acted in a way which furthered the commission of the tort by P; and D must have done so in pursuance of a common design.”

 

The central issue was whether or not the defendant was at the material times assisting the police in their tortious conduct to a more than minimal degree in pursuance of a common design. Where the parties to an alleged common design include corporate bodies, the requisite design must be common to individuals whose acts and knowledge are legally attributable to such bodies by the application of the approach of Lord Hoffmann in the Privy Council decision of Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500.

 

Here the defendant’s provision of vehicles and drivers to the SLP was sufficient to facilitate the tortious conduct of the SLP to an extent that was more than de minimis. However, it was not the case that the defendant intended the police to act tortiously at any stage. Those in authority in the defendant’s organisation were understandably concerned that the disruptions to their undertaking were potentially extremely damaging to their prospects of commercial success. However, at all relevant times the solutions they proposed were directed at conciliation and not at the deployment of unlawful means. In particular, it would have been perfectly possible for the SLP to deploy the defendants’ vehicles lawfully and it was no part of the defendant’s plans that they should do otherwise. Similarly, the provision of cash, food, accommodation and drink although alien to what would be expected in the UK were pragmatic incentives and not bribes to achieve tortious ends.

 

  1. PROCUREMENT LIABILITY

Procurement liability is a further manifestation of joint liability whereby a defendant might incur liability by procuring the commission of a tort by, for example, “inducement, incitement or persuasion” of the primary tortfeasor. If the torts, including battery and false arrest, perpetrated by the SLP were pursuant to “some direction, or procuring or direct request, or direct encouragement” from the defendant then the defendant would be liable as a joint tortfeasor for the loss and damage sustained as a result.

 

On the facts here, the defendant neither incited or procured the SLP to act tortiously. Its employees on the ground were anxious that the police should deal with the protesters robustly and not tolerate the construction and manning of unlawful roadblocks or any other form of unlawful protest. However, they had not exhorted them to unlawful behaviour including false arrest, battery or tortious damage to property.

 

  1. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

 

The ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution are set out in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 22 nd Ed. (2018) at paragraph 16-12:

“In an action for malicious prosecution the claimant must show first that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him by the defendant on a criminal charge..; secondly, that the prosecution was determined in his favour; thirdly, that it was without reasonable and probable cause; fourthly, that it was malicious. The onus of proving every one of these is on the claimant. Evidence of malice of whatever degree cannot be invoked to dispense with or diminish the need to establish separately each of the first three elements of the tort.”

Following the incident in 2010, members of the local population were rounded up and later prosecuted for various criminal offences alleged to have been committed during the disturbances. The claimants in this case fell at the first hurdle as those who were prosecuted in the aftermath of the 2010 incident faced charges which were set in motion by the police.

 

  1. NEGLIGENCE

 

The claimants alleged the defendant owed them a duty of care in three ways.

 

(i)                   There was an obligation on the Defendants when operating in a country such as Sierra Leone to ensure clear protocols and procedures were adopted and implemented so as to ensure the use of public and private security forces did not lead to abuses of the rights of those affected by the Defendants’ operations;

(ii)                 Further or alternatively, there was an assumption of responsibility by the Defendants towards the Claimants via their commitments to abide by the international standards and in the course of their use and control of the Claimants’ land and their coordinated response to the protests;

(iii)               Alternatively, if and in so far as the Defendants were operating as a separate entities, in the case of the First Defendant, there was an assumption of responsibility towards the Claimants via its commitments to abide by the international standards and its full effective control over the subsidiaries in respect of operational risk management and health and safety, to advise and direct its subsidiaries to take steps to prevent human rights abuses by their servants, agents and/or the police did not lead to abuses of the rights of those affected by the Defendants’ operations.

Turner J found that no duty of care arose on any of these pleaded grounds.

 

The defendant at senior management level was aware both in 2010 and 2012 that there was a risk that the police might react to protest with disproportionate violence. The generic danger of the police causing injury and loss was not, however, one which was “created” by the defendant. The proclivities of the police were, unhappily, an institutional fact long before the arrival of the defendant and, although not mitigated by the defendant’s failures to follow the active steps advocated by the relevant international standards, were not thereby exacerbated.

 

Nor could it be said that the defendant created the danger simply by calling the police. In both 2010 and 2012, dangerous situations were already developing which called for an effective response. In particular, the defendant undoubtedly owed a duty of care to its own employees to take reasonable care for their safety. The only sense in which it could realistically be argued that the defendant created the danger is with respect to the provision of vehicles, food, and financial or other support to the police. But the defendant was providing no more than that which the Sierra Leonean state, itself, ought to have provided to maintain an efficient police force in the first place. Suitable vehicles, proper remuneration, food and water are prerequisites to the proper functioning of any force.

 

The defendant exercised no supervision or control over the SLP. Individual employees did not give directions to the police and the responses of the police to the incidents which they were called upon to deal with were operationally entirely of its own choosing.

 

The claimants were members of the general public who lived near the mine and were policed by officers who, for the most part, would not have been there but for the activities of the defendant. This fell far short of establishing that the defendant had assumed a responsibility for the actions of the police. The circumstances in which the police are to be held to have assumed responsibilities for the acts of third parties is heavily circumscribed. The circumstances in which a party ought reasonably to be found to have assumed a responsibility for the police could hardly be less so. A finding to the contrary would open up the defendant to almost unlimited liability to a broad swathe of potential claimants within a class almost impossible to define or circumscribe with any clarity.

 

 

  1. BREACH OF A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY

 

The claimants sought to amend their pleadings to allege that if the SLP were operating, not in a relationship akin to employment but as independent contractors to the defendant, then they were engaged in an extra-hazardous activity the negligent performance of which exposed the defendant to liability As a general rule, liability does not generally attach to a defendant in respect of the tortious conduct of his independent contractors, although there is an exception which concerns extra-hazardous activities. In Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191. The scope of this exception was severely restricted by the Court of Appeal in Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH [2009] QB 725.

 

The claimants needed to prove (i) that the police officers who caused them injury, loss and damage were acting as independent contractors for the defendant and (ii) that the activities they were undertaking were exceptionally dangerous whatever precautions were taken.

 

They failed on both elements. First, with the possible exception of the officers stationed at the mine itself, the police were acting at any time as independent contractors of the defendant. The payments made to the police did not provide the defendant, either in form or substance, with any degree of significant control over what the police did or in what numbers. Similarly, the provision of vehicles, food and water was on an ad hoc basis and brought with it no corresponding contractual obligation on the part of the police to carry out its duties in a particular way which departed from those which they owed to the public at large to maintain the peace.

 

Second, although what many officers did was dangerous in both 2010 and 2012 the task in hand was not inherently and exceptionally dangerous if proper precautions had been taken. Honeywill liability arises where the work is extra-hazardous in itself not where the contractor’s performance makes it so.

 

Money in the bank is not a trust fund — OK?

It is hornbook banking law, and has been ever since 1848 (see Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28), that those lucky enough to have a credit balance with their bank have the benefit of a debt owed by the latter: nothing more, nothing less, and certainly no trust or other equitable interest in any funds in the institution. Any lingering doubts on the matter were dispelled by Space Investments v CIBC (Bahamas) Ltd [1986] 3 All E.R. 75.

Or so we thought, until Barling J put the cat among the pigeons in late 2017. The Court of Appeal has now, much to everyone’s relief, reversed his decision and restored orthodoxy in First City Monument Bank plc v Zumax Nigeria Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 294.

Cut away the intricacies of murky Nigerian financial transactions, and the background was this. Zumax, a Nigerian company servicing the oil industry in the shape of Shell and Chevron, banked in Nigeria with IMB. Like many Nigerian organisations, when it received dollar payments it ensured they were made offshore: here, into an account with Chase in the name of an Isle of Man nominee, Redsear. If and when monies were needed in Nigeria, Redsear would then transfer them into IMB’s account with Commerzbank; IMB in turn would credit Zumax in naira.

Between 2000 and 2002 several million dollars were transferred from the Redsear account to IMB, but allegedly never reached Zumax. Allegations of fraud were made against the person who organised these transfers, who had connections with both Redsear and IMB. Zumax alleged that in so far as these sums had reached IMB (whose obligations First City Monument had taken over), they had been held on trust for Zumax. We are not told in terms why Zumax did not simply sue to have its account credited, but this may have been due to the fact that Zumax was alleged to owe large sums of money to IMB under a previous facility, or some other reason connected with dubious dealings by IMB.

Barling J held that because the monies had been transferred to IMB via its Commerzbank account specifically for the benefit of Zumax, IMB had not been free to deal with them as its own, and there was in the circumstances no reason why a trust should not be inferred. The Court of Appeal saw this off in short order. It was of course possible for a bank to receive money as a trustee for its customer: but it was unlikely. The fact that monies were transferred to a bank for the benefit of the account of X was entirely consistent with a duty to credit the account and not to hold the monies on trust, and this applied as much to a transfer through a correspondent bank (i.e. Commerzbank) as to a direct transfer. The normal inference, indeed, was that a bank in such a case held the monies at its free disposal. For good measure there had been no mention of any need to segregate the monies — normally an important feature of a trust. (The court might have added that in so far as a “Quistclose trust” was alleged, it would still not get Zumax home, since the normal inference in such trusts is that unless and until put to its intended use the money is held not for the payee but for the payer — here Redsear).

Relief all round, one suspects, for the banking community. Banking law is complex enough without being regularly made more difficult by the use of trusts; this decision will make it that much more difficult for lawyers further to muddy turbid waters by lengthy pleadings alleging fiduciary duties, trust relationships and the like. In the view of this blog, this is quite right too.